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THE HUMAN PERSON AS IM AGO DEI: 
CHRISTIAN AND JEW ISH PERSPECTIVES
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the evolution of the biblical concept of imago Dei. Written from the 
perspective of Christian theology, the thesis engages select Jewish and Christian voices in 
analysis of the shared theological premise that the human person is created in the image of 
God The discussion will begin with the scriptural origins of the concept, drawing upon 
exegetical interpretations as well as the early perspectives of the Rabbinic and Patristic 
period. It will then offer a comparative account of the contributions o f Maimonides and 
Aquinas, in their intellectualist conceptions o f human distinctiveness. From there, the 
discussion will turn to the Christological appropriation of the concept in work of Karl 
Barth and then to the covenantal, dialogical interpretation of David Novak. In both of 
these thinkers, we will observe a rejection of the intellectualism of Aquinas and 
Maimonides in favour of relational interpretations which are, in their integrative 
understanding of the person as body and soul, more consistent with the biblical -  and 
Rabbinic -  view of the person. The desire for an integrated view of the person will also 
emerge as significant when the discussion turns to feminist engagements with the concept, 
which also emphasise the inclusive potential of imago Dei. The thesis will conclude with 
a consideration of the enduring relevance of the concept of imago Dei in the context of 
contemporary Jewish and Christian theology.
INTRODUCTION
The biblical concept of imago Dei, which is located at the intersection between our 
understanding of personhood and our concept of God, is the foundation o f Jewish and 
Christian theological anthropology. Derived from the first Genesis creation account, the 
idea that the person is created in the image and likeness o f God underpins the theological 
assumption that each human life has intrinsic value. Beyond its enigmatic and largely 
unelaborated primary statement in Genesis 1:26-27, and two further brief references 
elsewhere in the book of Genesis, the idea that the person is created in the image of God is 
accorded little consideration in the Hebrew Scriptures. However, despite the absence of 
much biblical reflection on the concept, an expansive interpretive tradition has ensued, 
which has made the concept o f imago Dei the focal point in the quest to articulate human 
self-understanding, human distinctiveness and human relation to God. Written from the 
perspective o f a Christian theologian, this thesis draws upon select Jewish and Christian 
voices to explore the evolution o f the biblical concept o f imago Dei at key moments of 
this interpretive history.
Taking an inclusive rather than a comparative approach, this study proceeds from 
the assumption that the imago Dei is a shared concept, which derives from a shared text, 
that has stimulated centuries o f intellectual engagement in the Jewish and Christian 
traditions. Given the intention to trace the evolution o f the imago Dei from its biblical 
origins to its interpretation in contemporary theology, drawing upon two distinct and 
internally diverse religious traditions, the parameters o f this thesis present a significant 
challenge. Selectivity has been required and there is much of significance and wisdom 
that has not been explored in this thesis: for example, we have not included the treatment 
of imago Dei in early Hellenistic Judaism or in the mystical Kabbalistic tradition; neither 
have we drawn from the Reformers or from the perspectives of Eastern Orthodox 
theology. It has also been necessary to limit our Patristic analysis to two thinkers and our 
Christian engagement with gender to theologians largely drawn from the Roman Catholic 
context. That which has been included is intended to reflect the primary interpretive 
currents that have characterised the reception of imago Dei in the Jewish and Christian 
religious traditions: image and likeness; human distinctiveness; deification; intellectual 
apprehension o f the divine; embodiment; dominion; sexual difference and relationality.
The thesis will take a narrative approach, beginning with the biblical origins of the
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concept and concluding with the insights o f contemporary theology. C hapter One will 
engage contemporary Jewish and Christian biblical scholarship to examine the scriptural 
origins of imago Dei> chiefly Genesis 1:26-27, the primary locus o f the concept. Through 
engagement with biblical scholarship, we will attempt to uncover what the text might 
have meant for its original authors before we then proceed to explore what the text came 
to mean in some of the formative theological elaborations o f the concept. Despite the 
absence of explicit theological reflection on the concept within the Hebrew Scriptures, the 
imago Dei re-emerges prominently in early Rabbinic literature, situated at the junction 
between theology and law. Such writings emphasise the physical dimension of our 
likeness to God and the halakhic implications o f the concept, also invoking the imago Dei 
to underpin ideas of human unity and individual worth. We will then return to the Bible to 
discuss the emergence of the theme in the writings of Paul, the most significant influence 
on what the concept would come to mean in Christian theology. While Paul refers to our 
transformation into the fullness of the image after death, he also envisages a gradual 
increase in likeness to Christ through the modelling of our earthly lives after his example, 
an influential idea for the subsequent Patristic tradition. Turning then to the Patristic era, 
a time when reflection on the imago Dei flourished, we will engage the work of two 
contrasting thinkers, Irenaeus of Lyons and Augustine of Hippo. Although both thinkers 
emphasise human rational capacity as that which defines our distinctiveness, their 
contrasting interpretations of the second creation account result in markedly different 
theological anthropologies.
C hapter Two will address the interpretation o f imago Dei in the philosophy of 
Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas. Both thinkers exhibit a significant 
philosophical dependence on Aristotelian epistemology in their attempts to articulate the 
meaning of human distinctiveness and our connection to the divine. While both 
Maimonides and Aquinas define the imago Dei in terms of human intellectual capacity, 
their emphases differ. Maimonides restricts the imago Dei to those who actualise their 
intellects, offering a stronger intellectual focus and also exhibiting a certain elitism in his 
vision o f  intellectual perfection. Aquinas, in his tripartite vision o f the image of God in 
terms of nature, grace and glory, envisions a gradual growth into the likeness o f God, 
though his disassociation of women from the capacity to reflect the image colours our 
appreciation of the merits of this scheme. While both thinkers recognise the limits of 
human reason on account o f our fallen nature, Aquinas, we will argue, places greater 
emphasis on the necessity of grace to illuminate the intellect.
The limits of human reason, acknowledged in the theology of Aquinas and 
Maimonides, present an insurmountable challenge for Karl Barth in his modem 
assessment o f the capacity o f the human intellect to know God. We thus find, in Chapter 
Three, a radically distinct Christian theology of imago Dei that severs the connection 
between the speculative intellect and the divine which characterised scholastic theology. 
According to the Christological derivation of Barth’s theological anthropology, our 
understanding o f personhood is entirely revealed by the Word of God. Our efforts to 
encounter God through intellectual contemplation are misguided and superfluous. Christ, 
the focal point of Barth’s theology and the ground and limit o f his theological 
anthropology, reveals both who God is and who we are as persons. We will discuss 
Barth’s radically Christocentric interpretation o f imago Dei, exploring the merits of a 
‘relational’ interpretation that is characterised by a very limited sense of mutuality or 
human response to God’s gracious election. How does this limitation affect the enduring 
relevance o f the concept and how does Barth’s theological anthropology, inextricable 
from his doctrine of the Word of God, function outside of the Christian context?
The quest to articulate revealed wisdom in a way that is philosophically 
intelligible in an inter-religious and non-religious context characterises the work of the 
contemporary Jewish theologian, David Novak, the subject of C hapter Four. Like Barth, 
Novak proposes a relational interpretation of imago Dei, though his covenantal theology 
allows for greater mutuality in the envisaged divine-human relationship. Novak’s 
interpretation o f imago Dei is particularly concerned with natural law, the law of God as it 
applies to all o f humankind, discoverable by every rational person but established by the 
Jewish tradition in the Noahide laws. We will discuss the manner in which Novak’s 
covenantal, Torah-centred approach to imago Dei informs his understanding of the 
relation between Jews and non-Jews and also the way in which the concept of imago Dei 
functions, for Novak, as the primary point of contrast between secular and religious 
understandings o f personhood. This will illustrate the tension between Jewish religious 
existence and Western culture that is inherent in Novak’s work, a tension that Novak 
retains in his attempt to bridge secular and religious modes of reasoning.
C hapter Five will explore the theological implications o f sexual difference, taking 
the impetus from the situation of the reference to ‘male and female’ creation in the image 
of God in Genesis 1:27. The chapter will engage with Jewish and Christian feminist 
theologians who see in the concept of imago Dei a resource for an egalitarian theological 
anthropology. In response to the often hierarchical understanding of gender that has
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characterised many notable interpretations of imago Dei -  such as those of Augustine, 
Aquinas and Barth -  feminist theological anthropology finds in Genesis 1:27 the strongest 
confirmation of the equal capacities of men and women to image God. Egalitarianism, 
however, does not imply sameness: it is possible to present an egalitarian approach to 
imago Dei in a manner that accommodates the assumption that sexual difference has 
meaning beyond our reproductive capacities. Although there is no consensus on the exact 
content of such meaning, the chapter will draw upon select voices from within the diverse 
fields of Jewish and Christian feminist theology to discuss the issues central to the debate: 
is the model o f gender complementarity, which has traditionally been argued to 
encapsulate the biblical vision of male and female relatedness, conducive to the 
flourishing of women and men? How does the language we use to describe God affect 
our view of lived gender relations? How do we live out our creation in the image of God 
as male and female?
C hapter Six will offer some concluding reflections, drawing together the insights 
of the previous chapters before considering the central themes that have emerged in the 
thesis in the context of contemporary Jewish and Christian theology. Each of the diverse 
interpretations o f the concept of imago Dei that we will encounter in this thesis is reliant 
upon ideas o f human distinctiveness. Such ideas are potentially problematic, as regards 
the contemporary reception of the text, because of our increasing sensitivity to animal 
rights and our awareness that those attributes that were formerly regarded as distinctively 
human are now found in rudimentary forms in other animals. In this concluding chapter, 
we will explore the manner in which a theocentric idea o f distinctiveness might be 
reconciled with our duty to care for the created world. Is it possible to emphasise our 
connectedness with the created world without weakening the ontological status of the 
person? We will also discuss the enduring relevance of the biblical concept of imago Dei, 
its interfaith potential and its relevance beyond the religious context.
Our narration of the evolution of the concept o f imago Dei will uncover great 
diversity of insight, offering a range of resources from which to draw in elaborating a 
contemporary theological anthropology. We turn first to the beginning of the story, 
Genesis 1:26-27 in the Hebrew Bible.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPT OF IM AGO DEI:
BIBLICAL ROOTS AND FORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
‘Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, after our likeness. They shall rule 
the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, the cattle, the whole earth, and all the creeping 
things that creep on earth.” And God created humankind in his image. In the image of 
God he created him; male and female he created them’ (Gen 1:26-7).
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Many of the biblical passages that have been accorded the most consideration throughout 
the expansive interpretive tradition receive relatively little attention in the Hebrew 
Scriptures themselves. Consider, for example, the proclamation of the oneness of God in 
the Shema Yisrael (Deut 6:4) or the theologically rich Eden narrative (Gen 2-3), neither of 
which re-emerge for consideration elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. The establishment of 
the imago Dei in Genesis 1:26-27 is a further example of a concept whose interpretation 
appears to outweigh its original biblical significance. For an idea that has carried so much 
weight in the interpretative tradition, the scriptural occurrence o f the concept is very rare. 
This chapter will examine these references to the imago Dei, in particular Genesis 1:26- 
27, the primary locus for the concept, with two objectives: firstly, to explore what the text 
may have meant in its original biblical and extra-biblical context and, secondly, to 
discover what the text came to mean for key interpreters in the formative years o f the 
Jewish and Christian religious traditions.
1.1 The Near Eastern Context of the Biblical Idea of Imago Dei
Almost all modem biblical commentaries note the importance of the Ancient Near Eastern 
context for understanding of Genesis creation account.1 It is accepted that the nineteenth 
century rediscovery of comparable texts, such as the Babylonian Enuma Elish, offers the 
contemporary reader a certain insight into the concerns of the ancient writers of the 
Hebrew Scriptures, also illuminating possible areas o f interdependence between the texts 
of neighbouring cultures.2 Yet, while there are certainly striking similarities between the 
Genesis account and the parallel creation narratives of Babylon and Egypt, this should not 
take from our appreciation of the distinctiveness and profundity of the Genesis account.3 
There are significant theological differences between Genesis and the texts of 
neighbouring cultures. In fact, the Genesis account implicitly denies the theology of the 
competing cosmogonies and can thus be understood to have polemic intent. For example, 
since Israel’s God has no rivals, Genesis 1 contains ‘no theomachy, or cosmic conflict 
among the gods, or victory enthronement motif.’4 Nahum Sama notes a similar 
distinction in relation to the creation of humankind in Enuma Elish, the Babylonian 
creation myth, and the Genesis account. Referring to the creation of the person in Enuma 
Elish, Sama writes:
There he is almost incidental, fashioned as a kind of afterthought as a menial of the 
gods to provide them with nourishment and generally to satisfy their physical needs. 
The Book of Genesis seems to be emphasising the antithesis of this, for the very 
first communication of God to man [...] is an expression of divine concern for man’s 
physical needs and well-being.5
1 The late 19th century work of Hermann Gunkel has been most influential in this regard. Gunkel 
established the parallel between the creation account and its Babylonian counterparts in 1895 in Creation 
and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2006).
" J. J. M. Roberts notes that the ‘value of ancient Near Eastern literature for the interpretation of the OT is 
profound, and that value is immediately apparent when one studies OT law, psalmody, or wisdom 
literature’. The Bible and the Ancient Near East (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2002), p. 44.
3 Parallels to Near Eastern literature such as Enuma Elish are discussed by Bruce Vawter in On Genesis: A 
New Reading (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1977) and also by Gerhard von Rad in Genesis: A Commentary 
(London: Scm Press, 1972), p. 58.
4 Bill T. Arnold, Genesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 32.
5 Nahum M. Sama, Understanding Genesis (New York: Schocken Books 1966) p. 14. Joel Kaminsky writes 
that ‘one o f the most theologically innovative moves made in the P creation account is the high place 
accorded human beings. In the Enuma Elish humans are created from the blood of the rebel deity Kingu to 
alleviate the workload o f the lower gods. In this view, human life is an endless task of low level servitude. 
In effect humans function as a type of guest workers created to help the lowest status inhabitants of the 
divine realm avoid chores they find demeaning’. ‘The Theology o f Genesis’, in The Book o f Genesis:
The Genesis use of the term ‘image’ illustrates this biblical distinctiveness. While 
parallel texts use ‘image’ to infer the superiority of the king over the people, the Genesis 
text uses the term to refer to every human person.6 In Genesis, Jon Levenson writes, the 
‘entire race collectively stands vis-à-vis God in the same relationship of chosenness and 
protection that characterizes the god-king relationship in the more ancient civilisations of
n
the Near East’. In this sense, Genesis 1:26 ‘appoints the entire human race as God’s
Q
royal stand in’. J. Richard Middleton provides us with a useful way of describing the 
distinctness of the Genesis imago Dei idea when he refers to the ‘democratization’ of 
Near Eastern royal ideology. The status that the imago Dei grants to every human person 
is, Middleton writes, ‘analogous to the status and role of kings in the ancient Near East 
vis-à-vis their subjects’.9
The acceptance o f the ‘democratization’ idea should not lead to the assumption that 
respect for life was exclusive to the Hebrew Scriptures. J.J. M. Roberts’ comparative 
study of the biblical laws and the Laws of Eshnunna and the Code of Hammurabi 
illustrates the strong dependence of biblical law on extra-biblical law codes. He 
concludes that respect for life was ‘part of the legal tradition in the Near East and in Israel 
well before the formulation of the doctrine of the image of God in Genesis 1. Its author 
has simply undergirded received ethical and legal mores with theological reflection’.10 
Therefore, in pointing to the possible distinctiveness o f the imago Dei idea in its 
‘democratization’ of royal ideology, we must not lose sight o f the fact that respect for life 
was also propagated in extra-biblical literature.
1,2 The Biblical Context of Imago Dei
The primary reference to imago Dei arises in the context of the first creation account in 
Genesis 1. Before we look at this reference in detail, it is necessary to establish the 
biblical meaning of its component terms, image and likeness. The Hebrew word for
Theology, Reception and Interpretation, ed. by Craig A. Evans, Joel N. Lohr and David L. Petersen 
(Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 635-657 (p. 637).
6 Gerhard von Rad notes that the Pharaoh in Ancient Egypt was regarded as the image of God living on 
earth. Genesis, p. 58.
7 Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence o f  Evil: The Jewish Drama o f  Divine Omnipotence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 114.
8 Levenson, Creation and the Persistence o f Evil, p. 116.
9 J. Richard Middleton, J. R., The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 
2005), p. 121.
10 J. J. M. Roberts, The Bible and the Ancient Near East, p. 45.
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image (D^IS) transliterated as 4ts e le m corresponds to the idea o f duplication or similarity 
to the original. It is mentioned seventeen times in the Hebrew Bible, usually in a negative 
sense in relation to foreign deities, e.g., Num. 33:52, or to idolatrous images, e.g., 1 Sam 
6:5. In the book of Ezekiel, the term tselem is used exclusively in relation to the 
condemnation of idolatry: ‘Because they made them stumble into guilt -  for out of their 
beautiful adornments, in which they took pride, they made their images {tselem) and their 
detestable abominations -  therefore I will make them an unclean thing to them’ (Ezek. 
7:20).11 The word for likeness, (nO“T) idemut\ is used twenty-five times, most commonly 
in Ezekiel. It usually corresponds to the words ‘appearance’ or ‘similarity’ -  e.g. ‘an 
appearance resembling {demut) a throne’ (Ezek. 10:1) -  but it can also share the anti- 
idolatrous connotations of tselem.n  In Isaiah 40:18, for example: ‘To whom, then, can 
you liken {demut) God?’
The continuous resistance of the Israelites to the idea that anything in the world 
could image God -  what scholars refer to as Israel’s aniconic tendency — is the context 
against which the Hebrew tselem (Elohim can be understood.13 It is sinful to try to make 
an image o f God, for ‘who in the skies can equal the Lord, can compare with the Lord 
among the divine beings?’ (Ps. 89:7) Yet although God cannot be adequately represented 
by images or objects, Israel, in her obedience, can be seen as an appropriate locus o f the 
divine presence. It is this contrast between the arguably countercultural prohibition of 
fixed images o f God and the designation of the person as the image of God that represents 
what Walter Brueggemann identifies as a ‘striking proclamation about God and about 
humanness’.14
There is one further point to make regarding the intra-biblical context of imago Dei. 
It relates to the unity of the human person, important in light of the intentions o f the
11 Hebrew Bible references follow the Jewish Publication Tanakh Translation (Philadelphia: JPS, 1985). A 
similar use of tselem occurs in Ezek. 16:17 and 23:14. J. K. Kutso argues that imago Dei plays an important 
-  if implicit -  role in Ezekiel’s theology, specifically as that which underlies Ezekiel’s aversion to idolatry. 
Between Heaven and Earth: Divine Presence and Absence in the Book o f  Ezekiel (Winona Lake: Biblical 
and Judaic Studies 7, 2000).
12 A Hebrew and English Lexicon o f the Old Testament, ed. by Francis Brown, Wilhelm Gesenius, Edward 
Robinson, Charles Augustus Briggs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
13 Nathan MacDonald discussed aniconism in the Hebrew Scriptures, particularly in Exodus 32-4, 
Deuteronomy 4 and Ezekiel. ‘Aniconism in the Old Testament’, in The God o f  Israel, ed. by Robert P. 
Gordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 20-35.
14 Walter Brueggemann, Genesis: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Atlanta: John Knox 
Press, 1982), p. 32. P. D. Miller suggests that Israel’s aniconism represented an anomalous situation in the 
Ancient Near East where the religious use of images was ubiquitous. The Religion o f Ancient Israel 
(London: Libraiy o f Ancient Israel, 2000). T.N.D Mettinger finds greater continuity between Israelite 
aniconism and Ancient Near Eastern culture. No Graven Image?: Israelite Aniconism in its Ancient Near 
Eastern Context (Stockholm: CBOT 42, 1995).
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Genesis creation accounts as well as the greater context of the Hebrew Bible.15 The 
Hebrew Bible contains no distinction between spirit and soul. The terms of description, 
ruach (fTP) and nephesh (K73J), which both mean ‘breath* and ‘wind* are used 
interchangeably in the Bible. Both terms correspond to the idea o f ‘life*, which is often 
depicted as a gift from God. Consider, for example, Job 10:12: ‘Your providence watched 
over my spirit (ruachy or Ps. 66:8-9: ‘O peoples, bless our God [...] who has granted us 
life (literally: ‘God kept our nephesh alive’).16 The fact that nephesh is believed to be 
located in the blood conveys this sense of unity between body and soul that is inherent in 
biblical thought, thus contrasting with the idea of the transcendence of the soul over the
1 7body. The point regarding the contrast between the wholeness o f the biblical view of 
the person and the somewhat fragmentary approach of the reason-centred interpretation of 
imago Dei will recur throughout the course of our discussion.
1.3 References to Imago Dei in the Hebrew Bible
Genesis 1:26-27 is the foundational text for Jewish and Christian theological 
anthropology, and the first Biblical reference to the creation of humankind:
‘Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, after our likeness. They 
shall rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, the cattle, the whole earth, and all 
the creeping things that creep on earth.” And God created humankind in his image. 
In the image of God he created him; male and female he created them’ (Gen 1:26- 
7).18
15 Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, trans. by John J. Scullion (London: SPCK, 1984), pp. 
147-155. Gerhard von Rad makes the same point in Genesis: A Commentary. He writes that ‘one will do 
well to split the physical from the spiritual as little as possible’, p. 58.
16 Theological Dictionaiy o f  the Old Testament, Vol. IV, ed. by G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer 
Ringgren, trans. by David E. Green (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1980), p. 338.
17 ‘But make sure you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life (nephesh), and you must not 
consume the life with the flesh’ (Deut. 12:23). A Hebrew and English Lexicon o f  the Old Testament, p. 659. 
There may, however, be some evidence of independence of the soul from the body in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, e.g., Psalm 49:16 ‘But God will redeem my life (nephesh) from the clutches of Sheol’ (JPS), 
translated in the King James Bible -  there labelled as Ps 49:15 rather than 49:16 — as ‘God will redeem my 
soul from the power of the grave’. For a discussion o f conceptions o f the afterlife in the Hebrew Bible that 
is particularly relevant to this discussion, see Jon Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration o f  Israel: The 
Ultimate Victory o f  the God o f Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). In examining the origin of 
the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection, Levenson concludes that the longing for immortality that emerges 
from the Hebrew Scriptures is not based upon an idea of the disembodied soul, but rather upon the vision of 
the embodied person ‘immune to the ravages o f disease, death, scarcity, injustice, and enmity, living forever 
in a perfected world, the world symbolized, most commonly, by the Temple’, p. 107. James Barr notes that 
the soul could be regarded as separate from the body in post-biblical Judaism, possibly due to Hellenistic 
influence, Old and New in Interpretation: A Study o f Two Testaments (London: SCM, 1982), p. 52.
18 Gen. 1:26-27. The compound Hebrew word betsal'menu) is composed o f 3 be, the prefix 
‘in^nbs tselem ‘image’, and the 13 ‘-mi’ suffix which corresponds to ‘our’.
When used in relation to the creation of humankind, the words tselem and demut denote 
the similarity of the image to God, the original image. The terms seem to imply human 
relation to God, which we can infer from the only other coinciding instance of tselem and 
demut in scripture: ‘When Adam lived 130 years, he begot a son in his likeness {demut) 
after his image {tselem), and he named him Seth5 (Genesis 5:16).19
The imago Dei is rearticulated in the flood narrative o f Genesis 9. The distinction 
o f human beings from other animals is established when it is decreed that while humans 
can eat other animals, no human can kill another human: ‘Whoever sheds the blood of 
man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in His image did God make man’ (Gen 9:6). 
This text establishes God’s right of dominion over all life. God himself will not avenge 
murder but the human person is empowered to do so. Human dominion over other 
animals is also reaffirmed here and situated in the covenantal context (Gen 9:1-8).
Because other scriptural references to imago Dei contain the word tselem without 
reference to demut, ‘image’ has been taken as the primary term for the concept o f imago 
Dei. ‘Likeness’, however, has retained a theological significance, particularly as regards 
the assumption that humankind has not retained the high status granted at creation. At 
this point, it is of particular importance to note that there is no reference to the loss o f the 
image or indeed to the loss of likeness in the Hebrew Bible. However, as we will see, the 
loss o f the image will emerge as a central point in our discussion of the interpretation of 
the concept. The idea is, of course, significantly dependent on the second creation 
account o f Genesis 2-3 -  as interpreted in Paul (Rom 5:12-21; 1 Cor 15:21-22, 45-49) -  
within which we find what has been traditionally interpreted as the ‘fall o f man’ narrative. 
However, before moving on, we should note that the legitimacy of the interpretation of 
Genesis 2-3 in terms of the ‘fall’ -  a rupture in relations between God and humankind -  is 
contested by many biblical scholars.20 At this point, it is necessary to analyze the
19 The Genesis 5 echoing of 1:26 lends weight to C.L. Crouch’s argument that the imago Dei refers to the 
divine parentage o f humanity. ‘Genesis 1:26-27 as a Statement o f  Humanity’s Divine Parentage’, Journal 
o f  Theological Studies, 61 (2010), 1-15.
20 James Barr, who is particularly opposed to the reading o f Genesis 2 in terms o f ‘fall’, writes that ‘OT 
scholars have long known that the reading o f the story as the ‘Fall o f M an’ in the traditional sense, though 
hallowed by St. Paul’s use of it, cannot stand up to examination through a close reading of the text.’ The 
Garden o f Eden and the Hope o f Immortality (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), p. ix. Similar positions are 
expressed by Walter Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 41 and Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 276. In 
contrast, John T. Strong argues that Genesis 2-3 indeed depicts a loss o f image in ‘Israel as a Testimony to 
YHWH’s Power: The Priests’ Definition of Israel’, in Constituting the Community: Studies on the Polity o f 
Ancient Israel in Honor o f  S. Dean McBride Jr. ed. by John T. Strong and Steven S. Tuell (Winona Lake, 
Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2005), pp. 89-106.
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components of Genesis 1:26-27, specifically: (i) the plural ‘let us make5 (ii) the 
commission to rule the created world and (iii) human creation as male and female.
1.3.1 Interpretations of the Phrase 6Let us M ake’
The Hebrew plural, na-aseh, represented in most English translations as ‘let us make5, is 
unique to the depiction of the creation of the human being. God speaks in the singular -  
‘Let there be’ -  in the description of the creation of celestial bodies, plants and animals. 
The Hebrew text reverts to the singular use in the subsequent verse which also relates to 
the creation of the person. This plural is a point of interest among biblical scholars, 
though no particular interpretive consensus is evident. Some contemporary scholarship 
cites Israel’s gradual ascension to monotheism as a relevant factor.21 Gerhard Von Rad 
suggests that the plural indicates God’s place among the multiplicity o f heavenly beings:
The extraordinary plural (“Let us”) prevents one from referring God’s image too 
directly to God the Lord. God includes himself among the heavenly beings and 
thereby conceals himself in this multiplicity. That, in our opinion, is the only 
possible explanation for this striking form.22
Other biblical scholarship draws our attention to the grammatical structure of the text: 
Ephraim Speiser remarks that the plural in the original Hebrew is a grammatical device 
corresponding to the plurality of the word, Elohim, the Hebrew term for God (DTibft). 
We know that the word Elohim is plural because it is used in Psalm 114:7 in the singular, 
Elo 'ah. Further, God referring to Godself may account for the formal plural. The plural 
use does not, Speiser suggests, have any direct bearing on the meaning of the text.
Nevertheless, many interpreters certainly have invested this use o f the plural term 
with theological significance. Some Christian thinkers, for example, saw in the passage 
an early allusion to the Trinity.24 Some Jewish interpreters draw parallels to a ‘divine 
council’ (1 Kings 22.19-22; Isa 6; Job 1-2).25 The divine council refers to the biblical and
21 Joel Kaminsky attributes the plural to the monolatrous nature o f Israelite worship at the time. ‘The 
Theology o f  Genesis’, p. 637. For a discussion of the development of monotheism in Israelite religion see 
R. K. Gmise, No Other Gods: Emergent Monotheism in Israel (Sheffield: SJSOT, 1997) and Nathan 
MacDonald, Deuteronomy and the Meaning o f Monotheism * (Tübingen: FAT II/1, 2003).
22 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, p. 58.
23 E.A. Speiser, Genesis: Introduction, Translation and Notes (London: Yale University Press, 2008) p. 7.
24 This was the interpretation proposed by Augustine and Karl Barth, as will be discussed.
25 The Genesis plural is discussed in Genesis Rabbah 8, 3, 1: ‘“And God said, ‘Let us make man’ ” (Gen 
1:26). And with whom did he take counsel? R. Joshua b. Levi said, “With the works of heaven and earth he 
took counsel”.’ It is also discussed in relation to Genesis 3:22 in Genesis Rabbah, 21,5,1-2 ‘“Behold, the 
man has become like one of us” (Gen 3:22): R. Pappias interpreted the verse as follows: “ ‘Behold, the man
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Rabbinic depiction of God’s consultation with an assembly before a decision is made.26 
This is the meaning proposed in the influential medieval biblical commentaries of Rashi 
(1040-1105 C.E.) and Abraham Ibn Ezra (1089-c.l 167). Rashi takes the plural as an 
indication of the humility of God. He suggests that God consulted the angels to prevent 
their jealousy: ‘Similarly, when He judges kings, He consults His heavenly court.’27 Ibn 
Ezra reiterates the idea that we are created in the image of angels. In response to the 
sequence o f the passage ‘in the image of God he created him* with ‘male and female he 
created them\ Ibn Ezra remarks that we were originally created with two faces. Here, Ibn 
Ezra may be referring to the dual nature of the person in terms of body and soul, or 
perhaps he is following the Rabbinic tradition that the human was originally created 
androgynous. The interest in the divine plural extends to contemporary interpretations 
of Genesis 1:26, which often emphasise the idea of human collaboration in creation, a 
process which has not yet been completed by God.29 This is an important point in relation 
to the limit of human dominion over the rest o f the created world, to which the discussion 
will now turn.
1.3.2 The Climax of Creation?
The interpretation of imago Dei in terms of the commission to rule the created world -  
referred to as the functional interpretation of imago Dei -  is the preferred understanding 
of the concept among biblical scholars.30 We have already mentioned the work of 
Levenson and Middleton, and their reference to royal imagery in extra-biblical literature
has become like one o f us’ means, like one of the ministering angels.’” Midrash Rabbah: Genesis, trans. by 
H. Freedman and Maurice Simon, (London: Soncino Press, 1939). The idea o f ministering angels recurs in 
the Talmud: ‘Rab Judah said in Rab’s name: When the Holy One, blessed be He, wished to create man, He 
[first] created a company o f ministering angels and said to them: Is it your desire that we make a man in our 
image?’ [Gen 1:26], Talmud Bavli, Sanhedrin 38b, ed. by I. Epstein, trans. by Jacob Shachter and H. 
Freedman (London: Soncino P, 1969).
26 The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, ed. by Raymond E. Brown and others (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1991), p. 11.
27 Rashi’s Commentary: Genesis, trans. by M. Rosenbaum and A.M. Silbermann (London: Shapiro, 
Vallentine & Co., 1949).
28 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Commentary on the Pentateuch: Genesis (Bereshit), trans. by H. Norman Strickman 
and Arthur M. Silver (New York: Menorah, 1988), p. 46.
29 For examples o f this view, see Avivah Gottleib Zomberg, Genesis: The Beginning Desire (Philadelphia: 
Jewish Publication Society, 1995), p. 19 and Tikva Frymer-Kensky, ‘The Image: Religious Anthropology in 
Judaism and Christianity’ in Christianity in Jewish Terms, ed. by Frymer-Kensky, T., Novak, D., Ochs, P., 
Fox Sandmel, D. and Signer M. A., (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), p. 331.
30 This existence o f this scholarly consensus was argued in 1988 by G.A. Jonsson and, according to Nathan 
MacDonald, Jonsson’s ‘assessment that the functional view is the predominant view among Old Testament 
scholars remains valid’ today. Jonsson, The Image o f God: Genesis 1:26-28 in a Century o f  Old Testament 
Research (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1988); MacDonald, ‘A Text in Search o f  Context: The Imago 
Dei in the First Chapters o f Genesis’, in Leshon Limmudim: Essays on the Language and Literature o f  the 
Hebrew Bible, ed. by David A. Baer and Robert P. Gordon (London: T&T Clark, 2014), pp. 3-17 (p. 4).
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to support their view of dominion as the hermeneutical key to the Genesis text. We can 
also refer again to work of Gerhard von Rad who offers a concise rationale for the 
functional approach: [0]ne will admit that the text speaks less o f the nature of God’s 
image than of its purpose. There is less said about the gift itself than about the task. This 
then is sketched most explicitly: domination in the world, especially over the animals.’31 
Although for Von Rad at least, the commission to rule does not belong to the definition of 
imago Dei, ‘it is its consequence, i.e., that for which man is capable because o f it’.32 Due 
to its importance in contemporary exegesis, the idea of human dominion merits further 
reflection.
The human commission to rule other creatures, inherent in Genesis 1:26, is restated 
in Genesis 1:28: ‘God blessed them and God said to them “Be fertile and increase, fill the 
earth and master it; and rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, and all the living 
things that creep on earth’” . The idea recurs in poetic form in Psalm 8: ‘You have made 
him little less than a God and crowned him with glory and honour. You have made him 
rule over the works of your hands. Put all under his feet’ (w . 6-7). To the contemporary 
reader, mindful of the current ecological crisis and questions of animal rights, such 
references to human rule are quite challenging. It is important, however, to situate the 
scriptural idea of human dominion in the correct context, specifically as regards its 
conceptual dependence upon divine and royal dominion. The Hebrew Bible depicts 
God’s righteousness and mercy, and also God’s providence, in his dominion over Israel 
and the created world: ‘Righteousness and justice are the base of Your throne; steadfast 
love and faithfulness stand before you’ (Ps 89:15). The importance o f service and care 
also translates to royal dominion. Psalm 72, a prayer for the success o f King Solomon, 
establishes the strong link between royal dominion and stewardship: ‘Let him [Solomon] 
be like rain that falls upon a mown field, like a downpour of rain on the ground, that the 
righteous may flourish in his time, and well-being abound [ ...]’ (Ps 72:6-7). 33 These 
ideas of divine dominion and royal dominion provide the context for the understanding of 
human dominion in terms of stewardship and care for the created world.
31 Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis, p. 58.
32 Von Rad, p. 58.
33 Phyllis A. Bird, ‘Theological Anthropology in the Hebrew Bible’, in The Blackwell Companion to the 
Hebrew Bible, ed. by Leo G. Perdue (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 265. In commentating on the 
biblical idea of human dominion, Phyllis A. Bird notes the recurring biblical theme o f the threat to the land 
o f returning to wilderness, inhabited only by wild animals (Isa 32:13). The ancient author was writing in a 
world o f peasant farmers trying to sustain life in an area o f marginal rainfall. Psalm 8 should be taken as an 
expression o f the psalmist’s faith in the wisdom o f God as opposed to any theological justification for 
ecological irresponsibility.
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It is possible to reconcile the belief that creation exists for human benefit with the 
duty to care for the created world as long as the emphasis is theocentric rather than 
anthropocentric. The person is the steward of the land which ultimately belongs to God: 
‘But the land must not be sold beyond reclaim, for the land is Mine; you are but strangers 
resident with me5 (Lev 25:23). This passage illustrates the extent of human accountability 
to God, the true owner of the land, an idea that finds particular expression in the following 
midrashic text that reflects on Genesis 2:
When God created the first human beings, God led them around the Garden of 
Eden and said, “Look at my works! See how beautiful they are! For your sake I 
created them. Do not spoil and destroy My world; for if you do, there will be no 
one to repair i f 5.34
Further scriptural passages institute the sabbatical and jubilee years in the Jewish religious 
calendar, with a view towards the correct care o f the land (Exod. 23:10-11; Lev. 25). 
Here we see the pattern of six years of use o f the land followed by a seventh year of rest. 
This mirrors the first creation narrative: six days of creation and one day of rest.
While the creation of the human person on the sixth day is commonly regarded as 
the climax o f the Genesis creation narrative, we should also attend to the actions of the 
seventh day (Gen 2:2) and the institution of the Sabbath (Exod 31:17). The seventh day is 
a plausible alternative point of climax in the creation narrative. Interestingly, the Book of 
Jubilees, an early retelling of narrative from Genesis and Exodus, emphasises the actions 
of the seventh day.35 Further, despite its elaborate creation account in its second chapter, 
the book makes no reference to the idea of imago Dei in the context o f creation.36 The 
institution of the Sabbath is, however, greatly emphasised. It is placed at the beginning of 
the creation account and is frequently mentioned throughout the narrative (Jub 2 :1-24).37
34 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:28, discussed by Eilon Schwartz, ‘Mastery and Stewardship, Wonder and 
Connectedness: A Typoiogy o f  Relations to Nature in Jewish Text and Tradition’ in Judaism and Ecology: 
Created World and Revealed Word, ed. by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 99.
35 The oldest copy of the book, written in Hebrew, dates from 125-100 BCE though the book is believed to 
have been written before this. It claims the status of revelation rather than midrash. James C. Vanderkam, 
An Introduction to Early Judaism (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001). Vanderkam dates the book at 150 BCE, p. 
97.
36 The single reference to imago Dei in Jubilees is a repetition o f Genesis 9:6: ‘Whoso sheddeth man's blood 
by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man.’ The Book o f  Jubilees, trans. by J.C. 
Vanderkam (Leuven: E. Peeters, 1989), 6:8.
37 The opening verse o f chapter II emphasises the Sabbath: ‘And the angel o f the presence spake to Moses 
according to the word o f the Lord, saying: Write the complete history of the creation, how in six days the 
Lord God finished all His works and all that He created, and kept Sabbath on the seventh day and hallowed
Returning to the biblical account, it is interesting to note that the chapter division 
o f Genesis 1 and 2, established in medieval times and subsequently standardized, 
purposely breaks the seven-day narrative into six days and one day, thereby instituting 
this arguably false sense of climax after the sixth day. The chapter and verse division of 
Genesis places the creation of humankind (day six) at the end of Genesis 1 and the 
seventh day at the beginning of Genesis 2.38 One feels that Genesis 2:4 -  ‘Such is the 
story of heaven and earth when they were created’ -  would make a far more logical 
conclusion to Genesis l .39 It would perhaps offer a more integrated picture of the person 
as a part of the created world rather than the climax and would also bring the Sabbath into 
focus, that which Abraham Joshua Heschel referred to as the ‘great Cathedrals’ of 
Judaism 40
1.3.3 Creation as Male and Female
While Chapter Five will elaborate the theological implications of our human creation as 
male and female, we will at this point note briefly some contemporary biblical scholarship 
relating to the situation of the ‘male and female’ clause in Genesis 1:27: ‘And God created 
man in his image. In the image of God he created him; male and female he created them’. 
The text o f this verse is understood to constitute a three-line poetic unit situated within an 
otherwise prose text. According to J. Richard Middleton, it is doubtful, on syntactical 
grounds, that ‘male and female’ defines the nature of the image. This is because ‘the third 
line in three-line Hebrew poetic units typically does not repeat a previous idea, but more 
usually serves a progressive function, introducing a new thought’.41
Phyllis Bird also disassociates the concept of imago Dei from sexual distinction. 
According to Bird’s exegesis of 1:26-28, the two statements o f Genesis 1:27 contain two 
distinct statements about humanity. Bird writes that ‘adam is created like (i.e.,
it for all ages, and appointed it as a sign.’ Discussed by Michael Segal in The Book o f  Jubilees: Rewritten 
Bible, Redaction, Ideology and Theology, (Leiden: Brill, 2007) p. 238.
38 The division o f the Bible into chapter and verse is discussed in The Cambridge History o f  the Bible, ed. 
by Peter Ackroyd et al., vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 147. Walter Moberly 
remarks that it is ‘doubtful that the author o f this seven-day creation would have approved, and yet this 
structural division, which in a certain way changes the logic o f the text, has been incorporated into its 
standard form’. The Theology o f the Book o f  Genesis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 47.
39 Especially since Genesis 2:4 marks the transition between what source critics refer to as the Priestly 
(Genesis 1 :1 -  2:4a) and Yahwistic (Genesis 2:4b -  2:25) sources.
40 Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath: Its Meaning fo r Modern Man (New York: FSG, 1951). ‘Judaism 
teaches us to be attached to holiness in time, to be attached to sacred events, to learn how to consecrate 
sanctuaries that emerge from the magnificent stream o f a year. The Sabbaths are our great cathedrals’, p. 8.
41 J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 
2005), p. 49. See also Robert Alter, The World o f Biblical Literature (San Francisco: Basic Books, 1992), 
pp. 177-78.
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resembling) God, but as creature -  and hence male and female. The parallelism of the 
two cola is progressive, not synonymous. The second statement adds to the first; it does 
not explicate i f  42 In relation to the theology of the priestly author, sexual distinction 
relates to the broader theme of nature and fertility in the created order. ‘Male and female 
he created them5 tells us nothing about the image or about God:
It relates only to the blessing of fertility, making explicit its necessary 
presupposition. It is not concerned with sexual roles, the status or relationship of 
the sexes to one another, or marriage. It describes the biological pair, not the 
psycho-social pair; male and female, not man and woman or husband and wife.43
The verse also does not indicate an original androgyne but rather the bi-sexual order of 
creatures. Furthermore, according to Bird, the fact that sexual difference does not pertain 
to the image means that we should not seek any sexual differentiation in God. Sexual 
difference is a biological entity, functioning only in relation to our animal nature.44
In spite o f the intentions of the authors of Genesis, as portrayed by biblical 
scholars such as Bird and Middleton, the specific identification of imago Dei with our 
gendered existence has carried great weight in the interpretive tradition of the concept. 
Our creation as male and female does seem an unlikely definition of imago Dei 
considering the fact that it is something that we share with other animals. The image of 
God, unlike gender, is distinct to human creation. However, although biblical scholarship 
rules out the definition of imago Dei in terms of sexual difference, this does not mean that 
our gendered existence is irrelevant to the way in which we image God. We will fully 
explore this question in Chapter Five, where will draw upon the insights of feminist 
theology. At this point, having explored the biblical meaning of imago Dei, we turn to the 
interpretation o f the concept in Rabbinic literature.
42 Phyllis Bird, ‘Sexual Differentiation and Divine Image in the Genesis Creation Texts’, in The Image o f  
God, pp. 5-29 (p. 11).
43 Bird, ‘Sexual Differentiation and Divine Image’, p. 13. Michael Welker questions Bird’s insistence that 
the passage intends only the biological couple. He writes that the ‘dichotomization o f “nature” and 
“culture” is foreign to the classical creation accounts’. Rather, ‘so-called natural and so-called cultural 
factors are seen very subtly in indissoluble reciprocal connections’. Creation and Reality, (Minneapolis: 
Augsberg Fortress, 1999), p. 69.
44 J. Richard Middleton writes that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ are ‘biological, not social terms and thus 
cannot support either the notion of human relationality or culturally male/female characteristics’. The 
L iberating Image, p . 5 0.
1.4 Theological and Halakhic Appropriation in Tannaitic Literature
As a text-centred tradition in which ‘the centrality of the text takes the place o f theological 
consistency’, Judaism has evolved around an expansive body of literature that comprises 
Torah.1 Barry Holtz writes that the study of, and interaction with, these writings is ‘the 
dominant religious preoccupation throughout the history of Judaism, at least until modem 
times, and for many even now’.2 Holtz proposes that we view the vast expanse of Jewish 
literature as an inverted pyramid: ‘The Bible is at its base, but the edifice expands outward 
enormously -  midrashic literature, the Talmuds, the commentaries, the legal codes, the 
mystical tradition, the philosophical books. All this literature is Torah’.3
Although the references to imago Dei in the Hebrew Bible are few, the concept 
manifests itself quite significantly in early Rabbinic literature, both explicitly, through 
halakhic prescriptions, and implicitly, through the high esteem for human life that 
pervades Rabbinic literature: ‘For one man is equal to the entire work of creation’.4 We 
will specifically draw upon Tannaitic literature, the formative layer of Rabbinic writings 
that records the sayings and homilies of the Tanna’im, the Palestinian sages of the first to 
the early third-century. These writings, according to the notable work of Yair 
Lorberbaum, allude to the iconic significance of imago Dei and the imminence of God:
The Tzelem theology occupied a central place in early Rabbinic literature. In 
Talmudic literature, the biblical notion of Imago Dei was given a strongly iconic 
interpretation. God’s icons are His dwelling in the mundane realm [...] In light of 
the conception of image as presence, the creation o f man in tannaitic literature is 
perceived as ‘the need’ of the divine. God’s desire to expand Himself motivated 
Him to create humanity in His own ‘image and likeness’.5
1 Moshe HaJbertal, People o f  the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority (London: Harvard University Press, 
1997), p. 2. Text, Halbertal argues, is one of Judaism’s ‘central operative concepts, like “God” or “Israel”. 
He writes that ‘Jews have had diverse and sometimes opposing ideas about God: the anthropomorphic God 
of the Midrash, the Aristotelian unmoved mover of Maimonides and his school, the Kabbalah’s image o f 
God as a dynamic organism manifested in the complexity of his varied aspects, the sefrot. These 
conceptions o f God have little in common and they are specifically Jewish only insofar as each is a genuine 
interpretation of Jewish canonical texts’, p. 2.
" Barry W. Holtz, Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish Texts (New York: Summit Books, 1984),
p. 12.
3 Holtz, Back to the Sources, p. 13.
4 Avot o f  Rabbi Nathan xxxi, trans. by Antony J. Saldarini, (Leidin: Brill, 1975).
5 Yair Lorberbaum, ‘Human Dignity in the Jewish Tradition’, in The Cambridge Handbook o f  Human 
Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. by Marcus Diiwell et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp. 135-147 (p. 138).
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The Rabbinic interpretation of imago Dei, Lorberbaum argues, emphasises the tangible 
presence of the divine in every human being. The person functions as an icon of God, 
similar to the manner in which idols functioned in the pagan world. Each person, as an 
icon of God, is unique, a point alluded to in the following Talmudic passage:
For if a man strikes many coins from one mould, they all resemble one another, 
but the supreme king of kings, the holy one blessed be he, fashioned every man in 
the stamp of the first man, and yet not one of them resembles his fellow. 
Therefore every single person is obliged to say: the world was created for my 
sake.6
This is a striking statement which articulates both human unity and individual worth. 
Though we share a common ancestry in a world that has been created for our benefit, each 
individual human person is unique. The following Mishnaic passage reaffirms the special 
status of the person, while also distinguishing those created in the image of God -  
humankind -  from the people of Israel, who are called children of God:
Beloved is man, for he was created in the image [of God]; still greater was the love 
in that it was made known to him that he was created in the image of God, for it is 
written, “For in the image of God, He made man”. Beloved are Israel, for they 
were called children of God; still greater was the love in that it was been made 
known to them that they were called children of God, as it is stated: “You are 
children o f the Lord your God”.7
In addition to such reflective passages relating to the special status of humankind -  
and Israel — the rabbis were also interested in the halakhic implications o f the concept of 
imago Dei, particularly in relation to the issue of capital punishment. The scriptural 
precedent for such interpretation is the Genesis 9:6 reference -  ‘Whosoever sheds the 
blood of man, By man shall his blood be shed5 -  where anthropology is brought into the 
context o f law and ethics. The Rabbinic tradition struggled with this paradoxical 
prohibition o f murder, where the sanctity of human life is protected with the death of 
another human being. The following Mishnaic text is often cited to illustrate the 
discomfort found in the Rabbinic tradition with the biblically sanctioned practice of 
capital punishment:
6 Talmud Balvi, Sanhédrin 37a.
7 Mishnak, Âboth, 3:15, trans. by Herbert Danby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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A Sanhédrin that puts one man to death in a week of years is called “destructive.” 
R. Eliezer b. Azariah says: Or one in even seventy years. R. Tarfon and R. Akiba 
says: Had we been in the Sanhédrin none would ever have been put to death.8
We should not, however, regard this statement as definitive of Rabbinic attitudes to 
capital punishment. As Beth A. Berkowitz writes, the early rabbis also ‘mobilized the 
death penalty as part of an argument for their religious authority, and this point has largely 
been missed’.9 Although they indeed utilized the death penalty, the high esteem that the 
early rabbis held for human life is indicated by the fact that they constructed elaborate 
legislation which placed considerable obstacles in the way of capital sentencing. Even 
after the death sentence had been passed, there were opportunities for witnesses to come 
forward: ‘If any man knoweth aught in favour o f his acquittal let him come and plead it’.10 
There were also complex procedures in place to determine the certainty of witnesses -  
‘the more a judge tests the evidence the more is he deserving of praise’ -  lest they be 
responsible for the death of another human being:
For this reason was man created alone, to teach thee that whosoever destroys a 
single soul of Israel, scripture imputes [guilt] to him as though he had destroyed a 
complete world; and whosoever preserves a single soul of Israel, scripture ascribes 
[merit] to him as though he had preserved a complete world.11
This Mishnaic passage provides us with another statement of the Rabbinic recognition of 
individual human worth. Despite the emphasis Rabbinic Judaism places on community, 
the sanctity of each human life is highly valued.12 It is on account of this sanctity, the 
divine presence within the person, that the rabbis upheld the biblical decree o f murder as a 
capital offence.13 For the rabbis, Moshe Greenberg writes, the ‘guilt of the murderer is
8 Mishnah, Makkoth 1.10.
9 Berkowitz cites the example from Sifra, a halakhic commentary on Leviticus, o f the death penalty being 
administered for the crime of teaching law in front o f one’s rabbi. Such a crime was committed by a student 
o f Rabbi Eliezer: ‘It once happened that a student made a legal decision before him [R. Eliezer]. He said to 
Ima Shalom his wife: He will not last the Sabbath. He [the student] died’. 45c. Beth A. Berkowitz, 
Execution and Invention: Death Penalty Discourse in Early Rabbinic and Christian Cultures (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 5.
10 Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 6.1.
11 Mishnah, Sanhedrin 5.2 and TalmudBalvi, Sanhedrin, 37a.
12 Jacob Neusner writes that in rabbinic Judaism ‘the word “Israel” does refer to persons, Israelites one by 
one, not only to the people. So a dialectic, not to be resolved, takes shape between the public and the 
private. Individuals each enjoy their own justice’. Rabbinic Judaism: The Theological System (Boston: 
Brill, 2002), p. 90.
13 Mishnah Sanhedrin 1 contains a discussion o f other biblically sanctioned capital offenses, e.g., 
blasphemy, idolatry, profaning of the Sabbath, sorcery and so forth. The Mishnah qualifies what we find in
the Bible, explaining the extent to which one would have to blaspheme, for example, in order to merit the
death sentence.
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infinite because the murdered life is invaluable’.14 We find an elaborate midrash on 
Genesis 9:6 in Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, which also restates the royal icon idea:
How were the Ten Commandments given? Five on one tablet, and five on the 
other. By writing “I am the Lord your God,” and opposite it, “You shall not 
murder,” Scripture states that if  anyone sheds blood, Scripture regards this as if  he 
diminishes the image of the King. This is comparable to a flesh-and-blood king 
who entered a province, and portraits of him were set up, images were made of 
him, and coins of him were minted. Some time later, his portraits were 
overthrown, his images were smashed, his coins were cancelled, and thus 
diminished the image of the king. So, too, if anyone sheds blood, Scripture 
accounts it for him as if he diminishes the image of the King, as it is said: 
“Whoever sheds the blood of man [...] for in His image did God make man”.15
Further light can be shed on Rabbinic interpretation of imago Dei through observing the 
halakhically permissible means of execution for the tanna’im, which reveal a strong 
concern to preserve the integrity of the body.16 Though the court has the power to inflict 
-  in order of gravity -  burning, stoning, strangling and beheading, the rabbis adjust these 
practices to limit (visible) bodily damage. The ordinance of burning, for example, can 
and should, in practice, be fulfilled by partial strangulation after which the executioner 
(the witness) must ‘kindle the wick and throw it into his mouth, and it goes down to his 
stomach and bums his entrails’.17 Although this sounds even more gruesome than the 
impermissible burning ‘with bundles of branches’, the point here is that the preservation 
of external appearance was, for the rabbis, a large part o f what it meant to acknowledge 
the imago Dei within the person.18 The following Talmudic parable, attributed to Rabbi 
Meir, illustrates the point:
‘ [T]wo twin brothers [lived] in one city; one was appointed king, and the other to 
highway robbery. At the king’s command they hanged him. But all who saw him 
exclaimed, ‘The king is hanged!’ whereupon the king issued a command and he 
was taken down’.19
34 Greenberg writes that an ‘absolute wrong has been committed, a sin against God which is not subject to 
human discussion’. ‘Some postulates of Biblical Criminal Law’, in Yehezkel Kaufinann Jubilee Volume, ed. 
by M. Haran (Jerusalem: Magnus Press, 1960), pp. 5-28 (p. 16).
10 Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Bahodesh, ed. and trans. by Jacob Z. Lauterbach (Philadelphia: JPS, 1933-35),
p. 262.
36 Talmud Balvi, Sanhedrin, 52a.
17 Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 7.2.
18 The Talmudic discussion of the ordinance of burning does, however, suggest that the concern for a 
humane death may have been another motivating factor: ‘R. Nahman answered in the name of Rabbah b. 
Abbuha: The verse saith, But thou shalt love they neighbour as thyself, [which implies:] choose an easy 
death for him.’ Talmud Balvi, Sanhedrin, 52a. This is restated in 45a.
39 Talmud Balvi, Sanhedrin, 46b.
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Because we image God in a very physical sense, respect for the body, even that o f an 
executed criminal, is important. The body, that which Hillel refers to as the ‘masterpiece 
of God’, must be respected and maintained in life and death.20 Decapitation — ‘there is no 
death more shameful than this’ -  is the exception that proves the rule.21 This practice, 
which the rabbis abhor as a ‘hideous disfigurement5, is intended for the murderer. It 
appears that such cases do not require the same concern for the theomorphic body, since, 
as Rabbi Akiva writes, ‘whoever sheds blood cancels the image5.22
Before moving on from Rabbinic engagement with Genesis 9:6, we should briefly 
note one further Talmudic response. In the verse in question, Rabbi Eliezer invokes 
Genesis 9:6 in an argument against celibacy: ‘R. Eliezer stated, He who does not engage 
in propagation of the race is as though he sheds blood; for it is said, Whoso sheddeth 
man’s blood by man shall his blood be shed, and this is immediately followed by the text 
And you, be fruitful and multiply' . 2 3  Since the command to beget offspring follows from 
the scriptural establishment of our creation in the image of God, it, therefore, diminishes 
the similitude when we refrain from procreation. It has been interesting to observe the 
Genesis prohibition of murder evoked in two contrasting ways in Rabbinic literature: to 
(uneasily) justify the death penalty and to promote fecundity and new life.
This brief survey has revealed the practical, halakhic nature that characterises much 
Rabbinic engagement with imago Dei and the manner in which Rabbinic writings 
emphasise the physical dimension of our likeness to God.24 One of the issues that will 
emerge consistently in discussion of the evolution o f the concept o f imago Dei is the
20 ‘It is m an's duty to keep his body in a state of cleanliness, as well as to keep his soul in a state o f purity. 
Hillel, when going to bathe, used to tell his pupils that he was going to do a godly deed. Once his pupils 
ventured to ask for an explanation. “Have you not observed,” said he to his disciples, “how the caretakers in 
the theatres and other public places always wash the statues and keep them clean? If  then such care is 
bestowed on inanimate sculptures, the works of man, it must surely be a holy duty scrupulously to clean the 
handiwork and masterpiece of God”.' Leviticus Rabbah 34.
21 Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 7.3
“  TalmudBalvi, Sanhedrin, 52b and Tosefta, Yevamot 8:7, trans. by Jacob Neusner (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 
1977-1986). Beheading is also the appropriate means o f execution for the ‘people of an Apostate City’. 
This is derived from Deuteronomy 13:16: ‘Thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants o f that city with the edge 
of the sword, destroying it utterly'.
23 Talmud Balvi, Yebomot 63b.
24 The practical approach is sometimes taken to characterise Jewish biblical interpretation, in general. The 
argument that biblical theology is a primarily Christian pursuit is presented by Jon Levenson, ‘Why Jews 
are Not Interested in Biblical Theology’ in Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel, ed. by Jacob Neusner, 
Baruch A. Levine, and Ernest M. Frerichs. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 281-307. Stefan Reif remarks 
that ‘Jewish exegesis [...] emphasises the people, the land and the language more than it does any systematic 
theology’. Stefan C. Reif, ‘The Jewish Contribution to Biblical Interpretation’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed by John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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question of fidelity to the biblical view of the person. The Rabbinic writings upon which 
we have drawn seem to indicate that the rabbis subscribed to an integrated view of the 
person as body and soul. This naturally leads to the assumption that Rabbinic writings are 
more consistent with the intentions of the prevalent monistic view of the person in the 
Hebrew Bible than, for example, more speculative anthropologies that isolate spiritual 
aspects o f personhood. We should note, however, that the rabbis were certainly not 
immune to the type o f dichotomous thinking that we will observe in formative Christian 
interpretations of imago Dei. We can briefly refer to two examples from the Rabbinic 
corpus, though there are many more. The following text from Genesis Rabbah creates a 
sharp division between physical needs and spiritual attributes:
He created in him four features from on high and four from below. He eats and 
drinks like a beast, he propagates like a beast, and relieves himself like a beast, and 
dies like a beast. From on high: He stands like the Ministering Angels, he possesses 
understanding like the Ministering Angels, and he sees like the Ministering 
Angels.25
The second example, from Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, vividly depicts the somewhat 
fragmentary nature of human composition. Our souls, we receive from God; our bodies 
from our parents:
And when his time to depart arrives [death], the Holy One, blessed be He, takes his 
share and leaves that of his father and mother before them, and his father and 
mother weep. The Holy One, blessed be He, says to them: ‘Why do you weep? 
Have I taken ought of yours? I have taken only that which is Mine’. They answer 
him: ‘Sovereign of the universe, so long as Thy portion was integrated with ours, 
our share was preserved from worms and maggots; but now that Thou hast taken 
away Thy share from ours, our portion is lying exposed to worms and maggots.26
These examples certainly challenge the assumption that the rabbis presented a unified 
view of person or are somehow representative o f the ‘Hebrew’ mind, as opposed to the 
more hellenistically influenced Church Fathers. Such a distinction, as James Barr argues, 
is, perhaps, more indicative of our modem self-perception than it is d¿scriptive o f the
25 Genesis Rabbah viii, 11, p. 64, A parallel text is found in T.B Hagiga 16a.
26 This saying of Rabbi Judah is translated and discussed by Ephraim E. Urbach in The Sages: Their 
Concepts and Beliefs, trans. by Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnus Press, 1979), pp. 218-219. Urbach 
also discusses the rabbinic speculation as to when the component parts o f the person are fused, pp 214-254.
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mental life of ancient Greece or Israel.27 The complexity of the Greek-Hebrew distinction 
should be kept in mind as we turn to the New Testament and the Patristic era. We should 
not, however, regard these dualistic Rabbinic passages as contradictory to our central 
points as regards Rabbinic engagement with imago Dei. Bearing in mind the diverse, 
multi-authored nature of Rabbinic literature, the assertion that the physical dimension of 
likeness is that which most characterised the early Rabbinic iconic interpretation of imago 
Dei still holds. The dualistic interpretations of creation merely serve to illustrate the fact 
that the rabbis, as with subsequent Christian theologies that isolated the faculty o f reason, 
also strove to account for our similarity to God and our dissimilarity to other creatures. 
Though this quest led some Rabbinic writings beyond the physical, it did not result in a 
repudiation of the physical, or to a negative view of the human body which is something 
that we observe in some Patristic writings. Though it is not necessary to force 
reconciliation between diverging strands o f Rabbinic literature, we can conclude the 
following: Rabbinic writings illustrate a high esteem for the sanctity of human life on 
account o f our creation in the image of God. While there is a strong emphasis upon the 
physical dimension of our likeness to God as that which manifests our iconic status, we 
also observe, in some writings, a tendency to look beyond the human body, to the 
(separate) soul, to define the God-like dimension of human personhood. The emphasis on 
the rational soul characterised Patristic interpretations of imago Dei, to which the 
remainder o f this chapter will be devoted. We will first turn the writings of Paul, the most 
significant influence on the Christian appropriation of the Genesis concept of imago Dei.
1.5 Imago D ei in the Letters of Paul
Walter Brueggemann acknowledges the long history of interest in the theological concept 
of imago Dei but argues that it is informed by subsequent theological categories, 
especially those developed by Paul, that are imposed upon the Hebrew Scriptures. 
Though the writings of Paul cannot account for the significant Rabbinic interest in imago 
Dei discussed above, it is true that the Pauline letters are of immense importance with
27 Barr rejects the familiar contrast between the Hebrew mind as historical, concrete and personal and the 
Greek mind as timeless, unhistorical and centred on logic: ‘Because the contrast is an analysis o f elements 
within modem culture, it sees the ancient cultures not as they were but as their influence feeds into more 
modern streams.’ Old and New in Interrelation: A Study o f Two Testaments (London: SCM, 1982), p. 35. 
Barr would probably object to Matthew Arnold’s comment that the ‘uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see 
things as they really are; the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct and obedience’. ‘Hebraism and 
Hellenism’» in Selections from the Prose Works o f Matthew Arnold, ed. by William Savage Johnson (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), p. 275.
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regard to the Christian re-shaping of the concept in an incamational light.28 Though we 
can encounter Paul as an interpreter of the Genesis text he is, for Christians, much more 
than that. His writings form a significant part o f the Christian biblical canon and, as such, 
these writings, and the interpretation of imago Dei in Christ, contribute to the Christian 
‘biblical’ view o f the person.29
Paul identified Christ as the image of God and as the embodiment of the invisible 
God (Col 1:15; 2 Cor 4:4; Phil 2:6). Through faith, we are transformed into the likeness of 
Christ: ‘For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of 
his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family’ (Rom 8:29). By 
identifying Christ as the image of God, Paul distinguishes Christ from God while at the 
same time identifying Christ’s glory with God.30 While Paul refers to our transformation 
into the fullness o f the image after death, he also envisages a gradual growth in likeness to 
Christ through the modelling of our earthly lives after his example, an influential idea for 
the subsequent Patristic tradition and the idea of ‘deification’ or ‘theosis’: ‘And all of us, 
with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being 
transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from 
the Lord, the Spirit’ (2 Cor 3:18). In his letter to the Ephesians, Paul writes that we 
should disregard our old selves which are corrupted by deceitful desires in order to ‘put on 
our new selves’ who are created to be like God (Eph 4:22-24). Paul contrasts Adam, the 
earthly man, and Christ, the heavenly man: ‘Just as we have borne the image of the man 
of dust, we will also bear the image of the man of heaven’ (1 Cor 15:49). Just as sin and 
death came through Adam, justification and life come through Christ (Rom 5:12-21).31
28James Barr writes that ‘the centrality of the incarnation carries with it a new emphasis on man and, also, 
through the relation between the incarnation which has already happened and the eschatological promises 
for the future, his future destiny, resurrection, immortality and so on. Thus there are good theological 
reasons why some essential thinking of the New Testament might be expected to spread beyond the limits 
given by the Old Testament and the Jewish heritage’. Barr, Old and New in Interpretation: A Study o f  Two 
Testaments (London: SCM, 1982), p.58.
29 R.W.L. Moberly writes that a ‘fundamental weakness o f  the biblical theology movement [...] was its 
tendency to separate “pure” biblical thought (of a Hebrew nature) from the distorting influences especially 
of patristic interpretation (of an unduly Greek nature), without realizing that to separate the biblical text 
from the continuing tradition of Christian thought and practice is to deprive oneself o f the necessary 
resources for responsible weighing and appropriating of the text’. The Theology o f the Book o f Genesis, p. 
15, fhl4.
30 The connection o f Paul’s Christology to the Genesis creation account is discussed by Herman Ridderbos 
in his Paul: An outline o f  His Theology, trans. by John Richard de Witt, (London: SPCK, 1977) pp 69-78.
31 A similar idea is found in the apocryphal Jewish text, 2 Baruch, which is thought to have been written in 
the late first or early second century: ‘For Adam first sinned and brought untimely death upon all. Yet of 
those who were bom from him, each one of them has prepared for his own soul torment to come, and again 
each one o f them has chosen for himself glories to come.’ 2 Baruch 54:15, in Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha: Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments, ed. by James H. Charlesworth (New York:
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This Adam-Christ motif is a most influential theological idea, particularly, as we shall see, 
for Augustine’s development of the doctrine of original sin. The image is lost in Adam 
but restored in Christ. This restoration o f the image does not refer to a return to the 
Garden of Eden but rather to a new creation brought about through Christ.
Thus, in the Pauline letters, we find the framework around which the Christian 
theology of imago Dei would develop: (i) the image universally granted at creation but 
lost from humankind through the sin of Adam; (ii) our growth in likeness through a life 
modelled on Christ, the true image of God; and (iii) the restoration o f the fullness of the 
image after death in Christ. Though we have noted the references that ground this view, 
we should also mention another Pauline reference to imago Dei which arises in the 
context of a discussion of the conduct of men and women in worship in 1 Corinthians 
11:7. According to Paul, the man should leave his head uncovered since he is the image 
and glory of God, whereas the woman is the glory of man. Paul proceeds to write that 
‘man was not made from woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for the 
sake o f woman, but woman for the sake of man’ (1 Cor 11:9). Here, Paul seems to place 
greater emphasis on the second creation account (Gen 2:4-3:24), which describes Eve as 
created after Adam, than on the first account in Genesis 1. His argument for the dominion 
of husband over wife is likely inferred from Genesis 3:16 which posits Eve’s sin as the 
reason for consequent hierarchical gender relations. We observe strong echoes of this 
sentiment in 1 Timothy 2:12-14: ‘I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a 
man; she is to keep silent. For Adam was formed first, then Eve; and Adam was not 
deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a transgressor’ .32 However, to return 
to the passage from 1 Corinthians, Paul does not explicitly here write that women are not 
created in the image of God and he concludes his discussion with the assertion that neither 
woman nor man can be deemed independent from one another. ‘For just as woman came 
from man, so man comes through woman; but all things come from God’ (1 Cor 11:12).
The two points drawn here from the brief survey of Paul’s idea o f imago Dei will 
be important in the discussion of the development o f the concept in Christian theology.
Doubleday, 1983-1985). Other apocryphal Jewish texts appear to lend weight to the idea o f the biological 
transmission o f sin. For example, in 4 Ezra, because o f Adam’s sin ‘the infirmity became inveterate [...] 
with the evil germ.’ (4 Ezra 3.21-2; 4:30-2; 7:116).
32 Raymond F. Collins, I  &II Timothy and Titus: A Commentary (London: Westminster John Knox Press,
2002), p. 72. For a feminist critique, which also acknowledges Paul’s positive collaboration with women in 
the early Christian communities, see Lone Fatum, ‘Image o f God and Glory o f Man: Women in the Pauline 
Congregations’, in The Image o f  God: Gender Models in the Judaeo-Christian Tradition, ed. by Kari 
Elizabeth Borreson (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 50-134.
25
Firstly, we note that the Genesis text and Paul’s identification of Christ with the image 
were, arguably, of equal importance in the Christian development of the doctrine. Christ 
came to be seen as the archetype of human existence through whom we may participate in 
the divine life. Secondly, Paul’s reference to male and female in Corinthians has been 
influential in the development of Christian theological anthropology and remains of 
interest to feminist theology. We will discuss Augustine’s attempt to reconcile this text 
with the egalitarian idea of Genesis 1:27 later in this chapter. For now, we turn to the 
interpretation o f the concept in the Patristic era, a time when writing on the concept of 
imago Dei flourished.
1.6 Irenaeus of Lyons
The writings o f the Fathers contain frequent references to biblical passages and efforts to 
uncover their meaning for Christian theology, as it was emerging. Together with the 
Gospels and the writings of the Prophets, the book of Genesis features prominently in the 
Patristic writings.33 Though many of the Church Fathers addressed the concept of imago 
Dei, the discussion will be limited to two thinkers, Irenaeus o f Lyons and Augustine of 
Hippo, each of whom helped to shape Christian theological anthropology. We turn first to 
the second century Church Father, Irenaeus (d. 202 C.E.), who is often regarded as the 
first Christian systematic theologian, based on his two surviving complete works, Against 
Heresies and The Demonstration o f the Apostolic Preaching:34 As indicated by the title, 
Against Heresies, Irenaeus’ aim in writing his five-volume major work was the 
counteraction o f the teachings of those of his contemporaries that were outside o f his view 
of Christian orthodoxy. Writing in the century in which Christian orthodoxy was 
beginning to be defined, Irenaeus was troubled by the emerging groups that propagated a 
distortion of the Christian message while claiming authenticity.
Though Irenaeus was responding to a diverse set of religious beliefs, the thinking 
that he opposes is often referred to generally as ‘gnosticism’ though this does not 
necessarily refer to a particular gnostic sect.35 Irenaeus’ use of the term 4gnostikos’ is
33 Boniface Ramsey, Beginning to Read the Fathers (London: SCM, 1993) p. 22.
34 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, trans. by Alexander Roberts and William Rambaut, ed. by Alexander 
Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 1 (Buffalo, NY: 
Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885); The Demonstration o f  the Apostolic Preaching, par. 11, trans. by 
J. Armitage Robinson (London: The Macmillan Co., 1920). Subsequent references will be parenthetical 
with the abbreviations AH and Dem respectively.
35Denis Minns notes the inaccuracy of the general use o f the term ‘gnosticism’ in relation to Irenaeus’ 
opponents since gnosticism relates to specific sects and not to each of the various systems of belief to which 
Irenaeus referred. ‘Gnostic’ may, for Irenaeus, have been synonymous with ‘heretic’. In book II, for
ambiguous and could be argued to refer to all of the groups that he opposes. Though he
referred to the gnostic sect (AH 1.11.1), he saw a continuity between all the positions he
sought to refute, the gnostics being forerunners of the Valentinians which all led back to
Simon Magus (Acts 8:9 -  24). ‘Gnostic’ may, for Irenaeus, have been synonymous with
‘heretic’.36 With this caution regarding the use of the term ‘gnostic’ in mind, it is still
possible to note some general characteristics of the teachings to which Irenaeus was
responding, most notably the tendency to place knowledge, and not faith, at the centre of
religious experience.37 Knowledge (gnosis) obtained through revelation, and not faith in
Christ, leads to salvation. Salvation, according to Gnosticism, is an exclusive construct: It
is guaranteed to the divine ‘gnostics’ on account of their possession o f knowledge; it is
attainable to those not fully gnostic but in possession of a soul, and it is denied to those
persons who were identified primarily with matter without possession of a soul. The belief
in the conflict between the evil world of matter and the divine world of the spirit naturally
leads to a negative view of the material.
It is against this background -  the spirit ‘trapped’ in matter -  that we come to
appreciate Irenaeus’ contrasting emphasis upon the human person as soul and flesh:
Now the soul and the spirit are certainly a part of the man, but 
certainly not the man; for the perfect man consists in the commingling and the 
union of the soul receiving the spirit o f the Father, and the admixture of that 
fleshly nature which was moulded after the image of God’ (AH V.6.1).
The image of God -  ‘His own form on the formation’ -  corresponds to the whole person 
(Dem 11). Irenaeus depicts the creation o f the person by God’s own hands ‘taking from 
the earth that which was purest and finest, and mingling in measure His own power with 
the earth’ (Dem 11). Irenaeus’ emphasis on our creation from the earth -  derived from 
Genesis 2:7 and 3:19 -  strengthens the bond between Adam, the first earthly man, and 
every person thereafter. We retain the earth as part o f ourselves. God ‘breathed on his
example, Irenaeus refers to ‘the rest who go by the false name o f Gnostics’ (AH II.35.2). Denis Minns, 
Irenaeus: An Introduction (London: T&T Clark, 2010), p. 19. See also Thomas G. Weinandy, ‘St. Irenaeus 
and the Imago Dei: The Importance o f Being Human’, Logos: A Journal o f  Catholic Thought and Culture, 6 
(2003), 35-50 and Michael Allen Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism: An Argument fo r  Dismantling a 
Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 33-37.
36 In book II o f Against Heresies, for example, Irenaeus refers to ‘the rest who go by the false name of 
Gnostics’ (AH II.35.2).
37 Irenaeus was most acquainted with the thinking o f the Gnostic teacher Valentinus. He had read the 
writings o f  disciples o f  Valentinus containing ‘the doctrine o f those who teach in error at the present time -  
I mean Ptolemaeus and his followers, whose doctrine is the “flower” o f  the school o f  Valentinus’ (AH I 
pref. 2). Discussed by Robert M. Grant, Irenaeus o f Lyons (London: Routledge, 1997) pp 21-28.
27
face the breath o f life; that both for the breath and for the formation man should be like 
unto God’ (Dem 11).
1.6.1 Irenaeus’ Distinction between Image and Likeness
Although biblical scholarship regards the two terms as synonymous, Irenaeus is well- 
known for his influential theological distinction between ‘’image’ and ‘likeness’. While 
Irenaeus distinguished between the terms ‘image’ and ‘likeness’, he also uses the term 
‘similitude’. The distinction between the terms is not always consistently applied in his 
writings and the terms are often used interchangeably. The distinction between ‘image’ 
and ‘likeness’ is put to good theological use throughout Irenaeus’ writings and is, 
arguably, the aspect of his interpretation that has the most enduring relevance. In Irenaeus 
we begin to see the origins of the sense of image as a static, ontological entity and 
likeness as a dynamic moral force, an idea that would characterise subsequent Patristic 
theology.38 We also see, in Irenaeus, the identification of human rationality as the 
defining element o f human distinctiveness, a most important theme in subsequent 
Christian theological engagement with imago Dei. Though Irenaeus derives the 
terminology for the image/likeness distinction from Genesis 1, its theology is based on 
Genesis 2 and the writings o f Paul.
Prior to the fall, Irenaeus argues that humankind lived in a state of ‘true 
rationality5: ‘[HJaving been created a rational being, he lost the true rationality, and living 
irrationally, opposed the righteousness of God, giving himself over to every earthly spirit, 
and serving all lusts’ (AH IV.4.3). Though lost through the fall, the image of God has 
been restored in Christ.
When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed both these [image 
and likeness]: for He both showed forth the image truly, since He became Himself 
what was His image; and He re-established the similitude after a sure manner, by 
assimilating man to the invisible Father through means o f the visible Word (AH 
V. 16.2).
Christ shows us, in his person, what the image really is. Furthermore, through his saving 
work, Christ reconciles humankind to God. Irenaeus’ understanding of redemption draws 
upon the Pauline analogy between Adam and Christ that we have referred to earlier (Rom 
5:12-21). While the Son was with the Father from the beginning, He was made man in
38 John Anthony McGuckin explores the influence of this understanding o f imago Dei in the Patristic period. 
The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology, (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), p. 179.
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order to grant salvation ‘so that what we had lost in Adam -  namely, to be according to 
the image and likeness of God -  that we might recover in Christ Jesus’ (AH III. 18.1). 
Christ, ‘through His transcendent love, becomes what we are, that He might bring us to be 
even what He is H im self (AH V. pref.). Our salvation through Christ was intended by 
God when we were created in God’s image. This is the meaning that Irenaeus intends in 
his frequent restatement of the Pauline idea of gathering all things in Christ (Eph 1:10: 
AH III.16-23).39
Therefore, while the image remains in every person through the saving work of 
Christ, the ‘likeness’ -  or similitude -  is something that we have to work at, with the help 
o f the Spirit: ‘But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is indeed of an animal 
nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image of 
his formation, but not receiving the similitude through the Spirit’ (AH V.6). This citation 
contains rich theological ideas. Firstly, it establishes the permanent status of the image, 
even with those o f an ‘animal nature’, i.e., those who have not yet received the Spirit of 
God. It also distinguishes Spirit from soul and suggests that our similitude -  our likeness 
-  is something that some people receive through the Spirit. It also suggests that, in order 
to increase our likeness to God, we have to become more ‘spiritual’. What, we might ask, 
does it mean to be ‘spiritual’ during our earthly lives? How can we grow in likeness?
1.6.2 Growth in Likeness
For Irenaeus, all persons are determined by union between flesh and spirit: ‘The saved 
man is a complete man as well as a spiritual man’ (AH V.6.1). In divergence from the 
Hebrew Bible, Irenaeus distinguishes between the Spirit and the breath of life. While the 
latter is that which makes a person animated, the Spirit has a more transcendent dimension 
in Irenaeus’ writings for it is regarded as eternal.40 We find a strong emphasis on reason 
in this aspect o f Irenaeus’ thought. Those that have received the gifts of the Spirit are not 
enslaved by lust but are guided by the light of reason. Thus, while all people are 
animated, only some receive the Spirit. And, as we have seen, it is the Spirit that allows 
our growth in likeness, envisaged by Irenaeus as a daily progression towards God:
39 Irenaeus’ reliance on Paul in expounding key aspects o f his theology -  particularly Ephesians, Romans 
and 1 Corinthians -  is discussed by Eric Osborn, Irenaeus o f  Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), pp. 189-192.
40 As Iain MacKenzie explains, ‘Spirit’ in patristic writings is used in reference to the third Person o f the 
Trinity and also in reference to the Deity as encompassing all three Persons, Irenaeus’s Demonstration o f  
the Apostolic Preaching: A Theological Commentary and Translation (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), p. 82.
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Now it was necessary that man should in the first instance be created; and having 
been created, should receive growth; and having received growth, should be 
strengthened; and having been strengthened, should abound; and having abounded, 
should recover [from the disease of sin]; and having recovered, should be 
glorified; and being glorified, should see his Lord (AH IV. 38.3).41
Likeness is dynamic, pertaining to human behaviour and the potential for 
transformation. Spiritual and moral growth is within our grasp. Because of our likeness 
to God, we possess free will and the capacity to choose good or bad actions throughout 
our lives (AH IV.37.1). However, God does not exercise compulsion on those who ‘flee 
from his hands’ (AH IV.39.3). In fact, freedom, the ability to make decisions, is part o f 
what Irenaeus understands by the image of God (AH IV.4.3). Through faith and 
receptivity we are transformed into the likeness o f God and can ascend to what is perfect: 
‘If then, you shall deliver up to Him what is yours, that is, faith towards Him and 
subjection, you shall receive His handiwork, and shall be a perfect work of God’ (AH 
IV.39.2). Our bodies reflect the image of God throughout our earthly lives but upon our 
redemption we will receive the full grace o f the Spirit. Then, we will be restored to the 
fullness o f the image and likeness of God. The whole person, body and soul, will partake 
in a ‘blissful and never-ending life granted by God’ (AH V.3.3). What Irenaeus is 
describing can also be referred to as ‘deification* or ‘theosis’, the transformation of the 
person into the likeness of God.42 As Eric Osborn explains:
The purpose of the divine exchange is that man might become what God is. God’s 
light or glory shines not in supernal heights but in living man. From the vision of 
God who is light comes the life o f man, and the end of all things is the participation 
of God in man and of man in God.43
41 Growth in likeness is a continuous theme in Irenaeus’ writings. As MacKenzie writes, ‘the progress, the 
leading, the development, the advance, the furthering from an infantile state to the adult, the gradual 
movement towards God of humanity in and through and by the Word and Spirit, are themes which are 
scattered throughout Adversus Haereses.’, Irenaeus's Demonstration o f the Apostolic Preaching, p. 105.
42 Irenaeus’ language o f deification or ‘theosis’ was influential for subsequent Patristic writers -  most 
notably, the Cappadocian Fathers -  and for the developing Orthodox tradition. There is grounding in the 
New Testament for this idea. See, for example, I John 3:2: ‘Beloved, we are God’s children now; what we 
will be has not yet been revealed. What we do know is this: when he is revealed, we will be like him, for we 
will see him as he is’, and also 2 Peter 1:3. There are also seeds of the idea in Paul, most notably, 2 
Corinthians 3:18 as referred to earlier. See Stephen Finlan, ‘Can We speak o f Theosis in Paul?’, in 
Partakers o f  the Divine Nature: The History and Development ofDeification in the Christian Traditions, ed. 
by Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), 
pp. 68-81. See also Norman Russell, The Doctrine o f  Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006).
43 Eric Osborn, Irenaeus o f  Lyons, p. 22.
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It is important to note that while we ourselves participate in our own growth in likeness in 
a most significant way, this process is ultimately the work of God. The failure to accept 
this fact corresponds to Irenaeus5 interpretation of original sin.
According to Irenaeus’ insightful interpretation of the Eden narrative, the story 
depicts the human failure to accept that growth in likeness to the Creator is a gradual 
process. Though regarding Adam and Eve as historical figures, Irenaeus also addresses 
their symbolic significance. Although the sequence of the historical narrative is important 
to Irenaeus, it is also his intention to establish the figures o f the historical narratives as 
iconic images for present-day humanity as well as eschatological images for the future. 
Irenaeus held that even before the fall, Adam and Eve were imperfect and infantile in 
relation to God. This is because only that which does not depend on another for its 
existence can be called perfect.44 Adam and Eve were of material nature in a time-bound 
existence and, as such, were at a distance from their Creator. Perfection would never have 
been sustainable for Adam and Eve even if they had not sinned: ‘God had the power at the 
beginning to grant perfection to man; but as the latter was only recently created, he could 
not possibly have received it, or even if he received it, could he have contained it, or 
containing it, could he have retained it’ (AH IV.38.2). The idea that humankind was not 
created perfect is important in the understanding of Irenaeus5 quite positive theological 
anthropology and his idea of original sin as the failure to accept the progressive nature of 
human likeness to God.45 Adam and Eve, designated by Irenaeus as ‘children5, lost their 
likeness because they could not wait for God5s plan to reveal itself (AH III.22.4; 
III.23.5) 46 Original sin, for Irenaeus, is the attempt to take matters into our own hands 
and an unwillingness to wait for God's plan for our perfection to be revealed to us.
Irenaeus presents revelation as a unified picture o f the relationship between God 
and his creation. His story is, as Denis Minns writes, a ‘theology of history built upon the 
belief that it is the God-given destiny of humankind to grow to perfection by gradual
44 Robert P. Brown, ‘On the Necessary Imperfection o f Creation: Irenaeus’s Adversus Haereses IV, 38,’ The 
Scottish Journal o f  Theology, 28 (1975), 17-25.
45 As with his positive view o f the body, Irenaeus’ emphasis on the imperfection o f the created and the need 
for patient endurance can also be understood in the context o f his critique of gnosticism, in particular the 
belief that perfection was already attained by those in possession o f the truth (AH 1.6.4).
46 The depiction of childhood in Eden, prominent in both o f his works, is an interesting feature of Irenaeus’ 
idea of sin. The merit o f a literal or figurative reading o f the child motif is discussed by M. C. Steenberg, 
who suggests that the term ‘infant’ should not be understood to be o f pejorative intention The context 
establishes Irenaeus’ conviction that such a state is entirely natural and appropriate to a created being. 
Moreover, there is nothing in Irenaeus’ writings to indicate that the reference to children should not be taken 
at face value. M. C. Steenberg, ‘Children in Paradise: Adam and Eve as “Infants” in Irenaeus o f  Lyons 
doctrines’, Journal o f  Early Christian Studies, 12 (2004), 1-22.
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stages, and that God guides this development in a loving, infinitely patient, ever-vigilant 
and non-coercive manner.’47 Since the history of salvation is coexistent with the history 
of the world, the incarnation does not constitute the beginning of a different story. All 
things, from Adam to Christ, are as was intended by God. What Irenaeus draws from the 
story is the conviction that faith is an expression of our obedience to God and a 
dependence on his goodness. Faith is the willingness to wait for the fullness of God’s 
revelation and our restoration to the full image and likeness o f God; since we are the work 
of God we must await the hand of our Creator. In this endeavour we must exercise both 
freedom and self-control.48 Irenaeus, we conclude, greatly contributed to the theological 
development of imago Dei, particularly as regards deification, our gradual growth into the 
likeness of Christ. According to Irenaeus’ vision of deification, the Christian life is 
characterised by patience: If we live spiritual lives and avoid the ‘original sin’ of 
impatience, we will advance in perfection and become perfect works o f God.
1.7 Augustine of Hippo
Of all the Church Fathers, Augustine’s thought was perhaps the most influential with 
regard to the development of the concept o f imago Dei in Christian theology. The 
Genesis creation account was of particular interest to Augustine and he returned to its 
interpretation many times in his life, attempting five commentaries on the creation stories 
over a period of thirty years.49 In addition to this interest, Augustine’s writings reveal a 
preoccupation with human interiority and the inner life o f the person as a means of 
apprehending the divine. Thus, Augustine approached Genesis with view to an 
intellectual understanding of the text since, as John Rotelle writes, he viewed creation ‘not 
only as a truth o f faith but also as something accessible to human reason’.50 The concept
47 Minns, Irenaeus, p. 69.
48 Iain MacKenzie notes the dynamic nature of Irenaeus conception o f freedom and self-control which are 
‘not statically fixed as formal concepts o f natural attributes in themselves, but point beyond themselves to 
where they are grounded, wherein resides their validity and in reference to which they may be exercised. 
The double contingency o f humanity’s existence to and from God is the light in which these terms are to be 
understood in Irenaeus’ employment o f them’ p. 109.
49 These five commentaries are: On Genesis: A Refutation o f  the Manichees (388-389); Unfinished Literal 
Commentary on Genesis (393-395); Commentary on Genesis in the final three books o f Confessions (397- 
401); The Literal Meaning o f  Genesis (401-416); book XI o f City o f  God (416).
50 Rotelle writes that Augustine wanted not only to hear but to understand the biblical message in Genesis. 
‘The creation o f the world by God was a matter not only o f faith but o f reason’. On Genesis: A Refutation o f  
the Manichees, in The Works o f  Saint Augustine, ed. by John E. Rotelle, trans. by Edmund Hill (New York: 
New City, 2002), p. 15.
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of imago Dei is, therefore, something of a point of intersection of the key aspects of 
Augustine’s theology, namely the quest for self-knowledge and knowledge of God.51
Like Irenaeus, Augustine affirms the goodness o f God’s creation and the 
similitude to God of all that is created.52 Though similitude is present in all things, it 
increases according to status.53 The human being, as created, existing and knowing, 
participates in God’s likeness to a degree greater than any other created being:
Since man can participate in wisdom according to the inner man, as such he is in 
the image of God in such a way that he is formed without the interposition of any 
other nature. Therefore, nothing is more closely united to God, for man knows 
and lives and exists and thus is unsurpassed among created beings.54
Irenaeus and Augustine are alike in their emphasis on our intellectual capacities as 
reflective o f the imago Dei. In contrast to Irenaeus, however, the idea that God could be 
circumscribed by the body is, for Augustine, a ‘debased and empty one.’55 The image 
relates to the rational mind -  or the ‘illuminated’ mind -  where the knowledge of God can 
exist (Lit Gen 111.20). As our discussion proceeds, we will observe that Augustine 
appears to use the terms ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ interchangeably in terms o f the imago Dei. 
There is, however, a distinction between the terms that we should clarify. In brief, animus 
is the rational soul and mens is its highest level. The mind {mens) is the highest function 
of the rational soul.56 It is spiritual in nature and the locus of the imago Dei.
The idea that our intellectual nature allows for knowledge of God is an important 
Augustinian idea, which will re-emerge in the context o f Aquinas’ thought. According to 
Augustine, our intellect is that which enables the transformation of the creature from our
51 In Soliloquies, Augustine writes: ‘I want to know God and the soul. Nothing else? Absolutely nothing 
else!’ (I. 2,7) and ‘O God who are ever the same, I want to know m yself, I want to know you? (II. 1,1), The 
Soliloquies o f  St. Augustine, trans. by Rose Elizabeth Cleveland (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1910).
52 This emphasis forms part o f Augustine’s refutation o f Manicheism, which holds a dualistic view o f 
creation in terms of the two opposing cosmic forces of good and evil. Manicheism is the system o f belief 
based on the struggle between the good, spiritual world of light and the evil, material world of darkness, to 
which Augustine adhered for almost a decade before his conversion to Orthodox Christianity. The effect o f 
this dualistic world-view on Augustine’s writings is discussed by Jason BeDuhn in Augustine's Manichaean 
Dilemma: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 
and by John Kevin Coyle in Manichaeism and its Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 307-329.
53 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, in Fathers o f  the Church, Vol. 70, trans. by David L. 
Mosher (Washington: CUA Press, 2002), LI. 2.
54 Eighty'Three Different Questions, LI. 2. The reference to the ‘inner man’ is derived from Paul: ‘[I]f our 
outer man is corrupted, nonetheless, the inner man is renewed from day to day’ (2 Cor 4:16).
55 The Trinity, in Augustine: Later Works, trans. and ed. by John Burnaby (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1955), XIL7.12. Subsequent references will be parenthetical and abbreviated as Trin.
56 Augustine also employs the term anima to denote the soul, though this does not always correspond to the
human soul. Where it does correspond to the human soul it depicts its lower functioning aspects.
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unformed, state to our status as created beings. Though Augustine and Irenaeus share the 
belief in the goodness of creation, Augustine, unlike Irenaeus, posits the idea that 
humankind was created perfect prior to the fall. Though we can value the wisdom of both 
thinkers, Augustine’s writings, permeated with a greater emphasis on human failure, lack 
Irenaeus’ valuable conviction that all things are as intended by God. Augustine’s 
interpretation of Genesis 2, however, became the dominant influence on the Christian 
theology of grace.
1.7.1 The Fall from Perfection
Augustine is renowned for his vivid depiction o f our fallen nature and for his formulation 
of the Christian doctrine of original sin.57 This idea fmds expression in the following 
extract from Augustine’s interpretation of the second creation account: ‘From this state, 
after he [Adam] had sinned, man was banished, and through his sin he subjected his 
descendants to the punishment of sin and damnation, for he had radically corrupted them, 
in himself, by his sinning’.58 Adam and Eve, in their pride, succumbed to temptation in 
order to become like God.59 Consequently, all who were descended from Adam, 
Augustine’s massa damnata, ‘stood condemned, lying ruined and wallowing in evil’.60 
Contemporary scholarship draws our attention to the effects o f Augustine’s use o f a 
mistranslation o f Paul’s Greek in the Latin Vulgate, which rendered ‘because all’ have 
sinned (NRSV) as ‘in whom [Adam]’ all have sinned (Rom 5:12). Michael J. Gorman 
writes that ‘Paul’s point was not really to blame Adam, and much less to suggest that 
original sin is passed on biologically (i.e., through sexual intercourse), but to affirm the
37 Augustine’s idea o f the Fall was most significantly influenced by Ambrose. E. W. Kemp warns against 
the tendency to attribute too much originality to Augustine’s idea o f original sin. He suggests that o f the six 
propositions o f Augustine’s doctrine of the Fall, none are in fact original to Augustine but are already 
present in the work o f Ambrose, by whom Augustine was baptised. Further, Kemp writes, ‘it must be 
remembered that having once become a Christian Augustine had the most profound respect for the authority 
of the Church in doctrine, and it is therefore important to understand what seemed to him to be the 
authoritative doctrine of the Church on the subject’. ‘AugustinianisnT in Man: Fallen and Free: Oxford 
Essays on the Condition o f Man, ed. by E. W. Kemp (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), pp. 158-172 
(p. 164). For a discussion of original sin in Augustine, see also James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits o f  
Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Tatha Wiley, Original Sin: Origins, 
Developments, Contemporary Meanings (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 2002).
38 Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), VM.26.7.
59 Augustine’s designation of pride as the evil impulse responsible for the Fall is indicated in The Literal 
Meaning o f Genesis, 11.5.7 and The City o f God, trans. by Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 
1984), XrV.13.
60 ‘The whole condemned mass o f the human race lay in evils, or even rolled about in them, and was 
precipitated from evils into evils [...]. Enchiridion, VIIL27.
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universality o f sin.’61 However, in acknowledging the significance of the mistranslation, 
we must also note that Augustine’s idea was not exclusively reliant on Romans 5:12, but 
also upon the general thrust of Paul’s theology of Adam and Christ in the entirety of 
Romans chapter 5 and also upon 1 Corinthians 15:22, T or as in Adam all died
Though his depiction of the massa damnata is much more forceful, Augustine’s use 
of the Pauline Adam/Christ motif is not dissimilar to Irenaeus. Like Irenaeus, Augustine 
follows the Pauline idea of reconciliation between God and humankind in Christ:
Since men are in this state of wrath through original sin -  a condition made still 
graver and more pernicious as they are compounded more and worse sins with it -  a 
Mediator was required, that is to say, a Reconciler who by offering a unique 
sacrifice, of which all the sacrifices of the Law and the Prophets were shadows, 
should allay that wrath.62
Importantly, for Augustine, reconciliation to God is not something humankind can do 
alone. It is the work of Christ.63 Because of the fall, the only divine-human relationship 
that Augustine can conceive of is that which is made possible through the grace of Christ. 
Furthermore, since the image of God is restored in Christ, it endures in every person. 
Though defaced on account of our fallen nature, the image is never lost. Since the image 
is identified with this ever-present rational soul it never ceases to be: ‘whether this image 
be so worn out as to be almost none at all, or whether it be obscure and defaced, or bright 
and beautiful, certainly it always is’ (Trin IV.4.6). The consequences of the fall are, for 
Augustine, physical in nature and, therefore, do not relate to the rational soul. Though the 
infirmities that we inherit through the fall -  pain, aging, lust and so forth -  may make it 
difficult to exercise rationality, they do not alter the soul as such.64 William E. Mann 
captures the centrality o f the rational soul to our human identity when he suggests that ‘an 
alteration o f the soul’s innate abilities would be tantamount to the creation of a new
61 Michael I. Gorman, Apostle o f  the Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul & His Letters, 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004) p. 366. See also W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic 
Elements in Pauline Theology, third edition, (London: SPCK, 1979). Davies writes that ‘to infer [...] that 
Adam’s transgression injected a kind of virus into man’s system which made him sin inevitably is to read 
into the text ideas borrowed from later theological speculation.’ p. 32.
62 Enchiridion, Vm.33.
63 Here we see the effects of Augustine’s dispute with Pelagius, who posited an idea o f salvation through 
works. For Augustine, in contrast: ‘What good works could a lost soul do?’ Enchiridion, VTII.30. See 
Dominic Keech, The Anti-Pelagian Controversy o f  Augustine o f  Hippo, 396-430 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).
64 Some o f  the consequences that Augustine attributes to the fall include: pain, fatigue, aging, lust and, 
ultimately, death. See hie Literal Meaning o f Genesis 11.32.42 and The City o f  GodXTV  14.16-19.
species’.65 It is worth keeping this point mind in order to grasp the innateness of 
Augustine’s view of the rational soul and, consequently, the imago Dei. Although the 
soul is corruptible and the extent to which the faculty o f reason is present in the soul 
varies, ‘the soul itself is never anything but rational or intellectual’ (Trin. XIV.2.6). The 
question o f universality in relation to the image of God, and in relation to rationality, leads 
to the question o f gender. How does Paul’s treatment o f male and female relations in 1 
Corinthians function in Augustine’s theology? Does Augustine understand the image of 
God to be equally present in every human person?
1.7.2 Augustine’s Interpretation of Male and Female Creation
Augustine’s early writing, which are marked by his opposition to the Manichaean world­
view, depict a spiritual view of the first human beings. Augustine, therefore, relates the 
command to ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ to the propagation o f ‘good works of divine 
praise.’66 His later writings, however, explicate the view that sexual differentiation was 
present when man and woman were created in God’s image.67 The fact that both men and 
women are created in the image of God is, Augustine acknowledges, affirmed in Genesis 
(Gen 1:27). This text, however, must be reconciled with the Pauline text that appears to 
prioritise the male imaging of God (1 Cor 11:7). Augustine’s attempt at reconciliation of 
the two texts is somewhat complex.68 The nature of the problem is expressed in book VII 
of The Trinity:
For after saying that God made man in the image of God, He created him, it says, 
male and female: or at any rate, punctuating the words otherwise, male and female 
created He them. How then did the apostle tell us that the man is the image of God, 
and therefore he is forbidden to cover his head; but that the woman is not so, and 
therefore is commanded to cover hers? (Trin VII.7.10)
65 William E. Mann, ‘Augustine on Evil and Original Sin’, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. 
by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 40-49 (p. 
47).
66 The Catechising o f the Uninstmcted, 18.26 discussed by John M. Rist, Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) p. 113.
61 Against Julian, 4.14.65. The chronological development o f Augustine’s attitude to sexual difference is 
discussed by Christopher C. Roberts in Creation and Covenant and by John M. Rist in Augustine, pp. 112- 
121 .
68 A noted early contribution to this discussion is the work of Kari Elizabeth Borreson in Subordination and 
Equivalence: The Nature and Role o f  Women in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, trans, by Charles H. Talbot 
(Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1981). The question is also considered by Judith Chelius 
Clark in In God’s Image, But Less So: Feminist Interpretations o f  Augustine, ed. by J. C. Clark (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
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Although, for Augustine, the distinction between male and female applies only to the 
body, the mind of the man also has its feminine and masculine dimensions, ‘the masculine 
part as the planner, the feminine as the one that is made.’69 In an introspective reading of 
Paul’s distinction between male and female, Augustine interprets the Corinthians passage 
in relation to this dual dimension within the mind. The external role o f women and men is 
an outward sign of the two dimensions of the male mind:
In this way what can be seen more clearly in two human beings, that is, in male and 
female, may be considered in a single person; that the interior mind, like the manly 
reason, should have as its subject the soul’s appetite and desire, through which we 
put the limbs or parts of the body to work, and by a just law should keep its help 
within bounds -  just as a man ought to govern his wife.70
Yet, for Augustine, this distinction within the mind is not relevant to the imago Dei. The 
important part of the mind is that part ‘devoted to the contemplation of immutable truth’ 
(Trin 111.22). Although, for Augustine, the outward appearance o f the woman may 
suggest otherwise -  ‘for all her physical qualities as woman’ -  she is certainly created in 
the image of God, insofar as she has a rational mind which, like the rational mind of a 
man, bears an analogical likeness to the Creator (Trin XII.7.12). Women are also 
intended as heirs o f grace. As Augustine puts it, ‘who will hold women to be alien from 
this fellowship?’ (Trin VII.7.12)
If he reaffirms that men and women are created in the image of God, what then does 
Augustine take from the Pauline text? Essentially, what Augustine draws from the text is 
the reaffirmation of his conviction that the more the mind is oriented towards the eternal 
the more fully it images God:
As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both in the case when as a whole it 
contemplates the truth it is the image of God; and in the case when anything is 
divided from it, and diverted in order to the cognition of temporal things; 
nevertheless on that side on which it beholds and consults truth, here also it is the 
image of God, but on that side whereby it is directed to the cognition of the lower 
things, it is not the image of God (Trin VII.7.10).
Therefore the lack of necessity for the male covering of the head, Augustine reasons, is 
the reminder o f this orientation towards the eternal and a disassociation from the corporeal
69 The Literal Meaning o f Genesis, 3:22.
70 On Genesis, H, 11.15.
and temporal. Women, it seems, represent the temporal aspect of the mind. The 
masculine part of the mind must restrain the temporal part for fear that it should slip 
irrevocably into outward things. However, Augustine does recognise that the 
consideration of the temporal is necessary for our earthly lives. Further, he does not 
forget the other Pauline text relevant to the image of God as male and female: ‘there is no 
longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus’ (Gal 3:28).
Augustine’s refusal to prioritise one scriptural text over another is characteristic of 
his exegetical approach and we see that his solution favours a symbolic reading of 
Corinthians. There has been much criticism of aspects of the resulting interpretation of 
the Pauline text, in particular Augustine’s deterministic association of men and women 
with the eternal and temporal respectively, and his suggestion that the female body does 
not image God as much as the male.71 Though problematic in relation to the 
contemporary relevance of Augustine’s work, there is nothing extraordinary about this 
aspect o f his thought given the context within which he was writing. We note that in the 
part o f the person that is clearly of the most importance to Augustine -  the rational mind -  
men and women are equal.
1.7.3 The Image of the Triune God
In our earlier analysis of the Genesis 1:26 plural -  ‘let us make’ -  we noted the tendency 
of some Christian interpretations to find Trinitarian significance in the verse. Augustine 
exemplifies this tendency: ‘Because of the three persons, it is said to Our image; because 
of the one God, it is said to the image o f G od'11 As the Genesis plural is taken to relate to 
the Trinity, the human person, for Augustine, images the one, Triune God. It is on this 
point that Augustine develops one of his most notable theological ideas, that is, the 
existence o f a Trinity in the part of the human mind that has the capacity to know God. 
While the divine mystery is greater than anything that the finite human mind can 
understand, Augustine draws an analogy between human interiority and the Triune God: 
‘We too as a matter of fact recognize in ourselves an image of God, that is o f this most
71 Tina Beattie remarks that ‘Augustine’s vision of eschatological reality is tempered by his acceptance and 
justification o f a created order in which women and men are orientated towards one another in a hierarchical 
relationship that reflects the psychological relationship between the will and the passions. Just as the 
healthy mind is one in which (masculine) contemplative wisdom prevails over (feminine) everyday 
knowledge and emotions, so a healthy society is one in which men have authority over women.’ New 
Catholic Feminism: Theology and Theory (New York: Routledge, 2006) p. 119.
72 The Literal Meaning o f Genesis, Vol. 1, trans. by John Hammond Taylor (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 
HI. 19. Subsequent references will be parenthetical and abbreviated as Lit Gen.
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high Trinity, even if  the image is not equal to Him in worth, but rather very far short of 
being so.’73 Though the image of God is not of the same substance as God, it is closer to 
God than anything else that is created, since it is the means by which we attempt to 
understand and behold God.74 It is understandable that Augustine should choose such an 
analogy given the preoccupation with human interiority that pervades his writings: ‘Do 
not go outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.’75
Augustine specifies three different activities of the human mind: memory, 
understanding and will (Trin X.l 1.17). Memory refers to the knowledge that the soul has 
of itself. The knowledge contained within our memory is not always explicit; we may not 
know that it is there. It can only be drawn out by the activity of understanding, the 
capacity to elevate truth above falsehood. However, understanding by itself does not 
guarantee that we will choose the good. The orientation of this understanding towards 
love engages the third activity, the will. According to Augustine, everything that we do is 
done by the power of these faculties o f the human soul, which are, in themselves, 
inextricably linked to one another. Intelligence, for example, cannot be engaged without 
memory and will. Interestingly, we can understand Augustine’s personal conversion 
narrative in terms of these dimensions: the conversion of the intelligence and the 
conversion of the will. As John O’ Meara notes in his introduction to The Confessions, 
‘Augustine represents the first of these as achieved through Platonic learning and the 
reading of Scripture [...] and the second through Christian submission.’76 Augustine 
formed a conviction of the veracity of his theory of human life in general from his 
experience o f the working of the Spirit in his own life. When the faculties of the mind 
operate correctly, he saw, all that we do is good.
Thus, we observe in Augustine a radical emphasis on interiority and also, perhaps, 
individuality. As Charles Taylor writes:
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who introduced the
inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of
73 The City o f  God, XI.26.
74 Mary T. Clark writes that the ‘dissimilarity between the temporal being and eternal Being, between 
changeable and unchangeable Being, is greater than the similarity. The divine Trinity is one with God; the 
human image is not identical with the human being. Remembering, understanding, and loving are functions 
of a human subject, whereas the Trinitarian Persons are not functions of a divine subject. There is no 
substitute for faith in Christ and what he reveals o f  Father and Spirit’. ‘De Trinitate’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine, pp. 91-103 (p. 99).
75 O f True Religion, trans. by J.H.S. Burleigh (Chicago: Heniy Regnery Co., 1959), XXXIX.72.
76 John J. O ’ Meara, The Young Augustine: An Introduction to the Confessions o f  St. Augustine (New York: 
Longman, 1954), p. 11.
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thought. The step was a fateful one, because we have certainly made a big thing of 
the first-person standpoint.77
Augustine’s introspection, however, ultimately serves the greater purpose of leading us to 
God. While each of the activities of the mind can be directed back to the self, they can 
also be directed to God and this, for Augustine, is the goal. If the mind remembers God, it 
will be wise, not by its own merit or ‘light’, but by the participation in the supreme light. 
This will result in the renewal of the imago Dei within the person, envisaged by 
Augustine as a gradual process, a transferral of love from temporal to eternal, from carnal 
to spiritual and from things visible to things intelligible. Augustine’s stance is 
individualist in the sense that we each turn to the self in our own particular way. Yet, 
when we turn inwards, the space where we are present to ourselves is illuminated through 
the work of God. To draw again from Taylor:
And so at the end of its search for itself, if it goes to the very end, the soul finds 
God. The experience of being illuminated from another source, of receiving the 
standards o f our reason from beyond ourselves, which is the proof of God’s 
existence already brought to light, is seen to be very much an experience of 
inwardness. 78
At the end of the search for self, we are led to God, the eternal, unchanging truth upon 
which we depend. The journey to this end is difficult since each of the faculties o f the 
mind can be obscured: memory by forgetfulness; intelligence by error; will by evil. The 
distorting effect o f human sinfulness on the mind is ever present in Augustine’s writings. 
As Matthew Drever writes:
This means that Augustine’s inward turn into the self in Trin. does not represent a 
simple road through a stable psyche to the truth of the triune God. It is neither the 
inner-Cartesian space of rational self-reflection, nor the objective and transparent— 
geometrical, nomological -  space of Newtonian physics. It is an ethically charged 
space, opaque and treacherous as a result of human sin, wherein one is easily 
deceived and corrupted.79
77 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f  the Modem Identity (Harvard, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 131.
78 Taylor, p. 135. See also Philip Cary, Augustine’s Invention o f the Inner Self: The Legacy o f  a Christian 
Platonist, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Cary, who explores the question o f interiority in the 
context o f the influence o f Platonism on Augustine’s work adopts a quite critical stance towards 
Augustine’s treatment o f this theme: ‘Why should we want to turn to our inner selves if  God is to be found 
in something external, the flesh of Christ?’, p. x.
79 Matthew Drever, ‘The Self Before God: Rethinking Augustine’s Trinitarian Thought’, Harvard
Theological Review, 100 (2007), 233-242 (239).
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The inner space is a soteriological space, ever in need of redemption. This is an 
appropriate point at which to conclude this brief account of Augustine’s exposition of 
imago Dei since it highlights again those central aspects of Augustinian thought around 
which his interpretation of the concept is developed: the importance of interiority and our 
ultimate dependence upon divine grace. Augustine’s Trinitarian analogy, we conclude, 
should not be understood as the mind providing the framework for an understanding of 
the Trinity. The imago Dei is a relational term, dependent upon our relationship to God. 
Thus the speculative exercise of De Trinitate is, as Matthew Drever writes, ‘one of 
attachment rather than detachment, dependence rather than independence’.80 While 
Augustine’s explanation does indeed proceed from the human mind to the Trinity, this 
movement from the temporal to the eternal must be seen as necessary only on account of 
our fallen human nature. A reverse of this sequence is Augustine’s intention: Through the 
restoration of the imago Dei within the mind, we can come to an understanding of the 
Triune God and ourselves. Yet because God transcends his creation, this understanding 
can only be minimal. However, ‘when this image therefore has been renewed by this 
transformation, and thus made perfect, then we shall be like God, since we shall see him 
not through a mirror, but just as he is, which the Apostle calls face to face’ (Trin 
XV.11.21).
1.8 Conclusion
In his 2007 discussion of imago Dei, the biblical scholar, Nathan MacDonald, describes 
Genesis 1:26-27 as ‘a text in search of a context’.81 In this chapter, we have attempted to 
fill in some of that much needed context: the function of royal ideology in the Ancient 
Near East; the meaning of tselem and demut within the Hebrew Scriptures; aniconism in 
ancient Israelite religion; divine and royal dominion in the Hebrew Scriptures; Gnosticism 
as the background for Irenaeus’ positive view o f matter and emphasis on our participation 
in our growth to likeness, and Manicheism as the context for Augustine’s affirmation of 
the goodness o f creation. Together, these ideas form part of the tapestry within which we 
understand Genesis 1:26-27 and its early reception. The diversity and vastness of 
contextual material also illustrates the near impossible nature o f inteipreting any biblical
80 Drever, Image, Identity, and the Forming o f the Augustinian Soul, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 111.
83 MacDonald, ‘A Text in Search o f Context: The Imago Dei in the First Chapters of Genesis’, p. 3.
text ‘in itself. We read the Bible with our own concerns in mind and in the knowledge 
that Jews and Christians have lived with this text for centuries, both intellectually and -  in 
synagogue and church -  liturgically. As the biblical scholar, Brevard Childs writes: ‘I 
cannot act as if I were living at the beginning of Israel’s history, but as one who already 
knows the story, and who has entered into the middle o f an activity of faith long in the 
process’.82
We have, nonetheless, attempted to return to origins -  the beginning of the story -  
in order to determine what the text might have meant for its authors and what it came to 
mean for interpreters in the formative years of the Jewish and Christian religious 
traditions. We have seen that the functional interpretation o f imago Dei, the reading of 
the text that finds less concern with what the person is than what the person does, is that 
favoured in contemporary biblical scholarship. We have observed that early Rabbinic 
literature offers a concrete interpretation of imago Dei, emphasising our physical 
similarity to God and the halakhic implications of such resemblance to the divine. These 
sources also provide evidence of an early conceptual development o f the idea o f the worth 
of the individual human person in relationship with the community and with God.
Drawing on Paul’s identification o f Christ with the image of God, Irenaeus and 
Augustine elaborated the Christological and Trinitarian implications of the concept of 
imago Dei, The ways in which Irenaeus and Augustine interpret the ontological state of 
the first humans in Eden reveal their vision of the ideal human life. Similarly, their 
understanding of the fall of Adam and Eve points to their conception of the archetypical 
pattern o f human sinfulness. Irenaeus’ interpretation o f the story of Adam and Eve is 
interesting in the sense that it is, as Denis Minns notes, ‘alive to the symbolic function of 
the story’.83 However, despite the richness of Irenaeus’ interpretation, it is Augustine’s 
more literal reading of Genesis that has influenced the Western Church for most o f its 
history, bequeathing the Christian doctrine of original sin to subsequent generations, a 
doctrine that, it could be argued, overshadows theological anthropology.
While the Hebrew Bible presented the human person as an indivisible union of 
body, spirit and soul, Irenaeus and Augustine incorporated some ideas o f their 
predecessors in the Greek philosophical tradition into their theological anthropology. The 
Platonic influence is generally taken to account for the emphasis on the mastery of the 
body by the soul -  in Augustine more so than Irenaeus -  which provided the rationale for
82 Childs, Old Testament Theology, p. 29.
83 Minns, Irenaeus, p. 71.
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a type of early Christian ascetic teaching. Because the body was essential to the Christian 
doctrine o f the resurrection, it was not completely discounted in the Patristic 
understanding of personhood. Further, Irenaeus and Augustine emphasised the goodness 
of all that God had created, including the human body. There is, however, a definite 
prioritisation of the mind in their thought, particularly in Augustine, who could not allow 
for the capacity o f the human body to image God. The negative ramifications of this type 
of thinking have been recognised in modem Christian theology, particularly with regard to 
Augustine and human sexuality.84 In later chapters, we will discuss the rejection of this 
type of thinking and the re-embrace of embodiment as central to the theological 
understanding of personhood. However, we should note, the Patristic emphasis on the 
mastery of the body is not without worth or relevance for succeeding generations. 
Through this emphasis, the Fathers offer good advice for responsible self-governance in 
many aspects of our lives. Given their largely halakhic intent, Rabbinic writings have a 
more practical dimension than formative Christian writings. For the same reason, 
perhaps, they offer a more realistic confrontation o f the lived realities o f bodily life. 
However, in their more speculative moments, as we have seen, the Rabbinic writings 
exhibit a certain philosophical overlap with the ‘Hellenism5 of the Patristics. We must 
acknowledge, however, that the rabbis do not share the Patristic emphasis on intellect as 
reflective of the imago Dei.
As the discussion proceeds, it will become evident that much of what the concept 
of imago Dei would come to mean to subsequent Jewish and Christian theologians was 
already present in the formative interpretations that have been discussed in this chapter. 
We will see an alternative approach to the concept of imago Dei in the modem era, which 
will be characterised by a rejection of the centrality of rationality in favour of a more 
relational approach. Yet, prior to rejection, we have intensification. Thus, we turn to the 
fully developed intellectualism in the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Moses 
Maimonides.
^See Rosemary Radford Ruether, ‘Augustine: Sexuality, Gender, and Women’ in Feminist Interpretation o f  
Augustine, ed. by Judith Chelius Stark. An exploration o f Augustine’s more positive ideas with regard to 
sexuality is presented by David G. Hunter, ‘Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine’s Teachings 
on Sex, Marriage and Celibacy, Augustinian Studies, 25 (1994), 153-77.
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CHAPTER TW O
IMAGO DEI AND THE HUMAN INTELLECT:
MOSES MAIMONIDES AND THOMAS AQUINAS
This chapter will address the concept of imago Dei in the writings of two thinkers o f the 
medieval period: the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1138-1204 CE) and the 
Christian thinker Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE). The discussion will focus on the 
concept of imago Dei as reflected in the human intellect and, accordingly, on the human 
capacity for knowledge of God through this faculty. In spite of their differing religious 
traditions, we will observe significant similarities in the way in which Maimonides and 
Aquinas engaged the concept o f imago Dei.1 Drawing upon the scheme of Aristotle in the 
philosophical interpretation of their respective religious traditions, both Maimonides and 
Aquinas emphasise the capacity of the human intellect to grasp metaphysical truth. With 
regard to commonality, we must also note Aquinas’ direct engagement with the writings 
of Maimonides, indicating what David Burrell refers to as 6a medieval climate far more 
open to interfaith and intercultural exchange than our stereotypes have presumed it to 
be’.2 Aquinas cites Maimonides twenty-one times between the Summa Theologiae and 
the Summa contra Gentiles? Aquinas’ references to Maimonides reveal a particular 
interest in Maimonides’ appropriation of Aristotle’s thought. Because of the extent o f 
Aristotle’s influence on both Maimonides and Aquinas, the discussion will begin with a 
brief outline o f those aspects of Aristotelian thought that are particularly relevant to this 
analysis o f imago Dei.
1 David Novak comments on the commonality between the ‘friends and the enemies’ o f both thinkers: ‘Both 
Maimonides and Aquinas had to battle against the fideists in their respective communities, those who 
seemed to think that ascribing reason to God’s law limits the infinity of God’s power and will. Talking With 
Christians: Musings o f  a Jewish Theologian (London: SCM, 2006), p. 85.
" Burrell has conducted several comparative philosophical studies between Maimonides, Aquinas and the 
Muslim philosopher Ibn-Sina. Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre 
Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1986), p. ix. See also, Burrell, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith 
Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
3 The Summa Theologica o f St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Fathers o f the English Dominican Province,
second and revised edition, (London:Bums, Oates & Benziger, 1912-1936). Subsequent references will be
parenthetical, abbreviated as ST. Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.57. trans. by The English Dominican Fathers
from the latest Leonine Edition, (Benzinger Brothers: New York, 1924).
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2.1 Aristotle’s Idea of Human Perfection
In Ms identification of the human person as the rational animal, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) 
presented the mind as the divine element within the human body: ‘Man deprived of 
perception and mind is reduced to the condition of a plant; deprived of mind alone he is 
turned into a brute; deprived of irrationality but retaining mind, he becomes like God.’1 
The mind, the place where the soul tMnks and judges, must be ‘related to what is 
thinkable.’2 The mind is separable from the body and must be ‘capable of receiving the 
form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without 
being the object’.3 The well-lived life, for Aristotle, is the life that is lived according to the 
authority of the divine element of reason witMn us. It is the life that strives towards 
excellence, or virtue of the soul.4 As Aristotle writes, ‘if  reason is divine, then, in 
comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life.’5 
The study of pMlosophy, as the intellectual contemplation of truth, is a most worthwMle 
pursuit to tMs end.
In Ms explication of the good life, Aristotle divides Ms idea o f virtue into two 
categories: intellectual virtue and moral virtue. TMs distinction is explored in 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s most well-known etMcal treatise: ‘Virtue, then, being of 
two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its 
growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time) wMle moral virtue 
comes about as a result of habit.’6 The idea of habit -  influential to Aquinas -  is 
indicative of the importance of action to Aristotle’s conception of virtue. As Aristotle 
writes, we become ‘just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by 
doing brave acts’.7 The state o f our character corresponds to our habitual actions. 
Aristotle is critical o f those who take refuge in theory, comparing them to ‘patients who
1 Exhortation to Philosophy in The Complete Works o f  Aristotle, trans. by W.D. Ross, ed. by Jonathan 
Barnes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
2 De Anima III.4 429a in The Works o f  Aristotle Translated into English, Vol. 3, ed. by W.D. Ross, 
(London: Oxford, 1931).
3 De Anima I3I.4.429a.
4 Virtue is defined by Aristotle as a state o f character which ‘brings into good condition the thing of which it 
is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6a. 15, The Works 
o f Aristotle Translated into English, Vol. IX, trans. by W.D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1915). 
See also Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 153.
5 Nicomachean Ethics X.7.
6 Nicomachean Ethics II.3.15.
7 Nicomachean Ethics H.3b.5.
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listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do’.8 
Intellectual perfection, though pertaining to the soul, also has a practical dimension. 
According to Aristotle, practical wisdom is that which prepares the way for theoretical 
excellence and contemplation, which is the highest level of human happiness through 
which ‘beautiful and divine5 realities are apprehended.9 Such theoretical excellence 
pertains to the nous, the part o f the soul ‘that thinks and judges5, belonging in first 
potentiality to every human person. Nous does not refer to ordinary thought (■dianoia), or 
to love and hate, but rather to that which ‘seems to be an independent substance implanted 
in the soul5 which is ‘incapable of being destroyed5.10 In other words, the intellect (nous) 
seems, for Aristotle, to come from without, as an extra type of substance. As Myles F. 
Bumyeat writes, ‘the divine intellect is cast as a non-material medium through which the 
intelligible forms become apparent to the human intellect5.11
There is much more that could be written about Aristotle's idea of the noetic soul. 
However, this brief survey has begun to illustrate the reason why Aristotelian metaphysics 
held such appeal for Maimonides and Aquinas in their philosophical elaboration of the 
biblical concept of imago Dei. Aristotle provided them with a framework within which to 
view both human distinctiveness and the spiritual connection to the divine inferred in 
Genesis 1:26. This framework centred on an intellectualism that permeated both 
Aristotle's writings and those of his medieval interpreters. As Isaac Husik writes, for 
Aristotle, ‘God is pure thought thinking eternally itself, the universal mover, himself 
eternally unmoved, and attracting the celestial spheres as the object o f love attracts the 
lover, without itself necessarily being affected5.12 The prioritisation of the speculative 
intellect, and the sense that the person has potential for knowledge of God through this 
faculty, influenced both Maimonides and Aquinas in a most significant way.
2.2 The Interpretation of Moses Maimonides
Aristotle is the philosophical source most often referred to in Maimonides5 most famous 
work, the Guide o f  the Perplexed, first published in 1190.13 In the Guide, Maimonides
8 Nicomachean Ethics II. 5b. 15.
9Nicomachean Ethics X .7a.l5. Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom is discussed 
by James L. Wood in ‘Contemplating the Beautiful: The Practical Importance of Theoretical Excellence in 
Aristotle5 s Ethics’, Journal o f  the History o f  Philosophy, 4 (2011), 391-412.
10 DeAnima, 1.4, 408b.
11 Myles F. Bumyeat, Aristotle ’s Divine Intellect, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), p. 41.
12 Isaac Husik, A History o f  Medieval Jewish Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 299.
13 The Guide o f the Perplexed, trans. by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963). 
Subsequent references to the Guide will be abbreviated as GP. Maimonides’ other sources -  in particular
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writes that he agrees with Aristotle with ‘great regard to any point he has demonstrated5, 
the term demonstrate (apodeixis) in this instance referring to the strongest form of 
philosophical proof, a deduction that produces knowledge (GP 1.71). Addressed to a 
disciple of Maimonides, the Guide is directed ‘to one who has philosophized and has 
knowledge of the true sciences but believes at the same time in the matters pertaining to 
the Law and is perplexed as to their meaning [ ...] ’ (GP I. Introduction). The perplexity 
referred to in the title of the work, therefore, relates to the tensions that arise from the 
contradictions between the principles of philosophy and the literal interpretation of 
scripture, a concern that will resonate with many contemporary readers o f Maimonides. 
This tension is one that Maimonides intends to at least partially resolve by illustrating the 
compatibility between philosophy and revealed scripture.
Maimonides was a Torah-observant Jew, writing for fellow Jews. Though some 
interpreters have questioned where indeed Maimonides5 true loyalties lay -  whether his 
work originated from Athens or Jerusalem -  many readers who are familiar with both his 
legal and philosophical texts see in Maimonides5 writings an intentional synthesis o f 
biblical and philosophical thinking that co-exists with his deep commitment to the Torah 
and the Talmudic world view.14 The commitment to halakhic life that we observe in the 
Mishneh Torah is the context against which we can understand Maimonides5 
philosophical writings.15 As Menachem Kellner writes:
His Judaism is a religion in which concrete behaviour serves the needs of abstract 
thought; that abstract thought is the deepest layer of the Torah and, at least in 
Maimonides5 day, could be clearly and accurately expressed in the vocabulary of 
the Neoplatonized Aristotelianism which Maimonides accepted as one of the 
highest expressions of the human spirit.16
the Muslim sources -  in the Guide are explored by Alfred L. Ivry in ‘The Guide and Maimonides’ 
Philosophical Sources’, in The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, pp. 58-82. See also Joel L. Kraemer, 
T h e  Islamic Context o f Medieval Jewish Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish 
Philosophy, pp. 38-71.
14 Leo Strauss presents a dualistic interpretation o f Maimonides’ writings, arguing that the Guide, rather 
than the legal writings, reflects Maimonides’ true views. See Persecution and the Art o f  Writing (New 
York: Free Press, 1952), pp. 38-94. Through illustrating the philosophical content o f Maimonides’ legal 
writings, David Hartman presents a very convincing argument for an integrated understanding o f 
Maimonides’ philosophical and legal writings. See D. Hartman, Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest 
(New York: JPS, 1976).
15 The Mishneh Torah, for which he is renowned in the Jewish tradition, is Maimonides’ compendium to 
Jewish law, completed, after ten years of work, in 1180. His other legal writings include a commentary on 
the Mishnah as well as a commentary on several tractates o f the Babylonian Talmud.
16 Menachem Kellner, Maimonides ’ Confrontation with Mysticism (Oxford: Littman Library o f Jewish 
Civilisation, 2006), p .l. Marvin Fox argues that ‘with all his regard for the great teachers o f  Greek antiquity 
and for their intellectual heirs among the Islamic thinkers, he never became an uncritical imitator’.
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It is the Jewish context of Maimonides’ philosophy that ultimately separates his work 
from his Greek and Islamic philosophical sources.
2.2.1 M aimonides9 Aversion to Literalism
Maimonides’ treatment of imago Dei is placed at the beginning of the Guide, thus 
providing an early example for the general theme and intention of the work: uncovering 
the hidden implications of those passages which may have been interpreted exclusively 
according to their literal sense. Genesis 1:26, in its reference to image and likeness, is one 
of the many scriptural passages that has, Maimonides regrets, suffered misinterpretation, 
largely due to literalistic tendencies. A brief digression to Perek Helek will illuminate 
Maimonides’ position as regards the literal interpretation of scripture.17
In the introduction to Perek Helek, Maimonides offers a timeless account of three 
differing approaches to the writings of the Rabbinic sages, though further in the passage 
he states that his views are equally applicable to biblical interpretation. The first group, 
which for Maimonides forms the regrettable majority, accept the teachings of the sages 
exclusively according their literal sense. Maimonides attributes the failure to recognise 
the deeper insights o f the sages’ writings to a lack of scientific understanding on the part 
of the reader:
They understand the teachings of the sages only in their literal sense, in spite of the 
fact that some of their teachings when taken literally, seem so fantastic and 
irrational that if  one were to repeat them literally, even to the uneducated, let alone 
sophisticated scholars, their amazement would prompt them to ask how anyone in 
the world could believe such things true, much less edifying.18
The second group -  also numerous -  are those who read the sages and assume that the 
literal meaning found within is the totality o f what the sages themselves intended. Such 
readers may accept the writings of the sages at face value while adopting a position of 
superiority towards them. This group largely comes from the realm of medicine and 
astrology, perhaps those we would refer to as ‘scientists’ in contemporary parlance:
Inevitably, they ultimately declare the sages to be fools, hold them up to contempt, 
and slander what does not deserve to be slandered. They imagine that their own
Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 124.
11 Perek Helek forms part of Maimonides’ commentary on the Mishnah, tractate Sanhedrin. Perek Helek is
particularly well-known since it concludes with Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles o f the Torah. Introduction
to Perek Helek, in A Maimonidean Reader, ed. by Isadore Twersky (New York: Behrman House, 1972), pp.
401-424.
18 Introduction to Perek Helek, p. 407.
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intelligence is of a higher order than that of the sages, and that the sages were 
simpletons who suffered from inferior intelligence. The members of this group are 
so pretentiously stupid that they can never attain genuine wisdom.19
The third group, whose number is almost too few to mention, constitute those who can 
truly appreciate the greatness of the sages and the profound truths contained within their 
writings. They can accept the fact that ‘whenever the sages spoke of things that seem 
impossible, they were employing the style of riddle and parable which is the method of 
truly great thinkers’.20
Though expressed in terms that might seem a little unforgiving to the 
contemporary reader, there is much in Maimonides’ insights here that transcend his 
historical and religious context. Many present-day readers o f scripture will recognise 
themselves and others amongst the groups that Maimonides describes. These passages 
also serve as a very good introduction to the thought of Maimonides. They indicate the 
tendency that permeates Maimonides’ writings to differentiate between the intellectually 
able and the ‘multitude’ according to their capacity to decipher meaning in 
scriptural/Rabbinic writings and also, as we will see, their capacity to progress towards 
intellectual perfection. In this sense, they provide evidence for what some commentators 
refer to as Maimonides’ intellectual elitism, a point to which we will return. The passages 
also strongly illustrate Maimonides’ forceful aversion to literalist interpretation and his 
commitment to uncovering the profound truths of biblical and Rabbinic writings. At this 
point, we return to the Guide to discuss what this means for Maimonides’ idea o f imago 
Dei.
2.2.2 The imago D ei as the Intellect in Actu
In its opening chapter of the Guide, Maimonides presents the terms tselem and demut as 
examples o f such terms that can easily lend themselves to literalist misinterpretation. 
Because these terms denote the shape and configuration o f a thing, Genesis 1.26 could 
potentially be interpreted as linking the physical attributes of God and the person, thereby 
entailing the corporeality o f God as a ‘necessary consequence’ (GP 1.1).21 Maimonides’ 
point o f departure in his interpretation of Genesis 1:26, therefore, is the refutation o f the 
doctrine o f the corporeality o f God. He argues that physical shape or form is denoted by
19 Introduction to PerekHelek, p. 408.
20 Introduction to PerekHelek, p. 409.
Maimonides counts the denial o f the corporeality o f God among thirteen principles o f  faith to which every 
Jew must subscribe: ‘We are to believe that he is incorporeal, that His unity is physical neither potentially 
nor actually.’ Introduction to PerekHelek, pp. 401-23.
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the Hebrew term toar (Gen 39:6, 1 Sam 28:14). Tselem, on the other hand, is more 
appropriate to the description of natural form. By this Maimonides means ‘the notion in 
virtue o f which a thing is constituted as a substance and becomes what it is’ (GP LI). 
Within the human person, this defining substance which makes us what we are is, for 
Maimonides, the intellect. Maimonides’ understanding of the intellect is non-corporeal: 
‘In the exercise of this [intellect], no sense, no part of the body, none of the extremities 
are used5 (GP 1.1).
So far, we see that Maimonides’ view of imago Dei illustrates a strong dependence 
on the Aristotelian intellect, though his writings do not contain a systematic account o f 
this theme.22 From the references to the intellect that are dispersed throughout 
Maimonides writings, we can observe the following: We have each been bom with the 
capacity to acquire knowledge through the potential or material intellect. The potential 
intellect is described as the bond between God and the person, which must be 
strengthened in our ‘endeavour to come closer to him’ (GP 111.51). We engage the 
acquired intellect in the learning of abstract truths ‘from the emanation of the active 
intellect’, whose source is God (GP II.4).23 This process actualises the intellect, though 
the human capacity to leam varies: ‘There is no doubt that the intellect o f one who 
understands something significant is not like the intellect of one who does not grasp it. 
The former possesses actual intellect, and the latter possesses only potential intellect.’24 
The highest degree of perfection refers to the intellect in actu, the intellect ‘in his most 
perfect and excellent state’ and it is this state o f intellect that corresponds to Maimonides’ 
idea of imago Dei: ‘It is on account of this intellectual apprehension that it is said of man: 
In the Image o f  God created He him [...] not their shape and configuration’ (GP LI). 
What we are bom with is simply a capacity, ‘whereas the thing that after death is separate 
from matter is the thing that has become actual and not the soul that also comes into 
being’ (GP 1.70). Only the actualised intellect survives death.
22 This aspect o f Maimonides’ thought is also influenced by Avicenna and Alfarbi, as discussed by Herbert 
A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories o f  the Active 
Intellect, and Theories o f  Human Intellect (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 197-207.
23 Space does not allow a detailed assessment of Maimonidean cosmology. Herbert A. Davidson provides a 
good survey, explaining: ‘Like the matter o f the sublunar world, forms come from the ever-present and 
never-changing emanation o f the active intellect, and the active intellect is accordingly termed the “giver o f 
forms” (GP 11.12)*. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, p. 198. The medieval Arabic tradition forms a large 
part o f the context here. As Alexander Altmann writes ‘Maimonides subscribes to an Avicennian type of 
ontology which sees the total reality, including God, as a continuum in which the flow o f emanations from 
God through the hierarchy of Intelligences reaches down to the Active Intellect as the immediate 
fountainhead of the activity of forms in the sublunar world’. ‘Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas: Natural or 
Divine Prophecy?’ AJS Review, 3 (1978), 1-19 (7).
24 Commentary on the Mishnah i.37.
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Knowledge of God is the ultimate goal of human life, an Aristotelian idea that 
Maimonides attempts to ground in Scripture, specifically in those references to knowing 
God:
Thus it says: “Unto you it was shown, that you might know that the Lord,” and so 
on [Dt. 4:35]; and it says: “Know this day, and lay it to your heart,” and so on [Dt. 
4:39]; and it says: “Know that the Lord He is God” [Ps. 100:3]. The Torah has made 
it clear that this ultimate worship to which we have drawn attention in this chapter 
can only be engaged in after apprehension has been achieved (GP III.51).25
The fact that God is unknowable is, however, a consistent Maimonidean theme: Our 
knowledge of God consists only in ‘our inability to attain the ultimate term in 
apprehending Him’ (GP 1.59). In other words, our greatest knowledge of God will only 
yield an understanding of God’s incomprehensibility. The failings of human language to 
depict God inspired Maimonides’ elaborate negative theology and his refusal to allow the 
predication of any attributes of God that can be predicated o f the person.26 He reluctantly 
allowed negative predications: The phrase ‘God is powerful’, for example, should be 
understood as ‘God is not lacking in power’.27 Maimonides’ emphasis here is on the idea 
that God’s power is incomparable to power as manifested in any created thing. 28 We 
cannot compare God’s power in creating the universe and the human power to, for 
example, move a book from a shelf. Similarly God is not lacking life, unity, wisdom or 
will though none of these can be understood to relate to God in the way they are 
understood in terms of our human capacities.29 In our effort towards the attainment of
25 Isaac Husik disagrees: T hat the Pentateuchal law is solely concerned with practical conduct, religious, 
ceremonial and moral, needs not saying. It is so absolutely clear and evident that one wonders how so clear­
sighted a thinker like Maimonides could have been misled by the authority or Aristotle and the intellectual 
atmosphere o f  the day to imagine otherwise.’ Medieval Jewish Philosophy, p. 300.
26 The Arabic-Islamic philosopher, Avicenna (980-1037), is an important influence on the thought of 
Maimonides and Aquinas in relation to the via negativa and the idea that God is the only being that exists 
by virtue o f itself and nothing else. Robert Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. by Peter Adamson, Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 92-137.
27 Although Maimonides is taken as an exponent of the via negativa, it seems that, for him, this method was 
merely preferable to affirmation. As Josef Stem remarks: ‘Negative attributes are “better” than affirmative 
ones. [Yet] negative divine attributes are still false and descriptions formed from them fail to represent the 
deity’. Stern, ‘Maimonides’ Epistemology’, p. 125.
28 Kenneth Seeskin writes that when ‘we say that God is merciful, we should not think that God sits in a 
heavenly court passing judgement on people but that God has given the gift o f existence to things that have 
no right to claim it on their own. If  there is a comparison to be made, it is not between God and us but 
between the results o f  our actions and the results o f God’s. ‘Metaphysics and its Transcendence’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, pp. 82-105 (p. 87).
29 David Burrell notes how this aspect o f Maimonides’ philosophy would have been somewhat unwelcome 
to the religious-minded o f his community: ‘We must attribute all such perfections to God, o f  course, but
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intellectual perfection, we need to come to an understanding of God’s otherness, in 
philosophical terms, the fact that God exists in actuality not in potentiality (GP 1.52). This 
-  what Aquinas would later refer to as ‘sheer actuality’ -  means that God can never be 
dependent upon external or additional powers to act as God does.30 We will discuss 
Aquinas’ engagement with Maimonides’ via negativa further in the chapter. At this point 
we turn to Maimonides’ understanding of the second Genesis creation account.
2.2,3 The Necessity for the Commandments
The intellectualist interpretation of imago Dei comes to prominence in Maimonides’ 
allegorical interpretation of the second Genesis creation (GP II. 30).31 According to 
Maimonides’ vision of the original human state, Adam was endowed with the capacity to 
distinguish truth and falsehood in perfection and integrity: T o r the intellect that God 
made overflow to man, and that is the latter’s ultimate perfection was that which Adam 
was provided with before he disobeyed’ (GP 1.2). However, because Adam yielded to 
‘desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily 
appetite [...] he was punished by the loss o f part of that intellectual faculty which he had 
previously possessed’ (GP 1.2). It was at this point, according to Maimonides, that 
humankind was endowed with the capacity to distinguish between good and evil and the 
necessity for the commandments (GP 11.30).
A brief digression back to Aristotle is important here, specifically his prioritisation 
of the theoretical intellect: ‘For it is the activity o f [the theoretical intellect] that 
constitutes complete human happiness [...] Nor ought we to obey these who enjoin that 
man should have human thoughts and a mortal the thoughts o f morality’ (1177b).32 In 
Aristotle’s case, ‘human thoughts’ relate to the practical matters of life, matters that are 
deemed inferior to theoretical speculation. As Shlomo Pines explains, the ‘practical
how God possesses them, and hence what they amount to in divinity, must escape us entirely. Knowing the 
Unknowable God, p. 55.
30 Aquinas wrote that ‘the very existence of matter is a being potential; whilst God as we have seen contains 
no potentiality, but is sheer actuality’ (ST 1.3.2). This idea of actuality is Aristotelian. He writes that the 
very being of the divine intellect ‘is actuality. For always that which acts is o f higher worth than that which 
is acted upon, the originative principle than the matter’. DeAnima HI 5.
31 Maimonides’ interpretation o f the Genesis account o f the creation of the human person is discussed by 
Sara Klein-Braslavy in ‘The Creation of the World and Maimonides’ interpretation o f Gen. I-V ’ in 
Maimonides and Philosophy, ed. by Shlomo Pines and Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986). Klein-Braslavy considers whether Maimonides interpreted the account of the creation o f 
Adam literally. While Maimonides does attribute historical significance to the figure of Adam, he also takes 
‘Adam’ to designate the human species. Then, ‘according to their inner sense, the stories about “Adam” are 
a-historical or, to be more accurate, they represent a philosophical anthropology’, p. 71.
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X. 1177b.
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intellect pursues by its activity an ulterior object; its activity is not an end unto itself, as is 
that of the theoretical intellect’.33 Maimonides interpretation o f the second creation 
account is indebted to this Aristotelian distinction, in its prioritisation o f the speculative 
intellect and its relegation of questions of morality to the realm of the practical intellect, 
though this is not a term that Maimonides himself uses. Practical and political matters 
are, for Maimonides, secondary to our contemplative end:
It is impossible that the end of man be that he eat or drink or engage in sexual 
intercourse or build a wall or become a king because [1] these activities are 
accidents in relation to him, they do not add to his substance; [2] moreover, all these 
activities are performed not only by him but also by some other species of 
animals.34
This is a quite clear Aristotelian disassociation of our form -  the intellect, what becomes 
the imago Dei -  from the practical, the political (‘become a king’) 35, and the ethical: 
‘Through the intellect one distinguishes truth and falsehood, and that was found in 
[Adam] in its perfection and integrity. Fine and bad, on the other hand, belong to the 
things generally accepted as known, not to those cognized by the intellect’ (GP 1.2). In 
the perfect state, humankind had no faculty for the consideration of generally accepted 
things, i.e., good and bad: ‘So among these generally accepted things even that which is 
most manifestly bad, namely, uncovering the genitals, was not bad according to him, and 
he did not apprehend that it was bad5 (GP 1.2).
Does this mean that the human person had no moral component in the original 
unfallen state? Considering the fact that it is our intellect that allows us to receive the 
commandments -  ‘for commandments are not given to beasts and beings devoid of 
intellect’ (GP 1.2) -  it does not seem that Maimonides considered morality to have been
33 Pines, T ru th  and Falsehood Versus Good and Evil: A Study in Jewish and General Philosophy in 
Connection with the Guide of the Perplexed 1,2’, in Studies in Maimonides, ed. by Isadore Twersky 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 95-159. p. 98. Pines argues that Maimonides diverges a little 
from Aristotle with the extent o f his distinction between good and evil, on the one hand, and truth and 
falsehood on the other. We should also note that while Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics closely associates 
ethics with politics (i.e. the practical) Maimonides’ ethical treatise Eight Chapters has quite a contemplative 
orientation. Raymond L. Weiss writes that ‘Ethics is intimately connected with metaphysics because 
training one’s character is necessary to prepare oneself to attain knowledge o f God.’ Maimonides’ Ethics: 
The Encounter o f  Philosophic and Religious Morality (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1991), p. 
15.
34 Maimonides, Eight Chapters, in Ethical Writings o f  Maimonides, trans. and ed. by Raymond L. Weiss 
and Charles Butterworth, (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 59-104.
35 As Raymond Weiss explains, ‘Political activity, then, does not enhance a man’s substance; it does not 
concern what is truly “one’s own” namely, intellection. Nor is it distinctive o f human life, for some species 
o f animals also have rulers (“kings”)’. Maimonides’ Ethics, p.19.
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entirely absent from the original human state. Rather, since the original humans 
possessed the fullness of the imago Dei, morality was a more precise matter concerned 
with the discernment between truth and falsehood by means of reason. After the fall, 
morality was demoted to a status inferior to reason. As argued by Steven Schwarzschild, 
morality became a ‘matter of established social mores [...] with their aesthetic, proximate 
and mean qualities’.36 It is not the case, therefore, that the human person was in a purely 
intellectual state before the fall. However, even if  we accept that morality was not absent 
from the original state, it does seem that Maimonides’ assertion that morality was more 
concerned with truth and falsehood disassociates the imago Dei from ethical 
considerations. Does this mean that our creation in the image of God has nothing to do 
with goodness? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider, in greater detail, 
Maimonides’ idea of human perfection.
2.2.4 M aimonides’ Conception of the Nature of Human Perfection
Like Aristotle, Maimonides affirms the practice o f contemplation leading to the 
knowledge of metaphysics as the ideal of human life (GP 111.51). The highest perfection 
for a human person is ‘the conception o f the intelligibles, which teach true opinions 
concerning divine things’ (GP III.54). The importance of intellectual perfection to 
Maimonides’ work is difficult to overstate. It manifests itself in many aspects o f his 
theology, including his halakhic writings. God’s providence, for example, ‘follows upon 
the divine emanation’ from God, ‘the most perfect intellect’ (GP 111.17). Providence is 
proportionate to intellectual attainment and not ‘equal in all men’ (GP III. 18).37 The 
nature o f the life o f the world to come is also dependent upon our intellectual attainment:
Hence, when the material portion of our being dissolves into its component 
elements, and the physical life perishes -  since that only exists in association with 
the body and needs the body for its functions -  this form of the Soul is not 
destroyed, as it does not require physical life for its activities. It knows and 
apprehends the Intelligences that exist without material substance.38
36 Schwarzschild, ‘Moral Radicalism and “Middlingness” in the Ethics o f Maimonides’, in The Pursuit o f  
the Ideal: Jewish Writings o f  Steven Schwarzschild, ed. by Menachem Kellner (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1990), pp. 137-161 (p. 147).
37 Herbert Davidson writes that divine providence for Maimonides ‘is contingent on a person’s perfecting 
his intellect and establishing contact with the same emanation from the active intellect; in explaining how 
providence works, Maimonides makes no mention o f a direct intervention by God in the lives of ordinary 
human beings [ ...] ’ Maimonides: The Man and his Works. p. 377.
nMishneh Torah, Laws o f the Foundation o f the Torah IV.9, trans. by Eliyahu Touger (New York: 
Moznaim, 1989). Subsequent references abbreviated as MT.
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After death, the perfected intellect separates from the body and enjoys ‘enormous 
pleasure9 (GP III.27). As Herbert Davidson comments, ‘Maimonides’ rationalism 
outweighs any religious scruples. He writes that human immortality is the exclusive 
outcome of man's intellectual development’.39 Maimonides’ vision of the messianic 
period is similarly understood. He envisions the ideal human society where there will be 
no earthly problems such as famine or war. All will be free to engage in the divine law 
and its wisdom:
The entire world will be devoted solely to the attainment of knowledge of God. 
All Israel will be great sages, knowing the hidden matters and attaining knowledge 
of their Maker to the extent o f human capacity, as it is stated “The world will be 
filled with the knowledge of God as the water covers the sea” (Isaiah 11:9).40
In light o f the most significant contribution that Maimonides made to the understanding of 
the laws that govern Jewish communal life, his emphasis on intellectual attainment can 
surprise some readers since, as Menachem Kellner writes, it goes against the grain of 
Rabbinic Judaism, ‘with its emphasis on perfection through observance of God’s 
commands and on purity o f motive’.41 However, we should note that in all his emphasis 
on intellectual attainment, Maimonides, like Aristotle, also advocates the ideal of moral 
perfection, the life of ‘loving-kindness and righteousness’ (GP 111.54).
Whether intellectual perfection or moral perfection constitutes the ideal of human 
life is something of a point of debate among Maimonides’ interpreters and for good 
reason: Maimonides, by his own admission, contradicts himself in the Guide, yet as 
Kellner writes, ‘rarely does he do it in so blatant a fashion as with the issue of human 
perfection.’42 In the first part of the Guide, for example, Maimonides writes that moral 
virtues are a preparation for the rational virtues which cannot be attained ‘unless it is by a 
man thoroughly trained in his morals and endowed with the qualities o f tranquillity and 
quiet’ (GP 1.34).43 Then, in the penultimate paragraph of the Guide, Maimonides seems
39 Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, p. 207.
40 MT, Kings and Wars XH.4-5.
41 Kellner, ‘Maimonides on Human Perfection’, Brown Judaic Studies, 202 (1990), p. 3.
42 Kellner, ‘Maimonides on Human Perfection’, p.7. In the introduction to the Guide, Maimonides specifies 
seven possible contradictions that are found within, the fifth and seventh type being used intentionally. See 
Daniel Davies in Method and Metaphysics in Maimonides * Guide fo r  the Perplexed (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 15-16 and Yair Lorberbaum, ‘On Contradictions, Rationality, Dialectics, and 
Esotericisnn in Maimonides’ “Guide of the Perplexed’” , The Review o f Metaphysics, 4 (2002), pp. 711-750.
43 This point is reiterated in the third part of the Guide where Maimonides discusses the idea of moral 
perfection: ‘Most o f the commandments serve no other end than the attainment o f this kind o f perfection. 
But this kind of perfection is likewise a preparation for something else and not an end in itself [ ...] ’ (GP 
IH.54).
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to favour the imitation of the actions of God as the goal of life. Having restated the idea 
of intellectual perfection as the goal of life, Maimonides writes:
The way of life of such an individual, after he has achieved this apprehension, will 
always have in view loving-kindness, righteousness and judgement, through 
assimilations to His actions, may He be exalted, just as we have explained several 
times in this Treatise (GP III. 54).
Can this statement be taken to indicate that the ultimate form of human perfection is, in 
fact, the imitation of the moral qualities o f God? Such was the position taken by the 
German Jewish philosopher, Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), who suggested that a correct 
reading of the Guide must begin with this conclusion: ‘Therein lies the key point in
Maimonides’ theory of divine attributes, that he reduces and confines the concept of 
divine attributes to the ethical attribute, and therewith the concept of God to the ethical 
concept o f God.’44 Of course Cohen, in his advocacy of ‘ethical monotheism’ and the 
universal potential of Jewish ethics, would have had reason to read Maimonides in this 
way.45 Cohen’s position is shared by Steven Schwarzschild, who writes that ‘it has to be 
remembered that the deity “is” only negations -  albeit negations and privations -  except 
of the attributes o f action. One cannot unite with negative. Unio with the deity can, 
therefore be brought about only through the positive, that is, actional attributes’.46 
According to Schwarzschild, the knowledge of God that is the goal of human life is, for 
Maimonides, only possible through knowledge of God’s practice o f grace, justice and 
righteousness in the world. Knowledge of God, therefore, is equivalent to the imitation of 
these practices throughout our lives. The perfection o f the human person consists in the 
imitation of the actional attributes of God. The attribute o f action is the only type of 
attribute that we can predicate of God because, Maimonides argues, an action is remote 
from the essence o f a thing about which it is predicated. All o f God’s acts are carried out 
by means o f God’s essence and not, Maimonides holds, ‘by means o f a superadded 
notion’ (GP I.53).47
44 Hermann Cohen, Characteristics of Maimonides ’ Ethics, trans. by A.S. Bruckstein (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 2004). See also Shlomo Pines, ‘The Limitations o f Human Knowledge according to al- 
Farabi, ibn Bajja, and Maimonides’, Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. by Isadore 
Twersky (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979).
45 See David Novak, ‘Universal Moral Law in the Theology o f Hermann Cohen’, Modern Judaism, 1 
(1981), pp. 101-117.
46 Schwarzschild, ‘Moral Radicalism and “Middleness” in the Ethics o f Maimonides’, p. 144.
47 Maimonides’ treatment of the divine attributes in chapter 52 of the first part o f the Guide is discussed by 
Joseph A. Bujis, ‘The Negative Theology of Maimonides and Aquinas’, The Review o f  Metaphysics, 4 
(1988), 723-738.
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As an alternative interpretation to that proposed by Schwarzschild, it should be 
considered whether Maimonides’ final statement could be taken to reaffirm that 
apprehension of God is the goal of life which, once attained, leads to Godlike behaviour. 
In this case, the imitation of the moral qualities of God assumes secondary importance in 
comparison to the primacy of intellectual perfection. Although Maimonides argues that to 
the ‘ultimate perfection there do not belong either actions or moral qualities’ (GP 111.27), 
the ultimate virtue consists in imitating the actions of God:
For the utmost virtue of man is to become like unto Him, may He be exalted, as far 
as he is able; which means that we should make our actions like unto His, as the 
sages made clear when interpreting the verse, Ye shall be holy. They said: He is 
gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so be you also merciful (GP 
L55).
Although it is difficult to ascertain whether Maimonides viewed intellectual or moral 
perfection as the goal of life, it is possible to affirm that he viewed moral virtue as 
essential to intellectual perfection, and therefore essential to the realisation of the imago 
Dei. We should also remember that Maimonides interpreted the Law in terms of the two­
fold nature o f the person: our contemplative end and our political nature. The recognition 
that both natures were important to Maimonides helps the reader the overcome these 
seeming contradictions.48 So although a clear answer to the question o f the relevance of 
ethics to Maimonides’ interpretation of imago Dei is quite difficult to attain for reasons 
just discussed, we can certainly say that Maimonides’ idea o f human perfection exhibited 
a deep concern for, and connection with, the ethical life.
2.2.5 The Attainment of the Ideal
Having established the importance of intellectual perfection for Maimonides’ idea of 
imago Dei, the discussion will turn to the manner in which this perfection can be attained. 
What was Maimonides’ perception o f our capacity for the realisation of his vision?49 If 
the imago Dei concerns the intellect in actu, does it hold any significance for those whose 
intellects remain in the state of potentiality? According to Yair Lorberbaum,
48 Raymond L. Weiss discusses the importance o f both aspects o f human nature to Maimonides: ‘To 
understand Maimonides, it is necessary to attend to which point o f view dominates the discussion in a given 
context. ’ Maimonides ’ Ethics, p. 3.
49 Whether Maimonides considered the state of intellectual perfection to be attainable is considered by 
Aviezer Ravitsky, ‘To the Utmost of Human Capacity: Maimonides on the Days o f  the Messiah’, in 
Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies, ed. by Joel Kramer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 221-256.
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Maimonides’ conception of the imago Dei excludes the overwhelming majority o f people 
from its remit:
For Maimonides, Tzelem Elohim is not the intellect as human potential but the 
intellect in actu. Only one whose intellect is ‘in his most perfect and excellent 
state’ is in God’s image. In other worlds, only those who reach the highest level of 
philosophical apprehension are for Maimonides in the image of God.5
Can any person attain intellectual perfection? For Maimonides, it seems not. He writes 
that ‘these matters are only for a few solitary individuals of a very special sort, not for the 
multitude’ (GP 1.55). For this reason, they should be hidden from the beginner, and ‘he 
should be prevented from taking them up, just as a small baby is prevented from taking 
coarse foods and from lifting heavy weights’ (GP 1.55).
Maimonides argues that the diverse nature o f human species — whereby ‘two 
persons may be so different from each other in every respect that they appear to belong to 
two different classes’ -  is a distinguishing factor between human beings and other animals 
(GP 11.40). In recognition of our diversity, we are each given different abilities and we 
have been created to allow for the fact that some people are ruled by others. In order to 
counterbalance our diverse natures and bring order to society, the leader must ‘complete 
every shortcoming, remove every excess, and prescribe for the conduct o f all, so that the 
natural variety should be counterbalanced by the uniformity o f legislation, and the order 
of society be well established’ (GP 11.40).
Ultimately, though, the pursuit of intellectual attainment is, for Maimonides, a 
solitary pursuit that pertains to the individual person alone (GP III.27). Though 
Maimonides emphasises the ceremonial acts that are essential to the life o f every Jew -  
and was meticulous in their observance in his own life -  he prioritises intellectual 
worship.51 Intellectual worship requires solitude and time apart from the practical affairs 
of family life. One should increase the time spent in diligent observation and study ‘with 
God or striving to reach Him’ and reduce the time spent ‘with others and not striving to 
approach Him’ (GP 111.51). Perhaps Maimonides does not give due consideration to the 
fact that such solitude and study would not be possible for everybody to realise in equal 
measure. We are reminded of the famous saying of the second century Tanna, Simeon
50 Yair Lorberbaum, ‘Human Dignity in the Jewish Tradition’, in The Cambridge Handbook o f Human 
Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. by Marcus Düwell et aL, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp. 135-147 (p. 141).
51 Herbert A. Davidson discusses examples of Maimonides’ ‘meticulous’ observance o f ceremonial 
practices. Maimonides the Rationalist (Oxford: The Littman Library o f Jewish Civilisation, 2011), p. 296.
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Ben Azzai: ‘My soul is in love with the Torah; the world can be carried on by others’.52 It 
would not be unfair to suppose that this aspect of Maimonides’ thought exhibits a certain 
elitism, as well as a somewhat deterministic view of what the ‘multitude’ is capable of 
understanding.
Tamar Rudavsky writes that what she identifies as intellectual elitism in 
Maimonides ‘is grounded in a form of biological or psycho-physical determinism, 
according to which our intellectual abilities are already determined by our very bodily 
constitution’.53 Rudavsky cites 1.34 of the Guide as evidence of the fact that for 
Maimonides -  in her words -  ‘the multitude cannot be taught the divine sciences’.54 
However, we should note that Maimonides does not write that the multitude cannot learn 
metaphysics but rather that ‘instruction cannot begin with metaphysics’ (GP 1.34). He 
goes on to posit five reasons for this: (i) the difficulty o f the subject; (ii) the initial 
insufficiency of the intelligence of the person; (iii) impatience of the person with the 
necessary preparatory studies; (iv) unsuitable temperament and (v) the necessary attention 
due to one’s material needs and those o f one’s family. Everyone must, however, be 
taught about the unity and incorporeality of God.
These reasons, though perhaps a little deterministic and generalised, are not 
unrealistic. In fact, they illustrate a certain practical awareness of a thinker who did, after 
all, spend a decade relating the minutiae of Jewish law to the lived circumstances of the 
Jewish community in writing the Mishneh Torah. Maimonides recognised that the 
ultimate intellectual perfection can only be attained after the first perfection -  the welfare 
of the body -  has been attended to. We cannot attend to that which leads to our 
permanent preservation when, Maimonides acknowledges, we are hungry or thirsty or hot 
or cold (GP 111.27). Maimonides writes of the ‘two-fold perfection’ at the heart of Mosaic 
Law: ‘The true Law, I mean the Law of Moses inculcates this two-fold perfection, and 
even indicates that it is the design of the Law to lead men to the attainment of them’ (GP
52 BT Yebamoth 63b, trans. by Israel W. Slotki, (London: The Soncino Press, 1984), p. 125. This saying 
arises in the course of a Talmudic exchange, referred to in Chapter One, relating to the importance of 
propagation for maintaining the imago Dei. Ben Azzai is defending his right to remain childless against the 
charge of R. Jacob and R. Eliezer that his actions are akin to bloodshed in diminishing the image (Genesis 
9:6). Interestingly, Maimonides, against the grain o f medieval jurists, ascribed normativity to Ben Azzai’s 
position: ‘When a person’s soul desires Torah at all times and is obsessed with its [study] as 
was ben Azzai, and clings to it throughout his life, without marrying, he is not considered to have 
transgressed’. MT, Laws o f  Marriage, 15.3.
53 T. M. Rudavsky, Maimonides (Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 25.
54 Rudavsky, Maimonides, p. 25.
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111.27).55 Maimonides views the role of Mosaic as the prevention o f injustice and the 
establishment of positive inter-human relations.56 The Law, correctly observed, results in 
temperance, something for which we should strive, once our physical needs are met (GP 
111.33). A cooperative society allows for the realisation of bodily perfection, or physical 
health. This, in turn, is the medium through which intellectual perfection can be realised. 
Such perfection should be desirable to every person, since it opens the gate to prophecy, 
the highest form of moral and intellectual development and the closest we can come to 
achieving conjunction with the divine in this life. The true prophet stands at ‘the highest 
level and the ultimate perfection possible for his species’ (GP 11.36).
2.2.6 Prophecy as a Cognitive Power
The prophet, Maimonides asserts, is one whose intellect is in tune with the emanation of 
the Active Intellect, whose source is God. The following passage illustrates the high 
standards Maimonides presumes for those upon whom the gift of prophecy is bestowed. 
Assuming that prophecy will come to the exceedingly wise person who is in perfect 
health, Maimonides continues as follows:
[This person] will, when studying esoterical philosophy and is attracted by those 
elevated issues and is o f an appropriate temperament to understand and comprehend 
them, and sanctifies himself by moving away from anybody who concerns himself 
with ephemeral matters, and encourages himself not to have any thoughts about 
useless matters and its contrivances, have his thoughts permanently attuned to 
above, from under God’s Throne, to understand the pure and holy forms, and looks 
upon the wisdom of God in its entirety, from the first form till the centre o f the 
Earth, and sees in them God’s greatness, and then prophecy will immediately come 
to him.57
Maimonides goes on to describe the transformation of the person at the time when 
prophecy comes to them, a process David Blumenthal refers to as ‘intellectual
* ■ 58mysticism’. At that point, the person will rise above the level of other wise men and
55 ‘Thus the godly community becomes pre-eminent, reaching a twofold perfection. By the first perfection I 
mean, man’s spending his life in his world under the most agreeable and congenial conditions. The second 
perfection would constitute the achievement of intellectual objectives, each in accordance with his native 
powers.’, Epistle to Yemen in A Maimonidean Reader, ed. by Isadore Twersky (New York: Behrman House, 
1972), pp. 437-463 (p. 442-3).
56 See Kellner, Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1991), pp. 71-73.
57 The Laws and Basic Principles o f  the Torah 7.1, trans. by Immanuel M. O’Levy (1993), 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/rambam-yesodei-hatorah.txt (accessed 1 May 2012).
58 David Blumenthal describes the process as one of ‘corresponding evidences. The evidence of these senses 
is abstracted and compared with abstract ideas which are already in the mind. If the correspondence is 
complete, truth or knowledge or intellect in actu is established. These abstract ideas that are already in the
become like an angel. Maimonides advises caution in relation to the recognition of a true
prophet who prophesises publicly. 59 In order to ascertain that the prophecy is genuine
and not plagiarised, one looks to the character of the prophet, which should display a
rejection of bodily pleasures (GP 11.40). Having determined the character of the prophet,
one then looks to the degrees of prophecy which Maimonides details. Maimonides’
depiction o f prophecy proceeds from the first degree, which is the receiving of divine
assistance in order to perform a good or great act, to the eleventh degree, which is an
encounter with an angel (GP II. 45). Different degrees of prophecy may be attained by
those who possess the faculty at various times throughout their lives.60 Though the
prophecy of Moses is depicted as exceptional, there is a sense in Maimonides’ writings
that other forms prophecy are attainable, that they are something for which we should
strive. Though ultimately subject to the will o f God, for Maimonides, ‘it is a natural thing
for everyone who according to his natural disposition is fit for prophecy [...] to become a
prophet’ (GP 11.32). The perfection of the intellect is key, as Herbert Davidson details:
The centrality of intellect for Maimonides and the attendant minimizing of a direct 
role o f God in human affairs cannot be stressed too often or too strongly: Before a 
human being may hope for the gift o f prophecy, he must perfect his intellect, for 
only then will he receive the emanation of the active intellect in the desired 
fashion; God limits his direct role to denying prophecy to some who would 
otherwise prophesy.61
However, although prophecy is a cognitive power, and thus almost a natural phenomenon, 
it opens the prophet to a realm that exceeds the power o f speculation. There is a definite 
sense, in Maimonides’ writings, that it is to prophecy we turn when we have reached the 
limits o f philosophy and science.62 True prophecy is reliant on perfection in the intellect 
and the imagination. Emanation from the Active Intellect comes ‘first to the rational 
faculty and then emanate upon the imaginative faculty’ (GP 11.36). As Leo Strauss 
explains:
mind, however, are not “innate” but are emanated to the human intellect from the divine intellect (that is, the 
Agent Intelligence)’. ‘Maimonides’ Intellectual Mysticism and the Superiority of the Prophecy of Moses’, 
Approackes to the Study o f  Medieval Judaism, ed. by D. Blumenthal (Chico, Scholars Press: 1984), pp. 27- 
52.
59 Maimonides’ distinction between public and private prophecy is discussed by Howard Kreisel, 
Maimonides1 Political Thought: Studies in Ethics, Law and the Human Ideal (New York: State University 
of New York Press, 1999), pp. 24-28.
60 Maimonides derives each of the degrees of prophecy from scripture, Samson being held as an exemplar of 
the first degree and Abraham of the eleventh. Moses is depicted as being exceptional among the prophets 
since his mind remained ‘connected to God, and God’s glory never left him at all; light emanated from his 
face, and he was holy like an angel’. The Laws and Basic Principles o f  the Torah, 7.6.
61 Herbert Davidson, Maimonides: The Man and his Works, p. 377.
62 Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, p. 287.
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Since in the case of prophecy, not only the intellect (as in the case of philosophical 
knowledge) but also the power of imagination is influenced by the Active Intellect, 
prophecy is [...] ‘‘the highest stage o f man and the most extreme perfection that 
can be found in the human race”. Even on this ground, the prophet is 
unconditionally superior to the philosopher, and all the more to other men [...] He 
can know directly what other men can only know indirectly.63
This, o f course, makes prophecy most desirable. Interestingly, Abraham Heschel assumes 
that Maimonides himself greatly desired to transcend the limitations of his own intellect 
in order to solve those philosophical problems that troubled him, to ‘peep behind the veil’, 
as Heschel puts it: ‘Prophecy was considered by him a cognitive power, and whoever was 
master o f that capacity could reach places where unaided reason faltered’.64 Heschel 
does not have any direct Maimonidean statement to draw on since he did not make his 
‘yearning for prophecy’ public. However, Heschel argues, Maimonides’ ‘secret’ comes 
forth ‘in hints scattered through his writings, slight in some places and fuller in others’.65 
Heschel concludes that if  ‘such spiritual heroes existed in his generation, men worthy of 
having the divine spirit rest on them, it is certain that he counted himself among them’.66
Before moving on to Aquinas’ treatment o f imago Dei, we will draw together 
some of the insights gained through our consideration o f Maimonides’ account of the 
concept. There is, for Maimonides, no higher ideal than the knowledge of God, that 
which is attained through the intellect in actut the imago Dei. Maimonides writes that 
‘nothing endures to all eternity save knowledge of the ruler of the universe.’67 It is this 
truth, and our capacity for knowledge of God, that enables us to ‘walk in the paths of 
righteousness’. Much of Maimonides’ philosophy consists in the recognition of the limits 
of human knowledge, particularly as regards metaphysics, the ‘divine sciences’: we can 
have no positive knowledge of God. Religious practice and the observance of the 
commandments enable the attainment of the ideal religious life which, like the ideal 
philosophical life, is characterised by contemplation: ‘When you have arrived by way of 
intellectual research at a knowledge of God and His works, then commence to devote 
yourselves to Him, try to approach Him and strengthen the intellect, which is the link that
63 Leo Strauss, Philosophy and Law: Essays Towards the Understanding o f  Maimonides and his 
Predecessors, (Philadelphia: JPS, 1987), p. 85.
64 Abraham Heschel, ‘Did Maimonides Believe That He Had Attained the Rank of Prophet?’ in Prophetic 
Inspiration after the Prophets: Maimonides and Other Medieval Authorities, ed. by M. M. Faierstein 
(Hoboken: KTAV, 1996), pp. 69-126 (p. 70).
65 Heschel, p. 79.
66 Abraham Heschel, Maimonides: A Biography, trans. by Joachim Neugroschelp (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, Giroux, 1982), p. 21.
67 MT Laws o f the Mezuzah, 6:13.
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joins you to Him5 (GP 111.51). Though acknowledging his tendency to prioritise the 
intellectually privileged, we should not dismiss Maimonides as elitist. Maimonides 
envisioned a just society attained through observance of the Law and he recognised, to 
some extent, that poverty restricts our ability to study and contemplate in order to progress 
towards intellectual attainment. However, we must conclude, Maimonides’ idea of the 
realisation of imago Dei is not universal. Though every human person can, in theory, 
strive towards intellectual apprehension, Maimonides’ concept o f the imago Dei has an 
undeniable emphasis on the privileged few, those who attain intellectual apprehension.
2.3 Imago Dei in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas
The discussion will now turn to the understanding of the concept o f imago Dei in the 
writings o f Thomas Aquinas. Like Maimonides, Aquinas engages Aristotelian philosophy 
in the development o f his dynamic theology of imago Dei, forming a synthesis between 
the philosophic concept of the soul and the Christian idea o f deification -  a growth in 
likeness to the Triune God -  that he inherited from the Patristic era. As William Dunphy 
writes: ‘Aquinas is following in the centuries-old footsteps o f the great Augustine, who 
saw true philosophy and true religion as one -  that is, as a love o f wisdom in which faith 
seeks to understand what it believes’.68 Aquinas, we will see, envisages a gradual and 
ascending realisation of the image of God within the person, enabling our participation in 
the divine life o f the Trinity.
For Aquinas, the human being is composed of one substance in which two 
components -  body and soul -  can be distinguished. The soul is the substantial form o f 
the body (ST 1.76.1). This means that the soul is that by which the body is actualised as 
human. The body is the instrument of the soul, through which the soul acts. Therefore, ‘it 
is clear that it is for the good of the soul to be united with a body’ (ST 1.89.1).69 As the 
first principle o f life, the soul is common to every animate creature. Although plants 
possess a nutritive soul, and animals possess a nutritive and sensory soul, the spiritual soul 
-  comprised o f nutritive, sensory and rational components -  is particular to human beings. 
Together, these components, which make up the spiritual soul, constitute a single 
substantive form. The faculties of the soul can, however, be differentiated. Although the
68 William Dunphy, ‘Maimonides and Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Beatitude’, in Studies in Thomistic 
Theology, ed. by Paul Lockey (Houston: Centre for Thomistic Studies, 1995), pp. 301-316 (p.315).
69 Idit Dobbs-Weinstein writes that it ‘cannot be overemphasized that, for Aquinas, the unity of body and 
soul is substantial and hence, properly speaking, neither the soul nor the body is the principle of 
individuation, rather the very union is’, p. 130. Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Limits o f  Reason 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).
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nutritive and sensitive powers of soul are destroyed with the body, the intellective soul is 
self-subsistent and immaterial:
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an 
operation ‘per se’ apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an 
operation ‘per se.’ For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we 
do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must 
conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, 
is something incorporeal and subsistent’ (ST 1.75.2).70
This is similar to Aristotle’s idea of divine intellect discussed earlier: the intellective and 
volitional powers are what actualises the soul and can therefore be thought o f as 
somewhat independent o f the union of the soul with the body. Aquinas refers to Aristotle 
on this point: ‘And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate, 
because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ’ (ST 1.76.1). Further ascertaining the 
independence of the intellective faculties, Aquinas writes that the soul has ‘an operation 
and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the 
intellect’ (ST I.76.1).71
The intellective component o f the human soul was, for Aquinas, the distinguishing 
factor o f human existence and thus essential to his understanding o f the imago Dei. While 
all creatures bear some resemblance to God, a likeness o f kind is required to constitute 
image: ‘But things are likened to God, first and most generally in so far as they are; 
secondly in so far as they are alive; thirdly and lastly in so far as they have discernment 
and intelligence’ (ST 1.93.2). However, simply equating the imago Dei with the capacity 
for rational activity fails to recognise the dynamism of Aquinas’ vision of the imago Dei, 
located as it is at the interplay between nature, grace and glory.
70Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 1 6 -1 7 . For Aquinas, Stump argues, ‘the human 
soul has a double character. On the one hand, unlike the forms of other material things, it is created by God 
as an individual entity in its own right, able to exist by itself as do purely immaterial angels. On the other 
hand, like the form of any corporeal thing, it exists in the composite it configures, and it comes into
existence only with that composite, not before it.’
71 The self-subsistence of the soul is an Avicennian idea, one that is not shared by Maimonides. For
Maimonides, we recall, human souls are not intrinsically immortal; only the perfected intellectual faculty
survives death. The Avicennian roots of self-subsistence are discussed by Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, 
Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, p. 83, 106. See also Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and his 
Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.522.
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2.3.1 Nature» Grace and Glory
Aquinas treats o f nature, grace and glory separately in terms of their relation to the image. 
Like Maimonides, Aquinas understands the commandments -  the ‘old law5 -  as a remedy 
to the loss of the state of reason that characterised our original state, in which reason was 
‘submissive to God, the lower powers to the reason, the body to the soul5 (ST 1.95.1), a 
state in which ‘man had all the virtues’ (ST 1.95.3).1 The original state of righteousness, 
reason under God, was not an entirely natural state but was in itself dependent upon ‘a gift 
of supernatural grace’ (ST 1.95.1). The Law was given when ‘natural law began to be 
obscured by reason of the proliferation o f sin’ (ST 1.2.98). Aquinas illustrates a 
supersessionist conception of the relation between the ‘old law’ and the salvation that we 
attain through Christ. The Torah is given intermediary status ‘between the law of nature 
and the law o f grace’ as that which ‘prepared the way for salvation which was to come 
through Christ’ (ST I-II.98.4).2
Aquinas elaborates Augustine’s idea of original sin, though he distances himself 
from ideas of hereditary guilt since ‘the fact o f having a defect by the way of origin seems 
to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary’ (ST I-II.81.1). He 
instead emphasises the common nature o f all who are ‘bom of Adam’, akin to the 
members of one’s body:
Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is 
called ‘original,’just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members 
is called ‘actual.’ And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the 
body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of 
the man, for which reason it is called a ‘human sin’; so original sin is not the sin of 
this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent 
[...] (ST 1.2.81).
1 ‘Now all that the virtues are is a set o f perfections by which the reason is directed towards God and the 
lower powers are managed according to reason’ (ST Ia.95.3).
~ See Matthew A. Tapie, Aquinas on Israel and the Church: The Question o f Supersessionism in 
the Theology o f Thomas Aquinas (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014). For a Jewish 
perspective on Aquinas’ supersessionism see Michael Wyschogrod, ‘A Jewish Reading of Thomas 
Aquinas’, in Understanding Scripture: Explorations o f  Jewish and Christian Traditions o f  
Interpretation ed. by Clemens Thoma and Michael Wyschogrod (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), 
pp. 125-38.
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Though we do not bear individual responsibility for original sin, it is part o f our nature, 
‘Christ alone excepted’ (ST 1.2.81).3 Our natural state, though fallen and corrupt, still 
possesses the aptitude for understanding and loving God. This aptitude, which Aquinas 
identifies with the imago Dei, is found in the mind, which is common to all human 
persons. Within the mind there is a natural desire to know God: ‘For there resides in 
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees (ST 1.12.1).4 
Yet, since God is beyond the capacities of sensory experience, it is difficult to speak of the 
created human person ‘knowing’ the infinite God.5 Sin presents an obstacle to the 
realisation o f this aptitude since it turns the soul ‘to what is contrary to God’s law’ and 
‘prevents the reception o f grace’.6 However, although sin diminishes the aptitude for 
grace, it never fully removes it. There is no state of ungraced nature in Aquinas’ thought, 
something to be kept in mind in order to avoid presenting nature, grace and glory as 
entirely distinct stages of the realization of the image.7
The image of God is further realised in those who habitually know and love God, 
though imperfectly, through grace (ST 1.93.4). Aquinas employs the Pauline parallelism 
between the sin o f Adam and the grace of Christ:
Just as Adam’s sin is transmitted to all who are bom of Adam corporally, so is the 
grace of Christ transmitted to all that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and 
Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal o f sin o f their first parent, but also 
unto the removal o f actual sins, and the obtaining o f glory (ST 1.2.81).
3 Timothy McDermott writes that this idea is ‘dependent on a conception o f man as all having one will in 
certain respects. The one will which Thomas identifies is the will o f Adam reproducing a faulty nature, a 
will which runs through reproduced humanity. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: A Concise 
Translation, ed. by Timothy McDermott (London; Methuen, 1989), p. 223.
4The influence o f Aristotle on Aquinas’ idea of knowledge and knowing is discussed by Jan A. Aertsen, 
‘Aquinas’ Philosophy in its Historical Setting’ in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. by Norman 
Kretzmaiui and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 12-38 (p. 31).
5 As Brian Davies explains, there is ‘no form o f God existing in matter which is raised to a level o f meaning 
by its reception immaterially in the mind’. Brian Davies, The Thought o f  Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 251.
6Aquinas, On Evil, 11.11, trans. by Richard Regan, ed. by Brian Davies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), p. 135.
?Fergus Kerr notes that the Manichean denial o f the goodness o f creation was held, by Aquinas, as the 
deepest error to which his age was prone: 'Thomas knows of no instances o f pure human nature, neither 
unfallen nor ungraced. No doubt he would have admitted the logical possibility o f pure nature but there is 
no sign he was interested in any other possibility other than nature unfallen and always already graced 
(Adam) and nature fallen and always already capax gratiae'. After Aquinas: Versions o f Thomism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002), p. 144.
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The soul of the rational creature is given the capacity to receive grace, ‘and the grace 
received strengthens the soul to perform requisite acts’.8 The gift o f grace ‘perfects the 
rational creature, putting him in a state not only of using the created gift but also of 
enjoying the divine person himself’ (ST 1.43.3). The state of grace allows us to live a 
Christian life and also, as Jean-Pierre Torrell argues, equips us ‘for the highest mystical 
experience, the enjoyment of the divine Persons5.9 Yet even the realised intellect is 
limited: we can never comprehend God.10 Comprehension -  the perfect knowledge of 
God -  is not attainable for the created intellect. During the course o f  our earthly lives, the 
soul has its being in corporeal matter so it can only know that which has a form in matter. 
This means that we cannot see the essence o f God in this life.
The fullest realisation of the image consists in the perfect knowledge and love of 
God, the image by likeness of glory. The blessed, who see God, are made ‘deiform5 or 
like to God, enjoying eternal life which consists in the vision of God. Likeness completes 
the image: It signifies the ‘expression and perfection of the image5 (ST 1.93.9). The 
evolution of the person -  creation, re-creation and likeness -  is never beyond the love and 
grace o f God, ever-present in our lives: ‘The light o f glory is the same as grace in its 
consummate stage, the same grace energising us in the acts o f our life.511
2.3.2 The Exclusive Realisation of the Image
The above offers an outline of Aquinas5 basic treatment o f imago Dei in the Summa 
Theologiae, an easier task than with Maimonides whose treatment o f the theme is more 
implicit and dispersed. From this brief survey, we see that Aquinas explicitly accords the 
imago Dei -  at its basic level -  to every human person, something that we do not find in 
Maimonides. However, we still see the potentiality/actuality distinction in Aquinas5 idea 
of imago Dei, which might mean that two thinkers have more in common than one might 
first assume. Further discussion is needed to ascertain how exactly Aquinas distinguishes 
between the potential and the actual stages o f the realisation of the image. In what way
*OnEvil 11.11, p. 135.
9Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: Vol 2 Spiritual Master, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, The 
Catholic University o f America Press, 2003), p. 97.
10 ‘But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of 
every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If  therefore the mode o f anything’s being exceeds the 
mode o f the knower, it must result that the knowledge o f that object is above the nature of the knower. 
Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence o f G od’ (ST 1.12.4).
u Commentaiy on the Sentences 3.23.2, discussed by Thomas F. O ’Meara in Thomas Aquinas: Theologian 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 150.
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does intellectual capacity feature in his scheme? Does Aquinas share Maimonides’ elitist 
tendencies?
At first glance, Aquinas does not seem overly concerned with matters o f intellectual 
attainment. Immediately following his outline o f nature, grace and glory, Aquinas writes 
that the ‘first stage of image is found in all men, the second only in the just, and the third 
only in the blessed’ (ST 1.93.4). This, Aquinas leaves undeveloped in Summa L93, though 
it seems self-explanatory: The imago Dei is a universal concept, which we actualise 
through ethical action, and fully realise through the grace of Christ in the hereafter. 
However, if  we read a little further, we see that Aquinas shares Maimonides’ deterministic 
tendencies, since he distinguishes between male and female capacity to realise the imago 
Dei. This distinction relates not to the primary location of the image, which is the 
intelligent nature of the person, but to the actualisation and realisation of the image.
According to Aquinas’ interpretation o f Genesis 1:27, the ‘male and female’ clause 
does not define the imago Dei, but indicates rather the fact that ‘the image of God is 
common to both sexes, being in the mind which has no distinction o f sex’ (ST 1.93.2). 
Aquinas also remarks that ‘if we consider the intellectual nature in which the image 
principally resides, the quality of image is found equally in man and woman’ (ST I. 93.4). 
For Aquinas, this means that the gender distinction will not be relevant to the afterlife, the 
ultimate state. 12 This seems to indicate Aquinas’ basic position but, like Augustine, he 
struggles to reconcile the egalitarianism of Genesis 1:27 with the hierarchical assumptions 
of 1 Corinthians 11:7-9. He writes, referencing the Corinthians text, that the secondary 
realisation o f the image -  the stages of grace and glory -  is found only in men, ‘for man is 
the beginning and end of woman, just as God is the beginning and end o f all creation’ (ST
1.93.4). Thus, Aquinas derives from Paul the conviction that ‘it is common to man and 
woman to be the image of God; but it is immediately characteristic of man to be the glory 
o f God.’13
If we read these passages in conjunction with Summa 1.92, where the role o f the 
woman in creation is explored, we uncover a little o f Aquinas’ motivation for this stance,
12 John Finnis writes that the ‘starting-point is that the mind, the intellect and will, which make us images of 
the divine -  our human kind of soul or spirit -  belongs, without distinction or difference, to the males and 
females o f the human species; it is found “as much in man as in woman”.’ Aquinas: Moral, Political and 
Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 171-2.
13Aquinas, Commentaiy on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. by Fabian Larcher, 
dhspriory.org/thomas/SSlCor.htm. [Accessed 20 July 2014]. Aquinas’ treatment of this text is discussed by 
Kari Elisabeth Borresen, ‘God's Image. Is Woman Excluded? Medieval Interpretation o f Gen. 1,27 and 1 
Cor. 11,7’ in The Image o f God: Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition, (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1995), 
p p .210-36.
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beyond his reading of Paul. Here, we find deterministic references to differing intellectual 
capacities, quite akin to Maimonides5 assessment of ‘the multitude5. Aquinas argues that 
men alone are destined for the ‘nobler function of intellectual operation5 (ST 1.92.1). 
Furthermore, because Aquinas holds that the exercise o f reason is more characteristic of 
the man, it is natural that women should be subject to men.14 Aquinas5 supposition that 
creation initiates a natural subjection of women to men, as well his famous reference to 
the woman as a defective male, are o f course indebted to Aristotelian biology and shaped 
by Aquinas5 cultural context.15
Though much more could be written about Aquinas5 treatment o f gender, and its 
reception in feminist literature, it is necessary to maintain our focus on Aquinas5 
intellectualist interpretation of imago Dei. From his references to gender, we can 
conclude that because women, as he perceived them, possessed inferior intellectual 
capacity, they did not share the ability of men to actualise and fully realise the imago Dei. 
However, Aquinas5 reference to the fact that our redeemed selves will be ungendered 
indicates that it is the rational soul, that possessed by male and female, that survives 
death. This distinguishes Aquinas from Maimonides, who designates the perfected 
intellect as the immortal element. We will bring Maimonides and Aquinas into dialogue 
on this issue further in the discussion. Firstly, before moving on, we note that although 
his exclusion of women renders Aquinas5 theology of imago Dei problematic in light of 
the insights o f feminist theological anthropology, this should not eclipse his positive 
contribution to the evolution of the concept o f imago Dei. The contemporary reader of 
Aquinas naturally takes an egalitarian approach to intellectual capacities. It is possible,
14 Anne E. Carr views the incorporation o f Aquinas’ anthropology with his Christology as particularly, 
problematic with regard to women: ‘The logic of Aquinas’ Christo logical pattern rest on the notion of 
“headship,” which in one sense is an organic model in which Christ is the head o f the body o f the faithful; 
when considered in another way it is a hierarchical and dominating model that is used to justify the 
subordination o f women’. Anne E. Carr, Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and Women’s 
Experience (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), p. 164. Another expression of the feminist critique is 
found in the work of Mary Aquin O ’Neill who writes that ‘Thomas Aquinas held quite clearly that the male 
sex was normative for humanity and that the female was the defective instance of human being. This 
anthropology underlies Aquinas’ argument for forbidding priestly ordination to women as well as other 
considerations o f her role in the church’. ‘The Mystery o f Being Human Together’ in Freeing Theology: 
The Essentials o f  Theology in Feminist Perspective, ed. by Catherine Mowry LaCugna (San Francisco: 
Harper, 1993), pp. 139-160 (p. 148).
15 ‘For the active power in the seed of the male tends to produce something like itself, perfect in 
masculinity; but the procreation of a female is the result either o f the debility o f the active power, or o f some 
change effected by external influences, like the south wind, for example, which is damp, as we are told by 
Aristotle’ (ST 1.92.1). In De Generatione Anamalium, Aristotle writes that ‘the woman is as it were an 
impotent male, for it is through a certain incapacity that the female is female, being incapable of concocting 
the nutriment in its last stage into semen’. 1.737A27 in The Oxford Translation o f Aristotle. Vol. 5, ed. by 
Ross, W. D., trans. by Arthur Platt (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1912).
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therefore, to contextualise and bracket Aquinas’ view of women’s potential to actualise the 
image, and apply his rich elaboration of the actualisation process to both sexes.16
2.3.3 Imaging God through Word and Love
Turning, at this point, to the actualisation process, we observe that although Aquinas
shares Maimonides’ intellectual emphasis, he also employs a Trinitarian scheme that is 
heavily indebted to the thought o f Augustine. Following Augustine, Aquinas centres his 
Trinitarian interpretation on the active mind, which is the part o f the person that he feels 
most closely resembles the divine. He argues that the image o f God is realised when the 
soul approaches the portrayal of the divine Trinity, through the activity o f the mind.17
If then we are to observe an image of the divine Trinity in the soul, it must be
looked for principally at the point where the soul approaches most closely, in so far
as this is possible at all, to a portrayal o f the divine persons in kind [...] And so an 
image of the Trinity is to be looked for in the mind first and foremost in terms of 
activity, in so far as out of the awareness we have we form an internal word by 
thinking, and from this burst out into actual love’ (ST I. 93.7).18
The image of the Trinity is first portrayed by activity in the mind -  the mind as it is 
engaged in thinking -  and from this ‘actual love’. Aquinas draws an analogy between the 
Triune procession of Word and Love and our human activities o f intelligence and love:
Given that the uncreated Trinity is distinguished according to the procession of the 
Word from the One who offers it and the procession of Love from both the one and 
the other [...] we may then state that in the rational creation, in whom are found the
16A s regards contextualisation, John Finnis argues: "The assumptions and social forms o f his era, and his 
corroborating Aristotelian generalization about domination by emotion, provide a distorted image of the 
domestic partnership o f  man and women [„.] Still Aquinas’ principles, and even his particular conclusions 
taken as a whole, do not underwrite domination and exploitation of wives by husbands. For him, authority 
is always responsibility [...] .’ Aquinas, p. 174. Aquinas’ view of marriage is also discussed by Colleen 
McClusky: ‘Although he emphasizes its procreative aspects, he does not neglect what is surely one of the 
most obvious and valuable goods of marriage, the profound love that exists between spouses in the very best 
examples o f its type.’, ‘An Unequal Relationship between Equals: Thomas Aquinas on Marriage’, History 
o f  Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2007), 1-18 (p. 1).
17 John P. O ’Callaghan comments on the differing perspectives of Aquinas and Augustine regarding the 
mind: ‘St. Thomas does not think that in one’s knowledge of the mind one can engage in a fundamental 
separation from one’s knowledge of material things to apprehend the mind in a kind of pristine clarity. In 
that case, there is no room for a robust methodological distinction between the “inner” and “outer” man.’ 
‘Imago Dei: A Test Case for Aquinas’ Augustinianism’ in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed. by Michael 
Dauphinais, Barry David, Matthew Levering (Washington: Catholic University o f America Press, 2007), pp. 
100-145, (p. 110).
18Fergus Kerr comments on the importance o f the Trinity to the dynamism o f Aquinas’ thought: ‘Thomas 
has a very dynamic concept o f the nature of the triune Godhead -  very much as a triad of mutually related 
activities; so it is no surprise that the image o f this God occurs at the “event” of a human being’s actually 
knowing and loving.’ After Aquinas: Versions ofThomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 127-8.
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procession of the Word in the intelligence and the procession Love in the will, 
there is an image of the uncreated Trinity [...] (ST 1.93.6).
There are two processions here: knowing and loving. When the intellect knows 
something it forms a concept, an inner word. The will then embraces that which is 
known. Embracing that which is known as good constitutes the procession of love. 
Imaging God consists in the turning of the rational soul towards God. This leads to the 
imperfect imitation of the divine processions o f the Triune God through our human acts of 
understanding and love.19
Such understanding is, however, greatly limited in this life due in part to the 
inability of human language to adequately express the reality o f God. Like Maimonides, 
Aquinas employs the use of negative theology -  ‘because concerning God we cannot 
know what he is, but what he is not5 -  though his theological language is more favourably 
disposed towards analogical reasoning.20 Aquinas proposes that the human person is 
related to God, as effect is related to cause (ST 1.13.5).21 Although we cannot know the 
essence of God, ‘we make use of his effects, either o f nature or o f grace, in place o f a 
definition’ (ST 1.7.1). Here, he differs from Maimonides, who cannot admit o f a relation 
of causation between creator and creature:
In this matter Rabbi Moses erred in many ways, for he wished to prove that there is 
no relation between God and the creature, because seeing that God is not a body he 
has no relation to time or place. Thus he considered only the relation which results 
from quantity and not that which arises from action and passion.22
19This is just an analogy; Aquinas is not positing a likeness o f substance for ‘whatever has an accidental 
existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no 
accident in God; for all in Him is His essence (ST 1.28.2). As Matthew Levering argues, the ‘interplay 
between Word and Spirit is far more mysterious than what we understand analogously from the human 
procession o f the intellect and will5. Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal o f  Trinitarian 
Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 159.
20 ST 1.3 Introduction. ‘In this way some words are used neither univocally nor purely equivocally o f  God 
and creatures, but analogically, for we cannot speak o f God at all except in the language we use of creatures, 
and so whatever is said both of God and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God as 
their source and cause in which all perfections of things pre-exist transcendently’ (ST 1.13.5).
21 See De Potentia Dei 7.7 and Summa Contra Gentiles 1.33. See Brian Davies, ‘Aquinas on What God is 
N ot’ in Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 227-243 and Kevin Hector, ‘Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: a re­
reformulation and recommendation’, Scottish Journal o f  Theology, 4 (2007), 377-393. As regards the 
Aquinas/Maimonides divergence and interdependence see Neil A. Stubbens, ‘Naming God: Moses 
Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas’, The Thomist, 54 (1990), 229-267 and Mercedes Rubio, Aquinas and 
Maimonides on the Possibility o f  Knowledge o f God: An Examination o f  the Quaestio De Attributis 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006) and For other influences on Aquinas’s apophaticism, see Gregory P. Rocca, 
Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay o f  Positive and Negative Theology 
(Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2004), pp. 3-27.
22De Potentia Dei, 7.10.
71
Unlike relation, Aquinas argues, both quantity and quality are accidents residing in the 
subject. A relation does not reside within the subject but signifies something that passes 
from the subject to something outside of itself. According to Aquinas, we come to our 
imperfect, creaturely understanding of God ‘through concepts appropriate to the 
perfections creatures receive from him5 (ST I.13.2).23 That which ‘pre-exists in God in a 
simple and unified way is divided amongst creatures as many and varied perfections5 (ST
1.13.4). Perfections exist primarily in God and derivatively in creatures: ‘When we say 
that God is good or wise we do not simply mean that he causes wisdom or goodness, but 
that he possesses these perfections transcendently5 (ST 1.13.7). Words such as ‘good5 and 
‘wise5 can indeed signify what God really is, ‘but they signify it imperfectly because 
creatures represent God imperfectly5 (ST 1.13.2).
Aquinas5 approach to theological language seems more realistic, and certainly more 
religiously appealing than Maimonides5 via negativa, a fact Aquinas himself recognised 
when he wrote, o f Maimonides5 aversion to the predication o f positive attributes o f God, 
that ‘this is not what people want to say when they talk about God. When a man speaks 
of the “living God55 he does not simply want to say that God is the cause of our lives or 
that he differs from a lifeless body5 (ST 1.13.3). As David Burrell argues, Aquinas 
recognises ‘the elasticity which ordinary usage demands o f certain term s5.24 It should be 
possible, therefore, to say that God is good. Since we use the term ‘good5 to describe 
many different effects of God on earth, we can use the term to describe the cause of this 
goodness. In other words, as a feature of creation, certain terms used within creaturely 
language have a transcendent dimension.
The above establishes that knowing and loving are the two pillars of Aquinas5 
Trinitarian interpretation of imago Dei and that knowledge of God is restricted by the 
limits of both intellect and language. However, we have yet to elaborate what exactly 
Aquinas means when he refers to the process that actualises our capacity for knowing and 
love i.e., the turning of the rational soul towards God. Does the ‘turning of the soul5 
denote a process o f rational activity that necessarily excludes those lacking this capacity?
23 Herbert McCabe writes that, for Aquinas, when we speak o f God, ‘although we know how to use our 
words, there is an important sense in which we do not know what they mean [...] We know how to talk 
about God, not because of any understanding of God, but because o f what we know about his creatures’. 
Summa Theologiae, appendix 3, Vol. 3 (London: Blackfriars, 1964).
24Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God, p. 67.
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2.3.4 Differing Rational Capacities
Aquinas’ idea of imago Dei is universal, at least at its basic level, since it pertains to our 
intellectual nature. Our capacity to realise the image is, however, dependent upon rational 
capacity:
[I]t is also natural to the mind that it has the power o f using reason to understand 
God, and it was in terms of such a power that we said that God’s image remains 
always in the mind; whether this image o f God is so faint -  so shadowy, we might 
say -  that it is practically non-existent, as in those who lack the use of reason; or 
whether it is dim and disfigured\ as in sinners; or whether it is bright and beautiful, 
as in the just, as Augustine says (ST I.93.4).25
This is an insightful paragraph, which contains three important points that are directly 
drawn from Augustine: (i) the image is ever-present in the mind; (ii) the image is 
disfigured through sin and (iii) the image is practically non-existent for those who lack the 
use o f reason. We also see another reference to the ‘just’ as those who are most able to 
actual ise the image.
As we will observe in the following chapters, contemporary interpreters, arguably
more mindful o f questions of inclusivity, tend to avoid the identification o f imago Dei
primarily in terms of reason on the grounds that could exclude those with profound
intellectual disability. Indeed the phrase ‘practically non-existent’ does not seem to offer
much hope for the status of such persons and their capacity to image God. However,
Aquinas’ ideas here are a little more complex than this Augustinian citation might
indicate. We should also consider the following passage:
When it is said that there is no ‘more’ or ‘less’ in substance, it does not mean that 
one kind of substance cannot be more perfect than the other but that one and the 
same individual does not belong to its kind sometimes more and sometimes less. 
Nor do various individuals belong to their kind some more, some less (ST 1.93.3).
This passage seems more hopeful; an individual cannot be ‘more human’ or ‘less human’. 
Their humanity is not dependent upon rational activity but rather upon the possession of a 
rational soul, something Aquinas envisages for every human person as evidenced by the 
fact that he writes o f the grace of sanctification received by the unborn child (ST 
1.68. II).26 The rational powers are always present in the soul even though the person may
23 This is drawn from Augustine: ‘Whether this image be so worn out as to be almost none at all, or whether 
it be obscure and defaced, or bright and beautiful, certainly it always is’ (Trin. XTV.4).
26 Jean-Pierre Torrell argues that capacity for knowledge o f God has ‘nothing to do with intellectual 
resources, and Thomas sees it to be perfectly realisable for people otherwise deprived o f all learned
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lack the use o f reason accidentally. In response to the question of whether practical 
reason is in all who have grace, Aquinas writes that baptised infants do in fact have 
practical reason, ‘as to disposition but not as to act, even as in the severely mentally 
impaired (amentibusY (ST 11-11.47.14). This is not the same as the lack o f reason in non­
human animals, who do not possess an intellective soul (ST IIL68.12). Aquinas’ idea of 
imago Dei would not exclude those who cannot exercise their rational faculties. The 
capacity to make moral decisions is neither necessary nor sufficient for spiritual 
perfection. The human capacity to realise the imago Dei -  imperfectly in this life — is 
dependent on grace. Furthermore, attaining our ultimate happiness, the beatific vision, is 
possible for every human person since ‘there is no created intellect o f so low a degree in 
its nature that it cannot be raised to this vision’.27
2.3.5 Likeness in Virtue
We mentioned above that while Maimonides strongly emphasised the intellectual 
perfection of Adam, for Aquinas, the original unfallen state was also characterised by the 
possession of ‘all the virtues’. Aquinas always emphasises human agency and 
participation in salvation, which is not an external good. Actualising the imago Dei, 
though ultimately dependent on God, is also a process within which we ourselves 
participate since it necessitates a Christian life, a live that is built on the love o f virtue. It 
is through virtue that we express our likeness to God: ‘Love of the word, which is
knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of “image”; but love o f virtue belongs to 
“likeness”, as virtue itself belongs to likeness’ (ST 1.93.9). Aquinas’ references to the 
‘just’ — those who realise the image -  can be understood in the context o f virtue. It is also 
on account o f virtue that Aquinas distinguishes our capacities for seeing God: He writes 
that ‘some are more virtuous, some less; and virtue is the way to happiness’.28
For Aquinas, the virtues reside in the intellectual and appetitive powers o f the 
soul. It is through these powers, the intellect and the will, that we know and love God and 
image the Triune God. In a departure from Maimonides, Aquinas assigns a relation 
between cognition and the appetitive faculty, envisaging the will as part o f the self-
knowledge because “this knowledge from which love springs is found abundantly among those who are 
fervent in their love o f God”.’ Saint Thomas Aquinas: Vol 2, Spiritual Master, trans. by Robert Royal 
(Washington: The Catholic University o f America Press, 2003), p. 98. See also Matthew Levering, ‘The 
imago Dei in David Novak and Thomas Aquinas: A Jewish Christian Dialogue’, The Thomist 72 (2008), 
259-311 (p. 300).
21 Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.57.
28 Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.58.
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subsisting intellective soul.29 The will is oriented towards the good, just as the intellect is 
oriented towards truth: ‘Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the 
universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone’ (ST I-II.2.3). 
The will is not compelled towards its end (the good) but reaches it rather through 
participation in intellectual deliberation: ‘[J]ust as the intellect inheres in first principles, 
so the will necessarily inheres in the final end, which is beatitude; for the end functions in 
operations as principles in speculation’ (ST 1.82.1). While the original ontological state 
was characterised by the complete submission of the soul to reason, the fall disrupted the 
internal relations between the intellect and will. Consequently, there arose a need for 
greater divine assistance to overcome the barrier between the will and its final end. The 
virtues also assume a more central role in the perfection of our intellect and will.
The intellectual virtues (wisdom, knowledge and understanding) perfect the 
intellective part o f the soul and the moral virtues (temperance, prudence, justice and 
courage) perfect the appetitive part. However, such ‘natural’ virtue, limited by human 
reason, can only get us so far:
The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic, vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue 
[wisdom], considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human 
reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as 
they surpass human reason (ST I-II.62.2).30
The theological virtues (faith, hope and love) are also related to the intellect and the will: 
faith to the intellect and hope and love to the will (ST I-II.62.3). The knowledge of God 
that is brought about through faith, though still imperfect in this life, is superior to the 
knowledge attained by the philosopher since ‘by faith we know certain things about God 
which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration’.31 While
29 Idit Dobbs-Weinstein writes that ‘for Maimonides the appetitive faculty has no direct relation to cognition 
and hence must be compelled to act in accordance with right order, Aquinas not only argues that there is an 
intellective appetite distinct from the natural appetitive inclination towards an object, but also, in 
maintaining that this power is the volitional faculty, he is maintaining in fact that it originates in the soul 
itself independently of its composition with the body’. Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Limits o f  Reason, 
p. 136.
0 Raymond L. Weiss compares the appropriation of the Aristotelian virtues in Aquinas and Maimonides. 
Maimonides, he writes, did not think of moral virtues as ‘unalterably fixed; the realm o f  morality has a 
certain malleability that makes possible the adaptation of philosophic ethics to the Law and, alternatively, 
the accommodation o f Jewish precepts to a framework that derives from philosophy [.„] Aquinas argues that 
precisely the ones set forth there [Nicomachean Ethics] exhaust the account o f  the human virtues from the 
supranatural virtues o f faith, hope, and charity. Maimonides, who remains completely upon a naturalistic 
plane, specifies only human virtues, but then takes into account the teachings o f the Law in the way that he 
fashions them.’ Maimonides' Ethics, p.2.
31 Summa Contra Gentile 3.40.
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Aquinas distinguishes between natural and supernatural virtues, all virtues -  intellectual, 
moral and theological -  interpenetrate since ‘grace does not destroy, but perfects nature’ 
(ST L1.8). All virtues, in conjunction with the corresponding gifts o f the Holy Spirit, 
graciously initiate the dynamic process of divinisation. While Aquinas is directly reliant 
on the Aristotelian virtues, his account of human action is ultimately distinguished by its 
goal: beatitudo rather than the Aristotelian eudaemonia32
Mow there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature. The 
first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure 
called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic, x) says that man’s ultimate 
happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can 
behold the best intelligible object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still 
another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby ‘we shall see God as He 
is.’ This is beyond the nature o f every created intellect (ST 1.62.1).
Ultimately, our soul is intended for union with the divine, beatitudo. Or, expressing the 
idea philosophically, Scott MacDonald writes that ‘the end, completion, or perfection o f a 
natural substance is its having fully actualized its specifying capacity [or power], its 
actually performing the activity for which its form or nature provides the capacity’.33 
Through the union of the intellect with God, who is pure form and ‘sheer actuality’, we 
are informed with God’s form: ‘When a created intellect sees the essence o f God, that 
very divine essence becomes the form through which the intellect understands’ (ST
1.12.5). This is why we can never achieve perfect happiness in this life. Though we strive 
to attain a likeness in virtue in our earthly lives, the fullness o f the imago Dei will be 
realised only when we attain the ultimate beatitude since, to cite 1 John, ‘when he is 
revealed, we will be like him, for we will see him as he is’ (1 John 3:2).
2.3.6 Departures from Aristotle and Maimonides on Intellectual Perfection
At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that Aristotle prioritised the speculative 
intellect as that which facilitates theoretical excellence, the goal o f human life. 
Maimonides, in continuity, centred his understanding of the object o f the intellect and of 
the telos o f human life on the true. Matters o f good and evil were relegated to the
32 Eudaemonia, for Aristotle, corresponds to the life well-lived. See J. O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p .l l .  See also Anthony Kenny, ‘Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness’, 
in Aquinas ' Moral Theory: Essays in Honor o f Norman Kretzmann, ed. by Scott MacDonald and Eleonore 
Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 15-27.
33Scott MacDonald, ‘Introduction: The Relation Between Being and Goodness’, in Being and Goodness: 
The Concept o f  the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 1991), pp. 1-28 (p.5).
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practical intellect, their relevance seen as consequential to the fall. Aquinas, by virtue of 
his twofold ontology -  the good understood as both the first principle and the true final 
end -  envisions the perfected intellect as oriented to the true and the good.34 Thus, in 
Aquinas, we do not find the same emphasis on individual intellectual attainment that we 
have seen in Maimonides, a fact that is indicated by their respective views of prophecy.35
We recall that while Maimonides proposes that it is essential that a person achieve 
intellectual excellence in order to be considered a prophet -  ‘we hold that fools and 
ignorant people are unfit for this distinction5 (GP 11.32) -  Aquinas, however, believes that 
God could make a prophet of anybody. Aquinas accords a more central role to the will o f 
God who ‘can transform the matter, however unfit, to the proper disposition which is 
needed for the perfection which He gives5.36 God will give the prophet the dispositions 
that are necessary for prophecy and will remove what opposes its operation, such as 
strong passions o f anger, sorrow or pleasure. However, although God can bestow the gift 
of prophecy on any person, the use of the gift is in the hands o f the prophet.
Intellectual attainment, the perfection of the speculative intellect, does not define 
Aquinas5 interpretation of imago Dei in the way it that it does for Maimonides. Nor is 
Aquinas5 idea o f human perfection so exclusive, since it places a far greater emphasis on 
moral perfection and virtue. To draw again from Idit Dobbs-Weinstein: ‘Whereas 
Maimonides5 ethics restricts the possibility o f attaining true perfection to a very limited 
number o f an intellectual elite, Aquinas5 ethics extends the possibility of perfection to the 
morally perfect ‘vulgar5 as well as to the intellectual elite5.37 In examining the 
philosophical underpinning of this divergence, Dobbs-Weinstein suggests that ‘it may 
well be. argued that Maimonides5 ambivalent attitude towards matter, at least in part, can 
account for his pessimism concerning the possibility o f attaining moral perfection.538 
Maimonides identified determinate matter as the source of the discontinuity between the 
sublunar and supralunar realms. This is why the speculative intellect alone, as that which 
bears least relation to matter, corresponds to the good. Aquinas, in contrast, does not 
understand matter to constitute a barrier to human perfection, seeing in it both potentiality 
and inherent goodness. All that is created, we recall, bears some degree o f likeness to 
God (ST 1.93.2).
34 Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Limits o f  Reason, p. 137.
35See Alexander Altmann, ‘Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas: Natural or Divine Prophecy?’ AJS Review, 3 
(1978), 1-19.
56De Veritate, trans. by Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), 12.4.
37 Dobbs-Weinstein, p. 114.
38 Dobbs-Weinstein, p. 114.
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Yes, Aquinas, like Maimonides, values intellectual attainment, brought about, to a 
certain extent through our own efforts at study and contemplation. However, he places far 
more emphasis on grace as that which glorifies -  ‘lifts up’ -  the intellect (ST 1.12.4). The 
actualisation o f the image is not an entirely natural process. This is because the created 
intellect cannot see the essence of God though its own natural power but only by God 
uniting Himself by grace to the created intellect. The natural intellect can thus be raised 
above its nature and illuminated though grace, constituting as Brian Davies terms it, ‘a 
deification o f the knower’.39 The comments of John Berkman provide an apt conclusion 
to this point:
[DJespite Aquinas being a person of towering intellect, he by no means attributes to 
the human intellect ultimate significance or importance. For the true perfection of 
the speculative intellect requires that one go beyond what any human being is 
capable o f on their own, and by grace to receive, for example, the theological virtue 
o f faith, and the gift o f wisdom.
Aquinas envisions the evolution of imago Dei as a gradual growth in likeness to the
Creator. Aquinas is quite close to Irenaeus in this respect, in his vision o f what Jean-
Pierre Torrell refers to as ‘boundless growth’:
It is a reality in the presence of becoming, present in human nature like a divine call. 
That is why, to suggest the evolving character o f the image -  another analogy of 
proportionality that rests on an indestructible ontological given -  Thomas utilizes 
the notion of a gradually ascending approach that opens the way to boundless 
growth.41
We can thus understand Aquinas’ imago Dei as an infinitely circular movement that leads 
the whole o f creation towards God.42 Drawing on Augustine’s insight into the orientation 
of the person towards God, Aquinas understands imago Dei as this orientation of the 
person towards the knowing and loving of God which only reaches its fulfilment in the 
vision of God in the world to come, the ultimate beatitudo o f human life.
39 Davies, The Thought o f  Thomas Aquinas, p. 252.
40 John Berkman, 'Are Persons with Profound Intellectual Disabilities Sacramental Icons o f Heavenly Life? 
Aquinas on Impairment', Studies in Christian Ethics, 26 (2013), 83 -  96 (p. 90).
41Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 88.
42 We can interpret the three degrees of conformity of the image to its model -  nature, grace and glory -  in 
terms o f exitus and reditus as they occur in the creature. Torrell writes that ‘if  the former, the image o f  
creation, is the term of the “going out,” the second, the image of re-creation or according to grace, is that 
[term] by which the return begins, inaugurating the movement that will be completed in heaven along with 
the third, the image o f glory, that is finally perfect resemblance’, Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 90.
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2.4 Conclusion
To conclude this discussion of Maimonides and Aquinas, we note the shared centrality of 
the intellect to the interpretation of imago Dei in the work of both thinkers. Both 
Maimonides and Aquinas illustrated the potential for philosophical discourse to enrich 
and elaborate religious concepts and, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the benefits 
of interfaith engagement regarding shared concepts. In their conviction that rational 
speculation can function within the parameters o f religious faith to bring us towards an 
understanding of God, Maimonides and Aquinas were kindred spirits.43 They both 
emphasise the actualisation of the intellect, which is the part o f the soul on account of 
which we are said to be in the image of God.
Having discussed Maimonides’ influence on Aquinas’s apophatic thought, we 
recognised their divergence centring on Aquinas’ positive view of analogical divine 
predication. This has allowed Aquinas to develop a more relational articulation of imago 
Dei that emphasises our human potential for growth in likeness to the goodness o f the 
Creator. Through our creation in the image of God we have, Aquinas holds, the ability to 
resemble and express our likeness to the Creator through the imitation of God’s self- 
understanding and love. Maimonides, it has been argued, placed a greater emphasis on 
individual intellectual attainment than Aquinas, as illustrated by their differing views of 
prophecy: self-attained ascension to divine truth for Maimonides and gracious 
beneficence for Aquinas. This, however, did not exclude the idea o f growth in ethical 
perfection from Maimonides’ thought. Maimonides’ idea o f imitatio Dei envisaged our 
growth in likeness to the ways o f God in justice and righteousness. Contextualised by 
their concern towards a proper understanding of divinity, the understanding of imago Dei 
in both Maimonides and Aquinas has a strong ethical component.
Contemporary theology, we will see, generally regards the imago Dei as that which 
underpins dignity and equality, somewhat akin to what we have observed in Rabbinic 
discourse. We can safely conclude that this is not the chief meaning that either Aquinas or 
Maimonides derived from the concept. However, this is not to say that they did not 
believe in human worth, or that their wider theologies were unconcerned with general 
human welfare. On the contrary, both thinkers espoused a certain universalism.44 The
43 William Dunphy, ‘Maimonides and Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Beatitude’, p. 316.
44 Maimonides opposed the tendency of his day, most notable in the writings of Judah Halevi, to assume the 
innate superiority o f Jews over non-Jews. As Menachem Kellner writes: ‘In his eyes human beings are 
human beings; there are not different species of human beings. He is, perhaps, the most consistent 
universalist in medieval Judaism’. Maimonides’ Confrontation with Mysticism, p. 220. See also John F. X.
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point, rather, is that neither thinker particularly viewed the imago Dei as the vehicle to 
express such sentiment.
The enduring relevance of both thinkers’ idea o f imago Dei may be diminished by 
the deterministic tendencies that characterise their interpretations, Aquinas as regards 
women and Maimonides as regards The multitude’. Further, the extent to which both 
thinkers emphasise intellectual attainment strikes the contemporary reader -  who is, in all 
likelihood, less enthralled by Aristotelian epistemology than were Aquinas and 
Maimonides -  as insufficiently biblical, even perhaps unbiblical for those who take 
account o f Jesus’ words in Matthew: ‘[Y]ou have hidden these things from the wise and 
the intelligent and have revealed them to infants’ (Matthew 11:25). However, we must 
also remember that beyond their shared philosophical influences and the commonality of 
the Hebrew Scriptures from which they derive imago Dei, the greatest similarity in the 
thought of Aquinas and Maimonides is the emphasis upon the need for divine assistance, 
whether through revelation, through Torah or through grace, to remedy the disruption to 
the original state that has left the person unable to perceive their true end unaided. Human 
reason is limited. Thus, Aquinas and Maimonides are chiefly concerned with the limits of 
our intellect and our inability to know God. As such their thought gives expression to the 
biblical appreciation of the ultimate mystery at the heart of our human experience, that 
which Job terms ‘higher than heaven...deeper than Sheol’ or the psalmists refer to as 
‘things too wonderful’ surrounded by ‘clouds and thick darkness’.45
The distorting effects o f sin on human reason present an even greater challenge to 
the theological anthropology of Karl Barth, the focus o f Chapter Three. For Barth, since 
sin has obliterated the possibility o f natural apprehension of divine truth, we have lost any 
capacity for God apart from God’s act of self-revelation. Moving then from deification to 
justification, we turn to the modem period, to Barth’s understanding of imago Dei as 
correspondence.
Knasas, Thomism and Tolerance (London: University o f Scranton Press, 2011). Knasas argues that 
‘Aquinas natural law ethics grounds the ideal o f tolerance that is so treasured in current Western 
democracies better than other ethical traditions’, p. 5.
45 Job 11: 8 (JPS); Psalm 97:2 (NIV) and Psalm 131:1 (NIV).
80
CHAPTER THREE
THE IMAGO D E I AS CORRESPONDENCE:
THE RELATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF KARL BARTH
This chapter turns to the theological anthropology of Karl Barth (1886-1968), which is 
characterised by constant attention to the doctrine of election, to Christology and to the 
meaning of the covenant between God and humanity. These are the fundamental 
emphases that permeate Barth’s distinctively Christian theology, which is constantly 
disassociated from any generic understanding of ‘human nature’ in abstraction from the 
Word of God. In Barth, we see an interpretation of imago Dei that is radically different 
from that which has emerged in previous chapters. This distinction derives from the fact 
that Barth’s theology marks a fundamental break from the metaphysical structure of 
classical theism as expressed in Aquinas and in the Fathers o f the Church.1 Though Barth 
expressed continuity with Aquinas’ idea of God as actus, or sheer actuality (ST L3.2), he 
radically reshaped its meaning in an incamational light: Tn speaking of the essence of 
God we are concerned with an act which utterly surpasses the whole o f the actuality that 
we have come to know as act, and compared with which all that we have come to know as 
act is no act at all’.2 For according to Barth’s doctrine o f  election, God’s essence 
coincides with God’s decision to become God-for-us: ‘God is who he is in the act o f his 
revelation’ (CD II/l, p. 262).3 This is the christological statement that permeates every 
facet of Barth’s theology, a statement which carries the implication that, for Barth, God
1 Matthew Rose describes the central themes o f classical theism: ‘Developed through common effort over 
centuries, it came to endorse a number of interlocking theses: that God’s essence is identical with his 
existence, that nature is governed by an act of divine intelligence and love, that rational beings find 
fulfilment in learning the truth about God, and that all knowledge is grounded in God’s self-understanding’. 
‘Karl Barth’s Failure’, First Things, 6 (2014), 39-45 (p. 43).
" Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, p. 263, ed. by Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957-1975). Subsequent references will be parenthetical, abbreviated as 
CD.
3 Our theology, Barth writes, should not derive from an abstract concept o f God as a ‘divine being-for- 
H im self but rather from a God who ‘wills to be and is nothing other than the God o f man’. ‘The Humanity 
of God’, in The Humanity o f  God, trans. by John Newton Thomas (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960), pp. 
37-69 (p.45; p.37).
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and God’s revelation in Christ are one.4 Thus, in Barth’s interpretation of imago Dei we 
will observe a firm rejection of the connection between the speculative intellect and God 
and a dissolution o f the classical synthesis of faith and reason.5 We also see a rejection of 
the identification of imago Dei with any innate human capacity.
As a Reformed theologian, Barth was influenced by the thinking of Augustine and 
Augustine’s interpretation in the subsequent Reformed tradition, particularly in relation to 
the concept of justification and the primacy of grace.6 Barth’s theology was also notably 
shaped by his break from liberal theology. Liberalism, which defined Protestant theology 
since the time of Schleiermacher, emphasised the immanence o f God and presupposed, as 
John Webster writes, that ‘religion was an ingredient within human being and experience 
and therefore became something which could be described and, indeed cultivated, without 
immediate reference to the gracious, intervening activity o f God h im self.7 Though this 
thinking formed a central part of his cultural and theological heritage, it gradually lost its 
appeal for Barth, decisively demonstrating its theological bankruptcy in 1914 when Barth 
witnessed the support of his former teachers for the war policy of Wilhelm II.8 To 
articulate a new theology, Barth turned to the objective Word of God, thus firmly
4 Barth writes that we develop our concept o f God ‘only as we conceive o f Him in the determination and 
limitation that are peculiar to Him, which He has not taken upon Him self as something additional, in his 
relationship with the world or as an accommodation to it, but which are the characteristics o f His presence 
and activity in the world because they are the determination and limitation proper to His own eternal being, 
so assuredly has he decided for them by the decree o f His eternal will’ (CD n/2 , p. 50). As Bruce 
McCormack argues, for Barth ‘there is no other being of God standing in [the] back o f it, hidden in the 
shadows, so to speak [...] The eternal event in which God chose to be “God-for-us” is, at the same time, the 
eternal event in which God gave (and continues to give) to him self his own being’. ‘The Actuality o f God: 
Karl Barth in Conversation with Open Theism’, in Engaging the Doctrine o f  God: Contemporary Protestant 
Perspectives, ed. by B. McCormack (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 2008), pp. 185-242 (p. 210).
5 For Matthew Rose, this constitutes the great error in Barth’s theology: ‘He simply could not allow that a 
genuinely philosophical understanding of God is demanded by the intellect’s desire to know [...] Why did 
Barth fail to see the theological necessity of metaphysical inquiry? His idée fixe— that God is wholly 
identical with his self-enactment in history— stood in the way. There can be no natural knowledge of God, 
after all, i f  God lives in and through his self-revelation.’ ‘Karl Barth’s Failure’, p. 44.
6 Dominic Robinson writes that the reformation theologies of Luther and Calvin moved the point o f 
reference o f the imago Dei ‘from asking the medieval philosophical and scientific questions about the nature 
of the human being per se and focussed instead first and foremost on the sovereignty o f God [...] The 
emphasis shifts towards Christ’s action in the life of the believer and away from the believer’s growth and 
fulfilment as he finds his way back to God’. Robinson argues that because Barth was attached to a Lutheran 
interpretation o f Augustine, he neglected that aspect o f Augustine’s thought in which ‘humanity is 
envisaged on a journey back to God’. Understanding the “Imago D ei”: The Thought o f Barth, von 
Balthasar andMoltmann (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), p. 21; p. 57.
7 John Webster, Karl Barth (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 25.
8 ‘One day in early August 1914 stands out in my personal memory as a black day. Ninety-three German 
intellectuals impressed public opinion by their proclamation in support o f the war policy of Wilhelm II and 
his counsellors. Among these intellectuals I discovered to my horror almost all o f my theological teachers 
whom I had greatly venerated. In despair over what this indicated about the signs o f the time I suddenly 
realized that I could not any longer follow either their ethics and dogmatics or their understanding o f the 
Bible and of histoiy. For me at least, 19th century theology no longer held any future’. ‘Evangelical 
Theology in the 19th Century’, in The Humanity o f God, pp. 11-33 (p. 12-13).
rejecting the personalism of liberal theology, with its potential to manipulate divine ‘will’ 
for human ends: Barth writes that ‘grace, which the theologians of the time described so 
beautifully as free, did not remain free for them. They claimed it as a right, a certainty, a 
possession o f the Christian’.9 Barth thus turned from the ‘religionism, the 
anthropocentrism, the ill-fated humanism of the earlier theology’ back to the Word of 
God.10
The return to sources, the conviction that biblical revelation is centred on God and 
the emphasis that knowledge of God cannot be abstracted from revelation in Christ define 
Barth’s interpretation of the imago Dei, a concept inextricable from his doctrine of the 
Word o f God. We will discuss Barth’s relational approach to imago Dei, in particular the 
manner in which he reconciles his idea of imago Dei as correspondence with his strident 
opposition to natural theology and the analogy of being. We will also explore how 
Barth’s theological anthropology -  the understanding of the person as saved yet still fallen
-  informs his ethical thought and effects the wider relevance o f his interpretation of imago 
Dei. We begin with Barth’s exegesis o f Genesis 1:26-27.
3.1 Barth’s Relational Exegesis of Genesis 1:27
There is a significant distance -  both chronological and theological -  between the thought 
of Barth and that o f Maimonides and Aquinas. The medieval interpretations o f imago Dei
-  and much that came before -  favoured the identification of imago Dei with the human 
intellect. Barth’s approach, in contrast, does not emphasise any capacity or potential 
inherent in the human person. The imago Dei, for Barth, pertains to the whole person and 
can never be identified with ‘anything that man is or does’ (CD III/I, p. 184). While 
further exploration o f the wider concerns o f Barth’s theology will shed light upon the 
particular motivation for his aversion to the intellectualist approach, we can, at this point, 
identify Barth’s interpretation of imago Dei as ‘relational’. However, as will be 
illustrated, the relationality of Barth’s approach results, in part, from an unusual and quite 
contested exegesis o f Genesis 1:27.
According to Barth’s interpretation of Genesis 1:27 -  ‘in the image of God he 
created him; male and female he created them’ -  the second phrase revealed the meaning 
of the first:
9 Barth, ‘The Word in Theology from Schleiermacher to RitschP, in Theology and Church, (London: SCM, 
1962), p. 216.
10 Barth, ‘The Humanity of God', p. 44.
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Could anything be more obvious than to conclude from this clear indication that the 
image and likeness of the being created by God signifies existence in confrontation, 
i.e., in this confrontation, in the juxtaposition and conjunction o f man and man 
which is that of male and female [...] (CD III/l, p. 195)?
In accordance with the scholastic idea of the indivisibility of the works o f the Trinity in 
creation (opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa), Barth finds Trinitarian significance in the 
Genesis creation accounts.11 The imago Dei is revealed, for Barth, in the fact that male 
and female exist in a relation that is analogical to the relation of the three persons of the 
Trinity: ‘“In our image” means to be created as a being which has its ground and 
possibility in the fact that in “us”, i.e., in God’s own sphere and being, there exists a 
divine and thus self-grounding prototype to which this being can correspond’ (CD III/l, p. 
183). With an implicit dependence upon Buberian ontology, Barth argues that the I-Thou 
intradivine relationship of the Triune God is reflected, analogically, in the interhuman 
realm, a fact signified by the ‘male and female’ reference o f Genesis 1:27 and the ‘let us 
make’ reference o f 1:26.12 The union and distinction o f human as male and female is a 
reflection o f the encounter and discovery of the Triune God:
The relationship between the summoning I in God’s being and the summoned 
divine Thou is reflected both in the relationship of God to the man whom He has 
created, and also in the relationship between the I and the Thou between male and 
female, in human existence itself (CD III/l, p. 196).
The question of analogy will be explored in greater depth further in the discussion. At 
this point, we can simply observe the problematic nature of Barth’s interpretation of 
Genesis 1:27 from the perspective of biblical scholarship. In Chapter One, we noted the 
views of Richard Middleton and Phyllis Bird as regards the implausibility of defining the 
imago Dei in terms of the ‘male and female’ clause. Such scholarship is largely directed 
at Barth’s reading of Genesis 1:27. The objection to his interpretation is expressed 
forcefully in the writings of James Barr, who suggests that Barth’s approach to the male- 
female reference represents a ‘particularly ill-judged and irresponsible piece of
1 ] ‘The proposition that God the Father is the Creator , and God the Creator the Father can be defended only 
when we mean by “Father” the “Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit” ' (CD III/l, p. 49). Discussed by 
Oliver Crisp, Retrieving Doctrine, p. 29.
12 The extent to which Martin Buber influenced this aspect o f Barth's thought is discussed by Mark J. 
Mclnroy, ‘Karl Barth and Personal ist Philosophy: A Critical Appropriation’, Scottish Journal o f  Theology, 1 
(2011), 45-63.
exegesis5.13 Phyllis Bird concurs, writing that at its ‘most fundamental level Barth’s 
exegesis fails to understand the grammar of the sentences he so ingeniously 
manipulates’.14 Both Bird and Barr conclude that Barth’s exegesis is, in relation to the 
male and female reference, unviable on linguistic and cultural grounds. There is no 
reason to suppose, linguistically, that the second clause explains the first. There is also 
nothing, given the cultural background to the passage, to lend credibility to Barth’s 
interpretation. As Bird writes, Barth’s ‘distinctly modem concept o f an “I-Thou” 
relationship’ would have been entirely foreign to the ancient writer’s thought and 
intentions’.15 To add to these concerns, we note that it is unlikely that the imago Dei, 
which pertains to humankind alone, could be identified with our gendered creation. There 
is nothing distinctively human in our creation as male and female.
Barth’s exegesis is also problematic when we consider the particularities of his view 
of lived male and female relationships. Despite the previously noted chronological and 
contextual distance between Aquinas and Barth, it is arguable that Barth’s view of the 
relationship between the sexes did not advance very far beyond that of Aquinas. 
Although, for Barth, men and women are alike in dignity by virtue of their shared creation 
in the image of God, his idea of lived gender relations is hierarchical. Barth, evidently 
unmoved by the emerging feminism of his day, understands the relation between male and 
female as a ‘natural supremacy of the I over the Thou’ (CD III/2, p. 292).16 This point is 
further illustrated with reference to CD ID/4:
Man and woman are not an A and a second A whose being and relationship can be 
described like two halves o f an hour glass [...] Man and woman are an A and a B, 
and cannot, therefore, be equated. In inner dignity and right A has not the slightest 
advantage over B nor does it suffer the slightest disadvantage [...] A precedes B, 
and B follows A. Order means succession. It means preceding and following. It
13 James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 160.
14 Phyllis Bird, “ ‘Male and Female he Created them” : Gen. 1:27b in the Context o f  the Priestly Account o f  
Creation \H TR , 74 (1981), 129-159 (p. 132).
15 Bird, “ ‘Male and Female he Created them”’, p. 132.
16 See Katherine Sonderegger, ‘Barth and Feminism5, in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. by 
John Webster, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 258-274. Sonderegger writes that 
though ‘comfortable in the presence o f socialism, Barth was filled with misgivings about feminism. In the 
Church Dogmatics, Barth refers to feminism rarely, and then grudgingly’, p. 258. Sonderegger also remarks 
that although few feminists write on Barth, when examined ‘more closely, the thought o f Karl Barth echoes 
themes in contemporary feminist theory -  in the understanding of the person and o f humanity, in ethics and 
epistemology -  that would make Barth attractive indeed.’ Sonderegger draws a comparison, for example, 
between the distrust o f the category o f experience in the work of both Barth and the second generation 
feminists, p. 260.
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means super- and sub-ordination. It does indeed reveal their inequality. But it does 
not do so without immediately confirming their equality (CD III/4, pp. 169-70).
Though words such as ‘supremacy’ and ‘subordination’ are difficult for the contemporary 
reader to accommodate, Barth, we must acknowledge, tempers this hierarchical vision 
with the idea that this supremacy is, in reality, played out in inversion: ‘[B]ecause he the 
first and stronger can only be one and strong in relationship to her, the second and weaker, 
as his first and stronger’ (CD III/2, p. 292). Though men and women differ in function, 
they are equal before God in their creaturely existence. Barth also writes most positively 
o f the loving mutuality of the marital relationship; ‘because she is so utterly for him he 
must be utterly for her’ (CD III/2, p. 292).17 However, Barth’s continuity with Augustine 
and Aquinas as regards female subordination is obviously problematic in light of the 
insights of feminist theological anthropology. As Rosemary Radford Reuther writes:
The ‘social roles o f male headship and female subordination are construed as a
divine created order. So for a woman to wish to step out of her place to do
“masculine” things, such as becoming a minister or a political leader, is for Barth a
violation of the will of God, who has laid down this fixed and unchangeable order
o f creation. It is in these terms that Barth denounces feminism in his Church 
18Dogmatics'.
While Chapter Five will offer a more substantial exploration of the issue of gender, at this 
point we simply note that Barth’s view of Jived gender relationships render his relational 
reading of Genesis 1:27 somewhat problematic. However, the relevance o f gender to 
Barth’s interpretation of imago Dei should not be overstated. Though the ‘male and 
female5 reference in Genesis 1:27 gives Barth the impetus for his relational reading of the 
text, the ‘relation’ in question is much broader and more complex than the lived male- 
female relationship.
The above offers a brief sketch of Barth’s exegesis of Genesis 1:27 which is, we 
conclude, problematic from the perspective o f biblical scholarship. However, it would be 
most inconsistent with the Barthian approach to scripture to give the final word to
17 This aspect o f Barth’s thought is discussed by Paul S. Fiddes in ‘The Status o f Woman in the Thought o f 
Karl Barth’, http://www.womenpriests.org/theology/fiddes.asp [Accessed June 14 2014]. ‘In his discussion 
o f Paul's sentence in 1 Corinthians 11.3, Barth makes the central point that Paul is not presenting a 
hierarchy of headship, as if there were a chain of subordination stretching from God the Father, to God the 
Son, to man and finally to woman (at the bottom of the pecking order) [...]. This is not a hierarchy at all, 
but a comparison of sets o f relationships - God with Christ, Christ with humankind and man with woman. ’
18 Rosemary Radford Reuther, Women and Redemption: A Theological History (London: SCM Press, 1998), 
pp. 181-2.
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historical criticism. Though he was not ill-disposed to the insights of historical-critical 
methods of biblical interpretation, Barth’s attentions were chiefly directed not at the 
acknowledged ‘human word’ of scripture, but rather at the Word of God.19 Barth’s 
concern that ‘today’s theology does not stand with the prophets and the apostles [...] but 
rather with the modem reader and his prejudices’ offers further context for his break with 
liberal theology.20 While Barth recognises that the Bible consists of ‘human .speech 
uttered by specific men at specific times [...] with a specific intention’, he regards 
scripture as that which bears witness to the ‘event’ o f revelation, which precedes both 
proclamation and scripture (CD 1/2, p. 464).21 Michael T. Dempsey explains that ‘for 
Barth and much of the pre-modem tradition, understanding of God’s Word in scripture 
can come only from God’s Word and Spirit, which is received in faith and obedience’.22 
In other words, God, for Barth, cannot be understood apart from Christ’s saving work. 
Barth presents Christ not only at the centre of his theology but also as the ground and the 
limit of his theological anthropology. Therefore, as Barth writes, ‘we must first enquire 
concerning this one man, and then on this basis concerning man in general’ (III/2, p. 44). 
Thus, to fully understand the context and motivation for the particular exegesis employed 
by Barth, we turn to his distinctly Christological understanding of the relationship of 
correspondence between God and the human person.
19 ‘I have nothing whatever to say against historical criticism. I recognize it, and once more state quite 
definitely that it is both necessary and justified\ It is, however, only a preliminary step. Barth admires 
Calvin’s approach: ‘how energetically Calvin, having first established what stands in the text, sets him self to 
re-think the whole material and to wrestle with it, till the walls which separate the sixteenth century from the 
first become transparent!’ Epistle to the Romans (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 6-1.
20 This citation is from an early preface draft o f Barth’s Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 
Referenced by Richard Burnett in his Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Principles o f 
the Romerbrief Period (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2004), p. 284. Elsewhere, Barth describes the change that 
resulted from his break from liberalism: ‘We made a fresh attempt to learn our theological ABCs all over 
again. M ore reflectively than ever before, we began reading and expounding the writings of the Old and 
New Testaments. And behold, they began to speak to us -  very differently than we had supposed we were 
obliged to hear them speak in the school of what was then called “modem theology” ’. ‘Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, in The Theology o f Schleiermacher: Lectures at Gottingen, 
Winter Semester o f 1923/24 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), pp. 261-279 (p. 264).
21 As Trevor Hunt remarks: ‘Revelation, as Barth never tires o f reminding his readers, is an event: it is 
something which happens, something which God does, and something in which we are actively involved. 
The habitual use o f the noun form tends inevitably to direct our thinking instead towards the abstract, and to 
suggest some commodity (textual, historical or whatever) which represents the abiding deposit o f a prior act 
o f “revealing” ’. ‘Revelation’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, pp. 37-57 (p. 45).
"  ‘Biblical Hermeneutics and Spiritual Interpretation: The Revelatory Presence o f God in Barth’s Theology 
o f Scripture’. Biblical Theology Bulletin, 3 (2007), 120 -  131 (p. 122). Dempsey argues that Barth’s view 
o f revelation provides a resource for an ‘historically informed theological interpretation o f scripture so that 
scholarly interpretation and pastoral application may benefit from insights that come, ultimately from the 
intimate encounter with God in the life o f the individual interpreter in the Church’, p. 122. Barth is 
similarly interpreted by Maico Michielin, ‘Bridging the Gulf Between Biblical Scholars and Theologians: 
Can Barth and Wright Provide an Answer?’, Scottish Journal o f  Theology, 4 (2008), 420-434.
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3.2 From Deification to Justification: The Barthian Idea o f Correspondence
Although Barth is opposed to the identification of imago Dei with the attribute of reason, 
his interpretation of imago Dei is still reliant upon ideas of human distinctiveness. His 
distinction between the human person and other animals is theological and relational: the 
human person can be distinguished from the rest o f creation in that it is the only creature
93that is for  God. This means That it is for the divine deliverance and therefore for God’s 
own glory, for the freedom of God and therefore for the love o f God’ (CD II1/2, pp. 70- 
71). This brings us to the most important point in relation to Barth’s idea o f personhood, 
which is the inseparability of anthropology from the context of the divine-human 
relationship. God’s act of self-revelation is the central premise o f Barth’s theological 
anthropology: ‘That God the Creator is gracious to man his creature is the principle to 
which it must always return and the presupposition at which it must always start’ (CD 
III/2, p. 34).24 The ‘real’ person, to whom Barth frequently refers, is neither self-initiating 
nor self-sustaining but can only be understood from above, from God in Christ.25 The 
creature, as destined and equipped to be the covenant-partner o f God, exists in 
preparedness for this reality.26 Barth writes that the nature o f the creature ‘is simply its 
equipment for grace’ (CD III/l, p. 231). God anticipated ‘that the goal and meaning of all 
His dealings with the as yet non-existent universe should be the fact that in His Son He 
would be gracious towards man, uniting Himself with him’ (CD II/2, p. 101).
Thus, Barth’s interpretation of imago Dei is entirely embedded within his doctrine 
of the Word o f God, a fact which ultimately distinguishes his interpretation of imago Dei
23 Barth is cautious regarding the idea that human beings are the only creatures that are capable o f hearing 
God’s Word. What he does hold, however, is that the human person is unique in the cosmos since the 
vision and the concept o f God within us is direct and immediate. Barth is open to the possibility that other 
creatures may have an indirect vision or concept of the Creator (CD III/2, p. 71).
24 Although ‘a knowledge of man which is non-theological but genuine is not only possible but basically 
justified and necessary even from the standpoint o f theological anthropology’, it does not yield to 
knowledge o f ‘real man’, the person as knowable through divine illumination (CD III/2, p. 202). Thus, 
differentiation between scientific and theological pursuits in anthropology does not necessarily imply 
opposition for Barth. As long as it maintains restraint and openness, the ‘science o f man’ is not the enemy 
of the Christian church. It only becomes this when it purports to offer a philosophy and world-view, ‘thus 
seeking to be exact science’ (CD III/2, p. 25).
25 Theology, Barth writes, ‘cannot be fixed upon, consider, and put into words any truths which rest on or 
are moved by themselves -  neither an abstract truth about God nor about man nor about the intercourse 
between God and man. It can never verify, reflect, or report in a monologue’. ‘The Humanity of God’, p. 
57.
26 Hans urs Von Balthasar writes that, for Barth, ‘the whole o f creation is as such polarized toward only one 
end o f the magnet: toward grace. Creation cannot stand indifferent to grace but is positively oriented to it, 
because it is a parable whose final meaning is unlocked when it receives the truth o f  God’s gracious 
revelation’. The Theology o f Karl Barth, trans. by Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 
p. 125.
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from that which we have observed in previous chapters. Although Barth condemns the 
intellectualist approach to imago Dei as unbiblical, his motivation for his opposition to 
this type of interpretation extends beyond his concern for fidelity to the Genesis text. We 
concluded our previous chapter with the argument that Maimonides and Aquinas were 
united in their conviction that fallen humanity cannot perceive their true end unaided. 
Barth, who was more sceptical of the powers of postlapsarian reason, took a much 
stronger approach to this human inability. For Barth, there is no innate capacity for God 
within the fallen human person: ‘In this sense, as a possibility which is proper to man qua 
creature, the image of God is not just, as it is said destroyed apart from a few relics; it is 
totally annihilated’ (CD 1/1, p. 238).27 What remains of the imago Dei, for Barth, is a 
“recta naturcf\ or proper nature. This, however, does not infer moral uprightness in any 
way (CD 1/1, p. 238):
No matter how it may be with his humanity and personality, man has completely 
lost the capacity for God. Hence we fail to see how there comes into view here any 
common basis of discussion for philosophical and theological anthropology, any 
occasion for the common exhibition of at least the possibility of enquiring about 
God (CD 1/1, p. 238).
The imago Dei only retains its relevance, for Barth, in relation to the rectitudo through 
which Christ is raised from the dead. This is the ‘real’ point o f contact between the 
person and the Word of God. There can be no cooperation between grace and nature in 
effecting salvation since, for Barth grace does not repair nature: it contradicts it. As 
George Hunsinger writes, grace, for Barth, is ‘that miracle by which human reason in its 
radical fallenness is so contradicted, disrupted, and liberated that it provisionally grasps
9 crevelation’. For Barth, the ideas that we can somehow participate in the being of God or 
grow into the likeness o f  Christ are fundamentally erroneous since they draw our 
understanding of justification away from the saving work of Christ. It was for this reason 
that Barth famously denounced the analogia entis as a ‘conflict against grace’ (CD II/l, p. 
85).
The analogia entis, the analogy of being, refers to the idea that the relationship 
between God and the person can be discerned through human understanding apart from
27 This aspect of Barth’s thought is influenced by Calvin. After the fall, Calvin writes, the imago Dei ‘was 
so corrupted that whatever remains is frightful deformity’. Institutes o f  the True Religion (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1960), 1.15.4.
Hunsinger ‘The Mediator of Communion: Karl Barth’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Karl Barth, pp. 177-195 (p. 184).
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revelation and that our experience of the created world leads us to an awareness of God. 
The concept originated in the thought o f Augustine and Aquinas and found detailed 
articulation in the writings Erich Przywara in the 1920s, who developed the concept 
around the idea o f the orientation of the believer towards God and the implicitness of our 
knowledge of God.29 Barth’s opposition to the analogia ends is informed by his rejection 
of natural theology, which he defines as The doctrine o f a unity o f humanity with God 
existing outside God’s revelation in Jesus Christ’ (CD II/l, p. 168).30 Barth, in opposition 
to the essentialist ontology that underpins natural theology, argues that knowledge of God 
is only possible through revelation and grace.
Though Barth rejects the Catholic idea o f the analogia ends, he does find a place 
in his theology for the language of analogy since There can be no receiving of God’s 
Word unless there is something common to the speaking God and the hearing man’ (CD 
1/1, p. 238). What he proposes is an analogia fidei, where the connection between the 
creature and Creator is one of faith in Christ. The analogia fidei expresses the fact that all 
knowledge o f God is derived from revelation, at the centre o f which is God’s self­
revelation in Christ. The human person can only gain knowledge of God by surrender to 
God in faith which, for Barth, is the conformity of the person to God and ‘an aptness to 
receive the Word of God’ (CD 1/1, p. 238).31 Faith -  the capacity given to the incapable -  
raises us beyond our own limits to knowledge of the Word of God.32
29 Przywara wrote that ‘such is the fundamental disposition of human knowledge of God: God nearer to me 
than all the world, God nearer to me than I am to myself; God more real than I am to myself: God all in all, 
Deus meus et omnia\ But precisely out of the implicitness of this knowledge of God, out of this -  shall we 
say, psychological immediacy to God -  grows that disposition of awe-struck longing, that inextinguishable 
Inquietum, that never satisfied but always blessed infinite restlessness towards God, which is: quaeritur 
inveniendus et invenitur quarendus, I seek in order to find, and I find in order to seek’. ‘Gottgeheimnis Der 
Welt’, p. 230. Discussed by Keith L. Johnson in Karl Barth and the Analogia Ends (London: T&T Clark, 
2010), p. 43.
30 The rejection of the analogia ends is an aspect of Barth’s thought that is central to his critique of Catholic 
theology: ‘I regard the analogia ends as the invention of the Antichrist, and I think that because of it one 
cannot become Catholic. Whereupon I at the same time allow myself to regard all other possible reasons for 
not becoming Catholic, as shortsighted and lacking in seriousness’ (CD 1/1: x). However, as Stanley 
Hauerwas argues, the above passage ‘does not reflect Barth’s most considered judgements on the subject, 
which arrive only when he is able to separate the question of natural theology from its association with 
Protestant liberalism’. With the Grain o f the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology 
(London: SCM, 2002), p. 159. Barth’s evolving approach to the analogia ends is also discussed by Keith L. 
Johnson. Johnson writes that, because of the ambiguity of Barth’s position regarding the analogia ends 
throughout his career, ‘many interpreters of his theology began to claim one of two positions: either that 
Barth should retract his earlier position [...] or that he already had retracted it in private without doing so 
publicly’. Johnson argues, however, that Barth did not revoke his view of Przywara’s analogia ends. Karl 
Barth and the Analogia Ends, p. 3.
31 Barth’s rejection o f the analogia ends emerges strongest in the context of his debate with Emil Brunner 
who, in his argument for a legitimate natural theology, seemed to present an idea of grace inherent in human 
nature based on the analogia ends. In his response to Brunner, Barth argues forcefully against an
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It is in this sense, in terms of the analogical relationship between the grace of God 
and the faith o f the ‘real’ person, that Barth understands correspondence. 
Correspondence, which is conformity in faith to God’s word, is entirely distinct from 
ideas of mutuality, likeness of substance or intellectual assent. God is made known to us 
only on the basis o f revelation, ‘in a medium’ and ‘as an object’ (CD II/l, p. 10). The 
quest to encounter God based upon the depiction o f ‘knowledge’ as the union of the 
person with God is fundamentally misguided since it dissolves the distinction between the 
knower and the known. It is for this reason that Barth describes Augustine’s account of 
the vision he shared with his mother at Ostia as ‘one of the most beautiful but also most 
dangerous passages in the Confessions'.33 The attempt to attain knowledge of God 
through human experience does not bring us to a higher plane, Barth argues, since we are 
seeking God in abstraction from the Word of God. Such attempts are misguided and also 
superfluous: Christ, Barth writes, ‘is the Word spoken from the loftiest, most luminous 
transcendence and likewise the Word heard in the deepest, darkest immanence’.34 We 
simply do not need anything else and if we regard ourselves as bound by God’s word, ‘we 
shall certainly find a deceptive appearance in that ascendere and transcenderé so far as 
what happens there -  whatever else it may be -  claims knowledge of God’ (CD II/1, p. 
11).
Thus prayer, for Barth, is decisively identified with petition and strictly 
disassociated from the ‘attempt to intensify and deepen ourselves, to purify and cleanse 
ourselves inwardly, to attain clarity and self-control’ (CD III/2, p. 97). Other forms of
understanding of imago Dei that centres on a capacity for revelation or a capacity for God. ‘No! Answer to 
Emil Brunner’ in Karl Barth: Theologian o f Freedom, ed. by Clifford Green, (London: Collins, 1989).
32 As Barth explains, this is distinct from an analogy of being: ‘We certainly regard the analogy, similarity
or equiformity between God and man which in fact requires asserting here, not as an analogia ends, as an 
analogy in a synthesis from the standpoint of an onlooker. Not a being which the creature should have in 
common with the Creator in spite of all the dissimilarity, but the action inaccessible to any mere theory, the 
human decision, in faith, amid all its dissimilarity, similar to the decision of the grace of God (CD 111, p. 
274). Barth also refers to an analogy of relationship, which posits a correspondence between the human- 
divine relationship and the prior intra-Trinitarian relationship: ‘The correspondence and similarity of the 
two relationships consists in the fact that the freedom in which God posits Himself as the Father, is posited 
by Himself as the Son and confirms Himself as the Holy Ghost, is the same freedom as that in which He is 
the Creator of man, in which man may be His creature, and in which the Creator-creature relationship is 
established by the Creator’ (CD III/2, p. 220).
33 ‘And when our conversation had brought us to the point where the very highest of physical sense and the 
most intense illumination of physical light seemed, in comparison with the sweetness of that life to come, 
not worthy of comparison, nor even of mention, we lifted ourselves with a more ardent love toward the 
Selfsame [Idipsum], and we gradually passed through all the levels of bodily objects, and even through the 
heaven itself, where the sun and moon and stars shine on the earth. Indeed, we soared higher yet by an inner 
musing, speaking and marveling at thy works’. Augustine, Confessions, trans. by H. Chadwick (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), IX, 10.
34 Barth, ‘The Humanity of God’, p. 47.
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prayer derive from the assumption that the person can ‘present something worthy to God’ 
(III/2, p. 97).35 It is much better, Barth argues, to come to God with empty hands which 
can be ‘spread out before God and filled by Him5 (CD III/2, p. 97). In prayer, Barth 
argues, we have nothing to offer, but everything to ask. ‘A man prays because he is 
permitted to do so by God, because he may pray, and because this very permission has 
become a command’ (CD III/2, p. 91).
In Barth, therefore, the emphasis radically shifts from the idea of deification, 
envisioned in Irenaeus and Aquinas, to that o f justification, as explicated by Augustine 
and Martin Luther.36 Saved, yet still fallen, we cannot access God. The imago Dei, for 
Barth, becomes ‘real’ only in faith, i.e., through the grace of reconciliation. It appears, 
therefore, that Barth’s explication of imago Dei within the confines o f the doctrine of the 
Word of God emphasises correspondence by faith alone at the expense o f any idea of 
participation or human response apart from faith. This point needs to be drawn out further 
in the context o f Barth’s view of sin.
3.3 Saved Yet Fallen: A Pessimistic Theology of Assurance?
Barth presents the person as a ‘betrayer o f him self who stands in contradiction to God: 
‘What is sinful and strives against God and himself is not just something in his qualities or 
achievements or defects, but his very being’ (CD III/2, p.26). Such an assessment of 
human personhood provides further context for Barth’s refusal to countenance an 
anthropology that takes ‘human nature’ as its starting point: ‘For what we recognise to be 
human nature is nothing other than the disgrace which covers his nature; his inhumanity, 
perversion and corruption’ (CD III/2, p. 24). According to Barth, we cannot come to a 
natural awareness of our sinfulness or of our justification in Christ:
Indeed, the Christian is simul peccator et iustus, and the surmounting of this 
irreconcilable contradiction does not lie in the Christian -  not even in the most 
secret sanctum of his existence, nor does it happen in any of the hours o f life’s
35 Contrary to those who argue that petition is one among many forms of prayer, Barth, following Luther 
and Calvin, centres his understanding of prayer on petition. This, for Barth, is what prayer means and he 
reminds us that ‘the Lord’s Prayer, apart from the address and the doxology, consists exclusively of pure 
petitions’ (CD III/2, p. 97).
36 Luther, in continuity with Augustine contra Pelagius, writes that ‘the person is justified and saved, not by 
works or laws, but by the Word of God, that is, by the promise of his grace, and by faith, that the glory may 
remain God’s who saved us not by works of righteousness which we have done, but by virtue of his mercy 
by the word of his grace when we believed’. The Freedom o f the Christian Man, in Martin Luther. 
Selections from his Writings, ed. by John Dillenberger (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1961),pp. 53-58 (p. 
71).
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journey, not even in those hours most moved and profound, of conversion and death 
-  but it is the action of the Word of God, the action o f Christ, who is always the One 
who makes him out to be a sinner, in order to make him, though a sinner, into a 
righteous man.37
Our self-knowledge is clouded in self-deception and we easily excuse ourselves.38 
Barth is convinced, therefore, that the ‘various ways in which we try by our own powers 
of judgement to distil our true creaturely essence from the disgrace and infamy which now 
cover us can only be arbitrary and frustrating’ (CD III/2, p. 30).
This brings us to Barth’s understanding of original sin, which is defined as ‘the 
original and radical and therefore the comprehensive and total act of man, with the 
imprisonment o f his existence in that circle o f evil being and evil activity’ (CD IV/1, p. 
500). Like Aquinas, Barth rejects the hereditary component of the classical Augustinian 
doctrine, the idea that sin passed from one man to all o f his successors like a spiritual 
disease.39 He argues that the idea of hereditary sin ‘which has come to man by 
propagation is an extremely unfortunate and mistaken one’ (CD IV/1, p. 500). It implies 
that the propagation of the human race is sinful and this, for Barth, is problematic: ‘Is it 
supposed to be sinful in itself, or because of its connexion with sexual sin, the one sin 
perhaps which is the basis of all others?’ (CD IV/1, p. 500). The idea o f original sin 
becomes obscured, Barth holds, when one loses sight o f the fact that such sin and 
imprisonment belongs to the person, that we make ourselves a prisoner. In other words, 
the idea of hereditary sin loses sight of human agency and responsibility. The term 
‘hereditary sin’ has a ‘hopelessly naturalistic, deterministic and even fatalistic ring’ (CD 
IV/1, p. 500). The sin that the person inherits as the ‘heir o f Adam’ can only loosely be 
regarded as his/her own act. The terms ‘heir’ and ‘sin’ simply cannot retain their meaning
37 Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological Basis o f  Ethics, trans. by R. Birch Hoyle 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), p. 31.
38 ‘This is revealed in the fact that he does not see beyond the natural inward contradiction of his existence, 
in the face of which he is capable of remorse and pity and melancholy, or even rueful irony, but not of 
genuine terror, in the face of which he can always quieten and excuse himself, remaining obstinately blind 
and deaf to the contradiction which is his guilt and the breach which is his need’ (CD IV/1, p. 361). 
Commenting on Barth’s refusal to allow for any natural knowledge of human sin, John Webster writes: 
Barth’s Christo logical determination of sin is not so much an attempt to dislocate ‘theological’ from 
‘empirical’ reality, as an argument bom of a sense that human persons are characteristically self-deceived. 
Human life is a sphere in which fantasy operates, in which human persons are not able to see themselves as 
they truly are. Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1998), p. 69.
39 Barth attributes the idea of hereditary sin to Romans 5:12: ‘that by one man sin entered into the world, 
and death by sin [...] for that all have sinned’, and to psalm 51:5: ‘Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in 
sin did my mother conceive me’ (CD IV/1, p. 500).
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when they are used together. What, we then ask, is the connection between our inevitably 
corrupt nature which Barth allows -  and emphasises -  and the figure of Adam?
In answer to this question, we note that Barth does not propose an historical 
interpretation o f Adam, instead reading the account o f Adam as "saga which can tell us 
that he came into being in this way and existed as the one who came into being in this way 
-  the first man’ (CD IV/1, p. 508). To read the account historically, comparing it 
‘favourably or unfavourably to scientific palaeontology’, would be to miss the point (CD 
IV/1, p. 508). The point, according to Barth, is that world-history began with the pride 
and fall o f the human person. The name ‘Adam’ points to the ‘staggering monotony’ of 
human history, to which humankind corresponds (CD IV/1, p. 508).40 There never was a 
golden age. We are doomed to re-enact the scene in the Garden of Eden though not, as 
we have seen, because a disease has been passed on to us: ‘No one has to be Adam. We 
are so freely and on our responsibility’ (CD IV/1, p. 509).
This point uncovers the tension inherent in Barth’s theological anthropology. On 
the one hand, in divergence with Augustinian anthropology, he rejects any idea of 
inheritance in relation to sinfulness on the grounds that it is fatalistic and that it limits 
agency.41 Then, on the other hand, he himself posits an anthropology that emphasises the 
inevitability o f human failure, the perversion and corruption of our nature.42 If we are 
Adam ‘freely and on our own responsibility’, then why does Barth argue for necessity in 
relation to our corruption? Barth is certainly adamant that the reality, as he sees it, has to 
be confronted:
If we try to deny this or tone it down, we have not yet understood the full import of 
the truth that for the reconciliation of man with God nothing more or less was 
needed than the death of the Son of God, and for the manifestation of this 
reconciliation nothing more or less than the resurrection of the Son of Man, Jesus 
Christ (CD DI/2, p. 27).
40 Barth does not believe that there can be any progress in human history: ‘In spite of all the movement in 
his historical forms and activities, man himself is not progressive. In respect of his capacity, incapacity, to 
live as homo sapiens, to make his being and being together tolerable and stable, he is remarkably stationary, 
his actions and reactions being only too similar to those of an unreasoning bullock plodding around a 
capstan.’ (CD IV/1, p. 507).
41 Darren Sumner writes that ‘Barth’s ontology is radically different from that of Augustine, such that the 
Fall need not be thought of as rendering an essential change to human being. Instead, men and women 
follow after Adam and stand guilty of their own stubborn contradiction of the will of God’. ‘Fallenness and 
Anhypostasis: A Way Forward in the Debate over Christ’s Humanity’, pp. 206-207.
42 Barth writes that the person is ‘the sinner who has covered his own creaturely being with shame’ (CD 
m/2, p. 27).
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Barth is arguing here that the denial of the distortion o f the person’s very being is a failure 
to grasp the ‘full import’ of the death and resurrection of Christ. He is trying to bring the 
reader from despair at our own ‘nature’ to hope in God’s grace. It seems, therefore, that 
Barth is emphasising the hopelessness of human nature in order to bring the fullness of 
redemption into focus, which is something that he denies in the opening volume of 
Church Dogmatics'. ‘We do not associate ourselves, therefore, with the common 
theological practice of depreciating human nature as much as possible in order to oppose 
to it the more effectively what may be made of man by divine grace’ (CD IIT/2, p. 274). 
Here, Barth argues that if  we see the person against the background of the person Jesus, 
we can assent to the existence of a human nature created by God that is good and not evil. 
Further, it is ‘not by nature, but by its denial and misuse, that man is as alien and opposed 
to the grace of God as we see him to be in fact’ (CD III/2, p. 274). However, lest we 
overemphasise the negative dimension of Barth’s theology, we note that our corruption, in 
itself, cannot make evil the good work of God. For Barth, even the corrupted and 
distorted sinner is still ‘real’. The only nature that matters is our ‘creaturely nature’ and 
this cannot be effaced. Though sin breaks the covenant, it does not dissolve it. Sin, 
therefore, takes place within the covenantal relationship. Even more positively, Barth 
asserts that ‘the fact that he is a sinner is true only when seen in connection with the truth 
that he is the object of the grace of God’ (CD III/2, p. 32).43 We can only understand sin 
from the context o f the doctrine of reconciliation and from the Word of atonement (CD 
HI/2, p. 34).
Further, in spite of our different spheres o f existence and our differing relationship 
to God, Barth forcefully emphasises the point that we share the same human nature with 
Christ. Though he is sometimes thought to place undue emphasis on the divinity of 
Christ, Barth certainly affirmed Christ’s full humanity (CD III/l, p. 227).44 The fullness 
of Christ’s humanity extended to his assumption of our fallen nature. The Word became 
‘the bearer o f our human essence, which is marked not only by its created and unlost
43 This may account for the brevity of Barth’s treatment of original sin. Suggesting that Barth is only 
interested in sin post Christum, John Webster writes that this ‘means that Barth refuses to treat sin as other 
than a defeated reality, an ‘impossible possibility’. Barth ’s Moral Theology, p. 67.
44 Charles T. Waldrop presents the argument for Barth’s emphasis on the divinity of Christ based 
Christology in Karl Barth’s Christology: Its Basic Alexandrian Character (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984). A 
contrary position is taken by Paul Dafydd Jones in The Humanity o f Christ: Christology in Karl Barth ’s 
Church Dogmatics (London: T&T Clark International, 2008) and also by George Hunsinger in ‘Karl Barth’s 
Christology’, in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth. Hunsinger suggests that Barth follows the New 
Testament in its juxtaposition of the two natures of Christ: ‘On the one hand, Jesus of Nazareth is depicted 
as the Son of God; and on the other, the Son of God is depicted as Jesus of Nazareth.’ p. 139.
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goodness but (in self-contradiction) by sin, so that it is a perverted essence and lost as 
such’ (CD IV/2, p. 92). Yet, although Christ bore our sinful nature and shared in our 
corruption he ‘bore them without sin5 (CD IV/2, p. 92). There is nothing in the human 
nature o f Christ that excludes the possibility of corruption. To suppose otherwise would 
be to minimise the agency and full humanity of Christ.45 Christ was tempted as we are. 
The difference, however, is that Christ asserted Himself against temptation ‘with the 
freedom and power with which God as Creator confronted chaos5 (CD III/2, p. 51/52). 
Sinlessness was something that Christ imposed upon himself on account of his unique 
relationship with God. Barth writes that ‘the reality of a sanctified life was a fight, not just 
a being. Jesus had to obey. But it was a fight that could not have another result.546 We 
observe in Barth's emphasis on Jesus5 choice o f a sanctified life a distinct divergence with 
Augustinian anthropology. Darren Sumner's comments regarding the distinction between 
sin as an essential or an actual possibility are instructive:
This displacement of the Augustinian notion of natural corruption allows Barth to 
suggest a way in which Jesus might be impeccable not by virtue o f his metaphysical 
make-up but by virtue of his act, i.e. a distinction between sin as an essential 
possibility and sin as an actual possibility.47
Barth's position seems to be that Christ's sin was a theoretical possibility but an actual 
impossibility. Yet throughout his discussion of the sinlessness of Christ, Barth's 
emphasis is not upon the fallen nature of Christ, or even the unfallen nature of Christ, but 
rather upon the communication of grace, and the direct union with God. This is in 
consistency with Barth's far-reaching aversion to essentialist or static ideas o f ‘nature5 in 
all aspects o f his theology. ‘Relationship' is a more suitable point o f reference: Christ is 
in a relationship with God in a way that we have never been, and will never be: the 
relationship ‘is actualised in Him as the original and in us only as the copy' (CD III/2, p. 
50). Yet it is through this relationship that we are reconciled to God, ‘the rent is healed, 
the impure become pure and the enslaved is freed' (CD III/2, p. 48).48
45 This point is discussed by Paul Dafydd Jones in The Humanity o f  Christ: ‘Christ humanly applies the 
decision for sinlessness throughout his life. This decision forms an elemental part of the decision that he 
enacts in gratitude and responsibility -  and sometimes in struggle -  in correspondence to God.’ p. 175.
46 Karl Barth, Karl Barth's Table Talk (Scottish Journal of Theology, Occasional Papers, 10), ed. John D. 
Godsey (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1963), p. 69.
47 Darren Sumner,‘Fallenness and anhypostasis, p. 207.
48 ‘In Him is the human nature created by God without the self-contradiction which afflicts us and without 
the self-deception by which we seek to escape from this our shame. In Him is human nature without the 
human sin. For as He the son of God becomes man, and therefore our nature becomes His, For although He 
becomes what we are, He does not do as we do, and so He is not what we are’ (CD III/2, p.48).
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This passage, which reveals the hopeful dimension of Barth’s theology of the imago 
Dei, also indicates why Barth would not have considered his theology to be pessimistic. 
In spite o f our nature, our depravity and our incapacity, God still takes the part of the 
person:
For with God and from God he has a future which has not been decided by his self- 
contradiction or the divine judgement which as the sinner guilty o f this self- 
contradiction he must inevitably incur, but which by the faithfulness and mercy of 
God is definitely decided a very different way from what he deserves (CD III/2, p. 
31).
This, Barth argues, has nothing to do with optimism regarding human nature for we are 
elected through God’s grace alone. Neither can it be denied through a pessimistic 
judgement. It is a statement of fact:
On the basis o f the eternal will of God we have to think of every human being, even 
the oddest, most villainous or miserable, as one to whom Jesus Christ is Brother and 
God is Father; and we have to deal with him on this assumption.49
This is the only possible understanding of the human person that can be drawn from our 
understanding of the humanity of God. God does not reject the human so we should not 
undervalue our humanity. Thus in spite of the radically theocentric nature of his theology, 
he never loses sight o f the human, a point we will elaborate with reference to Barth’s 
ethical thought.
3.4 Ethical Implications of Barth’s Idea of Imago Dei
Though one might assume that Barth’s arguably pessimistic account o f the person’s sinful 
nature would colour his assessment of the worth o f human moral action, he, in fact, 
devoted considerable attention to the ethical life. Interestingly, if we look to Luther, 
whose account of justification was similarly anti-Pelagian, we see a thoroughly altruistic 
account of human moral action. Since, as Luther argues, we cannot participate in our own 
justification, we are free to live out our faith for the other:
The Christian ‘may serve and benefit others in all that he does, considering nothing 
except the need and the advantage of his neighbour [...]. Here faith is truly active 
through love, that is, it finds its expression in works of the freest service, cheerfully
49 Barth. ‘The Humanity of God\ p. 53.
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and lovingly done, with which a man willingly serves another without hope of 
reward’.50
Similarly, though Barth firmly rules out the possibility of human co-operation in 
salvation, he envisions a life lived according to the command of God, not only in 
obedience but also, as Nigel Biggar writes, ‘out of regard for our own best good, which 
this gracious God alone truly understands and which he intends with his heart’.51 Noting 
the limited -  or late developing -  scholarly attention given to Barth’s ethical writings, 
Webster argues that ‘conventional treatment o f Barth often revolves around an anxiety 
that the sheer abundance of Barth’s depiction o f the saving work of God in Christ tends to 
identify real action with divine action, and leave little room for lengthy exploration of 
human moral thought and activity’.52 However, Barth’s writings are not unconcerned 
with the goodness of human conduct and the Christian life. He understands that the 
person is absorbed in the actuality o f human existence. Just as we think, we also live and 
act and suffer: ‘As we will, we are; and what we do, we are’ (CD 1/2, p. 792). That the 
person is elected to be the covenant-partner o f God is signalled by the fact that he/she is 
‘constituted, bound, and obligated as a fellow man’.53 By nature, the person is 
‘determined for his fellow man, to be with him gladly’ (CD III/2, p. 274). This 
determination as a being for others is what marks the similarity between the human person 
and the person Jesus. As Barth writes, ‘to his beingybr others there must correspond as at 
least a minimum on our side the fact that our human being is at root a free being with 
others’ (CD III/2, p. 274). Further, we live out our creation in the image of God 
through our relationships with other people: ‘God is in relationship, and so too is the man 
created by Him. This is his divine likeness’ (CD III/2, p. 323-24).
This understanding of the inter-human relationship as a reflection of the divine 
self-encounter informs Barth’s treatment o f ethics. Barth emphasises the importance of 
ethics to his theology. Without ethics, Barth writes, ‘dogmatics incurs the grave suspicion 
of being now no more than an idle intellectual frivolity’ (CD 1/2, p. 787). Although the 
final word must be left to God, Barth understands ethical discourse as the preliminary 
word which is necessary to focus the person’s ‘wandering thoughts’ on the Word of
50 Luther, The Pagan Servitude o f  the Church, in Martin Luther, ed. by Dillenberger, p. 275.
51 Nigel Biggar, ‘Barth’s Trinitarian Ethics’, in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, pp. 212-228 (p. 
215).
52Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology, p. 1. For Webster’s more explicit treatment of the role of human moral 
action in two of Barth’s later texts, Church Dogmatics IV/4 and The Christian Life see Barth’s Ethics o f  
Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
53 Barth, ‘The Humanity of God’, p. 53.
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God.54 Theology divorced from ethics would acquire the reputation o f being aloof from 
life and of questionable value:
A reality which is conceived and presented in such a way that it does not affect or 
claim men or awaken them to responsibility or redeem them, i.e., a theoretical 
reality, cannot possibly be the reality of the Word, no matter how great may be the 
richness o f its content or the profundity of its conception (CD 1/2, p. 793).
Barth asserts that ‘dogmatics in itself must be ethics and ethics can only be dogmatics’ 
(CD 1/2, p. 795). Therefore, though Barth values ethics, it is unsurprising that he rejects 
any attempt towards an independent treatment of ethics apart from dogmatics since 
‘Christians are found only in Christ, not independently’ (CD 1/2, p. 791). Any attempt to 
secure theological independence for ethics has obscured theology, ‘transforming it into an 
ethical system with a Christian foundation, and then penetrating and controlling biblical 
exegesis and pastoral theology in the same way’ (CD 1/2, p. 782-3).55 The acceptance of 
such a theology -  which is really only an ‘applied anthropology’ -  would subject the 
church to an alien sovereignty no longer identifiable with the Word of God (CD 1/2, p. 
783). Barth sees much evidence of this tendency towards independent ethical systems in 
Christian antiquity and the Middle Ages, though not in Aquinas’ writings. Barth writes 
that it is ‘certainly remarkable that although Thomas’s ethics refer unmistakably to an 
independent basis it is not presented independently o f his dogmatics, but in a subordinate 
position within it’ (CD 1/2, p. 783). The classic dogmatics o f Reformation theology made 
the separation of theology and ethics impossible. It would be very difficult, Barth argues, 
to find passages in Luther or Calvin where ‘faith or the object of faith is treated without 
regard to the conduct o f the believer’ (CD 1/2, p. 783). It would be even more difficult to 
find references to ethics independent from dogmatics since the reformers could not lose 
sight of Jesus as the object o f faith.56 Barth identifies the failure of ethical systems that 
are removed from dogmatics as instrumental in his decision to break with liberal theology: 
‘Was it -  this has played a decisive role for me personally -  precisely the failure of the 
ethics o f the modem theology of the time, with the outbreak of the First World War,
54 Barth, ‘The Gift of Freedom: Foundation of Evangelical Ethics’, in The Humanity o f  God, p. 88.
55 Barth is not, however, opposed to a literary or academic treatment of ethics that is outwardly distinct from 
dogmatics as long as the separation is merely technical in character and that ethics is maintained to be 
subordinate to dogmatics (CD 1/2, p. 795).
56 This is why the Reformers, Barth argues, did not make systematic use of an idea of natural law even 
though they agreed with the scholastics on the existence of the law of nature inborn in the person and prior 
to faith (CD 1/2, p. 783).
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which caused us to grow puzzled also about its exegesis, its treatment of history, or its 
dogmatics?’57
Though some Christian thinkers might see the ideal form of Christian ethics in 
Barth’s thought,58 it may be asked whether Barth’s radically christocentric approach, 
isolated from all other methods of inquiry into the nature of personhood, restricts the 
potential for dialogue with other faiths or discourses within the public sphere. As 
articulated by Richard Roberts, ‘[h]ow then does the supremely positive assertion 
embodied in the theology of Barth relate to a secularised view of reality which has 
dispensed with transcendence and grants no Lebensraum to revelation?’59 Interestingly, 
given its extreme Christological persuasion, Barth’s work is valued in some contemporary 
Jewish theology. Michael Wyschogrod, for example, a self-described ‘Jewish Barthian’, 
appreciates the grounding o f Barth’s theology in historical revelation:
Barth’s refusal to substitute ontological constructions, whether in the form o f the 
“ground of being” or any other similar deflection of the God known by Israel, for 
the God who acts in Jewish history, cannot fail to meet with instinctive recognition 
by the Jewish reader that he has before him a biblical attuned thinker whose focus is 
on the God of Israel, even if, at a certain point, the Jewish story diverges from the 
Christian.60
We also find admiration for Barth’s work in David Novak, whose work we will address in 
Chapter Four. Novak suggests that if Barth had been a Jew, he would have made a superb 
Talmudist: ‘Barth’s sustained efforts to ground Christian ethics in prescriptive biblical 
revelation (especially in the Old Testament as did Jesus and Paul) reminds some 
perceptive readers, especially of a traditionalist bent, of the way the Rabbis did 
theology.’61 Novak values the tenacity with which Barth maintains his views, contrasting 
this with the ‘assimilationism’ of some liberal Jews:
57 Barth, T he Humanity of God’, p. 40.
58Stanley Hauerwas, for example, argues that ‘Barth shows the way that theology must be done’. With a 
Grain o f  the Universe, p. 145.
59 Richard H. Roberts, A Theology on its Way?, p. 60. As J. Daryl Charles articulates the issue: ‘To be 
faithful to Christ’s lordship is not to deny the challenge -  or the necessity -  of communicating truth to the 
nonbeliever, whose worldview and language are devoid of biblical and Christological understanding’. 
Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 129.
60 Michael Wyschogrod, Abraham's Promise: Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), p. 215.
61 David Novak, ‘Defending Niebuhr from Hauerwas, Journal o f  Religious Ethics, 40 (2012), 281-295 (p. 
283).
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Barth’s opposition to the elites of his day is in refreshing contrast to the tendency of 
most liberal Jewish thinkers to accommodate themselves and their fellow Jews to 
currently popular ideologies, especially to the ideologies of the elites of the societies 
from which Jews have so desperately sought both full acceptance and full 
approval.62
Novak feels theologically close to Barth on account o f Barth’s view of revelation which 
he applies by analogy to his own Jewish tradition. Novak, however, favours a natural law 
approach to ethics, unlike Barth, ‘because it is more philosophically arguable in a secular 
society and culture, and because it is more politically effective there’.63 From this 
perspective, Barth does not have much to offer. Nonetheless, Barth’s theology, Novak 
writes, should offer inspiration to those Jewish theologians who wish to make Jewish 
ethical teaching known to the wider world but ‘who seek ultimate approval for their 
representations o f the tradition from the divinely revealed Torah alone’.64
The views of Novak and Wyschogrod indicate that Barth’s anthropology and ethics 
may have something of a transferable relevance to other traditions of revelation by 
analogy.65 The difficulty, however, is much more obvious in relation to the relevance of 
Barth’s ethics in a secular context. It must be acknowledged, however, that Barth 
presented his theology in full awareness of the wider social context. His insistence on the 
importance of Christian revelation for any type of ethical discourse persisted in spite of 
his recognition that such argument had the potential to be marginalised:
The idea of a Christianity which is automatically given and received with the rest of 
our inheritance has now become historically impossible, no matter how tenaciously 
it may linger on and even renew itself in various attempts at restoration by the 
Church and the world. The Christian West [...] no longer exists either in the city or 
in the peace of the remotest hamlet (CD IV/3, p. 524).
It was not the case, therefore, that Barth envisaged a future re-emergence of Christendom, 
a point that is further indicated by his comments on infant baptism:
The real reason for the persistent adherence to infant baptism is quite simply the fact 
that without it the church would suddenly be in a remarkably embarrassing position.
62 Novak, ‘Defending Niebuhr from Hauerwas’, p. 283.
63 Novak, ‘Defending Niebuhr from Hauerwas’, p. 281.
64 Novak, ‘Defending Niebuhr from Hauerwas’, p. 284.
65 See also Glen A. Chestnutt, Challenging the Stereotype: The Theology o f  Karl Barth as a 
Resource for Inter-religious Encounter in a European Context (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010).
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Every individual would then have to decide whether he wanted to be a Christian.
But how many Christians would there be in that case?66
As Barth’s comments on baptism indicate, he envisioned a Church that was alive and bold 
and not ‘afraid to walk on the water’ and proclaim the full ‘reality’ o f the Christian 
message. He even maintained this emphasis in work addressed to audiences outside of 
the Christian context. For example, in a lecture delivered in 1949 entitled ‘The Christian 
Message and the New Humanism’, Barth told the audience, which he described as ‘an 
assembly of intellectuals of widely differing capabilities and interests’, o f the 
unavoidability of his commitment: ‘We shall not be able to conceal the fact that with the 
Christian message it is not the case of a classical humanism nor of a new humanism which 
is to be rediscovered today, but rather o f the humanism of God’.68 The centrality of 
Christian revelation to ethics was simply the inescapable reality o f Barth’s doctrine o f the 
Word of God.
The ethical life, we conclude, is central to Barth’s interpretation o f imago Dei, 
since we live out and express our creation in the image of God through our relationship 
with fellow humanity. Just as God is in relationship, so too is humankind. This is the 
only reference to divine likeness that Barth will allow. Though his ethics are potentially 
valuable to other traditions of revelation by analogy, the uncompromising dependence of 
Barth’s ethics on dogmatics limits their viability outside of a religious context.
3.5 Conclusion
Barth’s understanding of the concept of imago Dei, embedded within his doctrine o f the 
Word of God, can only be understood in relation to the ‘event’ o f revelation encountered 
in faith. As such, the meaning of the concept cannot be deduced from empirical 
observation or with reference to the ideals of ethical humanism but only through the event 
of revelation. Barth defines the imago Dei in terms of correspondence, which is described 
as conformity in faith to God’s word. Though we cannot participate in the being of God, 
we express our likeness to God through our relationship with fellow humanity, a fact that 
gives Barth’s interpretation of imago Dei a strong ethical dimension. Though Barth 
emphasised the corrupt and delusional nature o f human personhood, the supposition that
66 Barth, The Heidelberg Catechism for Today, trans. by Shirley Guthrie (John Knox Press, 1964), p. 104.
67 The Heidelberg Catechism for Today, p. 104.
68 Barth, ‘The Christian Message and the New Humanism’, in Against the Storm: Shorter Post-War 
Writings 1946-52 (London: SCM, 1954), p. 190.
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he held a ‘negative’ view of the human person would amount to a simplification o f his 
thought. As we have seen, there are many examples to the contrary in his writings, most 
notably, his rejection of a fatalistic interpretation of sin. Barth favoured instead the idea 
of sin as an ‘inconceivable revolt’ which ‘never loses the character o f a crime, or becomes 
a kind of second natural state which is excusable as such’ (CD III/2, p. 274). Yet 
although, ‘negativity’ should not be associated with Barth’s view o f the person as such, it 
is perhaps appropriate to his view of human participation in redemption or of our capacity 
for relationship with God, both of which he stridently opposes by virtue o f the 
christological starting-point o f his theology: ‘This is where the false propositions of 
Roman Catholicism and humanism arise, and we must be on our guard against them’ (CD 
III/2, p. 274). Crucially, for Barth, we cannot encounter God apart from his act o f self­
revelation: ‘There is no height or depth in which God can be God in any other way’ (CD 
II/l, p. 77). This emphasis on the objectivity o f the Word of God comes at the cost o f any 
real sense o f mutuality, something that is arguably very necessary for religious 
experience. This is not something that would have troubled Barth very much since the 
quest for religious experience contradicts the entire thrust o f his theology. However, the 
lack o f mutuality or participation apart from faith affects the enduring relevance of his 
interpretation of imago Dei.
It can seem that Barth accords an essentially passive role to the person with regard 
to our relationship to God in Christ, within which our election is akin to an exercise of 
divine lordship. In explaining our human destiny wholly in terms of the work of God 
taking place within us, Barth’s theology can leave the reader with the sense that what we 
are is decided elsewhere since ‘both the first and last word is spoken about us’ (CD III/2, 
p. 50). However, though he prioritises grace, Barth does also assert our freedom, and 
even our independence, in relation to God as God’s partner. Even in differentiation to 
God, the person ‘can be a real partner; which is capable o f action and responsibility in 
relation to Him’ (CD III/l, p. 184-5).
Barth presents his approach as yielding a clear-sighted picture of ‘real man’ 
undistorted by any human images and ideologies. He was opposed to any system or 
ideology that promised to bring all human problems under control and that failed to 
recognise the relativity o f our earthly actions. Barth saw it as the mission of the Church to 
stand in defiance against such ideologies because of his firmly-held conviction that ‘man 
may generally mean and give a great deal to His fellows, but he cannot be their Deliverer 
or Saviour’ (CD III/2, p. 222). Although Barth does not allow for human access to God in
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this life, comfort can be drawn from Barth’s assertion that it is not possible for the human 
person to be absolutely godless. In emphasising what God has done for us, Barth places 
the human person in a position of grace. The person is saved yet still fallen and apart 
from God. Though pessimistic with regard to human potential, in his realistic assessment 
of lived human experience, Barth’s interpretation of imago Dei was also one of hope and 
faith: ‘Man has not fallen lower that the depth to which God humbled Himself for him in 
Jesus Christ’ (CD IV/3, p. 119).
Chapter Four will address the concept of imago Dei in the thought of the 
contemporary Jewish theologian, David Novak. Novak, as we have seen, valued Barth’s 
emphasis on revealed wisdom, though his own theology adopts a favourable disposition 
towards natural law. This, therefore, lends Novak’s interpretation o f imago Dei greater 
flexibility in relation to dialogue outside of the Jewish context.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BETW EEN REVEALED W ISDOM AND NATURAL LAW:
THE CONCEPT OF IMAGO D E I IN THE THEOLOGY OF DAVID NOVAK
This chapter will discuss the interpretation of imago Dei in the work of the contemporary 
Jewish theologian, David Novak, and the implications of the concept for Novak’s 
commitment to dialogue. Like Karl Barth, Novak rejects the intellectualist approach to 
imago Dei that characterised earlier interpretations. He favours, instead, a relational 
understanding of the concept that emphasises the mutuality o f the covenantal relationship. 
After examining Novak’s explicit treatment of Genesis 1:26-27, the chapter will consider 
the way in which Novak’s view of imago Dei functions in a dialogical context. There are 
two objectives to this exploration of dialogue: firstly, to establish the way in which 
Novak’s covenantal, Torah-centred approach to imago Dei informs his understanding of 
the relation between Jews and non-Jews; and secondly, to explore the way in which the 
concept of imago Dei functions, for Novak, as the primary point of contrast between 
secular and religious understandings of personhood. It will be seen that Novak contrasts 
the sense o f being commanded, inherent in the concept o f imago Dei, with the self- 
legislating inclinations of a radical form of autonomy that characterises aspects of secular 
culture. The chapter will begin with a brief description o f Novak’s method and priorities 
as Jewish theologian, which will illustrate the centrality of dialogue to his work.
4.1 Theological Retrieval, Philosophical Imagination and Political Prudence
In his commitment to the interaction between the Jewish tradition and public moral 
discourse, Novak employs the threefold method of theological retrieval, philosophical 
imagination, and political prudence.1 It is at this intersection between theology, 
philosophy and politics that Novak situates his understanding of the human person. 
Theological retrieval, to which Novak accords primacy, is centred firmly on Torah. The 
previous chapter noted Novak’s response to Barth’s christocentric approach to ethics. 
Novak, we have seen, values Barth’s prioritisation o f revelation and the tenacity with 
which he maintained his theological principles. He applies Barth’s revelation-centred 
approach, by analogy, to his own tradition, contrasting it with what he views as the
1 David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract: An Essay in Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), p. xiii.
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tendencies o f liberal Jewish theology to divorce ethics from the context of Jewish 
revelation. In contrast to Barth, however, Novak emphasises the importance of context. 
The degree to which he invokes revelation is, therefore, dependent upon his conversation 
partner. This type of approach is described by the modem Christian theologian, Paul 
Tillich, as follows:
He is a philosopher even if he is a theologian and although his ultimate concern is 
dependent on the subject matter of his theological work [...] But as an ethicist he 
does not bring his theological assertions into arguments about the nature o f the 
moral imperative.2
This quotation aptly summarises Novak’s stance as a Jewish theologian in engagement 
with wider ethical discourse.
For Novak, loyalty to covenantal life and the Torah is more important than loyalty 
to any secular community to which one belongs. His understanding of Torah 
encompasses both Scripture and the normative tradition o f the oral Torah. Although 
halakhic deliberation is the most important component of Jewish ethical thought, the input 
o f science, philosophy and history is also deemed important to the analysis of issues 
pertaining to human life. Therefore, philosophical imagination and political prudence are 
both essential to Novak’s commitment to dialogue in the public square, where Jews are 
called to speak and act in a world beyond the ‘four cubits o f the law’.3 Novak’s long­
standing concern regarding how Jews, and Christians perhaps, can participate in a liberal 
democracy in good faith influences the direction of his theological work, although the 
‘democratic polity is neither one’s original nor ultimate destination in the world’.4 Novak 
recognises that, in the secular sphere, argument cannot be justified according to Jewish 
revelation but must be answerable to more universal criteria. Therefore, in contrast to 
Barth, Novak favours an approach derived from natural law in dealing with questions 
pertaining to the inter-human realm. As we will see, this does not minimise Novak’s 
commitment to the distinctiveness and importance o f Jewish revelation.5 It does,
2 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 267.
3i?. Berakhot 8a, discussed by Novak in Covenantal Rights: A Study in Jewish Political Theoty (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. xiv.
4 Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 28.
5 In commenting on Novak’s commitment to Jewish-Christian dialogue, Stephen Haynes writes that 
‘Novak’s desire to dialogue with Christians does not tempt him to downplay theological differences 
between the communities or compromise Jewish revelatory claims. On the contrary, his tendency to identify 
Jewish distinctiveness in election and covenant makes him an attractive dialogue partner for Christians who 
also view the divine-human relationship through these biblical lenses.’, ‘Review of Talking With
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however, increase the effectiveness of his contribution to dialogue in the public square. 
Having observed Novak’s method and priorities as a theologian, we now turn directly to 
his interpretation of imago Dei, which is derived from the doctrine o f creation.
4.2 The Imago D ei as Active Mutuality
How, Novak asks, can our view of personhood be ‘extended so as to include those who do 
not act well for me or for anyone else, and even those who cannot act at all for anyone 
else, even themselves’?6 In convergence with Barth, Novak argues that this question 
cannot be answered by any ethics that attempts to constitute an ontology or a 
philosophical anthropology out of its own operations. Such ethical methods, Novak 
argues, inevitably reduce human existence to our action in the world. This question can, 
however, be answered with reference to the doctrine o f creation, ‘specifically the creation 
o f the human person as the image o f  God\ 7 The disassociation from any idea of self­
creation on the part o f the human person is a consistent feature o f Novak’s theology, and a 
facet o f his thought that has strong affinity with Barth’s idea of the ‘real’ person. Any 
attempt to reduce the human person to some worldly category results, Novak holds, in a 
distortion of the truth.
As noted earlier, Novak’s approach to imago Dei can be regarded as ‘relational’, 
and is, as such, radically divergent from the reason-centred approach observed earlier in 
Maimonides’ writings, for example.8 This divergence is to be expected given the 
significant difference in the historical and philosophical contexts within which Novak and 
Maimonides were writing. As Novak insightfully remarks, it is ‘a mistake of many 
current followers o f Maimonides to think they can conduct the search for truth using the 
same tools he used’.9 Novak holds a different view of the covenantal relationship, which
Christians: Musings o f  a Jewish Theologian’, Reviews in Religion & Theology, 14 (2007), 75-77 (p.76). 
This, Haynes argues, makes Novak a natural conversation partner o f Christians of a more orthodox 
persuasion.
6 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image of God (1998)’, in Tradition in the Public Square: A David Novak Reader, 
ed. by R. Rashkover and M. Kavka (London: SCM Press, 2008), p. 148.
7 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image of God’, p. 148.
8 Nevertheless, Novak was particularly influenced by Maimonides’ understanding o f the commandments 
and natural law. He describes himself as a disciple o f Maimonides in the foreword to Matthew Levering’s 
Jewish Christian Dialogue and the Life o f  Wisdom: Engagements with the Theology o f David Novak 
(London: Continuum, 2010), p. xi.
9 Novak, ‘The Mind of Maimonides’, First Things: A Monthly Journal o f  Religion and Public Life, 90 
(1999), p. 27. Novak remarks that ‘just as Maimonides himself reworked scriptural and rabbinic materials, 
finding implications in them that their original authors would not or could not develop, I intend to do the 
same here with the implications o f Maimonides’s own theory’. Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish 
Justification, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 68.
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for Maimonides is a ‘relation to a God who seems too closely to resemble the God of 
Aristotle’.10 There is, Novak holds, an absence of reciprocity in Maimonides’ conception 
o f the divine-human relationship. ‘All concern is in one direction: from man to God. 
Maimonides in no way ever attempts to constitute a truly responsive role for God. There 
is no real reciprocity here.’11 Covenant, Novak holds, must retain that element of 
mutuality, a constant transaction between God and Israel. Israel must act with God in 
response to God’s action for Israel. Even where scripture depicts God’s active saving of 
Israel, Israel is not merely the passive recipient.12
The divine-human relationship, as Novak envisages it, is such that God can make 
claims upon the human person to which the person can freely respond. Novak writes that 
in order ‘for this response to be possible, God must relinquish some of his own space, as it 
were, to allow his human creatures a place on which to stand before him — but never 
successfully against him’.13 This ‘place on which to stand’ signifies the particular status 
of the human person. This special status and ability to respond to the claim of God, is 
what Novak intends by his use of the concept o f imago Dei.14 This special status is 
universal. Novak counts as persons all those bom of human parents. While the capacity 
for reason is valued as an attribute to be developed by humans to whatever extent they 
can, an anthropology solely based on reason would be ‘insufficient to ground an ethics 
that embraces all o f humankind so defined’.15 Whether personhood should be defined 
according to rationality is not merely an academic question, Novak argues, since this 
anthropology has been invoked as grounds for dehumanising those on the margins of 
human life:
In our day especially, when essential humanness is denied by some to those at the 
edges of human life -  the unborn, the permanently and severely retarded, the 
irrevocably comatose -  such an ontology and its anthropology are inconsistent with 
the whole thrust of the Jewish tradition on the issue of human personhood.16
This point undergirds Novak’s treatment o f many ethical and social issues pertaining to 
human life, as will be discussed further.
! 0 Natural Law in Judaism, p. 135.
11 Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, p. 135.
u  Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, p. 136,
13 Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 40.
14 Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 40.
15 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image o f God’, p. 149.
16 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image o f God’, p. 149.
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Novak’s opposition to the intellectualist interpretation o f imago Dei can be further 
illustrated with reference to his understanding of divine election. The imago Dei ‘is not a 
quality humans have any more than election o f Israel is due to a quality she has’.17 Any 
view of Jewish particularity that is not based on the covenant -  for example ‘Jewish 
genius’ or ‘Jewish peoplehood’ -  is ethically inauthentic. ‘Particularism of this kind, 
unlike the transcendence of the general world by the singularity of the Jewish covenant 
with God, can be presented only as ethnocentricity or chauvinism’18 Similarly, as regards 
the imago Dei, the problem with the centralisation o f particular human attributes, such as 
rationality or will, is that such human attributes can be constituted phenomenologically 
without reference to God. Central to Novak’s understanding of the concept o f imago Dei 
is the conviction that ‘humans are more than they can ever do or make of themselves’.19 
The intellectualist interpretation also loses the intimacy of the human-divine relationship 
as depicted in Genesis: ‘the only way one can constitute the intimacy of the relationship 
with God, which Scripture suggests is a possibility fo r  humans from the very beginning 
and continually thereafter, is to see the “image of God” as that which God and humans 
share in what they do together' .20
Novak employs Maimonides’ via negativa to construct an anthropology that looks
beyond the human. As with Maimonides’ use o f the via negativa in relation to God, this
method moves from what the human person is not in order to arrive at an understanding of
what the person is. Novak notes that the word for image, tselem, can be argued to be
derived from the noun tsel, meaning shadow. While image reflects what is being
‘imaged’, a shadow ‘only indicates that something lies behind the blank form that is
cast.’21 Novak suggests that this approach prevents our assumption that what is within us
comes from ourselves. It also means that any of our conclusions about the shadow are
tentative until the presence behind the shadow becomes known to us. The idea also
functions in natural law terms since it can be apprehended, prior to revelation, that the
-human person cannot be categorised according to the things o f the world:
For if  the human person is the “shadow of God”, then even before God presents 
himself to us in revelation, we still have some apprehension of why the human
17Novak, The Election o f Israel The Idea o f the Chosen People (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 121.
18 Novak, Jewish Social Ethics, p. 9.
19 ‘Persons in the Image o f God’, p. 148.
20 Covenantal Rights, p. 40.
21 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image of God’, p. 150.
109
person cannot be definitely categorised by any category by which we determine the 
nature of the things of the world.22
Any reductive categorisation, such as that of the animal rationale, is a distortion of the 
true being of the human person. ‘No matter how much humans might share with the other 
creatures in the world, they are always in the world, but never truly o f  it.’23
According to Novak, the human person is distinguished from other animals as the 
only being that is answerable to God and responsible for other persons and for the rest of 
creation. ‘The image of God does not designate a substance or attribute conveyed by God 
to humans. Instead it is a relational capacity for what pertains between God and all 
humans.’24 In this sense, Novak’s interpretation o f imago Dei is covenantal. It envisages 
an ‘active mutuality’ which can only be possible between God and the person.25 Though 
the capacity for this covenantal relationship is inherent in every human person, the 
commandments constitute the content of the imago Dei.
4.3 The Content of the Imago Dei
For Novak, the capacity to enter into a normative, covenantal relationship with the source 
of our existence is not dependent upon historical revelation but it is, rather, inherent in 
every human person. In his concern for the ability o f a religious anthropology to be 
brought into philosophical and political discussion, Novak does not ground his argument 
pertaining to personhood in terms of Jewish revelation, but rather in our common human 
dignity. He argues that the Jewish understanding of the human person can be made 
intelligible in the secular sphere since aspects o f the God-human relationship have their 
correlates in the inter-human relationship. However, while Novak -  in contrast to Barth -  
holds that we have a natural awareness of our particular status, it is only through 
revelation that the truth of our election is brought to conscious mutual relationality. 
‘Although felt inchoately by desire in advance, the meaning o f this capacity only comes to 
knowledge/experience when her desideratum presently reveals himself to her’.26 The 
Torah brings ‘the meaning of being created in the image of God to human awareness and 
action’.27 The Torah reveals what Novak views as the ‘content’ of the imago Dei: ‘the
22 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image o f God’, p. 151.
23 ‘Persons in the Image of God’, p. 151.
24 The Jewish Social Contract, p. 17.
25 Covenantal Rights, p. 41.
26 Novak, The Election o f Israel, p. 121.
27 Novak, The Election o f Israel, p. 121
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normative relationship when humans recognise that the moral law, which is consistent 
with their nature, is rooted in the commandment of God.’28
The commandments are, therefore, central to this covenantal life of divine-human 
active mutuality: ‘Human dignity is affirmed by the teaching that all human beings are 
either the subjects or the objects of God’s commandments’.29 It is only with the ‘indignity 
of death5 that we are free from the commandments.30 This sense of a shared covenantal 
life is depicted in Rabbinic teaching, where God is imagined to observe the positive 
commands o f the Torah.31 We have been given the means, through the commandments, 
of living according to our nature. When we are attuned to the sense of being commanded, 
we understand that the purpose of our earthly lives is not derived from the world or from 
ourselves but from the covenantal relationship with God. The centrality of Torah brings 
the discussion to the relation between the status of the Jew and non-Jew as regards the 
imago Dei. If  the commandments o f the Torah are identified as the content o f the imago 
DeU how does Novak’s theology view the non-Jew in relation to the image?
4.4 Judaism and the Religious Other
Given his commitment to many forms of dialogue, it is unsurprising that Novak has given 
the question of the relation between Jews and non-Jews considerable attention. Novak 
regrets that Jewish moral teaching can appear to be particularistic -  even discriminatory -  
and applicable only to the Jewish community. ‘The charge is that the Jewish tradition 
teaches Jews to act toward their fellow Jews in one way and to act toward gentiles in 
another way and that these two ways of acting are opposed to each other.’32 This view 
found particular expression in Immanuel Kant’s argument that the ‘Jewish faith , as 
originally established, was only a collection o f merely statutory laws supporting a 
political state’.33 The moral content of Judaism was, according to Kant, a subsequent 
addition that did not belong to Judaism as such. Judaism, he wrote, excluded all other 
peoples from its communion and was hostile towards them. Novak finds an early
28 Covenantal Rights, p. 42.
29 Covenantal Rights, p. 43.
30 Covenantal Rights, p. 43.
31 Novak refers to YT. Rosh Hashanah 1.3/57b and Vayiqra Rabbah 35.5, Covenantal Rights, p. 42.
32 Novak, ‘The Universality of Jewish Ethics: A Rejoinder to Secular Critics’, The Journal o f  Religious 
Ethics, 2 (2008), 1 8 1 - 2 1 1 ,(p. 181). Novak remarks that, today, Christian ethics can appear to be equally 
particularistic.
33 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries o f  Mere Reason, trans. by A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), pp. 130-131.
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expression of this view in the Gospel of Matthew: ‘You have heard that it was said, “You 
shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy5” (Matt: 5:43).34 This well-known passage 
goes on to cast Christian ethics in a more universalistic light: ‘But I say to you, Love your 
enemies and pray for those who persecute you5 (Matt: 5:44).
The dismissal of Jewish ethics as particularistic forgets that at the heart of biblical 
and Rabbinic writings we find ideas of equality o f moral status and human worth, as well 
as the imperative to aid and protect the poor and defenceless. It is interesting to note the 
views of the Jewish theologian, Ruth Langer, on this point. Langer argues that Judaism, 
since it pertains to the relationship of God to a specific group of people, is better placed 
than Christianity to appreciate the theological status of the religious other. Langer writes 
that ‘Judaism makes universalist claims only about the existence o f God, the Creator, and 
God's fundamental demands of humanity as expressed in the Noahide laws.535 These are 
the seven commandments of Noah which are pre-Mosaic in origin and universally 
applicable since all of humankind is considered to be a descendent o f Noah. Since 
Judaism does not make any further universalistic claims, Langer argues that it is well 
placed to appreciate the paths of other faiths. Langer contrasts this aspect o f Judaism with 
the Christian teaching that Christ is the universal path to salvation. Such an assertion, 
Langer argues, ‘is actually a limitation on God's omnipotence, a suggestion that God can 
only operate in a single way in the world. Judaism can understand other religions, and 
especially Christianity and Islam, also to be God5s communications o f divine will to the 
world.’36 While it could be argued that Langer does not give sufficient attention to those 
changes in Christian teaching that have heightened the appreciation of other faiths, her 
point regarding the stance of Judaism is interesting, as is her account o f the Noahide 
laws. Langer writes that, in Rabbinic terms, Noahide law ‘is a functional equivalent to
34 Novak, ‘The Universality o f Jewish Ethics’, p. 182.
35 Ruth Langer, ‘Jewish Understandings of the Religious Other’, Theological Studies, 64 (2003), 255-277 
(p. 276-7).
36 Langer, ‘Jewish Understandings of the Religious Other’, p. 276.
37 The Vatican II document, Nostra Aetate (1965), marked the beginning of a change in Catholic attitude 
towards other faiths: ‘The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. She 
regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, 
though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of 
that Truth which enlightens all men.’ http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ 
documents/vatii_ decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html [accessed July 20 2013], par. 2. In continuity with 
Vatican II, Pope John Paul II wrote that ‘though the routes taken may be different, there is but a single goal 
to which is directed the deepest aspiration of the human spirit as expressed in its quest for God and also in 
its quest, through its tending towards God, for the full dimension of its humanity, or in other words for the 
full meaning o f human life’, Redemptor hominis, (1979),
http ://www. Vatican. va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor- 
hominis_en.html [Accessed 16 July 2014], par. 11.
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the Christian assertion that all people, even if  they do not know it, are saved only through 
Christ -  Christianity’s fundamental theological category’.38
Noahide law is also central to Novak’s view of religious diversity. Since the idea 
that Jewish ethics are particularistic runs contrary to his appeal to the wider relevance of 
Jewish moral wisdom, it is essential that Novak can illustrate the universal dimension of 
Jewish ethics. The Noahide laws are a good starting point since they indicate that 
Judaism has long been concerned with the prescription of norms for human life and not 
just for Jewish life. Where the religious traditions teach normative practices which are 
universally applicable, these prescriptions must be justified according to reason as well as 
through the authority o f the tradition. Novak holds that ‘in order to be truly universal and 
thus rationally persuasive, these normative practices have to be universalizable\ in other 
words they must have a reason for which they were enacted, a reason that could easily be 
accepted by any rational person’.39
Novak, therefore, considers all questions regarding the relationship between Jewish 
and non-Jewish life in the context of Noahide law which provides the justification for 
natural law. This is the law of God as it applies to all o f humankind, discoverable by 
every rational person but discovered by the Jewish tradition in the Noahide laws. Novak 
presents the Noahide laws as a Rabbinic creation.40 They find their earliest articulation in 
the Tosefta, a late second century text:
Seven commandments were the sons o f Noah commanded: (1) concerning 
adjudication, (2) and concerning idolatry, (3) and concerning blasphemy, (4) and 
concerning sexual immorality, (5) and concerning bloodshed, (6) and concerning 
robbery, (7) and concerning a limb tom from a living animal.41
The Noahide laws contain the universal ethical teaching of Judaism, the minimum 
standard o f morality for all nations. They were considered to have been binding for Jews 
prior to the revelation at Sinai. Jews began as Noahides. The laws were regarded by the 
rabbis as prescriptive for all of humankind, unlike the 613 commandments of the Torah 
which were applicable to Jews alone. They provide, as Dan Cohn-Sherbok terms it,
38 Ruth Langer, ‘Jewish Understandings o f the Religious Other’, p. 267.
39 Novak, ‘The Universality of Jewish Ethics’, p. 183.
40 Novak presents an extended study of the Noahide laws in The Image o f the Non-Jew in Judaism: The Idea 
o f Noahide Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Littman, 2011). Here, he considers alternative views o f earlier scholars 
with regard to where Noahide law found its first expression -  in the Torah, among Hittite scholars or during 
the Maccabean era -  and concludes that the Noahide laws are a rabbinic creation. Although they find their 
theological origin in the Torah, they did not find an historical starting point prior to the destruction of the 
Second Temple when the question of Jewish relation to non-Jews became more relevant., pp. 12-35.
41 Tosefta AZ  8.4, discussed by Novak, The Image o f the Non-Jew in Judaism, p. 11.
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evidence o f ‘Rabbinic inclusivisrrr with regard to other faiths. Gentile nations that abided 
by Noahide law were considered righteous. Contrary to biblical exclusivism which 
ridiculed the gods of other nations, the rabbis accepted that, while Israel worshipped God 
directly, other nations worshipped through intermediaries with a symbolic function.42 
Gentiles could only be deemed guilty of violating the prohibition of idolatry if  they 
believe that such symbols have a divine nature.43 There are, therefore, two ways of 
speaking of the ‘Noahide5, presently as co-Judaic and historically as pre-Judaic.44
For Novak, the primary significance of the Noahide laws lies in the fact that they 
indicate a primary point of authority which is required for the ordering of human life. For 
Novak, ‘it follows that any rejection of God’s norms presupposes the substitution of 
God’s authority by the authority of one who is not-God being made into God5 45 Since, 
however, the Noahide laws mostly consist in prohibitions, they are indicative of a 
relationship between the Creator and creature that is essentially negative. For a positive 
relationship to be sustained, ‘there must be the discovery of positive reasons by humans 
within themselves for them to want to accept and maintain this relationship5.46 The person 
must have a desire for good.
4.5 Natural Law
If, according to the Rabbinic tradition, the Noahide laws are universally binding, what is 
the extent o f their dependence on Jewish revelation? How are they discoverable to non- 
Jews? This is the point at which, for Novak, Noahide law leads to the idea of natural law. 
Novak argues that the Noahide laws contain an expression of those ethical norms that are 
universally knowable. It is a very positive thing, therefore, that these ethical norms find 
their parallels in many other cultures. Novak writes that ‘the image of God is not a 
peculiarly Jewish domain. Jews can accept the fact that other cultures enable their 
members to function as the image of God5.47 Natural law, for Novak, is the rational
42 Dan Cohn-Sherbok writes that, according to the rabbis, ‘pagans should be understood as polytheists in 
practice but monotheists in theory if they worship the One God through the adoration o f nature and 
reverence for the symbols which their culture has developed5. Judaism and Other Faiths (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 30.
43Cohn-Sherbok finds evidence that other nations were permitted to worship the heavenly bodies in the 
following text: ‘And lest you lift up your eyes to the heaven and see the sun and the moon and the stars -  all 
the heavenly host, and you be swept away and you worship them, which the Lord has allotted to all the 
peoples under the heaven5 (Deuteronomy 4:19).
44 Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue, p. 26.
45 Novak, The Election o f Israel, p. 118.
46 Novak, The Election o f  Israel, p. 119.
47 The Jewish Social Contract, p. 17.
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discovery o f what is required in order for us to live in the world according to God’s 
image: ‘Conscious and free human participation in that divine project is how humans 
make their own worldly projects an imitation of God’s project fo r  the world, a project 
com ing/r<9m the Only One who is beyond the world.’48 This, for Novak, is practical faith 
and it begins with the rational discovery o f the way in which we can reflect God’s 
benevolence in the world. Natural law can, therefore, be seen as a preparation for 
revealed law rather than its replacement; it places within us the desire for covenant. 
Natural law, in itself, does not constitute the direct relationship with God that humans 
need. For Jews, this direct relationship is initiated through the covenant at Sinai and finds 
fulfilment in the eschatological redemption which only God can bring about. It is 
Novak’s aim to produce a minimal natural law theory which is inextricable from 
revelation and positive law, and from covenantal life. Natural law is the minimal 
normative conditions necessary for the survival o f human communities. It is the structure 
which protects life since it is inspired ‘by a sense o f urgency about assaults on the 
inherent dignity o f people and of human community’.49
In considering Novak’s use o f the Noahide laws to ground his natural law theory, 
it is important not to over-emphasise the specific content of the laws. The Jewish 
theologian, Elliot Dorff, finds issue with Novak’s suggestion that the three prohibitions 
that Jews may never violate -  idolatry, killing of innocent life and sexual immorality -  are 
the strongest evidence of commonality between Jews and other gentile communities.50 
Dorff suggests that while these are indeed important in the Jewish faith, their universal 
prominence cannot be presumed. Even if they are prohibited, they may be viewed in a 
different way in other traditions or they may not share the same degree of prominence. 
Dorff considers, for example, the debate and variance o f opinion regarding 
homosexuality, a divisive issue in different Jewish and Christian groups and hardly 
grounds for interfaith, or even intrafaith, commonality. For Dorff, Novak is reading his 
own faith into other faiths instead of trying to understand the other faith as it understands 
itself, something which is an important accepted principle o f interfaith dialogue.51
D orff s point regarding the diversity of interpretation is certainly valid, raising the 
issue of cultural pluralism, which is a challenge to the viability o f natural law. What is
48 Novak, ‘The Universality o f Jewish Ethics’, p. 199.
49 Natural Law in Judaism, p. 192.
50 Elliot N. Dorff, ‘Another Jewish View o f Ethics, Christian and Jewish’, in Christianity in Jewish Terms 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 127-135 (p. 133).
51 Dorff, ‘Another Jewish View of Ethics, Christian and Jewish’, p. 133.
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included within the remit of natural law and who decides? It is easy to read our own 
customs as ‘natural5, a prescient concern considering perspectives of previous chapters 
regarding the natural subordination of women. However, we must remember that Novak 
uses the three prohibitions of idolatry, murder and sexual immorality as illustrative o f a 
common law of God that applies to all of humankind, discoverable by every rational 
person through reason. While it is true that the prohibitions are interpreted differently in 
the two traditions, Novak is not concerned as much with the positive content of natural 
law as he is with the fact of human ability to discover the law of God. Natural law is 
neither the content nor the telos of the law but is the limit of the law, establishing the 
normative criteria that positive law, both Jewish and non-Jewish, must adhere to in order 
to be considered just. Again, natural law is inextricable from revelation and covenantal 
life.
Like Dorff, the Christian theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, suggests that the Jewish 
and Christian traditions may understand obedience to the same commandment in different 
ways. It is important for Hauerwas that all commonalities between the two traditions exist 
only as analogies: ‘Both Jews and Christians gather to worship God on the Sabbath. 
However, that we do not gather for worship on the same day of the week is an important 
aspect not only of our differing understandings of worship but also of our differing 
understandings o f “ethics” ’.52 Hauerwas argues that Novak may read too much into 
Christian observance of the Noahide commandments. He also holds that the proposition 
of a Christian-Jewish ethic based on natural law is problematic since this would entail the 
separation o f ethics from the theological assumptions and practices o f both traditions, 
which is something that Hauerwas cannot allow. We need only recall Hauerwas’ 
identification of the ideal form of Christian ethics with Barth’s theology to see how 
problematic this would be for him. We have already noted Novak’s prioritisation of 
revelation and the centrality of Torah to this theology. Natural law is, as he consistently 
maintains, merely a minimal ethical standard. It is, however, indispensable to Novak’s 
contribution to dialogue on many issues pertaining to human life.
5" Stanley Hauerwas, ‘Christian Ethics in Jewish Terms: A Response to David Novak’, in Christianity in 
Jewish Terms, pp. 135-141 (p. 140).
4.6 The Sanctity of Human Life
For Novak, human life begins at conception. Though acknowledging the arguments of 
other ethicists that life begins at a particular stage of prenatal development, Novak 
suggests that this type of reasoning presents a moral dilemma. What if  life really begins 
earlier than this? Therefore, Novak argues, in cases o f doubt, the presumption must be in 
favour o f life. This issue, for a Jewish theologian, is somewhat complicated by the 
existence of some Rabbinic precedent for the differentiation between the stages o f pre­
natal life in relation to personhood. Most significantly, there exists a Talmudic passage 
that assumes a lesser status for the embryo before forty days after conception, referring to 
the embryo as ‘mere water’.1 In response to this passage, Novak argues that the rabbis 
were influenced by the scientific thinking of the time which has since been disproven. 
The ‘mere water’ argument is not a legal fiat but a scientific judgement, a statement of 
fact, and as such must be open to analysis regarding its truth. Since current scientific 
opinion would not find any human properties lacking in an embryo before forty days, we 
must discount this as a well-intentioned error on the part of the rabbis.
Here, Novak invokes Maimonides’ distinction between reasoning when used to 
consider ritual or religious questions and reasoning pertaining to moral questions in the 
inter-human realm. Scientific evidence is only relevant to a subject to which universal 
reason pertains. It would not be relevant in matters regarding, for example, kosher food 
unless it happened that the eating of the food would endanger human life. In matters of 
Jewish ritual and religious practice, traditional authority is normatively sufficient and, if it 
were the case that the ‘mere water’ principle pertained to a particularly Jewish cultural 
practice, it would be binding. However, the authority o f the Jewish tradition cannot 
outweigh the input of universal human reason regarding matters pertaining to universal 
human relevance. The discovery o f DNA has lent scientific credibility to the belief in the 
continuity of life between the different stages o f pre-natal development. Novak, therefore, 
challenges his fellow Jewish ethicists to recognise the sanctity o f human life in all its 
stages: ‘Does our reverence for human life as the image of God not require that we treat
1 Babylonian Talmud Yevamot 69b, discussed in The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 52.
“Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Shehitah, 10.12-13 (New York: E. Grossman, 1957), discussed by Novak, 
The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 65.
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every human life, even the minuscule human life of the newly conceived embryo, with 
what the tradition calls “human dignity” (kvod ha-beriyotfV1
Novak’s ethical positions, however, cannot be simply deduced from the principles 
outlined above:
In the context o f the Jewish normative tradition no one can simply say “Based on 
my theological principles, this is the only ethical course o f action.” When legal 
precedent already exists, one can use his or her theological principles only to 
exercise judgement and attempt to persuade others.4
Novak is referring here to the somewhat casuistic nature o f halakhic deliberation, focusing 
as it does upon paradigmatic cases rather than on ethical principles.5 It is illustrated very 
well by the former Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the 
Commonwealth, Immanuel Jakobovits, in the following passage. In commenting on the 
possibility o f overlap between the Christian and Jewish approaches to abortion, 
Jakobovits writes that in ‘Jewish law, the right to destroy a human fruit before birth is 
entirely unrelated to theological considerations. Neither the question of the entry of the 
soul before birth nor the claim to salvation after death have any practical bearing on the 
subject.’6 There is nothing in halakhah, Jakobovits holds, which guarantees the ‘human 
inviolability’ o f the fetus.
Although it is difficult to imagine any ethical issue being, for Novak, ‘entirely 
unrelated to theological considerations’, he also takes full account o f halakhic precedent. 
Novak’s position as regards abortion -  unacceptable except in the case o f a threat to the 
life of the mother -  illustrates the halakhic nature o f his thinking.7 Novak refers to a 
Mishnah Oholot text, which gives the life o f the mother in difficult labour priority over
3 The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 68.
4 Jewish Social Ethics, p. 235.
5 Dena S. Davis emphasises the importance of casuistic reasoning in halakhic approaches to abortion in 
‘Abortion in Jewish Thought: A Study in Casuistry’, Journal o f  the American Academy o f Religion, 2 
(1992), 313-324.
6 Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics: A Comparative and Historical Study o f  the Jewish Religious 
Attitude to Medicine and its Practice (New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1975), p. 182. In commenting on 
the methodological difference between Jewish and Catholic ethical approaches, Aaron Mackler notes that 
differences are less clear cut that they seem: ‘Although Jewish ethics has long focused on tradition and 
halakhah, reason and experience have always been part o f the process as well; although Catholic ethics has 
focused on natural law and reason, tradition has been recognised as an important source of authority. 
Introduction to Jewish and Christian Bioethics: A Comparative Analysis (Washington, D.C., Georgetown 
University Press, 2003), p. 212.
7 Novak’s argument is reliant upon Exodus 21:22-23, Mishnah, Ohalot 7:6, and Babylonian Talmud, 
Arakhin 7a-b.
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the life o f the fetus, who can be killed to save the mother’s life.8 It is not the case here 
that the fetus or the mother possess superior human life. Rather, the text allows for the 
possibility o f saving one life when only one can be saved. The priority is given to the one 
at closest proximity to the rescuer, in this case, the mother. The fetus is regarded, in a 
Talmudic text, as akin to a pursuer (rodef) against whom self-defence is permitted: Tf 
someone comes to kill you, kill him first.’9 In these uncommon cases, the burden of proof 
is on the party seeking the abortion: the prenatal right to life is a prima facie right. 
Abortion is also prohibited, in natural law terms, on the grounds that it amounts to the 
taking of innocent human life. An assault on human life, created in the image of God, is 
an assault on God (Gen 9:5). Although Novak recognises the importance of halakhic 
deliberation, the question of abortion is, for him, ‘ultimately ontological’.10 It pertains to 
one’s definition of human personhood.11
The issue o f  abortion is controversial within the Jewish tradition, with radical 
intra-faith divergence as regards the permissibility of the practice. The following citation 
records the opposition of the Reform Rabbi, David Ellenson, to the American Partial- 
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: T his law as it has been enacted unquestionably 
diminishes the inviolable status and worth that ought to be granted women as moral 
agents created in the image of God.’12 It is interesting that Ellenson invokes the concept 
o f imago Dei in his argument in favour o f abortion. Ellenson expresses his concern that 
the view of the ‘religious right’ should become overly dominant in the debate. A different 
religious approach to the issue is possible, he argues. It is unlikely that Ellenson would 
find agreement with his position in Novak. Indeed, Novak is particularly critical of any 
Jewish sanctioning of abortion: ‘Jews, especially, who have been the most tragic victims 
of the contempt for life, should be the last people in the world to support legislation that 
would give carte blanche and moral sanction to abortion.’13
Novak’s ethical thinking is informed by his belief in the sanctity o f human life. He 
believes that the phrase, ‘sanctity of life’, can be used cogently in theological,
8M  Ohalot, 7.6., discussed in The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p.43.
9 BTBerakhot 62b, discussed in The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 47.
10 Jewish Social Ethics, p. 235.
11 Novak also considers embryonic stem cell research under the rubric o f abortion. His opposition to the 
practice is necessitated by his belief in the sanctity o f human life from the moment o f conception. The 
destruction o f the embryo would also violate the norm that ‘one life is not to be set aside for the other’ (M. 
Ohalot, 7.6). Novak evokes this principle in the case o f embryonic stem cell research, even likening the 
practice to human sacrifice. The Sanctity o f  Human Life, pp. 1-72.
12 David Ellenson, ‘Abortion Ban Degrades and Devalues and W omen’, The Forward^ 21 November 2003.
13 Novak, ‘A Jewish View o f Abortion’ in Tradition in the Public Square, p. 274.
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philosophical and political contexts and is thus translatable from religious language to 
philosophical and secular vocabulary. By ‘sanctity’ Novak means that the human person 
is a metaphysical being whose existence points to something beyond the world.14 Human 
nature, our own and that of the other person, is the measure of human action. Ethics, 
however, cannot be simply deduced from our metaphysical view of human nature:
We do not have a metaphysical view of human nature and then put it into practice. 
We are already acting in a certain way: doing this but not doing that, consciously 
and wilfully. When we reflect on why we are doing this but not that, we see 
retrospectively that we act this way because o f the way we regard both our own 
nature and the nature o f those with whom we interact -  a nature that is freely 
affirmed or denied by the way we act.15
Our human nature is relational, manifesting itself in the claims that others makes on us, 
and us on them. A metaphysical understanding of human nature must point to God, since 
those human attributes that correspond to personhood and distinguish us from other 
animals, are transcended by the One who has them in greater measure.
Exhibiting a negative view of secular ethics, Novak adopts a critical stance 
towards those who regard their morality as being without metaphysical foundations, 
arguing that this results in legalism, a blind obedience to a law without concern for who 
made it. ‘The question o f whether that law is made by someone as benevolent as Ghandi 
or as malevolent as Hitler cannot make any real difference’.16 Aside from reward or 
punishment, those who cannot admit a metaphysical foundation for morality cannot give a 
metaphysically cogent reason for obedience to anyone. This seems an unfair appraisal of 
those who adhere to non-religious ethical systems, those for whom the intentions o f the 
lawmaker and the effects of the law certainly do make a real difference. Yet, for Novak, 
‘these agnostics have reduced ethics to power politics instead of regarding the political 
realm as the primary context for a person to act ethically according to his or her 
metaphysically constituted human nature.’17 For Novak, ethics must be validated by a 
higher order.18 At this point, one might wonder what effect Novak’s opposition to ethics 
without a metaphysical foundation has upon his aim to make the sanctity of human life
14 Novak, The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 6.
15 The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 8.
16 The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 8.
17 The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 9.
18 Jewish Social Ethics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 17.
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cogent by means o f ‘worldly reason5 in the public square.19 How does Novak understand 
the interaction between secular and religious perspectives o f the human person?
4.7 Revealed Wisdom in the Public Square
We turn, firstly, to Novak’s understanding of the interaction between society and the 
religious communities. Modem civil society is pluralistic, composed as it is of various 
communities that interact contractually with one another in order to be functional. Novak 
argues that civil society should be a secular space that does not give official standing to 
any one religion over others. The community and society are distinguished from one 
another respectively as the original human association and the contractual human 
association.20 The social contract is established through the protection of the prior 
communal rights and the acceptance of subsequent social duties. The society is the 
‘invented realm5, distinct from the sacred space, within which the primal communities can 
interact with one another.21
All religious communities, Novak argues, have a right to bring the wisdom of their 
tradition to wider public discussion in the democratic society. This is one of the ways in 
which Novak understands the concept of religious liberty. He writes that ‘one can speak 
of religious liberty as the freedom of a religious community to bring its own moral 
wisdom into the world, especially the moral wisdom it regards as being available to
everyone precisely because that wisdom can be presented with cogency by means of
00  _worldly reason.5 The aim to present moral wisdom with ‘cogency by means of worldly 
reason5 is, o f course, what makes natural law discourse so central to Novak5 s work. 
Although, for Jews and for Christians, questions relating to human nature and society will 
still involve theology, they should be framed according to worldly reason. Novak 
recognises that the voice of the religious communities may be resisted and that they may 
be accused of imposing their convictions upon others. He is convinced, however, that this 
form of religious liberty is exercised for the sake of the world.
Novak appeals to his own religious community -  what he terms “traditionalist”, 
Judaism — to bring its voice to democratic society:
19 Novak, In Defence o f  Religious Libetty (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2009), p. x.
20 Novak argues that ‘a democratic polity is neither one’s original nor ultimate destination in the world, and 
that those who think it is, originally or ultimately, inevitably come to deprive their democratic polity o f the 
very limitations that essentially make it the democracy it is meant to be’. The Jewish Social Contract, p. i.
21 The Jewish Social Contract, p.8
“2 Novak, In Defence o f  Religious Liberty (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2009), p. x.
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It should be emphasized that if traditionalist Jews refuse to participate in dialogue, 
then on the political issues in which they cannot help but have an interest -  issues 
such as abortion, homosexuality, war, and so on -  Jews far less committed to the 
authority of the Torah will be “Judaism’s spokespersons” by default.23
This passage is indicative o f Novak’s attitude to non-traditionalist forms of Judaism. In 
relation to Jewish participation in the social contract of the modem polity, Novak 
privileges -  in the theoretical if  not the practical sense -  traditionalist or Orthodox Jews. 
Novak holds that Reform, Reconstructionist and Conservative Judaism, which are 
theologically indistinguishable from one another, have disengaged from the Jewish 
community in their ‘antinomianism’. Antinomianism is defined by Novak as ‘self-chosen 
religious doctrines that are contrary to the dogmas of traditional Judaism.’24 Novak 
believes that the term ‘antinomian’ is justified since these forms of Judaism have rejected 
the three dogmas o f traditional Judaism which are: (i) the Torah as the direct word of God 
(ii) the Oral Torah as the normative application of the Torah and (iii) the final redemption 
and the resurrection of the dead as the fulfilment of the destiny of the Jewish people. It is 
his contention that the contribution of the ‘antinomian’ forms of Judaism to public 
discourse is rarely distinguishable from that of secularism.25 However, although he 
regrets their lack of conformity with the covenantal tradition, Novak does not go as far as 
to dissociate ‘liberal Judaisms’ from Judaism altogether. Their Judaism may be 
inadequate, according to Novak, with regard to revelation, tradition and redemption, but 
they are still practicing Jews. He holds that liberal Judaism may have saved other Jews, 
who were not ready for full conformance with traditionalist Judaism, from apostasy or 
assimilation.
For a theologian who is so committed to dialogue, Novak’s view of Jewish 
religious diversity is quite surprising. In this context, Novak’s willingness to understand 
the religious other in their own terms is less apparent than it is in his contribution to 
Jewish-Christian dialogue, for example. This is not to dismiss the differences that Novak
23 Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue, p. 9.
24 Covenantal Rights, p. 202; The Jewish Social Contract, p. 27.
25 There are interesting parallels in John Paul IPs Veritatis Splendor: ‘Some people, however, disregarding 
the dependence o f human reason on Divine Wisdom and the need, given the present state of fallen nature, 
for Divine Revelation as an effective means for knowing moral truths, even those o f the natural order, have 
actually posited a complete sovereignty o f  reason in the domain o f moral norms regarding the right ordering 
of life in this world. Such norms would constitute the boundaries for a merely “human” morality; they 
would be the expression of a law which man in an autonomous manner lays down for himself and which has 
its source exclusively in human reason’.
http ://www. vatican. va/holy_father/j ohn_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis- 
splendor_en.html [accessed July 13 2013], par. 36.
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highlights between the various forms of Judaism. These differences are certainly 
significant, particularly with regard to halakhah. However, for Novak to emphasise them 
as he does raises the possibility that, because of his attitude to revelation, he may find his 
views in greater alignment with some Christians who accord the same importance to 
scripture and tradition, than with some of his fellow Jews. This is a point that emerges in 
Allan Arkush’s response to Novak’s political theology. Arkush holds that Novak’s 
‘reasoning can be fully persuasive to only a small sector o f the Jewish people. For Novak, 
a self-described traditionalist Jew, bases most of his positive recommendations on 
dogmatic premises that less traditional Jews simply cannot accept.’26 Arkush, however, 
still cites Novak as the most important twenty-first century political thinker in the Jewish 
tradition.27
Having noted Arkush’s concern, we now turn to the extent to which the ‘dogmatic 
premises’ o f Novak’s theology are invoked in his contribution to matters of public 
concern. If, as Arkush argues, Novak’s theology can only be persuasive for a minority of 
the Jewish people, how does his reasoning function in the secular context? Novak’s 
discussion of the issue of same-sex marriage provides a useful example.28 In consistency 
with the principles outlined earlier, Novak does not invoke the authority of revelation to 
ground his opposition to same-sex marriage. In response to advocates o f same-sex 
marriage, Novak writes that ‘neither of us claims morality as being exclusively his or 
hers. Were that the case, we could only condemn each other rather than engage in a civil 
and reasonable debate’.29 In the context of that debate, Novak argues that he does not 
deduce his moral positions from ‘authoritative theological propositions’.30 Rather, he 
states that his moral positions are theologically influenced, though this does not, in itself, 
lend his arguments more philosophical weight. Novak’s argument, therefore, turns to 
other sources to justify his position. He analyses the question o f equality, assessing its 
appropriateness in the context of marriage, and he also discusses the relationship between
26Allan Arkush, ‘Drawing up the Jewish Social Contract’, The Jewish Quarterly Review, 2 (2008), 255-271 
(p. 256). Arkush holds that Novak’s method has ‘excluded all but traditionalist and Orthodox Jews from the 
ranks o f his potential disciples. Novak no doubt is well aware o f this exclusion but unbothered by it, or 
perhaps consoled by the fact that he has a much larger potential audience among the millions o f Christians 
who share his faith in biblical revelation and who might therefore find his political thought 
“ appropriable.” ’, p. 258-9.
27 Arkush writes that with ‘his customary display of vast erudition and incisive thinking Novak has made 
an impressive endeavor ... to formulate distinctively Jewish but broadly applicable answers to some of the 
age-old questions o f political philosophy.’, ‘Drawing up the Jewish Social Contract’, p. 255.
28Novak, ‘Response to Martha Nussbaum’s “A Right to Marry?” ’, California Law Review, 98 (2010), 709- 
720.
29 Novak, ‘Response to Martha Nussbaum’s “A Right to Marry?”, p. 710.
30 ‘Response to Martha Nussbaum’s “A Right to Marry?”, p. 710.
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marriage and the raising of children. Though his arguments are still contestable, the 
universally accessible language he employs allows Novak to defend the rational validity 
of ‘traditional’ marriage, without drawing on the authority o f the tradition. It enables 
Novak to enter the dialogue and to exercise religious liberty as he sees it. It is worth 
noting that Novak’s theological work invokes other forms of argument in its opposition to 
homosexual relationships, at times using a type o f language that could only compromise 
the reception of his contribution to public discourse. He argues, for example, for the 
continuity between homosexuality and idolatry, which ‘perverts human existence’ and 
‘leads men to assume the identity of women and women the identity o f man’.31
This brief example of Novak’s view of same-sex marriage illustrates the importance 
of context for the extent to which Novak invokes the authority of revelation. However, 
the fact that Novak does not refer to revelation does not mean that he is ‘bracketing’ his 
ultimate theological concerns:
When these metaphysical or theological concerns are purposely bracketed, secularist 
criteria o f human nature and society must inevitably become the basis of common 
discussion. And, as we have learned more and more o f late, these secularist criteria 
contradict the views of human nature and society and their consequent values 
advocated by both Jewish and Christian traditions [...] When the faithful remain 
silent, secularism wins by default.32
Here, Novak emphasises the commonality between the Jewish and Christian views of 
human nature which, he feels, are contradicted by secularist criteria. The passage presents 
a somewhat negative view of the secularist perspective o f human nature. Though it is 
important, o f course, for religious communities to participate in public discussion, the 
way in which Novak places the religious and secularist views at opposite ends o f the 
spectrum -  and his reference to winning -  seems to exacerbate the division. Further, in 
the following quotation, the religious understanding of the person created in the image of 
God is depicted as the most foundational point of conflict between the secular and 
religious understandings of the human person:
31 ‘Idolatry perverts human existence as a whole (the soul) by substituting no gods for the ‘One God. When 
human existence as a whole has been so spiritually perverted, it follows that there is nothing to prevent the 
immanent relationship of the whole human self with its body from succumbing to its own perversion as 
well. After God, we are most intimately related to our own bodies. That is why idolatry leads men to 
assume the identity o f  women and women the identity o f  men.4 Talking With Christians: Musings o f  a 
Jewish Theologian, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), p. 118.
32 Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue, p. 7.
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Thus, for example, the assertion of both Jewish faith and Christian faith that the 
human person is the image of God directly contradicts secularist notions that the 
human person belongs to itself (autonomy) or to some larger human or nonhuman 
whole (heteronomy), even though Jews and Christians can certainly live in peace 
with those who hold these notions.33
The concept of imago Dei is here depicted as a unifying force between Jews and 
Christians which, by the same token, defines what Novak sees as a radical difference in 
self-understanding between religious and secularist thinking. The concept of autonomy 
also has the negative connotation of something that directly contradicts the human self- 
understanding as imago Dei. Does the understanding of the person as imago Dei 
necessitate a negative view of human autonomy?
4.8 N ovak’s Opposition to Foundational Autonomy
A brief explanation of the Kantian concept o f autonomy will help to uncover Novak’s 
opposition to a modem conception of autonomy that he sees as an extension and distortion 
of the Kantian idea. According to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the rational being is ‘free 
as regards all laws of nature, and obeying only those laws which he himself gives.’34 
Autonomy is strongly emphasised as ‘the sole principle o f all moral laws and of the duties 
in keeping with them [...] the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of 
pure practical reason, that is, freedom’.35 Practical reason, alone, is the source of moral 
law since any reliance on extrinsic sources constitutes heteronomy. Although Kant 
includes religious sources among those that constitute heteronomy, he posits belief in God 
as a postulate o f practical reason: ‘The moral law commands me to make the highest 
possible good in a world the final object o f all my conduct. But I cannot hope to produce 
this except by the harmony of my will with that o f a holy and beneficent author of the 
world [ . . .] ’36
33Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue, p. 8.
34 Kant, Groundwork fo r  the Metaphysics o f  Morals, trans. by Thomas K. Abbott, ed. by Lara Denis 
(Ontario: Broadview Editions, 2005), p. 93 (435).
35 Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 30.
36 Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason, p. 108.
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According to Kant, the rational being is given the privilege o f being an end in itself, 
and can legislate in the possible ‘kingdom of ends5.37 Both our human will and the will of 
God are governed by moral law in the kingdom of ends. As J.B. Schneewind writes:
His astonishing claim is that God and we can share membership in a single moral 
community only if we all equally legislate the law we are to obey. The mature Kant 
does not hesitate to make an explicit comparison between human agents and God. 
When we try to bring about a harmonious totality of all ends, a totality made 
possible and governed by the moral law, we may think o f ourselves as “analogous to 
the divinity” .
Unlike God, however, the human person is an imperfectly rational being who has the 
ability to act on principle and to choose which action to pursue, but who can, by nature of 
imperfection, act contrary to reason. For this reason, the human person needs imperatives, 
which are commands presented by rational principles, to which reason obligates 
obedience. The rational being, then, must act so that he can will that his maxim, the 
principle o f will, should become a universal law. This is the categorical imperative, the 
supreme principle of morality.39 ‘Categorical’ here is contrasted with the hypothetical 
imperative, which commands rational beings to undertake the means towards achieving 
ends that they themselves have chosen, commands pertaining to the pursuit of happiness, 
for example. The hypothetical imperative is contingent since the agent may choose to 
abandon the end. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, pertains to morality and is 
necessary for every rational being, independent o f any other desires or goals. The 
categorical imperative is formulated in different ways by Kant, but in its earliest statement 
it appears as follows: ‘Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that 
it become a universal law.’40 For Kant, universality is the most important property o f law.
This idea, Kant’s conception o f autonomy as universal, is something that Novak 
welcomes. Novak sees in this aspect o f Kant’s thought a sociality that views other 
members of society as ‘similarly autonomous persons’.41 Kant’s view, as Novak sees it, 
is that any act that did not treat the other person as an end-in-itself, or was not something
37 Kant, Groundwork, p. 93 (435).
38J. P. Schneewind, The Invention o f Autonomy: A History o f  Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 512.
39 Groundwork, p. 62 (401).
40 Groundwork, p. 62 (401).
41 Novak, The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 145.
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that everyone in a similar situation could do, was not autonomy but licentiousness.42 Kant 
also accepted the correlation of moral rights and duties, according primacy to the latter. 
Ultimately, however, Novak is critical of the Kantian idea o f autonomy on account o f its 
assumption that, as ethical subjects, we are our own law-givers. There is, o f course, the 
need to reject Kant’s ethical theory on theological grounds because of its insistence that 
the rational human subject is the source of its own law’.43 This, Novak holds, entails a 
contradiction of natural law and revealed law, since both of these testify to trans-human 
grounding of the law. Novak argues, however, that ‘if  we shift his specific denotation of 
person as end-in-itself from the human subject of moral action to the human object of 
moral action, something quite helpful emerges for us theologically’.44 This would allow a 
very different idea of human mutuality since ‘both the source and end of my action are 
one and the same by the very act of the other person presenting himself or herself to me, 
without my prior permission’.45
The Kantian idea of autonomy is central to the divergence between secular and 
Jewish or Christian views of personhood, as Novak sees it. He writes that ‘human beings 
qua imago Dei are unlike the autonomous members o f Kant’s moral universe who create 
themselves by the exercise o f their autonomy and who can only recognize those who are 
able to exercise this same capacity’.46 It is, however, the contemporary divergence from 
Kant, that which Novak terms ‘foundational autonomy’, which particularly evokes his 
criticism.47 This type of radical autonomy can manifest itself in certain kinds of human 
rights discourse and seems, to Novak, to be ‘concerned with rights only as necessary 
preconditions for the advancement of individual projects’, thereby sharply diverging from 
Kant.48 Novak finds this type of autonomy, which he views as a strand of modem 
liberalism, problematic for the advancement of the community in democratic society. It is 
this type o f autonomy that Novak has in mind when he contrasted the concepts of 
autonomy and the imago Dei. For Novak, it is the concept o f ‘theonomy’ that aptly 
depicts the appropriate comingling of autonomy and heteronomy:
42 The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 145.
43 Natural Law in Judaism, p. 166.
44 ‘Persons in the Image of God’, p. 147.
45 ‘Persons in the Image o f God’, p. 147.
46 Novak, ‘The Universality o f Jewish Ethics’, p. 203.
41 The Sanctity o f  Human Life, p. 145.
48 Covenantal Rights, p. 14.
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Rather the solution is theonomy -  a realization that our dependence upon the 
Ground of being, our object of ultimate concern [...] includes both autonomy and 
heteronomy. Being prior to themiboth, it harmonizes them and integrates them in a 
person’s existence so that their tensions become creative rather than destructive.49
We see from this citation that it is not autonomy that Novak rejects, but rather a 
foundational form of autonomy that does not hold due regard for our communal existence, 
a form o f autonomy that ‘asserts that in the most fundamental practical sense, I am 
alone’.50 We should also recall that Novak envisaged the commandments of God as the 
content o f the imago Dei. In this context, the idea o f the person as a self-legislator can 
certainly contradict the sense of being commanded that is so central to Novak’s Jewish 
theology. It remains to be seen whether Novak’s work, with its strong emphasis on the 
community, has due regard for personal autonomy and the rights o f the individual. This 
question necessitates a brief discussion of Novak’s theory o f covenantal rights.
4.9 The Individual and the Covenantal Community
In his treatment of human rights, Novak acknowledges the apparent difficulty in 
accommodating rights discourse within the confines of a duty-based covenantal and 
communal faith. Certainly, the language of duty and commandment is more traditional to 
Jewish theology than rights. Novak holds, however, that there is nothing contradictory 
between the idea o f rights and the fulfilment of the duty of the covenant:
[Ojnce it is shown that all duties presuppose correlative rights, including duties 
owed to God or the community, and that individual rights as claims are as valid as 
those of God or the community, this erroneous dismissal of a Jewish rights theory 
can be refuted, for it is based on the mistake o f assuming that Judaism is nothing but 
a system of heteronomous duties for their own sake.51
49 Novak, Theonom ous Ethics: A Defence and Critique o f Tillich’, Soundings: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal, 4, (1986), 436-463 (p. 453). The concept o f theonomy is drawn from Paul Tillich. See Systematic 
Theology, vol. 3, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 250 and ‘The Conquest o f the 
Concept of Religion in the Philosophy o f Religion’ in What is Religion?, ed. by James Luther Adams 
(London: Harper & Row, 1969) pp 122-155 (p. 151). Tillich does not intend theonomy to indicate ‘the 
subjection o f  a culture to divine laws, imposed from outside and mediated by a church’ as this would 
constitute heteronomy. He envisions rather a culture that is ‘Spirit-determined and Spirit-directed’. 
Systematic Theology, vol. 3, p. 249-50.
5 Novak, ‘Privacy’, in Natural Law and Contemporary Public Policy, ed. by David F. Forte, pp. 13-28 (p. 
16). .
51 Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 31.
128
As an advocate of human rights within the Jewish context, it is important for Novak to 
ascertain that all duties pertaining to the inter-human realm have specific reasons in 
addition to their role as fulfilment o f God’s will and are not, therefore, a system o f 
heteronomous duties for their own sake. Commandments can be distinguished from one 
another as those whose object is God and those whose object is another human person.
It is Novak’s contention that unless we stand before God with others, we are less 
than our fully human selves. Since the covenant with Israel is permanent, Jewish survival 
is a claim on God.52 This means that the people of Israel will survive as long as the earth 
itself. Even the individual relationship with God is really a relationship between God and 
the members of the covenantal community. If Novak’s theory o f rights gives priority to 
the covenantal community, then what protection is given to the individual within -  or 
even against -  that community? Is Novak advocating a form of ‘group rights’ that gives 
inadequate protection to the members of the community?53
Novak admits that there is no explicit scriptural evidence for the rights of the 
individual against the power of the community, though he does refer to some relevant 
Talmudic passages on this subject o f private property. Novak records the shock with 
which the rabbis reacted to the proposal that private property could be taken for public 
roads.54 The rabbis’ reaction seems to provide some basis for the right to private property. 
Although he finds in the Jewish tradition the explicit prioritising of communal over 
individual needs, Novak argues that this does not amount to a denial o f individual needs. 
He simply asserts that the needs o f the community are greater and this is why the rabbis 
traditionally legislated for common or usual human circumstances rather than individual 
cases. The Jewish community cannot satisfy every human need. Such fulfilment cannot 
occur until the final redemption. It seems here that Novak only allows for the rights of the 
individual over the community when they do not conflict with prior social duties.
It is certain that, for Novak, covenantal rights can never be grounded in personal 
autonomy. As Novak argues, with regard to the ritualistic aspects o f Jewish law, ‘one’s
52 Novak prefers the term ‘claim’ to ‘right’ though he is concerned that the ‘ubiquity o f the term “rights” in 
modem political discourse makes any elimination of the term risk elimination from the discourse 
altogether’. Covenantal Rights, p. 11.
53 The notion of group rights can be controversial when it is felt that individual human rights are being 
diminished. Scepticism regarding the idea can be found in the work o f George Kateb who argues that 
‘under some versions o f  this concept, a group has rights that are not translatable into each members’ 
individual rights, but rather are a sort o f corporate rights that may abridge members’ individual rights’. 
George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011) p. 11.
54‘When the public choose a road for themselves, what they chose is considered to have been lawfully 
chosen’. BTf Baba Batra 100a, discussed by Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 210.
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autonomy is going to come into conflict with the covenant inasmuch as it includes 
practices that seem to be absurd in themselves.’55 Novak illustrates the relevance of this 
point with reference to the contentious issue of the participation of women in public ritual. 
Novak is critical of the egalitarianism adopted by the Reform, Reconstructionist and 
Conservative movements in North American Jewry. For Novak, the suggestion that there 
is no functional difference between men and women is at odds with both scripture and the 
Jewish tradition which establish deep gender differences. A lack o f connection to the 
normative tradition is a serious deficiency, according to Novak:
Since individual rights have meaning only in a communal context anyway, this total 
disregard for the normative tradition will, sooner or later, make the practice of these 
new religious rights a hollow exercise, for it quickly calls into question everything 
the tradition has ever bequeathed, including the monopoly of heterosexuality.56
Using the example of the Jewish feminist theologian Judith Plaskow, whose work will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, Novak is critical o f the kind of Jewish feminism that 
substitutes the continuity of the community with a new ideological vision that in his view 
is based neither on revelation or reason. Novak does, however, allow for a certain 
inventiveness in halakhic life to allow for the greater inclusion of women. In relation to 
women’s participation in the synagogue, Novak argues that legitimate Jewish feminism 
allows for the following:
[W]oman may pray at the same regular times as men do, individually or in groups, 
as long as they do not assume the roles originally assigned to men, such as being 
counted in a male quorum (minyan) needed for traditional public worship, or acting 
as the leader (sheliah tsibbur) of any such quorum.57
This example is interesting in its indication of Novak’s position regarding the role of 
women in Judaism, an issue to which we will return in Chapter Five. Beyond this, 
though, it reveals two important aspects of Novak’s theology that relate to this discussion 
and will be noted now by way of conclusion to this point. Firstly, his opposition to the 
egalitarian feminist view indicates that while he acknowledges the place of personal 
autonomy, Novak cannot support any view that places the autonomy of the individual 
over the community. Secondly, it is the normative structure o f the tradition that 
guarantees the continuity of the community, something for which personal autonomy 
cannot provide a substitute: T he tradition represents the majority opinion of the
55 Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 201.
56 Novak, Covenantal Rights, p. 202.
57 Covenantal Rights, p. 203.
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normative Jewish community throughout history, even though that same tradition has not 
predetermined every possible future practice.’58 The continuity o f the community would 
be jeopardised by any movement that seeks to contradict any existing traditional and 
communal norms. From this we deduce Novak’s reticence towards both the gender 
egalitarianism as well as the non-halakhic forms of Judaism.
4.10 Conclusion
The concept of imago Dei is understood, by Novak, to pertain to the special status granted 
to every human person at the moment of creation. This universal status enables a 
covenantal relationship between God and the human person which Novak envisages as a 
relationship of active mutuality. Although we can gain a sense of our particular status 
through reason, the imago Dei comes to full awareness and action through revelation. For 
the Jewish community, revelation communicates the content of the imago Dei, which is 
the moral law rooted in the commandments of God. The fullness of the imago Dei comes 
about through fulfilment of the covenantal obligation.
Novak emphasises the commonality between Jewish and Christian ideas of imago 
Dei as they define human personhood. He presents the concept of imago Dei as a 
unifying force between the two faiths that contradicts the secularist view o f ‘self-creation’ 
and autonomy. Novak is particularly critical of a modem liberal conception o f autonomy 
that goes beyond Kant, which he terms ‘foundational autonomy’. This form of autonomy, 
Novak argues, espouses the view that we are our own creators, in a realm within which 
the subject is the only member. Having discussed the manner in which Novak opposes 
the imago Dei and the concept of autonomy, we conclude that this is only appropriate in 
relation to this radical form of autonomy. Autonomy, in itself, does not wholly contradict 
the imago Dei since a certain degree of autonomy is necessary for the realisation o f the 
image. Further, not every secular worldview regards the individual as an isolated subject 
in a manner contradictory to Novak’s conception of imago Dei. Novak, perhaps, does not 
give enough regard to the fact that secular views of the human person can also be 
relational. There is, in his thought, an undue emphasis on the negativity o f ‘worldly 
categories’. Human beings are necessarily worldly; we are formed from the earth (Gen 
2:7) and -  recalling Irenaeus -  we retain the earth as part of ourselves. Though the
58 Covenantal Rights, p. 204.
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concept of imago Dei loses its meaning in a non-theistic context, secular ideas of 
personhood do not always contradict every facet or implication of the imago Dei. The 
concept o f imago Dei can find itself in alignment with the idea of human dignity in 
affirming the worth of the human person in relationship.
The issue o f autonomy lies at the heart of the tension between Jewish religious 
existence and Western culture that is inherent in Novak’s work. This is a tension that 
Novak retains, refusing to sacrifice the Jewish tradition to the world, or the world to the 
Jewish tradition. Novak resists, therefore, the dichotomy between revelation and reason. 
It is possible, he believes, to bridge the gap between secular and theological modes of 
reasoning. This is achieved through a retrieval o f natural law thought from the classical 
Jewish sources. This allows Novak to bring his commitment to the irreducible sanctity of 
human life to a wider audience and to exercise religious liberty as he sees it. Novak 
challenges his fellow Jewish ethicists to see this sanctity as extending to all stages o f the 
life o f the human person. The worth of every person is affirmed because o f the belief that 
we are all objects of God’s concern. To understand the human person as anything less 
than the object o f this concern is, Novak believes, a denial o f the true intention of our 
existence.
Chapter Five will turn to question o f sexual difference in relation to our creation in 
the image of God, drawing upon Jewish and Christian feminist theologies which find in 
Genesis 1:27 a resource for an egalitarian theological anthropology. As Novak’s 
opposition to the egalitarianism espoused by more liberal forms of Judaism indicates, the 
meaning of sexual difference is a contentious and potentially divisive issue within the 
Jewish and Christian traditions. Novak’s aversion to egalitarianism seems to stem from 
an opposition to an anthropology of ‘sameness’, an opposition which has ample 
correlation in contemporary Roman Catholic teaching. However, as we will discuss, it is 
possible to reconcile gender egalitarianism with the view that sexual difference has 
theological meaning and that such difference has something to say about the way in which 
we live out our creation in the image of God as male and female.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMAGO D E I  AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE:
BETW EEN DETERMINISM AND APOPHATICISM
The significance o f gender for the understanding of the concept o f imago Dei can be 
inferred from the primary location of the concept o f imago Dei in Genesis 1:27. Here we 
read that ‘God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; 
male and female he created them.’ This apparent connection between imago Dei and 
sexual difference has carried substantial weight in the interpretive tradition. For Karl 
Barth, for example, this text intends the identification of the imago Dei precisely in terms 
of sexual difference. Henceforth, we ‘cannot say man without having to say male or 
female and also male and female. Man exists in this differentiation, in this duality’.59 In 
Chapter One, we drew upon the work of Phyllis Bird and J. Richard Middleton to 
conclude that the suggestion -  in Barth, for example -  that the ‘male and female’ clause 
defines the imago Dei is simply not plausible from the perspective o f biblical scholarship. 
However, although sexual difference, something that we share with other animals, is not 
the primary implication of imago Dei, it is certain that our gendered life affects the way in 
which we image God.
The clause concerning our creation as male and female, situated in Genesis 1:27 in 
connection with the imago Dei, has become a key reference point for feminist theology, 
establishing the equality of men and women in creation and their equal capacities to 
image God. Thinking theologically about gender is not, however, unique to contemporary 
thought, as illustrated by our encounter with thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas and 
Barth and their conception of the relationship between male and female. We have 
observed, through engagement with these thinkers, an often hierarchical categorisation of 
men and women, which has obscured the dignity o f women as created in the image of 
God. The equality envisioned in feminist thought is put forth in response to the gender 
hierarchy that has characterised Christian and Jewish theology.
59 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IIL2, p. 286. The identification of imago Dei with sexual distinction is also 
prominent in the feminist biblical scholarship of Phyllis Trible: ‘God creates, in the image o f God, male and 
female. To describe male and female, then, is to perceive the image o f G od’. God and the Rhetoric o f  
Sexuality (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1978), p. 21.
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Equality, we should note, does not imply sameness; neither does the appreciation 
of the significance o f sexual difference necessarily endanger gender equality.60 Though 
their conclusions may substantially diverge, all of the thinkers that we will encounter in 
this chapter strongly acknowledge the importance of the distinction between male and 
female, that which the Orthodox rabbi, Steven Greenberg, refers to as the ‘difference of 
all differences5:
Human existence, being and unbeing, ecstasy and pain, union and separation are all 
tied to the great difference of all differences, the male-female divide and the 
mystery o f sexual union that is the foundation of ongoing life5.61
The parameters o f the chapter present something of a challenge, because as an 
intercultural, multi-faith and global endeavour, feminist theology represents a wide array 
of methodologies and opinions and is marked as much by internal diversity, within the 
Christian and Jewish traditions, as it is by consensus.62 Nevertheless, we can say that 
there is a commonality in the outlook of feminist theology, that which Serene Jones terms 
‘feminist theology's imaginative landscape5, and a common aim that centres on the 
flourishing of women.63
Drawing on Jewish and Christian, primarily Roman Catholic, voices in a manner 
that seeks to honour their diversity of context and theological outlook, this chapter will 
analyse the central questions of the theological study of gender: Is sexual difference a 
theological as well as a biological fact? Who decides its significance? How important is 
our gendered existence -  our creation as male and female -  to our capacity to image God? 
And, of course, for Christians, how relevant is our gender to our capacity to image Christ? 
In advance of the direct engagement with these, the focal questions o f this chapter, it will
60 Lisa Sowle Cahill writes that the commitment to equality that is espoused by feminist theology does not 
‘mean that the sexes have no innate differences; it does mean such differences -  whatever they may be — 
will not be accepted as warrants for social systems which grant men in general authority and power over 
women in general’. Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2.
61 Steven Greenberg, Wrestling with God and Men: Homosexuality in the Jewish Tradition (Madison: 
Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 41-2.
62 As Tamar Ross articulates it: ‘Feminism is old, rich and variegated enough to be spoken o f as having a 
history with identifiable stages and trends (which are labelled in confusing and inconsistent ways). 
Feminism also has a future that is still developing and undetermined. Not all feminists think alike’. Tamar 
Ross, Expanding the Palace o f  Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 
2004), p.3.
63 Having acknowledged the great diversity of thought among feminist theologians, Serene Jones writes that 
‘there are similar directions in which our thinking tends to move, things we have grown accustomed to 
focusing on, plays o f mind that structure the questions we ask and the answers we seek’. ‘Feminist 
Theology and the Global Imagination’, in The Oxford Handbook o f  Feminist Theology, ed. by Mary 
McClintock Fulkerson and Sheila Briggs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 23-51 (p. 26).
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be necessary to clarify the use of the term ‘gender’. The chapter will begin, therefore, 
with a brief account of some important concepts of mainstream feminist theory that have 
been most influential in theological engagement with gender.
5.1 Contemporary Approaches to Gender
We begin with the distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, the former referring to the 
physiological differences between men and women and the latter to socially constructed 
aspects of those differences. Serene Jones explains the use of the term ‘gender’ in 
feminist theology as follows:
Invoking ‘gender’ points to the fact that what we often think of as natural, given, or 
universal features -  what’s usually referred to as the ‘sexed basis’ — of women’s 
experience are, in reality, socially constructed ‘gender’ stories about masculinity and 
femininity that have been mapped onto human bodies as if  they were self-evident 
descriptions o f universal, biologically stable phenomena.64
This dual understanding of sexual difference -  biological and social -  challenged the view 
that social expectations with regard to male and female roles were ‘natural’ and, as such, 
impervious to change.65 The sex/gender distinction was a mark of early feminist thought 
which did not remain unchallenged in subsequent feminist writings.66 Challenges to this 
position emerged on the grounds that the complete distinction between sex and gender 
tended to homogenize the situations of women. Linda Nicholson, for example, writes that 
‘the idea that the body provided certain constants in women’s experience led to theories 
depicting women’s situation as fundamentally similar across history and culture’.67 The 
dichotomous understanding o f the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ has come to be regarded as an 
over simplification of the complexity of human identity.68
64 Serene Jones, ‘Feminist Theology and the Global Imagination’, p. 27.
65 Simone de Beauvoir, renowned for the idea that ‘one is not bom but becomes a woman’, was particularly 
influential in this regard. The Second Sex (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 267.
66Christine E. Gudorf writes that ‘in terms o f both the data on human sexuality today and the choices that 
are made by human societies about sex, it is no longer correct to distinguish sex and gender by saying that 
sex refers to our biological given-ness as male or female and gender refers to the traits and roles that a 
particular society and individuals construct for male and female persons’. ‘The Erosion o f Sexual 
Dimorphism: Challenges to Religion and Religious Ethics’, in Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources fo r  
Theological Reflection, ed. by Marvin M. Ellison and Kelly Brown Douglas (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2010), pp. 141-165 (p. 143).
6/ Linda Nicholson, ‘Gender’, in A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, ed. by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris 
Marion Young (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 289-298 (p. 291).
68 Rachel Muers writes that the sex/gender split is itself ‘based on a “nature/culture” or “matter/spirit” 
division that is itself gendered -  in that women and femaleness have been traditionally associated with 
nature and matter, as opposed to the masculine realms o f culture and spirit’. ‘Feminism, Gender and
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As feminist scholarship evolved, the focus changed to the idea of essentialism, 
which posits the existence of particular attributes that are universal -  or ‘essential’ -  to 
being female. Thus, as Diana Fuss writes, femininity is defined according to women’s 
‘transhistorical, eternal, immutable essences’.69 Essentialist thinking is prevalent in 
everyday remarks about what women or men generally think or how they generally 
behave. The question of essentialism is also most significant in relation to the theological 
idea of gender and can manifest itself in ways that both elevate and demote women. 
Those who are reliant upon essentialist thinking may argue, for example, that women 
embody an innate and unique capacity to love, nurture and live for the other, while men 
are more naturally disposed towards leadership and authority.
The critique of essentialism found one o f its most forceful expressions in the work 
of Judith Butler. Notable for her concept o f gender performativity, Butler strongly 
critiqued the idea of any unified meaning to the concept o f ‘woman’. Butler’s work 
emphasises the socially constructed nature o f gender and the culturally conditioned nature 
of our perception o f female identity. According to Butler, there is ‘no gender identity 
behind the expressions of gender’.70 Our gender identity is ‘performatively constituted by 
the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’.71 Gender, for Butler is ‘a kind of 
doing, an incessant activity performed’.72 We enact our gender through the repetition of 
those acts that conform to dominant conventions.
Although essentialist claims relating to the innate nature o f women are generally 
regarded as unhelpful in the effort towards equality and the emancipation o f women, 
feminist thought does not universally reject essentialist thinking. There is often an 
openness to accommodate some form of essentialism in recognition o f the fact that its 
complete rejection runs the risk of obscuring any type o f commonality among women,
Theology’, in The Modern Theologians, ed. by David F. Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 431-451 (p. 
435).
69 Fuss Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (London: Routledge, 1989), p. xi.
70 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 1. Moya Lloyd writes that through her 
‘theorization o f gender as performative and her advocacy of a political practice based on subverting 
compulsory heterosexuality, Butler not only offers a radical critique o f sex as natural and innate, she also 
contests the viability of women as a unitary category’. In this respect, Butler’s work represented a great 
challenge to feminist thought. Judith Butler: From Norms to Politics (Malden: Polity Press, 2007), p. 25. 
Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville survey the impact o f Butler’s work on feminist theory, noting the 
positive and negative responses to Butler’s work in this context. ‘Judith Butler -  in Theory’, in Bodily 
Citations: Religion and Judith Butler ed. by Amour and St. Ville (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), pp. 1-15 (p. 8).
71 Butler, Undoing Gender, p. 1.
72 Butler, Undoing Gender, p. 1.
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thus leaving feminism without a political subject.73 In order to celebrate feminine 
distinctiveness and the idea that women have something unique to offer in every walk of 
life, there is an increasing willingness, as Diana Fuss terms it, ‘to “risk” or to “dare” 
essentialism’.74 In fact, some of the most radical forms of feminism can be heavily reliant 
upon essentialist thinking. Mary Daly, for example, exemplifies a type of biological 
essentialism in her association of female selfhood with the particularity of the female 
body.75 Some feminist thought is marked by its adherence to what can be termed 
‘strategic essentialism’, which is the valuing of essentialist claims according to their 
ability to empower women.76
This debate regarding essentialism and constructivism has helped to shape the 
development o f feminist theology and its engagement with gender. The quest for equality 
of access to education and for equality in the home and in broader societal contexts has 
been extended, through feminist theology, to include religious structures. Feminist 
theologians, together with the broader women’s movement, have had to choose whether 
their goal centred on equality of access to existing male-dominated structures or the 
transformation of structures to make something new.77 In these issues, feminist theology 
has, to some extent, mirrored the evolution o f feminist theory. The quest to find some 
unifying goal for feminist theology rests uneasily with the awareness that all 
generalisations can be seen as purporting an homogenised idea o f ‘women’s experience’. 
In recent decades, consequently, feminist theology has broadened its horizons to facilitate 
the awareness o f varying cultural contexts and geographic locations. This diversity has 
been marked by the emergence, in the late twentieth century, o f alternative terms to 
‘feminism’. The term ‘womanist’, for example, represents the theology that has evolved 
around the experience and lived faith o f African American women, while ‘mujerista’ is the
73 Linda Nicholson, ‘Gender’, p. 294.
74 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speakings p. xi.
75 Daly, whose writings depict female ‘be-ing’ participating in the ultimate ‘Be-ing’, redefines essentialism 
as a feminist concept: ‘Believing that they are “persons first, not just women,” women befuddled by false 
universalization yearn to belong to the thrusting throng that thrives on defacing, erasing, replacing female 
be-ing5. Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 325.
76 Nancy Dallavalle advances the case for strategic essentialism in ‘Neither Idolatry nor Iconoclasm: A 
Critical Essentialism for Catholic Feminist Theology’, Horizons, 25 (1998) 23^42. See also Donna Teevan, 
‘Challenges to the Role of Theological Anthropology in Feminist Theologies’, Theological Studies, 64 
(2003), 582-97, (p. 582).
77 Rachel Adler writes that equality of access integrates women into structures that have been created by 
men. ‘If, however, transformation is the goal, the very content o f prayer, study, and praxis must be 
reconsidered. Judaism itself must be studied and practiced differently’. ‘Judaism’, in A Companion to 
Feminist Philosophy, 245-253 p. 247,
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term favoured by some North American Latina women theologians.78 This issue of 
inclusivity and representation is also coming to prominence in the Jewish context, as 
Melissa Raphael describes:
Jewish feminist theology has been dominated by middle-class, privileged Reform 
and Reconstructionist Ashkenazic women of European background who have yet to 
attend to and learn from non-Ashkenazic Mizrahi (Middle Eastern and North 
African) and central Asian Jewish women’s voices within and outside the State of 
Israel.79
Notwithstanding the considerable internal diversity, it is generally held that there are three 
facets to the method of feminist theology for those thinkers that work within the Jewish or 
Christian traditions: (i) the critique of patriarchal ideology within texts and traditions; (ii) 
the retrieval of alternative sources within the tradition; and (iii) the reconstruction of
*  Rfltheological constructs while attending, in particular, to the lived experience of women. 
Each facet o f feminist theology -  critique, retrieval and reconstruction -  can draw upon 
the Jewish and Christian scriptures in a significant way.81 An account o f imago Dei in 
terms of gender must begin with the text itself. At this point, therefore, we return briefly 
to the book of Genesis, in order to consider the effects o f reading the egalitarian Genesis 
1:27 text in conjunction with the more controversial Genesis 2-3 text.
78 Diana L. Hayes explains the important impact o f her African American identity on her theology: ‘It 
“colors/’ quite simply, our concept o f God, our faith in Jesus Christ, our existence in the Holy Spirit, our 
total understanding o f what it means to be “truly black” and authentically Catholic” ’. Standing in the Shoes 
My Mother Made: A Womanist Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), p. 28. The mujerista 
theologian Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz writes that ‘the fact that the word ‘woman’ refers only to middle- and 
upper-strata white woman shows who decides what is normative. All the rest o f us, in order not to be totally 
invisible, have to add adjectives to the word: poor women, Black women, Hispanic women’. Isasi-Diaz and 
Yolando Tarango, Hispanic Women: Prophetic Voice in the Church (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 
97. See also, for an Asian perspective, Kwok Pui-lan, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
79 Melissa Raphael, ‘Feminist Theology and the Jewish Tradition’, in The Oxford Handbook o f Feminist 
Theology, ed. by Mary McClintock Fulkerson and Sheila Briggs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
pp. 51-73 (p. 68).
0 Though recognisable in the Jewish feminist theologies that will be referred to in the chapter, this 
distinction is, in general, more suited to Christian feminist theology. Rachel Adler notes that while the 
Christian theological tradition is highly systematized, ‘the nature and boundaries o f the Jewish feminist 
project have been more amorphous’. The nature and methodology of theology are, she writes, more ‘open 
questions’ in Judaism., ‘Judaism’, p. 245.
81 Esther Fuchs surveys the trends in feminist engagement with the Hebrew Bible in ‘Feminist Approaches 
to the Hebrew Bible’, in The Hebrew Bible: New Insights and Scholarship, ed. by Frederick E. Greenspahn 
(New York: New York University Press, 2008), pp. 76-99. Fuchs writes that ‘feminist criticism is often 
misunderstood as “negative” or “rejectionist”; however, the feminist critic does not reject the Bible, though 
she may criticize it’, p. 79.
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5.2 Creation as Male and Female
It is likely that those readers interpreting scripture prior to the advancement o f the 
historical-critical method would have read the two accounts o f the creation of humankind 
as one continuous text, thus identifying the male and female of Genesis 1 as Adam and 
Eve of Genesis 2. While an egalitarian meaning can be drawn from the first account, the 
second is more problematic. When the two creation accounts are read together, the 
egalitarian meaning of the first text can be lost. The second creation account has been 
interpreted to justify the subordination of women to men and the idea that the creation of 
women was enacted as a concession to a male need: Then the Lord God said, Tt is not 
good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper as his partner’ (Gen. 2:18). 
The text can invite the idea that the woman was created in order to support the more 
godlike male from whom she was created: ‘And the rib that the Lord God had taken from 
the man he made into a woman and brought her to the man. Then the man said, “This at 
last is bone o f my bones and flesh o f my flesh; this one shall be called Woman, for out o f 
Man this one was taken.’” (Gen 2:22-23). Commenting on the designation of man as the 
physical source of woman, Rosemary Radford Reuther writes that ‘[h]is priority and her 
derivative origin from him locate her as both an extension of him and a partner to aid him 
in procreation and family life. She is “of him” and “for him” in a way that disallows the 
possibility that she can be “for herself’ as he can be for himself’.82
However, although a subordinationist reading of Genesis 2-3 has been common, 
acquiring almost, as Phyllis Trible describes it, ‘a status o f canonicity’, such a reading is 
by no means inevitable.83 According to Trible’s seminal reinterpretation of Genesis 2-3, 
the misogynistic reading of the creation account -  ‘woman as the “temptress” and 
troublemaker who is dependent upon and dominated by her husband’ -  violates the 
rhetoric of the text itself.84 Trible’s reading of the text reinterprets Adam as the ‘sexually 
undifferentiated earth creature’, thereby refuting the interpretation that sees man as the 
physical source o f woman. Genesis 2:21-24, Trible argues, depicts the creation of 
sexuality which ‘will alter radically the nature o f ha- ‘adam and bring about new creatures
82 Rosemary Radford Reuther, Women and Redemption: A Theological History (London: SCM, 1998), p. 
26. Reuther examines the early exegesis o f the Genesis creation accounts noting that ‘some commentaries 
assume the shared image o f God in both men and women, while others move to a subordinationist and a 
misogynist reading o f these texts’. Early Jewish interpretations o f the second creation account are discussed 
by Anders Hultgard in ‘God and Image of Woman in Early Jewish Religion’ in The Image o f God: Gender 
Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition, ed. by Kari Elisabeth Borresen (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1991), pp. 29- 
50.
83 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 73.
84 Trible, p. 73.
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so that female and male together become the one flesh [ ...]’.85 Trible’s work has been 
significant to the extent that it raises critical awareness o f the possibility for interpreters to 
impose meaning upon a text and of the difficulty o f extracting the original text from 
centuries o f such imposition. Her influence is evident on subsequent interpretations that 
strive towards an egalitarian reading of the text.86
The ‘male and female’ clause of Genesis 1:27 and the Eden narrative o f Genesis 2 
and 3 both influenced the sexual anthropology of the subsequent Jewish and Christian 
religious traditions, particularly its heteronormative character.87 The normative 
significance o f the marital union was drawn from the biblical depiction of creation, since 
the female was brought into being in order to facilitate the heterosexual union. The 
creation accounts, therefore, ground the ‘sexual dimorphism’ that characterises Jewish and 
Christian understandings o f gender. As Christine E. Gudorf explains: ‘Throughout all 
three sets o f sacred texts, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, males and females are 
distinguished from each other again and again in terms of social function, worth and 
relation to each other and to God, that is, in terms o f religious norms.’88 This has given 
rise to the idea of gender complementarity, the assumption that humans are naturally 
divided into males and females and find dual unity in one another, each possessing unique 
characteristics from which the other is excluded. We will now consider the way in which 
gender complementarity functions within contemporary religious tradition, using as 
examples the contexts o f Orthodox Judaism and Roman Catholicism.
5.3 Halakhic Feminism
With its emphasis on innate male and female roles, gender complementarity is particularly
85 Trible, p. 94. Interestingly, Trible’s interpretation echoes that found in Genesis Rabbah: ‘R. Jeremiah b. 
Leazar said: “When the Holy One, blessed be He, created the first adam, He created it with both male and 
female sexual organs, as it was written, ‘Male and female He created them, and He called their name 
adam (Gen. 5:2). R. Schmuel bar Nachman said, “When the Holy One, bless be He, created the first 
adam, He created him with two faces, then split him and made two backs -  a back for each side.” Genesis 
Rabbah 8:1.
86 That o f Alistair McFayden, for example: ‘Woman’s creation out o f man in the second creation stoiy does 
not signify her subordination but her equality with man as his fitting co-human partner. That Eve’s creation 
takes place while Adam is made to sleep is surely a sign that it is God’s and not Adam’s work. Her creation 
from one of her ribs is a sign of their common nature, o f their interdependence, and not o f her 
subordination.’ The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory o f the Individual in Social Relationships 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 35.
87 Such anthropology, Joel Kaminsky argues, corresponds to the biblical worldview. The second creation 
account, Kaminsky writes, ‘even more so than, for example, the Sodom story or the few laws in Leviticus, 
presents a much more serious challenge to those in church and synagogue who argue that Judaism and 
Christianity can fully embrace those maintaining a homosexual lifestyle. This is so because [...] the B ible’s 
worldview is hetero-normative’. ‘The Theology of Genesis’, p. 632.
88 Christine E. Gudorf, ‘The Erosion of Sexual Dimorphism’, p. 143.
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embedded into the tradition o f Orthodox Judaism, where halakhah governs every aspect of 
daily life for men and women. Jewish feminist thought, as we will see, varies greatly in 
its attitude to the sustainability of traditional gender roles. Sometimes, in the context o f 
Orthodox Judaism, what is identified as ‘feminism’ is simply concerned with the 
provision o f a forum for a female voice to explain a woman-specific commandment.89 
While non-halakhic Jewish feminist thought would object to the fact that women-specific 
commandments were authored exclusively by men, some contemporary Orthodox women 
strive to foster an intra-feminine space for the appropriation o f female halakhic 
obligations.90 Feminism, in this context, promotes the obedience to Torah that lies at the 
heart o f Orthodoxy while offering an alternative rationale for those commandments that 
appear to be at odds with contemporary sensibility.
A good example o f this tendency is the response to the laws o f niddah in the 
writings o f contemporary Orthodox feminists. The laws of niddah -  euphemistically 
referred to as the family purity laws -  require a period o f separation between husband and 
wife lasting twelve days each month, after which the post-menstrual woman performs a 
ritual immersion in water to restore purity (mikveh). For non-halakhic feminists, this 
practice is irredeemably misogynistic -  or ‘gynophobic’ as Melissa Raphael terms it -  and 
indicative o f the negative view of the female body in halakhic thought.91 However, those 
defenders o f the sustaining relevance of the family purity laws argue that niddah enables 
women to attend to their own needs rather than the needs o f their husbands. ‘This 
rationale transforms a system of prohibitions and obligations into a psychosocial strategy 
of emotional sustenance and marital health. It gives women the feeling that they are in 
control o f their sexual lives.’92 Some female Orthodox writers refer to the family purity 
laws and the lack o f female participation in communal life in positive terms, as that which
89 While women are exempt from all time-bound commandments and are discouraged from participation in 
acts o f  communal worship and Torah study, they are obliged to perform three women-specific 
commandments: the laws of family purity {niddah); the lighting o f Shabbat and festival candles {nerot) and 
the baking o f the Shabbat bread and the removal and burning o f a small portion o f  the dough {hafrashat 
khallah).
90 This is the approach taken by Tamar Frankiel in The Voice o f  Sarah: Feminist Spirituality and Traditional 
Judaism (New York: Biblio Press, 1990).
91 Raphael, Judaism and the Visual Image: A Jewish Theology o f  Art (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 72. 
Rachel Adler, for example, writes that the ‘worlds reflected in such rules are not worlds we inhabit. Neither 
should we seek to replicate such worlds. They are unjust1. “ ‘In Your Blood, Live” : Re-Visions of a 
Theology o f Purity’, in Lifecycles: Jewish Women on Biblical Themes in Contemporary Life, ed. by Debra 
Orenstein and Jane Rachel Litman, (Woodstock: Jewish Lights, 1997), Vol. 2, pp. 197-207 (p. 205).
92 Jody Myers and Jane Rachel Litman draw together various female Orthodox perspectives on women- 
specific commandments in ‘The Secret o f Jewish Femininity: Hiddenness, Power and Physicality in the 
Theology o f Orthodox Women in the Contemporary W orld1, in Gender and Judaism: The Transformation 
o f  Tradition, ed. by Tamar Rudavsky (New York: NYU Press, 1995), p. 59.
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guarantees the ‘hiddenness5 -  thereby increasing the perceived worth -  o f women.93 
Hariva Ner-David writes of the potential benefits that the together/apart cycle inherent in 
niddah may bring to the marital relationship. However, she w rites,4it is our responsibility 
as women to reclaim this ritual and reinterpret it, express what it means for us in the 21st 
century5.94 Blu Greenberg, one of the leading voices o f Orthodox feminism, holds that the 
laws of niddah constitute ‘an attempt to attach some measure o f holiness to a primal 
urge5.95 Although the practice o f this law may have accumulated some nuances that have 
been less honourable to women, Greenberg argues that it falls to ‘this generation of 
women, Jewish women with a new sense o f self, to restore that element of holiness to our 
bodies, our selves5.96
The particular challenge of accommodating feminist thinking within the framework 
of halakhic Judaism requires a certain measure of halakhic inventiveness or, as the 
Modem Orthodox feminist Tamar Ross terms it, an ‘expansion5 of the realm of Torah.97 
We turn to Ross5 work here to illustrate the point that self-identification as a ‘feminist5 
does not necessitate a rejection o f the halakhic way o f life or, indeed, a rejection o f the 
sustaining viability of many of what are regarded as traditionally feminine roles.98 
Recalling the distinction between essentialism and constructionism, we note that Ross 
describes her view as ‘somewhere in the middle5.99 Ross accepts the truths o f both 
constructivism and essentialism in some measure and explores, in her work, how the two 
overlap and interact. One does not, Ross argues, have to subscribe to biological 
essentialism in order to support the maintenance o f culturally created gender differences:
Even though the wishes and expectations men and women have o f each other may 
be culturally induced and not an inevitable aspect o f human nature, and even if  they 
may have served the interests of male hegemony for thousands o f years, we may 
still be left with a variety o f very good reasons for remaining with the way things
93 Myers and Litman, ‘The Secret o f Jewish Femininity’, p. 59.
94 Hariva Ner-David, ‘Reclaiming Nidah and Mikveh Through Ideological and Practical Reinterpretation’, 
in The Passionate Torah: Sex and Judaism, ed. by Danya Ruttenberg, (New York: New York University 
Press, 2009), pp. 116-136 (p. 116).
95 Blu Greenberg, On Women and Judaism: A View from Tradition (Philadelphia: JPS, 1981), p. 120.
96 Blu Greenberg, On Women and Judaism, p. 120.
97 Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace o f Torah, p. xv.
98 Melissa Raphael writes of the sharp distinction between Orthodox and more liberal forms of Jewish 
feminism: ‘Orthodox feminism focuses on halakhah as a necessary and sufficient locus of revelation that 
has made it far less concerned with theology as an engine o f reform than feminists from the less 
traditionalist denominations’. Such dependence on a conservative legal framework, Raphael suggests, 
means that Orthodox feminism ‘limits its will to change to interpretations allowable by the male rabbinic 
establishment [...]*. ‘Feminist Theology and the Jewish Tradition’, p. 52.
99 Ross, T h e  View From Here: Gender Theory and Gendered Realities, An Exchange Between Tamar Ross 
and Judith Plascow’, Nashim, 13 (2007), 207-251, (p. 219).
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Certain standards of behaviour may be socially necessary, it is argued, even if  they are not 
biologically programmed. Ross notes, for example, the role that the gender binary has 
played in encouraging stable familial structures. Orthodox feminists, Ross argues, do not 
generally share the view that heterosexuality is a tool o f male oppression and, in their 
everyday experience, ‘they still find conventional sex roles satisfying’.101 Further, in 
terms o f their religious life, some of the so-called male depictions of God could be 
valuable to women since they would enhance our sense of the otherness o f God: ‘The 
vision of God as outside us may be crucial to the experience o f prayer as a dialogic 
activity’.102 Ross writes that ‘the notion o f a God who stands over and above the created 
universe may be valuable in imaging a God who is more than the projection o f our 
subjective desires’.103 Such association of maleness with the fact that God is ‘over and 
above’ the universe would be unacceptable to most feminists on the grounds that it 
reinforces a hierarchical relationship between the sexes.
Ross’ work provides an interesting insight into the workings o f feminist discourse 
within the context of Modem Orthodoxy. She acknowledges the anxiety and discomfort 
that the very mention of feminism can cause in Orthodox circles and she cautions her 
readers from outside of Orthodoxy against simplifying the importance of divergence from 
traditional practice.104 Questions which may appear to be trivial -  whether, for example, a 
woman can conduct the ceremonial blessing of her Sabbath meal -  are not necessarily 
regarded as such within the tradition:
Even the slightest symbolic changes in ritual create a dissonance with primeval 
memories, associations, and traditional patterns o f worship that have nurtured the 
spiritual self-image of Jewish women for centuries [...] The changes suggested 
often relate to moral sensibilities that are pivotal to human experience, touching 
upon religious attitudes and principles that define our total vision o f ourselves, the 
nature o f human sexuality, the family, and society at large.105
100 Ross, ‘The View From Here’, p. 219.
101 Ross, ‘The View From Here5, p. 221.
102 Ross, ‘The View From Here5, p. 222.
103 Ross, ‘The View From Here5, p. 222.
104 While acknowledging the multiple forms of both feminism and M odem Orthodoxy, Tova Hartman 
writes that ‘most strands of Modernity, define their Modernity, and their Orthodoxy, in a way that makes it 
very difficult for feminism to enter into its bloodstream, much less to exert a religious claim5. Feminism 
Encounters Traditional Judaism: Resistance and Accommodation (Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University 
Press, 2007), p. 2.
105 Ross, Expanding the Palace o f Torah, p. xiv-xv.
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Changing the halakhic status of women constitutes an upheaval o f the foundations of the 
Jewish tradition. Yet, for Ross, feminism is a challenge rather than a threat to traditional 
Judaism and, as such, it should be faced with faith and not with fear. Feminist theology 
can be filtered through the prism of tradition in a constructive manner.106
In her development of a feminist theology for the ‘community o f the halakhically 
committed5, Ross5 method centres upon the idea of ‘cumulative revelation5.107 
Revelation, for Ross, is not a static legacy impervious to ‘the developing moral intuitions 
o f the faith community5.108 Rather, the meaning of Torah is revealed through the dialectic 
between the original revelation at Sinai and the progressive unfolding of history and 
human understanding. God is revealed in each generation through the dynamic 
interaction between the sacred text, official interpretation and the consensus o f the 
community. In contrast to more liberal forms of Jewish feminism, Ross5 cumulative 
approach does not discredit earlier patriarchal engagements with revelation, since these 
too reflect the community consensus of the day. Further, once feminist insights gain 
consensus from the halakhic community, they can also be deemed revelatory of God's 
will. Elizabeth Shanks Alexander comments on the importance o f the idea of cumulative 
revelation in Ross5 thought:
Ross's conjoining of the patriarchal past with a feminist future in the single 
unfolding process of divine revelation is an unprecedented and, I would suggest, 
brilliant move in the world o f Jewish feminism [...]. To the extent that she posits 
continuity between sacred texts of the past and the feminist vision o f the future, it is 
continuity with a past that has been creatively reconstructed to reflect contemporary 
feminist ideals.109
Ross sees her approach as expanding, as opposed to undermining, the religious tradition. 
The resources for the advancement o f women can be found within the boundaries o f the 
living, dynamic entity that is halakhah. Despite the antihalakhic attitude of much o f its 
discourse, Ross acknowledges the insight o f Jewish feminism in relation to the male bias
106 Taking a similar approach to Ross, Blu Greenberg writes that she does not feel ‘threatened when 
addressing the question of the new needs of women in Judaism nor in admitting the limitations of halakhah
in this area.’ Indeed, she writes, ‘it is my very faith in halakhic Judaism that makes me believe we can
search within it for a new level o f perfection, as Jews have been doing for three thousand years’. ‘The 
Theoretical Basis o f Women’s Equality in Judaism’, in Contemporary Jewish Ethics and Morality: A 
Reader, ed. by Elliot N. Dorff and Louis E. Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 315- 
327 (p. 316).
107 Ross, Expanding the Palace o f Torah, p. 156,164.
108 Ross ¡Expanding the Palace o f Torah, p. 164.
109 Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, ‘Review o f Expanding the Palace o fT orah \ Nashim: A Journal o f  Jewish 
Women's Studies & Gender Issues, 10 (2006), 243-249 (244).
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in the Jewish tradition and she articulates the implications for her halakhic feminism as 
follows:
This observation does not in itself entail a negation of the general concept o f respect 
for the sages (kevod hakhamim) or a rejection o f my previously held conviction that 
the leading and reputable Rabbinic authorities try their best to be objective and 
disinterested in rendering the law as they see it. Nevertheless, I believe there is a 
significance to the fact that halakhah has been molded primarily by men, and I 
believe we should be willing to explore that significance.11
Many of the issues that arise in Ross’ work find resonance in the work of feminism within 
the Christian tradition. The concern, expressed in the above quotation, that halakhah has 
been moulded by men, certainly has its correlation in Christian feminist theology. This is 
a prevalent issue within the Roman Catholic tradition, where many feminists question the 
absence of female input into official teachings that pertain to women. The following 
section will discuss theological reflection on gender roles within the Roman Catholic 
tradition, with particular emphasis upon the concept of complementarity.
5.4 Ontologically Determined: Complementarity in the Roman Catholic 
Tradition
The idea of gender complementarity has been central to the definition of Roman Catholic 
teaching regarding sexual difference. A theological anthropology derived from 
ontological difference underpins official Church teaching on all aspects o f gendered 
identity, most notably the contentious issue of ordination and governance. The function 
o f gender complementarity in Catholic teaching can be illustrated with reference to the 
2004 Letter to the Bishops o f the Catholic Church on the Collaboration o f Men and 
Women in the Church and in the World, a document that is representative o f contemporary 
Catholic teaching on gender.
We begin with the explicitly gendered account o f the imago Dei that is presented 
within the document: ‘From the very beginning therefore, humanity is described as 
articulated in the male-female relationship. This is the humanity, sexually differentiated,
110 Tamar Ross, ‘Modem Orthodoxy and the Challenge o f Feminism’, p. 4.
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which is explicitly declared “the image of God.”’111 The situation o f the ‘male and 
female’ clause within Genesis 1:27 is therefore a fact of great consequence to Catholic 
teaching, since it justifies the stance that sexual differentiation is a definitive facet of both 
creation and redemption, revealed ‘belonging ontologically to creation and destined 
therefore to outlast the present time, evidently in a transfigured form’.112 In other words, 
the Genesis text underpins the assumption in Catholic teaching that men and women are 
ontologically different. This means that gender belongs to our essential nature and is thus 
imbued with infinite significance. Our maleness or femaleness -  our essential difference 
-  extends to the depths o f our being, in this life and the next.
While the letter draws the idea of ontological difference from Genesis 1:27, which it 
describes as ‘the immutable basis of all Christian anthropology’, it derives the relational 
implications o f this difference from the second creation account, which ‘confirms in a 
definitive way the importance of sexual difference’.113 The second creation account 
underpins the Catholic assumption that the ‘nuptial attribute’ o f gender was present from 
the very beginning, thereby grounding the heteronormative paradigm that lies at the heart 
of Catholic teaching.114 Although the celibate life is depicted as closer to our eventual 
experience of ‘face-to-face encounter with God’, the letter is highly affirmative o f the 
married state o f life, seeing it as the perfect realisation and enactment o f ontological 
gender complementarity.115 The equal dignity o f men and women, which the letter 
derives from the imago Dei, is ‘realized as physical, psychological and ontological 
complementarity, giving rise to a harmonious relationship o f “uni-duality” and 
psychophysical completion’.116 The vocation of motherhood, through which women 
realise their life-giving potential, is strongly emphasised. On account o f her capacity for 
motherhood, ‘woman, in her deepest and original being, exists “for the other’” .117 In 
anticipation o f the feminist critique perhaps, when the letter extols the virtue of 
motherhood, the ‘reality that structures the female personality in a profound way’, it
1,1 Congregation for the Doctrine o f the Faith, Letter to the Bishops o f  the Catholic Church on the 
Collaboration o f  Men and Women in the Church and in the World (2004), www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
congregations [accessed June 19 2013] par. 5.
1122004 Letter, par. 12. Emphasis in original.
113 2004 Letter, par. 5; 2004 Letter, par. 6.
1,4 2004 Letter, par. 6.
115 2004 Letter, par. 12. Since the marital relationship will not extend to our heavenly state, those who 
currently live the life o f celibacy ‘for the sake of the kingdom’ provide us with a prophecy of our future as 
male and female. The idea that the married state is exclusive to earthly life is likely inferred from an 
interaction, depicted in the synoptic gospels, between Jesus and the Sadducees in which Jesus states that 
there will be no marriage in the afterlife (Mark 12:25; Matthew 22:30; Luke 20:36).
116 2004 Letter, par. 8.
1172004 Letter, par. 6.
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condemns the tendency to ‘enclose women in mere biological destiny'.118
Complementarity also functions to determine the roles o f men and women in the 
church. While priestly ordination is reserved to men, ‘this does not hamper in any way 
women's access to the heart of Christian life’.119 Women embody the Marian principle of 
the Church since they, in ‘particular intensity and naturalness’, live the Marian 
‘dispositions o f listening, welcoming, humility, faithfulness, praise and waiting’, though, 
on this point, the letter disassociates itself from the promotion of a passivity that derives 
from an ‘outdated conception of femininity’.120 Thus, the role o f women in Church 
consists in ‘recalling these dispositions to all the baptized and contributing in a unique 
way to showing the true face of the Church, spouse o f Christ and mother o f believers’.121
The above represents a brief outline o f the appeal to ontological difference and 
gender complementarity in contemporary Catholic teaching. We will now turn to the 
manner in which Catholic feminist theology critically engages with this thinking. We 
should first note that Catholic feminism is a broad area of theological work that 
encompasses great diversity o f perspective. It is an ecumenical movement which thus 
shares the work of Christian feminism -  and indeed aspects of Jewish feminism -  in its 
critique of biblical sources and the retrieval of neglected stands o f the tradition and also in 
advocating correct speech about God. However, it also engages with the specifically 
Catholic context, and thereby extends it critique to philosophy and language such as that 
contained within the document referred to above. Our discussion of theological responses 
to complementarity within the Catholic tradition will mainly draw upon those thinkers 
who, while deeply committed to the tradition, are compelled to articulate an alternate 
vision of our gendered relationality to that proposed in Catholic teaching. Their struggle -  
within the tradition -  for theological and ecclesial change lends their work the label 
‘transformationist’ feminism.122
The assumption that men and women are ontologically different is particularly 
problematic, from the perspective of Catholic feminist theology, where it lends weight to 
naturalistic assumptions o f gender identity and to deterministic ideas o f the role o f women
118 2004 Letter, par. 13.
119 2004 Letter, par. 16.
120 2004 Letter, par. 16.
121 2004 Letter, par. 16.
122 Ethna Regan writes that the ‘negotiation of contested territory and the acceptance o f disciplinary limits 
because o f loving fidelity to a tradition that is richer than any polity o f the present are characteristic o f many 
theologians operating in this strand of feminism’. ‘Women, Theology and the Church: Whose Expertise?’, 
Doctrine and Life, 7 (2011), 4-17 (8).
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in the church.123 Since this is, in fact, the way in which the appeal to ontological 
difference functions in Church teaching, Catholic feminists seek to offer an alternative to 
the dualistic anthropology of ontological complementarity with its tendency to 
predetermine male and female roles. To its critics, complementarity is viewed as deeply 
essentialist, a philosophy that holds insufficient regard for the light that feminist theory 
has shone upon the socially constructed manner o f many male and female characteristics. 
As Colleen Griffith writes: ‘Can we really give the chromosomal difference o f sex so 
much ontological meaning?’ 124 For Griffith, the narrow focus on the mechanics of the 
heterosexual experience inherent in the idea o f complementarity ‘privileges an important 
but limited dimension of bodily existence’.125 The opposition to complementarity is often 
rooted in an aversion to the reduction of theological anthropology to biology and the 
consequent over-identification of women with motherhood. As Mary Catherine Hilkert 
writes, while ‘women’s bodily experience and female sexuality provide appropriate 
images and metaphors for the divine, the way women image God or the destiny and 
vocation o f women cannot be extrapolated solely from biology’.126 The imagery of 
Catholic teaching, which implicitly reinforces the stereotypical view o f the active male 
and passive female, can serve as a prescriptive model for gender roles, specifically the 
inference that all women follow their exemplar, Mary, in obedience, self-giving, 
receptivity and acceptance.127 The identification o f women with these character traits can 
undermine their full subjectivity. As Elizabeth Johnson argues:
123 Naturalism refers to the fact that essentialist claims about men and women traditionally appeal to nature, 
or the natural state of things. Determinism relates to the belief that the natural characteristics that make up 
the essence of a woman determine what that woman can become. See Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and 
Christian Theology: Cartographies o f  Grace (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), p. 27.
124 Colleen M. Griffith, ‘Human Bodiliness: Sameness as Starting Point’, in The Church Women Want: 
Catholic Women in Dialogue, ed. by Elizabeth Johnson (New York: Crossroad, 2002), pp. 60-69 (p. 63).
125 Griffith, p. 62.
126 Mary Catherine Hilkert, ‘Cry Beloved Image: Rethinking the Image of God’, in In the Embrace o f God: 
Feminist Approaches to Theological Anthropology; ed. by Ann Elizabeth O ’Hara Graff (Maryknoll, Orbis, 
1995), p. 199.
127 Pope John Paul II writes that 'The Church sees in Mary the highest expression o f  the 'feminine 
genius ” and she finds in her a source of constant inspiration. Mary called herself the “handmaid o f the 
Lord” (Lk 1:38). Through obedience to the Word of God she accepted her lofty yet not easy vocation as wife 
and mother in the family of Nazareth. Putting herself at God’s service, she also put herself at the service o f 
others: a service o f  love. Precisely through this service Mary was able to experience in her life a mysterious, 
but authentic “reign” . Letter o f  John Paul I I  to Women (1995), http://www.vatican.va/hoIy_father /john_ 
paul_ii/letters/documents/hfjp-ii_let_29061995_women_en.html, [accessed June 14 2013], par. 10. 
Discussed by Susan A. Ross in ‘The Bridegroom and the Bride: The Theological Anthropology o f John Paul 
II and its Relation to the Bible and Homosexuality’, in Sexual Diversity and Catholicism (Collegeville, 
Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2001), ed. by Patricia Beattie Jung and Joseph Andrew Coray, pp. 39-60 (p. 
40).
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Much of women’s negative reaction to this image of Mary stems from the 
realization that this feminine ideal functions as an obstacle to personal growth, 
preventing the development of a critical intellect, capacity for righteous anger, and 
other characteristics of a mature personality. Living “femininely” can even be
dangerous to one’s health and life, inculcating passivity in abusive and violent
* 128 situations.
Gender complementarity emphasises the biological at the expense of the personal and, in 
some aspects o f the moral teaching that is derived from this anthropology, 'the teaching 
appears more important than the people for whom it is intended’.129
To its critics, therefore, an anthropology based upon gender complementarity is 
insufficient for contemporary relational situations. Relationships that do not enjoy 
reproductive complementarity do not necessarily exclude the potential for personal 
complementarity. The merit of Catholic feminism in dealing with such questions lies in 
the value that is often placed upon human experience as a legitimate source of moral 
insight. Such perspective recognises that the question of personal complementarity -  as 
regards same-sex relationships -  can only be fully confronted with reference to the lived 
reality of loving, committed, same-sex couples. Margaret Farley, for example, draws our 
attention to the existence of ‘some clear and profound testimonies -  written, spoken, 
visibly lived -  to the life-enhancing possibilities of same-sex relationships and the 
integrating possibilities o f sexual activity within these relationships’.130 For Farley, 
‘given the arguable inconclusiveness of Scripture, tradition, and secular disciplines,
131concrete experience becomes a determining source on the issue’. Such experience, 
Farley argues, provides the strongest indication o f the potential for the embodiment of 
Christian love through same-sex relationships.
While complementarity is, in Catholic teaching, primarily realised in the marital 
union, it is also realised in the roles of men and women within the Church. The feminist 
critique, therefore, also extends to the appeal to ‘the “iconic” complementarity’ o f these
128 Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery o f  God in Feminist Theological Discourse, (New York: 
Crossroad, 2007), p. 320.
129 Catherina J.M. Halkes, New Creation: Christian Feminism and the Renewal o f  the Earth (London: 
SPCK, 1991), p. 136.
130 Margaret Farley, Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics (New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 
286.
131 Farley, Just Love, p. 286. Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler draw similar conclusions in The 
Sexual Person: Toward a Renewed Catholic Anthropology (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
2008). ‘On the basis of the Magisterium’s own recognition of sexual orientation, and the scientific research 
and anecdotal testimonies that affirm the personal complementarity experienced by homosexual couples, we 
suggest that the complementarity defended in John Paul’s theology of the body needs to be reconstructed to 
include orientation complementarity’, p. 89.
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roles. The defence of the reservation of priestly ordination to men is made on 
ontological grounds, appealing to our determined nature, our unchanging essence and the 
two ‘essential dimensions’ of the Church: the feminine Marian principle and the 
masculine Apostolic-Petrine principle.133 The argument for restricting ordination to men 
on account o f their natural resemblance to Christ is particularly explicit in Pope Paul VPs 
1975 declaration Inter Insigniores:
Christ is o f course the firstborn of all humanity, o f women as well as men [...] 
Nevertheless, the incarnation o f the Word took place according to the male sex: this 
is indeed a question of fact, and this fact, while not implying an alleged natural 
superiority of man over woman, cannot be disassociated from the economy of 
salvation [...] .134
The position expressed within this passage, which has been consolidated in subsequent 
pontificates, establishes the centrality of gender to the salvific role o f Christ, thereby 
dissociating women from the potential to act as imago Christi.12,5 This attitude has 
traditionally been reinforced by what Elizabeth Johnson terms a ‘naïve physicalism that 
collapses the totality of the Christ into the bodily form of Jesus’.136 While many feminists 
can accept without difficulty the fact that Jesus’ maleness was part o f his historical 
identity, they strongly object to the insistence on the male character of salvation as it has 
come to dominate Christian thought. Within the ‘multipolar’ anthropology favoured by 
Johnson, Jesus’ maleness is viewed as an intrinsically important attribute for his own 
historical identity but not as theologically consequential for the redeeming role of 
Christ.137 In questioning the validity of the assumption that gender roles in the church are 
ontologically determined, feminist theology emphasises instead our unity in Christ, that 
inferred in Paul’s message that ‘there is no longer male and female; for all o f you are one
132
132 Letter o f  John Paul II  to Women, par 11.
133 Letter o f  John Paul II  to Women, par 11.
134 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Inter Insigniores (1976), www.vatican.va/roman_curia 
/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19761015_inter-insigniores_en.html [accessed July 14 
2013] par. 28. This document is discussed by Catherine Mowry LaCugna in ‘Women’s ordination’, 
Commonweal,\2\ (1994), 10-13.
135 John Paul II restates this thinking in Ordinatio Sacerdotalis (1994), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father 
/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/1994/documents/hf_Jp-ii_apl_19940522_ordina tio-sacerdotalis_en.html 
[accessed July 22 2014].
136 Johnson, She Who Is, p. 72.
137 Interestingly, Johnson finds a positive meaning -  an ‘appropriateness’ -  in Jesus’ maleness for feminist 
thought: ‘If  in a patriarchal culture, a women had preached compassionate love and enacted a style of
authority that serves, she would most certainly have been greeted with a colossal shrug. Is this not what
women are supposed to do by nature? But from a social position of male privilege, Jesus preached and acted 
this way and herein lies the summons.’ She Who Is, p. 160.
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in Christ Jesus (Gal. 3:27-28).138 Janet Martin Soskice, for example, suggests that the idea 
of ontological difference is theologically problematic and potentially at odds with 
‘Scripture itself if  it suggests that a woman cannot say that “in every sense, Christ is like 
me except without sin”. It is for this reason that we must insist that, Christologically 
speaking, men and women cannot be different’.139 Thinkers such as Soskice who 
challenge the Catholic tenet of ontological difference are not purporting an ideology of 
sameness. Instead they consider sexual difference in a way that asserts that, at our 
fundamental level we are of one nature, an argument that is well supported by the 
scholastic distinction between essence and existence. Though men and women may differ 
existentially, in essence they are the same.140
Much feminist theology in the Catholic context has been written in response to the 
exclusion of women from ordination and, because of the link between governance and 
ordination, their exclusion from leadership.141 Regarding what she terms the ecclesial and 
theological invisibility o f women, Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza writes that women ‘are 
not only the ‘silent majority’ but we are also the ‘silenced majority’ in the Roman 
Catholic Church’.142 There is much criticism of the fact that Church teaching is 
formulated without any apparent female contribution.143 There is no evidence of any
138 The 2004 Letter arrives at a different interpretation of this passage. It argues that when Paul writes that 
there is ‘neither male nor female’ (Gal. 3:27-28) he does not intend to erase the difference between the 
sexes. What he means, the Letter holds, is that the enmity and violence between male and female can be 
overcome in Christ. ‘In this sense, the distinction between man and woman is reaffirmed more than ever; 
indeed, it is present in biblical revelation up to the very end.’ par. 12.
139Soskice, ‘Imago Dei and Sexual Difference: Towards an Eschatological Anthropology’, in Rethinking 
Human Nature: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. by Malcolm Jeeves (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 
295-309 (p. 304).
140 This point is discussed by Sarah Hinlicky Wilson, in ‘Ordaining Women: Two Views’, First Things, 1 
(2007), http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/ordaining-women-two-views [accessed 24 April 2014]. 
She argues that Jesus’ statement that ‘in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but 
are like angels in heaven’ (Matthew 22:30) is not, Wilson writes, ‘a heretical denial of incamational life or a 
plug for interchangeability, but an anticipation of the reunion that his own life already inaugurates’.
141 In an address to clergy in 2006, Pope Benedict XVI responded as follows to the issue of the absence of 
women from the government of the church: ‘[T]he priestly ministry of the Lord, as we know, is reserved to 
men, since the priestly ministry [...] governs the Church. It is not the man who does something, but the 
priest governs, faithful to his mission, in the sense that it is the Sacrament, that is, through the Sacrament it 
is Christ himself who governs, both through the Eucharist and in the other Sacraments, and thus Christ 
always presides.’ Address to the clergy of Rome on 2 March 2006:http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
pontifical_councils/chrstuni/cardkaspdocs/rc_pc_chrs tuni_doc_20060605_kasper-bishops_en.html 
[accessed 1 May 2013].
142 Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza, ‘Breaking the Silence -  Becoming Visible’, in The Power o f  Naming, ed. 
by Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1996), pp. 161-62.
143 Ivy A. Helman writes that, in the future, ‘it seems that official Vatican teachings need to include more 
women’s voices. After all, women are the topic of discussion, and it makes sense that they become a central 
part of that discussion as well as recognized in a more official capacity [...]. Who knows how the Roman 
Catholic theology of womanhood would evolve when women are empowered to speak for and about
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meaningful engagement with the voices of those Catholic feminists who articulate these 
concerns. The evidence suggests that Rosemary Radford Reuther’s observation in the late 
1990s, that ‘hierarchical Catholicism views feminist theology with deepest suspicion’, 
still stands.144 Certainly, the 2004 letter referred to above contrasts the ‘demands’ o f the 
feminist movement with the humility and living for the other that characterises the 
Church’s vision of femininity: ‘Although a certain type of feminist rhetoric makes
demands “for ourselves”, women preserve the deep intuition o f the goodness in their lives 
of those actions which elicit life, and contribute to the growth and protection o f  the 
other’.145 Pope Francis, in his call for a ‘more profound theology of women’, takes little 
account of the pre-existing body of work that constitutes feminist theology.146
Pope Francis’ call echoes John Paul II’s challenge to women, expressed in his 1995 
encyclical Evangelium Vitae, to promote a new feminism which ‘rejects the temptation of 
imitating models o f “male domination”, in order to acknowledge and affirm the true 
genius o f women’.147 This call has been answered in the form of ‘New Feminism’, a 
recently emerged perspective that seeks, according to one of its leading proponents 
Michele Schumacher, to articulate a dynamic Christian anthropology that insists upon ‘the 
right and responsibility o f each woman to realize herself in perfect Christian freedom’.148 
New Feminism gives expression to Catholic teaching regarding ontological difference and 
gender complementarity, employing much of the theological and philosophical 
anthropology of Pope John Paul II. Unfortunately, New Feminism has also inherited the 
negative attitude to other forms of feminism inherent in Catholic teaching.149 There is a 
sense, in much of the writings of New Feminism, that traditional forms of feminism have
themselves?’ Women and the Vatican: An Exploration o f  Official Documents (New York: Orbis, 2012), p. 
252.
144 Rosemary Radford Reuther, Women and Redemption, p. 190.
145 Letter, par. 13.
146 Pope Francis’ comments were made during a press conference in Rio de Janeiro in July 2013. They are 
discussed by Kathleen Sprows Cummings in ‘A Promising Path: Building ‘a profound theology of 
womanhood’ for the 21st century’, America, 28 October 2013, http://americamagazine.org/issue/promising- 
path [accessed on 16 April 2014].
147 Evangelium Vitae> par. 99.
148 Michele M. Schumacher, ‘An Introduction to New Feminism’, in Women in Christ: Towards a New  
Feminism, ed. by M. Schumacher (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. ix-xvi (p.xii).
149 Beatriz Vollmer Coles attests to the ‘great failure’ of twentieth century feminism marked as it is by 
largely unrealised goals. She advises that, within the realm of New Feminism, ‘“gender-neutrality,” 
“liberation,” and other confrontational terms implied in feminist discourse should be concepts of the past’. 
‘New Feminism: A Sex-Gender Reunion’, in Women In Christ, pp. 52-66 (p. 62, 66). Mary Rousseau, 
similarly, writes that feminism, in its traditional sense, is an ‘egocentric urge to desire and dominate other 
persons instead of finding communion with them in self-giving love. For too many feminists [...] freedom 
translates into the right to be egocentric, to define our fulfilment as we see fit, and to seek it without 
interference from anyone. If that search means abandoning husband and children, so be it. ‘John Paul II’s 
Teaching on Women’, The Catholic Woman, 3 (1990), 11-31.
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failed in their goals, due in large part to the minimisation of the importance o f sexual 
difference, illustrating, as Tina Beattie writes, that ‘many Christian women, far from being 
converted by feminism, are actually alienated by its claims and concerns’.150 Therefore, 
just as the increased understanding of the cultural diversity o f women has highlighted the 
false universalism of the early feminist movement, it must now be acknowledged that 
transformationist Catholic feminism cannot, when it voices dissatisfaction with the role of 
women in the church, speak for all Catholic women.151
However, the concerns raised by transformationist Catholic feminism -  which are 
shared by many Roman Catholics, male and female -  are still unresolved, even 
unacknowledged. Although Catholic teaching shows evidence of genuine respect for and 
appreciation of women, the extent of the frustration relating to the contentious issues of 
female ordination and Church governance may mean that the ways in which Church 
teaching seeks to promote the rights of women in society and family go unappreciated. In 
the words o f Tina Beattie:
Until women are recognized as full and equal participants in the life o f faith, until 
we are acknowledged as persons graced with the image of God, capable of 
representing Christ to the world as fully and effectively as men do, the Church 
herself will continue to be a spiritual desert where men’s fears and fantasies lead 
them to refuse the grace that female sacramentality might bring to Catholic liturgical 
and institutional life.152
The appeal to ontological difference to justify roles within the Church -  and the denial
150 Beattie, p. 23. This attitude can also be observed in the writings of Hans Urs von Balthasar, a key 
influence in New Feminist writings: ‘The assault of ‘feminism’ is in a fatal predicament, because it is 
fighting for equal rights for women in predominantly male-oriented, technological civilization. Thus it 
either takes up the front against this civilization, which can scarcely be done without an unnatural 
masculinization of woman or a levelling of the difference between the sexes.’ Theo-Drama: Theological 
Dramatic Theory, Vol. II: The Dramatis Personae: Man in God, trans. by Graham Harrison, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1990), p. 365.
151 Tina Beattie writes that although she does not believe that ‘neo-Orthodox Catholicism, informed by the 
theology of Balthasar and John Paul II but also manifesting the kind of social and sexual ideologies that are 
a feature of contemporary American politics, holds the key to [...] feminist revival’, New Feminism does 
have a contribution to make to feminist theology since it stimulates close critical engagement with the 
Catholic tradition ‘in a way that might liberate new meanings and possibilities for feminist theological 
reflection’. Tina Beattie, New Catholic Feminism: Theology and Theory (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 3. 
Similarly, Rosemary Radford Reuther writes that ‘dialogue is not well promoted by either stereotyping a 
“bad old” feminism that has failed, or by dismissing this particular brand of "new feminism" as merely “old 
femininity.” A respectful recognition that both groups share a desire for common values of justice, peace, 
and male-female relations of loving mutuality is needed’. ‘Review of Women in Christ: Towards a New 
Feminism’, Theological Studies, 3 (2005), 687-689.
152 Tina Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, p. 2.
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that the teaching is prejudicial to women — makes this aspect o f church teaching difficult 
to counter, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the ordination of women is, in the 
words o f Pope Francis in Evagelii Gaudium, ‘not a question open to discussion’.153 As 
Rosemary Radford Ruether writes, although the Church affirms equality in terms of 
nature and secular society, ‘eucharistic and priestly matters are removed to a second 
super-natural sphere unconnected with gender equality in creation’.154 Yet the move 
towards a prohibition of even speaking about the issue, which is also a prohibition of 
discussion about the capacity of women to act as imago Christie constitutes a contraction 
of feminist theological discourse.
To return to the document with which we began this section, the 2004 letter states 
that ‘only the woman, created from the same “flesh” and cloaked in the same mystery, can 
give a future to the life o f the man’.155 This simple phrase -  ‘cloaked in the same 
mystery’ -  is o f arguably greater value to women than any of the affirmations o f their self­
giving nature that permeate Catholic teaching, expressed by John Paul II as the ‘true 
genius of women’. This is not only because these affirmations insufficiently acknowledge 
the self-giving attributes of men, but also because they exemplify the limiting 
determinism — for both men and women -  that characterises ontological complementarity. 
Thus feminism seeks to move from the determinism that derives from ontological 
complementarity back to this sense of mystery inherent in Genesis 1:27. This brings us to 
one of the most significant areas of feminist theological discourse: the mystery of God. 
The effects o f a theological anthropology that derives from ontological difference and 
gender complementarity are far reaching, underpinning the Catholic understanding of the 
inter-human and the divine-human relationship. Much of the feminist response to gender 
complementarity has inspired an increased sensitivity to the implications o f the language 
that we use to depict both of these relationships and, importantly, the language that we use 
to describe God. We thus turn to feminist reflection on God-language, an insightful area 
of theological discourse, in order to elaborate the assumption that an appreciation of the 
mystery o f God has potentially positive implications for our understanding of the person 
created in the image of God.
,53 ‘The reservation of the priesthood to males, as a sign of Christ the Spouse who gives himself in the 
Eucharist, is not a question open to discussion, but it can prove especially divisive if sacramental power is 
too closely identified with power in general.’ Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium, par. 104
154 Rosemary Radford Reuther, 4Imago Dev. Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics’, in The Image 
o f God, ed. by Kari Elisabeth Borresen, pp. 261-291 (p. 269).
155 2004 Letter, par. 6.
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5.5 Reflecting the Mystery of God
One of the defining dimensions o f feminist theology since its emergence has been its 
critique and its creativity in relation to language about God. This work has increased 
awareness o f the fact that if  our concept o f God is exclusively reliant upon male imagery, 
it follows that our picture of the imago Dei within the person will suffer distortion, to the 
detriment o f both women and men.156 The interrelation between our image of God and 
our understanding of the person as imago Dei is most famously summarized in the radical 
feminist perspective of Mary Daly: ‘[I]f God is male, then male is God5.157 The failure to 
recognise some degree of femininity in God creates an obstacle to the realisation o f the 
woman as the image of God. Feminist theology has drawn attention to the fact that an 
identification o f God as male helps to hold structures o f oppression in place since it 
implies and supports the natural authority o f men over women. The type o f reasoning that 
feminist writings have opposed is rarely stated as explicitly in contemporary theology as it 
is in the writings o f the Calvinist theologian, John M. Frame. Frame argues that the 
reason that scripture contains so much male imagery for God is that scripture wants us to 
think of God as Lord, and ‘lordship, in Scripture, always connotes authority.’ There is, 
therefore, an ‘awkwardness’ in speaking of God in female terms since women are subject 
to male authority in the home and in church. Frame concludes that the use of female 
language is misguided, from a biblical point o f view, and unhelpful for cultivating our 
image of God as Lord, which is, Frame believes, very necessary for contemporary 
religious experience.158
At this point, we should pause to appreciate the wisdom of Aquinas and 
Maimonides and to consider the value o f their conception o f the unknowable God, 
entirely beyond the limitations of human language. It is only when confronted with 
sentiments such as that expressed by Frame, that we see that apophaticism -  though at 
times seeming inflexible -  is motivated by the desire to protect the mystery o f God. A 
rediscovery o f apophaticism, as Catherine Keller writes, a theology ‘between mystical
156 Ann Loades writes that, arguably, ‘men as well as women suffer spiritual and other forms of damage 
when the symbolism is false or mistaken'. The ‘theological task' of feminist interpretation proceeds, 
Loades argues, ‘on the assumption that all stand to gain by it, not just women'. ‘Feminist Interpretation', in 
The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. by John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp.81-95 (p. 82).
157 Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father (Boston: Beacon, 1973), p. 19.
158 Frame, ‘Men and Women in the Image of God’, in Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood: A 
Response to Evangelical Feminism, ed. by John Piper and Wayne Gruden (Wheaton: Crossway, 1991), pp. 
225-233 (p. 228).
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disclosure and prophetic iconoclasnv, liberates theological language from the illusion o f 
certainty.159 Thus, the multitude of scriptural images that depict the divine heightens the 
expression of the incomprehensibility of God. The many names for God should be 
positively regarded as both an expression of, and a safeguard for, the mystery of God, an 
idea strikingly captured in the sixth century by Dionysius, one of the most influential 
proponents o f negative theology, as the ‘darkness so far above light’.160
The challenge to confront and embrace mystery is what makes the theology o f 
unknowing appealing for feminist theological discourse in its quest to overcome the 
certainty o f determinism. Elizabeth Johnson, for example, values the apophatic 
tendencies o f Maimonides and Aquinas, recognising the potential of analogical language -  
the movement from negation to mystery -  for contemporary theology:
In this sense analogical language is more akin to the reverential abstinence from the 
use o f God’s name that characterizes later Judaism, than to any exaggeration o f 
divine aloofness from the world. At the end o f the process the mystery o f the living 
God is evoked while the human thinker ends up, intellectually and existentially, in 
religious awe and adoration.161
Johnson regrets that this negating power of analogy was forgotten in the subsequent onset 
o f an ‘ecclesiastical desire to make simple, positive and authoritative statements about the 
divine.,L62 Recognising the damage that the overuse o f literal male imagery has done to 
our sense o f the mystery of God, feminist theological discourse has conducted a retrieval 
o f female images o f God from within the scriptures which has helped to correct the 
imbalance.163 Such work does not, however, aspire to the complete replacement of male 
with female images since this would still obscure the mystery of God and would also
159 Keller, Face o f  the Deep: A Theology o f Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 201.
160 Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (Mahwah, NY: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 138.
161 Johnson, She Who Is , p. 115. Johnson finds much value in Aquinas’ thought for her efforts towards a re­
articulation of the mystery of God. In fact, the title of the book ‘She Who Is’ is drawn from Aquinas’ idea 
that, since divine essence is identical with divine existence, ‘HE WHO IS’ is the most appropriate name for 
God (ST 1.13.11)’. p. 242.
162 Johnson, She Who Is , p. 242.
163 Catherine Keller argues that since Genesis 1:26 confers equality, women must take the opportunity to 
correct the imbalance in terms of the language we use to depict God: Women would seem therefore to be as 
entitled as men to make God-signs in our image -  to mirror as men have always done our sense of our own 
cosmic significance. So why can we not correct the systematic oversight of two thousand years or so and 
invest a few female metaphors with their overdue holiness? ‘Christianity’, in A Companion to Feminist 
Philosophy, pp. 225-236 (p. 226). This theology of retrieval has even led Rosemary Radford Reuther to the 
renaming of the divine: ‘When discussing the fuller divinity to which this theology points, I use the term 
God/ess, a written symbol intended to combine both the masculine and feminine forms of the word for the 
divine while preserving the Judeo-Christian affirmation that divinity is one. The term is unpronounceable 
and inadequate. It is not intended as a language for worship’. Sexism and God-talk: Towards a Feminist 
Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 46.
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alienate men. The issue, from a feminist point o f view, is not with the use o f male 
metaphors for God but, as Johnson writes, with the use o f these metaphors ‘exclusively, 
literally, and patriarch ally5.164
Though the re-emphasis on the unknowability o f God is an important aspect of 
much feminist theology, this does not mean that our image of God has to be purified o f  all 
gendered language. The Jewish theologian, Rachel Adler, presents a very convincing case 
in favour o f gendered God language. Adler notes the impossibility o f presenting the 
divine Other in neutered language, since Hebrew does not have a neuter gender. In any 
case, even in English, neutered language is often taken to refer to males, which is why we 
often feel the need to add appendages, such as for example, a female rabbi. Though God 
can be compared to non-human aspects o f creation such as rock, sea or fire, all 
anthropomorphic language implies gender. Adler suggests that anthropomorphism is a 
necessary part o f God language, particularly to the language o f prayer. Though often very 
beautiful, non-anthropomorphic images alone are not sufficient to signify the human- 
divine relationship. As humans, we need story and so, ‘God must cloth Godself in 
metaphor, and especially in anthropomorphic metaphor, because the most powerful 
language of God’s engagement with us is our human language of relationship’.165 Gender 
is an essential part of this relatedness; for example, ‘mother’ or ‘father’ is much more 
personal than ‘parent’. Adler sees our gendered existence as significant for our 
understanding of God. She regards the sexual distinction depicted in Genesis 1 as a 
metaphor for the divine nature:
Something in God seeks to restate itself in flesh and blood. Perhaps it is God’s 
creativity, or delight, or the ingrained yearning for communion with the other that 
serves as impetus for creation and for covenant. But something in God, in seeking 
its human mirror, reveals itself as both infinitely varied and utterly whole. That 
something is, as it were, God’s sexuality, which our own sexuality was created to 
reflect.166
164 Johnson writes that the ‘first expression of the unknowability of God is the proliferation of names, 
images and concepts, each of which provides a different perspective onto divine excellent [...]. Each 
symbol has a unique intelligibility that adds its own significance to the small store of collected human 
wisdom about the divine. In addition, as a concrete term balances an abstract one, and so forth, each 
operates as a corrective to any other that would pretend to completeness’. She Who Is , p. 33.
165 Rachel Adler, Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics (Philadelphia: JPS, 1998), p. 96.
166 Adler, p. 117.
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Adler infers this point from the placement of the idea of sexual difference at the climax of 
a passage that is devoted to the establishment o f human similarity to God. Just like God, 
who is referred to in the singular and the plural in Genesis, humankind encompasses both 
singularity and plurality through sexual diversion. Our sexual diversion is, for Adler, ‘a 
metaphor for the infinitude and unity of God’.167 It is our sexuality that turns us towards 
to the other and, as Adler writes, this ‘capacity to create intersubjective space, which we 
and God share, is what makes covenant possible’.168 The feminist dilemma will not be 
overcome by rejecting those stories where God is metaphorically clothed in a male body 
but by writing new stories, or by rediscovering hidden ones.
The work of Melissa Raphael is a good example of what Adler is advising.169 In 
The Female Face o f  God in Auschwitz, Raphael presents a theological response to the 
Holocaust based on the experience of those in the death camps, whose embodied and 
relational care of one another made the presence o f God possible. While acknowledging 
the problematic nature o f reading women’s memoir literature in the light of contemporary 
feminist thought and the danger of idealising female relationships, Raphael constructs a 
theology of presence arguing that ‘each gesture o f care retrieved a spark of the 
humanity/divinity that had been trodden into the mud’.170 Raphael argues that it was not 
God-in-God-self but rather the patriarchal model of God that failed Israel during the 
Holocaust. While Raphael largely draws on the memoirs of women, the gestures of care 
around which she bases her discussion are not exclusively expressed by women. She also 
describes the ‘maternal attitude’ of some Hassidic rabbis, who offered not only religious 
teaching, but also ‘calming words, counsel, consolation and a practical support’.171 This 
is consistent with Raphael’s conclusion in her earlier work that patriarchal values are not 
limited to the biologically male, just as biological femaleness is ‘not always a 
precondition o f female sacrality’.172
167 Adler, p. 118.
168 Adler, p. 119.
169 Melissa Raphael describes the liberal Jewish feminism, within which her and Adler’s work is situated, as 
follows: ‘Less bound by halakhic judgements and obligations than Orthodox feminists, and, indeed, 
sometimes indifferent to halakhic precedent, feminist scholars of the broadly liberal traditions [...] have 
conjoined the tradition’s inherent prophetic self-criticism and self-revision with the humanistic values of 
modem Judaism to address (and sometimes move beyond) the classic theological framework of Judaism: 
God, Torah, and the people Israel’, ‘Feminist Theology and the Jewish Tradition’, p . 53.
170 Melissa Raphael, The Female Face o f  God in Auschwitz: A Jewish Feminist Theology o f  the Holocaust, 
(London: Routledge, 2003), p. 151.
17* Raphael, p. 123.
172 Raphael, Theology and Embodiment: The Post-Patriarchal Reconstruction o f  Female Sacrality, 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), p. 16.
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Raphael’s idea o f imago Dei is central to this argument. The Shoah represents a 
radical disruption in our understanding of God and also in our understanding of the human 
person as imago Dei. In Auschwitz, where the image of God was almost lost from view 
and, for some, rendered invisible, each feminine gesture o f care which even momentarily 
restored the dignity of the person made in the image of God, helped to restore God’s 
image in the world. Tn Auschwitz, women’s humanity was completed by the restoration 
o f God’s image in their own face, just as God’s female face was restored by taking on the 
suffering of women. Perhaps God created humanity in her own image so as to bear some 
of its burdens.’173 Raphael’s emphasis on embodiment seeks to celebrate the immanent 
divinity o f the female body and to renegotiate the meaning of female sacrality -  those 
qualities o f femaleness that mediate the sacred -  as a ‘structure by which we can imagine 
how the divine is immanent in the world through female embodiment and in ‘female’ 
modes of being and doing’.174 As such, Raphael’s theology celebrates the manifestation 
of divine presence in the ordinary, rather than through any particularly sanctified objects 
which are set above daily life.175 She argues that ‘immanentism breaks down the 
traditional binary oppositions of spirit and flesh, heaven and earth, sacred and profane, 
where the value o f one element in the duality -  the transcendent -  is secured at the 
expense of the other -  the immanent’.176
Raphael explores an image of the relational God of the feminine experience, the 
Shekhinah, a manifestation of God defined by her presence. In the Talmud, the term 
Shekhinah, coined by rabbis from the root o f the verb ‘to dwell’ (shakhan), denotes the 
personification of the presence of God in a particular location.177 Where the term Ha- 
Kadosh Barukh Hu (The Holy One, Blessed Be He) describes God’s hidden persona and 
transcendence, Shekhinah describes the nearness and presence of the immanent God.178 
In Auschwitz, the depth of evil into which the Shekhinah was placed made her presence 
almost imperceptible just as the personhood of the women became less perceptible. The
173 Raphael, The Female Face o f  God in Auschwitz, p. 149.
174 Raphael, Thealogy and Embodiment, p. 8.
175 Raphael, Thealogy and Embodiment, p. 23.
176 Raphael, Thealogy and Embodiment Immanentism, according to Raphael, overcomes the practice of 
attaching transcendent value to the spirit at the expense of the flesh, which was common in the tradition of 
Western theology: ‘To be of “flesh” in traditional Christianity is to have been bom of woman, profaned by 
her blood, distracted by her embodiment and generally in a state of rebellion against God’, p. 23-24.
m  The Shekhinah is regarded to be present in, for example, acts of public prayer: ‘Whenever ten are 
gathered for prayer, there the Shekhinah rests’, Talmud Sanhedrin 39a.
178 David Ariel, Kabbalah: The Mystic Quest in Judaism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 
p.95. The use of the Shekhinah in rabbinic literature and the targums is discussed by Martin McNamara in 
Targum and Testament Revisited: Aramaic Paraphrases o f  the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2010), pp. 148-153.
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Shekhinah, as depicted by Raphael, suffers with her people but not fo r  her people, as with 
the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation.
Drawing on the mystical Kabbalist Isaac Luria, Raphael can find some meaning in 
seemingly insignificant acts of kindness within the camps, interpreting them as traces o f 
transcendence, forming part of tikkun, the redemptive struggle. ‘Here, women’s holding, 
pulling, and pushing the Other from death back into the slender possibility of life -  so 
often the very substance of their memoir -  were means o f carrying God into Auschwitz 
under a tom shelter: an improvised Tent o f Meeting in which women could meet God in 
the face-to-face relation’.179 Thus, we observe a meeting o f theological anthropology and 
ethics in Raphael’s conception of imago Dei. The redemption that is envisaged by 
Raphael is performative and gradual, as with the Hasidic concept kimah himah, bit by bit. 
It is this point that marks the distinction between Raphael’s theology and other Holocaust 
theologies such as that of Richard Rubenstein.180 Raphael argues that the expectation of 
an Exodus-type deliverance from the Holocaust is a patriarchal projection of power that 
justifies domination and abuse onto the idea of the omnipotent God, contributing to the 
problem that created the conditions for the Holocaust in the first place. O f the patriarchal 
God, Raphael writes: ‘Auschwitz was his place insofar as the conditions of numinous 
horror were graphic illustrations of his threats to bring punitive disaster upon the house o f 
Israel.’181 Raphael attributes patriarchy to an alienation from the divine and the worship 
of the masculine numen in its place. Raphael suggests, however, that this sin of 
patriarchy is redeemable. When the female divine image is honoured, and the conception 
of God is re-imagined in terms of presence, Jewry will be engaged in tikkun.
Thus, Raphael’s work has brought our reflection on God language from mystery to 
immanence. Feminist theological discourse celebrates the possibilities inherent in 
worshipping the unknowable God, seeing in apophatic counter-discourse a potential 
corrective for what Johnson terms the ‘idolatry’ o f the literal, exclusive and patriarchal 
male imagery that has dominated religious discourse. Such an approach enhances the 
capacity to recognise the theomorphic potential o f women while also destabilising the 
assumption that human gender hierarchies naturally mirror the relation between the male
179 Raphael, ‘Feminist Theology and the Jewish Tradition’, p. 64.
180 Richard Rubenstein argued for the unsustainability of the traditional Jewish belief in an omnipotent, 
beneficent deity after the Holocaust. Such tradition ‘has interpreted every major catastrophe in Jewish 
history as God’s punishment of a sinful Israel. I fail to see how this position can be maintained without 
regarding Hitler and the SS as instruments of God’s will’. After Auschwitz (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 
1966), p. 153.
181 Raphael, The Female Face o f  God in Auschwitz, p. 51.
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God and his human subjects. To draw again from Keller, ‘when the dominological deity 
is destabilized, so are the coercive practices o f His representatives5, a point that strongly 
resonates with Raphael’s thesis.182 However, in this celebration o f mystery, we must also 
affirm the personal dimension of the covenantal relationship, that which is depicted in 
Raphael’s theology of presence. This is why, once we ascent to the otherness and non­
corporeality of God, we can make space in our theology and worship for, as Adler 
advocates, God language that is clothed in gendered metaphor. To bring these insights 
together, it is interesting to note Tina Beattie’s advocacy of a ‘gendered apophaticism’ in 
order to reflect the fact that ‘woman’s unknowing of God may be different from man’s 
unknowing of God’. This shows the importance of broadening the discourse of theology 
to create space for the female voice to articulate our imperfect understanding of God.183 
However, such gendered apophaticism is also intended to reflect the mystery of woman’s 
own being, the self ‘hidden in the mystery of God’, thus illustrating the anthropological 
relevance o f refocusing on mystery.184
The idea o f anthropological apophaticism, briefly referred to in the context of 
Roman Catholic teaching, bears particular relevance for our understanding of imago Dei. 
As Janet Martin Soskice argues:
Some Orthodox theologians suggest, to my mind convincingly, that to say “man is 
in the image o f God” is to say that “man is mystery” because God is mystery. On 
this reading, attractively, we do not know who or what we are -  positively as well as 
negatively. “Know thyself’ is, after all, a pagan injunction, and St. Paul’s 
psychological realism Romans 7:19 -  “For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I 
do not want is what I do” -  is instantly familiar.185
There is significant grounding in the tradition for this anthropological apophaticism. The 
sense o f mystery relates not just to our ultimate state -  ‘what we will be has not been 
revealed’ (1 John 3:2) -  but also to our earthly existence. Soskice’s argument finds direct 
grounding in Gregory of Nyssa, for example, who writes that ‘since one of 
the attributes we contemplate in the Divine nature is incomprehensibility o f essence, it is
182 Keller, Face o f the Deep, p. 204.
183 Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, p. 66.
184 Beattie, p. 66.
185 Janet Martin Soskice, ‘Imago Dei and Sexual Difference: Towards an Eschatological Anthropology’, pp. 
297-298 (p. 298). Linda Woodhead writes that ‘since human nature is fulfilled through participation in 
God, it shares the mystery o f  God -  and can never be pinned down’. ‘Apophatic Anthropology’, in in God 
and Human Dignity, ed. by R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), pp. 
233-247 (p. 233).
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clearly necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of the 
archetype’.186 It is appropriate for Gregory that just as God (the archetype) transcends 
human comprehension, the nature of our mind (the image) ‘evades our knowledge’.187 
Human mystery is also a significant theme in Augustine, for whom the human person was 
‘a great deep’ whose nature ‘is more investigated than comprehended’.188 We should also 
recall Novak’s idea of the imago Dei as shadow and his assertion that any o f our 
conclusions about the shadow are tentative until the presence behind the shadow becomes 
known to us.189 Our theology of imago Dei should retain the focus on the limits of human 
self-understanding and thus heed the words of Abraham Heschel when he writes that the 
imago Dei refers to mystery, and thus becomes distorted when taken as a ‘matter-of-fact 
description’. The concept becomes caricatured ‘when transposed into categories of 
pedestrian thinking’.190
There is certainly liberating potential in apophatic anthropology to act as a 
counter-discourse to the deterministic and prescriptive anthropologies that have eclipsed 
the potential o f women to image God. Our understanding of the concept o f imago Dei -  
as male and female -  must retain something of the mystery and hesitance that should 
characterise our statements about God. With this hesitance in mind, we will now draw 
together some concluding remarks as regards our capacity to image God as male and 
female.
5,6 Conclusion: Imaging God as Male and Female
At this point, it is apparent that the weight that should be accorded to the corporeal 
distinction between man and woman remains uncertain. The complexity o f the issue at 
hand, and its relation to Christian theology, is articulated by Janet Martin Soskice as 
follows:
We must say that, Christologically speaking, women and men cannot be different, 
for “all will bear the image of the man of heaven”. But we must also say that sexual 
difference is not, or should not be, a matter o f theological indifference. Genesis 1
186 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making o f Man, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 5, ed. 
by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1893), XI.3.
187 On the Making o f Man , XI.3.
188 Augustine, Confessions, 4:22.
189 Novak, ‘Persons in the Image of God’, p. 150.
190 Heschel, God in Search o f Man: A Philosophy o f  Judaism (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1953), 
p. 65.
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Indeed, the idea that sexual difference is not a matter of theological indifference may be 
one of the only points of commonality shared by all the thinkers encountered in this 
chapter. Though divergences emerged in the definition o f its meaning, the argument for 
the importance of sexual difference has remained consistent. Our creation as male and 
female has implications for the understanding of personhood beyond the reproductive 
capacities o f men and women.
In addition to its efforts towards the discovery and promotion of richer and more 
diverse language for divinity, feminist theology aims to correct the imbalance in the 
traditional reason-centred interpretation o f imago Dei by emphasising the fact that the 
human body, male and female, also images God. The emphasis on embodiment emerged, 
as we have seen, in response to the feminist appraisal o f dualistic views o f personhood in 
theological texts that denigrated the female body.192 Feminist thought has uncovered an 
anthropology that associated women, as Rachel Muers writes, ‘with “the flesh” 
understood negatively, with matter rather than form, with chaotic emotion rather than 
divine reason’.193 In response to this anthropology, it is argued that ‘women image the 
divine in the embodied reality of their daily lives including the bodily changes and 
processes that patriarchal religion has found so difficult to deal with -  menstruation, birth, 
sexual activity, menopause, ageing and death’.194 In drawing our attention to the dualistic 
tendencies within the tradition, feminist theologies have worked to recover the sacrality of 
the female body created in the image of God. We have observed this rediscovery o f 
female sacrality in halakhic feminism, in its efforts to create an intra-feminine space to 
rearticulate the meaning of niddah in order to, as Blu Greenberg writes, restore the 
‘element o f holiness to our bodies’.195 We have also seen an effort to renegotiate female
suggests that sexual difference has something to tell us.191
191 Soskice, ‘Imago Dei and Sexual Difference’, p. 302.
192 Ruth Mantin, 'Theological Reflections on Embodiment’, Feminist Theology; 12 (2004), 212-227.
193 Rachel Muers, 'Feminism, Gender and Theology’, p. 435. Francis Martin is critical of this reading of the 
Christian tradition. Martin concedes that feminism is justified in their opposition to the objectification of 
women. However: ‘Their attempt to locate the impetus for this degradation within Christianity, however, is 
one more example of a selective reading of history, based on the myth of total oppression, and filtered 
through the crystallization process of the Enlightenment. Only an unsparingly unsympathetic reading, 
determined to avoid all evidence to the contrary, could project upon Christianity itself the fundamentally 
pagan antipathy toward to body and sexuality that reemerged in the thought of the late Renaissance and 
Enlightenment.’, Francis Martin, The Feminist Question: Feminist Theology in the Light o f  Christian 
Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 280.
194 Introducing Body Theology, ed. by Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998), p. 79.
195 Greenberg, On Women and Judaism, p. 120.
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sacrality in the liberal Jewish perspective o f Melissa Raphael, in her celebration of the 
immanent divinity of the female body, the divine made manifest in female ‘modes of 
being and doing’, most especially in the face of the Shoah.196 Feminists within the 
Roman Catholic tradition, in calling for greater female inclusion in the Church, are also 
concerned with what Tina Beattie articulates as the ‘sacramental significance’ o f the 
female body created in the image of God with the capacity to act as imago Christi. The 
female body, according to Beattie, is ordained towards procreation but also, more 
importantly, to worship, devotion and prayer. ‘Only then might we begin to explore the 
mystery and wonder of our own being, as beings made in the image of God who is also a 
mystery and wonder’.197 Beattie’s comments point us to the fact that feminist theology, in 
both the Jewish and Christian contexts, should not lose sight o f the object o f theology. 
Thinking theologically about the imago Dei entails a broadening of focus beyond, as 
Judith Plaskow writes, the fruits o f gender discrimination.198
The great complexity of the question of gender necessitates an openness to dialogue 
on the part o f religious communities, an ability to listen, as the Jewish theologian Tamar 
Ross writes, with faith rather than fear. Regrettably, the lack o f openness that we have 
observed in some cases results, at least in part, from fear. Proponents of gender 
complementarity adopt an ambivalent stance towards contemporary theories of gender, 
which they often regard as contradictory to the biblical vision o f men and women seeking 
their reciprocity and complementarity in one another.199 As articulated by the Calvinist 
theologian, John Piper, contemporary theories o f gender have the potential to destabilize 
the biblical view o f man and woman and, do not, in themselves offer a concrete 
replacement for this vision:
196 Raphael, Thealogy and Embodiment, p. 8.
197 Tina Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, p. 15.
198 Noting the largely practical, rather than theological, emphasis of Jewish feminism as it has developed, 
Plaskow writes: ‘If the Jewish women’s movement addresses itself only to the fruits but not to the basis of 
discrimination, it is apt to settle for too little in the way of change. It may find that the full participation of 
women in Jewish life -  should it come -  will only bring to light deeper contradictions in Jewish imagery 
and symbolism’. ‘The Right Question is Theological’, in On Being a Jewish Feminist: A Reader, ed. by 
Susannah Heschel (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), pp. 223-234 (p. 224). A similar argument is found 
in the work of Susan Frank Parsons in ‘Accounting for Hope: Feminist Theology as Fundamental 
Theology’, in Challenging Women’s Orthodoxies in the Context o f  Faith, ed. by Susan Frank Parsons 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 1-21 (p. 18).
199 Luis Correa Lima, ‘The Language of Creation and Gender’, trans. by Francis McDonagh, Concilium, 4
(2012), 46-56 (p. 50). ‘The conflict between the language of creation and gender theory sets up an 
opposition between, on the one hand, those who believe in nature as the bearer of a creative reason and in 
union between man and woman in matrimony as the sacrament of creation and, on the other, those who 
rebel against gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality, and reject any ontology that gives them a 
theoretical underpinning’.
A lot of energy is being expended today minimizing the distinctions o f manhood 
and womanhood. But we do not hear very often what manhood and womanhood 
should incline us to do. We are adrift in a sea o f confusion over sexual roles. And 
life is not the better for it.200
There is, perhaps, some truth to this idea that engagement with gender theory unsteadies 
the certainty with which we can claim knowledge of what manhood and womanhood 
mean. However, many feminist theologies question the truth o f traditionally held ideas of 
manhood and womanhood and their consistency with the life-giving mission of 
Christianity and Judaism. Such theologies are also seeking the true meaning o f our 
gendered existence, guided by the vision of our equal capacity to image God. In 
questioning the rigidity of existing ideas o f gender, feminist theology seeks to extend 
boundaries and to encourage greater inclusion. As Luis Correa Lima writes:
[L]ocal churches, apostolic initiatives and theological reflection can go further and 
create a church environment favourable to greater change in the future. We should 
never lose sight of the freedom of the sons and daughters of God and of Jesus’ offer 
o f a yoke that is easy and a burden that is light.201
The specific identification of imago Dei with gender is potentially exclusivist where 
marriage is regarded as the sole paradigm for male-female relations, since it can casts 
other relationships in a subordinate light. To draw again from Soskice, ‘sexual difference
9H9is not just instrumental to marriage or even to the family. It is a good in itself. 
Though the creation narratives accord a particular status to procreative unions, this status 
should be understood as a blessing bestowed upon humankind as a species -  rather than 
upon an individual -  so that it may continue through generation. This reading of the 
imago Dei, as Alistair McFadyen writes, ‘provides no basis for the exclusion of the
9 0^homosexual, the single and the variously infertile from the image’.
The idea of inclusion, so characteristic o f feminist engagement with imago Dei, is 
already present within the Jewish and Christian traditions. Feminist theology, through its
200 John Piper, ‘A Vision of Biblical Complementarity', in Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, 
pp. 31-60 (p. 33).
201 Luis Correa Lima, ‘The Language of Creation and Gender’, p. 54.
202 Soskice writes that ‘sexual difference is a primordial difference, a template for the fruitfulness that can 
come not when two are the same, but when they are different. For human creatures, as for sea and dry land, 
light and dark, fecundity is in the interval. * Imago Dei and Sexual Difference’, p. 306.
203 Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory o f the Individual in Social Relationships 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 38.
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work in reclaiming and re-imagining neglected strands o f the tradition, heightens the 
existing Jewish and Christian challenge to embrace the equal dignity o f every human 
person. It thereby critically engages with the wisdom of these traditions which, while 
contributing to the hierarchical view of the relation between men and women, has also 
‘sustained generations of foremothers and foresisters in the faith’.204 Jewish and Christian 
feminist engagement with imago Dei reveals the liberating and inclusive character o f the 
concept Such an approach to imago Dei directs us away from the speculative abstraction 
that has, in the past, justified discrimination, towards an ethic o f inclusion that embraces 
the lived reality o f the embodied human person created in the image of God, both 
immanent and transcendent.
The immanent presence of God, who as Raphael writes, suffers with humankind, is 
made manifest through our relational embodied existence, particularly through gestures of 
care. Through appreciation of God’s transcendent otherness, we understand, by analogy, 
the mystery o f our own gendered personhood and, ultimately, our capacity for self­
transcendence. We are, again, aided by the Patristic language of deification, which 
envisions a gradual growth in likeness to God, an insight which has been overwhelmed by 
deterministic anthropologies and obscured by a reductive physicalism. What we are and 
what we will become cannot be reduced to our corporeality. A theology of sexual 
difference, while celebrating the goodness of creation, including the good of sexuality, 
ultimately looks beyond the physical to the mystery o f God. Deification implies that we 
grow into something unknown to ourselves, not into something already possessed. We 
therefore need to remain hesitant as regards the meaning of sexual difference, resisting the 
temptation to define and delimit female and male nature, so that we may aid, not impede, 
our capacity to flourish as men and women created in the image o f God. The relationship 
of sexual difference to human being as imago Dei is negotiated in the tension between 
determinism and apophaticism, between that which has been made known to us and our 
growth into the unknown. We will carry this insight, and those o f the previous chapters, 
to Chapter Six, which will offer a reflection on the enduring relevance o f the concept of 
imago Dei in the context of contemporary theology.
204 Elizabeth Johnson, She Who ls} p. 9.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS:
THE ENDURING RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF IM AGO D E I
Paul Ricoeur remarks that when ‘the theologians o f the sacerdotal school elaborated the 
doctrine of man that is summarized in the startling expression o f the first chapter of 
Genesis -  “Let us make man in our image and likeness” -  they certainly did not master at 
once all its implicit wealth and meaning’.1 Ricoeur’s remark provides us with an 
appropriate opening for our conclusion, implying as it does the gradual, dynamic 
character o f scriptural interpretation and the possibility that interpreters o f a text can 
uncover meaning that may not have been evident to its original authors. Our analysis of 
the evolution of the concept of imago Dei at some key moments of its theological 
development has indeed illustrated the wealth and meaning inherent in this powerful 
symbol. This concluding chapter will survey the central themes that have emerged from 
previous chapters while also reflecting upon the enduring relevance of the concept of 
imago Dei for contemporary theology. We will begin with a brief survey of our findings 
in each o f the chapters of this thesis.
6.1 Survey o f Findings
Drawing upon contemporary Jewish and Christian biblical scholarship, Chapter One 
explored the scriptural origins of imago Dei, primarily Genesis 1:26-27. While 
acknowledging the interdependence between texts of neighbouring cultures, we identified 
the theological distinctiveness of the Genesis account o f the creation o f the person, a 
distinctiveness that is best served with use o f the term ‘democratization’. While parallel 
literature attests to the theomorphic potential o f kings, the Genesis tselem (Elohim is 
egalitarian, applying to every human person. The distinctness o f Genesis was further 
illuminated with reference to inter-Biblical contextual material: Israel’s countercultural 
aniconism, illustrated by the wider biblical use of tselem and demut to reinforce the 
prohibition of idolatry, means that the designation o f the person as the image of God
1 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, trans, by Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1965), p. 110.
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represents, to draw again from Brueggemann, a 'striking proclamation about God and 
about humanness’.2 Turning then to the text itself, we discussed the tendency in 
contemporary biblical scholarship to favour the functional interpretation o f imago Dei, 
that is, the interpretation that defines the concept according to the explicit biblical 
commission to rule the created world, thus emphasising the task rather than the gift.
Chapter One also addressed some formative Jewish and Christian interpretations 
o f imago Dei, beginning with early Rabbinic writings which alluded to the iconic 
significance o f imago Dei and the immanence o f God. Such writings emphasised the 
physical dimension of likeness to God and the consequent importance of respect and care 
for the body. The writings of Paul constituted the most significant influence upon 
Christian interpretations o f imago Dei, offering the framework around which subsequent 
Christian theology would develop: i) the universal image granted at creation but lost 
through the sin o f Adam; (ii) our growth in likeness through a life modelled on Christ, the 
true image o f God; and (iii) the restoration of humankind to the fullness of the image after 
death in Christ. Irenaeus and Augustine drew out the implications o f the Pauline 
structure, offering creative theological explorations o f the manner in which the human 
person can image Christ. In both thinkers, we observed the identification o f rational 
capacity as the distinguishing factor o f human existence and that which, in purer form, 
characterised the original ontological state. Though both Irenaeus and Augustine 
emphasised the goodness of creation, Irenaeus’ inclusion of the body in his interpretation 
o f imago Dei was, for Augustine, a ‘debased and empty’ idea (Trin. XII.7.12). Augustine 
emphasised the fallen nature o f humankind, the massa damnata, utterly powerless and 
dependent upon salvation in Christ. Though Irenaeus shared Augustine’s idea o f 
dependence on Christ, he developed a more positive theological anthropology based on 
his idea of likeness as a dynamic moral force that orients us on the pilgrimage of life 
towards God. Both Irenaeus and Augustine emphasised self-mastery in order to bring 
ourselves closer to the original state, thus placing in opposition the light o f  reason and the 
enslavement to lust (AH V.6.1). Much of what the concept o f imago Dei would come to 
mean was already present in the formative Jewish and Christian interpretations surveyed 
in Chapter One.
The centrality of reason was further emphasised in Chapter Two, which discussed 
the interpretation of imago Dei in the medieval philosophy o f Maimonides and Aquinas.
2 Brueggemann, Genesis: A Biblical Commentary fo r  Teaching and Preaching (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 
1982), p. 32.
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Illustrating their significant dependence upon Aristotelian epistemology, as well as the 
fecundity o f interfaith engagement on shared concepts, Maimonides and Aquinas both 
emphasised human intellectual capacities as reflective o f the imago Dei. Maimonides’ 
conception of imago Dei corresponded to the intellect in actu, the intellect ‘in his most 
perfect and excellent state’, that which survives death. While Maimonides limited the 
imago Dei to those who actualise their intellects, Aquinas developed a tripartite scheme 
that accorded the image -  at its basic level -  to every human person. Echoing Irenaeus’ 
process o f deification, Aquinas envisioned the development, through grace, o f our natural 
intellectual capacity to know and love God, thus constituting an imperfect reflection of the 
image of God. This imperfect reflection anticipates the perfect knowledge and love of 
God and the full reflection of the image in glory. Aquinas’ view o f actualisation o f the 
image, though ultimately dependent upon grace, also emphasised intellectual perfection, 
thus resulting in a regrettable exclusion of women from this earthly reflection of the 
image, the ‘stage of grace’. However, like Augustine -  and unlike Maimonides -  Aquinas 
envisions the rational soul, our intellectual nature, as the immortal element o f our person, 
which means that his lapse regarding female intellectual capacities was not ‘ultimately’ 
consequential. Both Maimonides and Aquinas emphasised the difficulty o f attaining the 
telos o f human life -  knowledge of, and union with, the divine -  because o f the loss o f the 
perfect reason that characterised the original ontological state and the consequent need for 
divine assistance, through Torah and through grace.
The loss of the human capacity for God and our complete dependence upon grace 
are the central ideas around which Karl Barth developed his theology o f imago Dei in the 
twentieth century. The idea that we can encounter God through our own abilities -  an 
idea present to different degrees in Aquinas and Maimonides -  was anathematic to Barth. 
Chapter Three explored Barth’s relational anthropology and his rejection of natural 
theology, his scepticism regarding post-lapsarian reason intensified by his experience of 
post-Enlightenment thought, specifically the deficiencies o f ‘humanized’ and ‘idealized’ 
visions o f nature as he saw them.3 Barth drew the impetus for his relational understanding 
of imago Dei from his exegesis of Genesis 1:27, though his definition o f imago Dei in 
terms o f ‘male and female’ has been contested by contemporary biblical scholars. Though 
we designated Barth’s account of imago Dei as ‘relational’, the relation in question was 
highly analogical. Our relationship with fellow-humanity places us in a position of
3 Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background and History, rev. ed. (London: 
SCM, 2001), p. 45.
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‘similarity-in-dissimilarity’ to Christ to the extent that we can imperfectly reflect the way 
in which Christ alone is for  humankind through our efforts at being for other people. For 
Barth, the only possible relationship between God and humankind referred to the 
relationship that Christ has formed through his saving work. Barth’s rich reformulation 
o f the concept o f imago Dei in Christ was hopeful and potentially universal. However, 
his inability to allow for any form of participation in the being of God in this life -  beyond 
faith in salvation -  seems somewhat rigid and contrary to the experience of those who 
attest to their capacity to encounter God beyond the inter-human realm, through prayer, 
for example. To recall what Aquinas wrote of Maimonides’ via negativa: ‘This is not 
what people want to say when they talk about God’ (ST 1.13.3). Barth’s refusal to 
consider the implications o f imago Dei beyond its revelatory context also creates 
difficulties for those who wish to bring theology, particularly theological anthropology, 
into dialogue with other faiths and with secular discourse, a priority for David Novak, the 
subject o f Chapter Four.
Though he shares Barth’s prioritisation of revelation, Novak developed his 
theology around a natural law framework, to increase its effectiveness in dialogical 
contexts where arguments must be justified according to more universal criteria. 
Novak’s covenantal interpretation of imago Dei attested to the universality o f the 
theomorphic potential of the person, a universality that is also grounded, for Jews, in the 
Noahide laws. Novak envisioned a relationship of active mutuality between Creator and 
creature, thereby providing counter-discourse to the arguably problematic lack of 
reciprocity in the Barthian idea of correspondence. For Novak, human distinctiveness 
consisted in the fact that we, alone, are addressed by God. God makes claims upon us and 
we, in a relationship of true correspondence, can make claims upon God. We are active 
collaborators, not passive recipients. Novak valued the potential inherent in the concept 
for Jewish-Christian dialogue, though like Barth, he espoused a somewhat negative view 
of the secular. This overshadowed his ability to appreciate shared concerns, relating to 
humanity and the common good, between religious communities and secular society.
Chapter Five considered the gendered dimension o f our capacity to image God 
based upon the egalitarianism established in Genesis 1:27. We observed echoes, 
particularly in Jewish feminist theology, of the Rabbinic idea o f the iconic significance of 
the body, in this case with particular emphasis upon the sacrality and theomorphic 
potential o f the female body. We also noted the great diversity o f perspectives as regards 
the theological meaning of sexual difference, drawing in particular upon the insights of
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Roman Catholic feminist theology to guide us away from the complementarity model of 
sexual difference, with its tendency to predetermine male and female roles. Such 
reinterpretation of the gendered meaning of imago Dei centred on a rediscovery o f the 
language of mystery, an apophaticism that translates to anthropology, to help to counter 
deterministic accounts o f gender that have limited the theomorphic potential of women.
This survey has illustrated the theological richness encountered in our exploration 
of the evolution of imago Dei. While these interpretations have extended the boundaries 
of Genesis 1:26-27, they have, nonetheless, drawn out what Ricoeur refers to as the 
‘implicit wealth and meaning’ of the concept of imago Dei. Notwithstanding the 
considerable diversity of interpretation and the differing historical and religious contexts 
considered, central themes have emerged and recurred throughout this analysis, themes 
which merit further reflection in the context of contemporary Jewish and Christian 
theology.
6.2 The W hole Person as the Image of God
Contemporary theology generally attests to the integral unity o f the person and the 
theological relevance of the embodied self, perhaps in reaction to the perception that, as 
David Fergusson observes, the ‘tradition has been haunted by the notion that the human 
being is really a “deficient angel” whose destiny is to transcend the physical limitation of 
other creatures5.4 For much of the history of theology, the imago Dei was primarily 
identified with reason. This view of human nature, which we have observed in our 
account o f Patristic and medieval interpretations o f imago Dei, presupposes an analogy o f 
being and some form of ontological link between God and the human person. Its 
proponents place the emphasis upon the individual human mind/soul in relation to God, 
an idea that finds particular resonance in Maimonides who identified the actualised 
intellect as the immortal facet of human personhood: ‘whereas the thing that after death is 
separate from matter is the thing that has become actual and not the soul that also comes 
into being5 (GPI.70).
It is important to note that the proponents o f the intellectualist interpretation o f 
imago Dei do not develop their view of the concept in abstraction from their 
understanding of God. Their emphasis on intellect is not akin to an Enlightenment 
exaltation o f human reason, but is rather, as Anna Williams writes, a celebration of ‘the
4 David Fergusson, ‘Humans Created According to the Imago Dei: An Alternative Proposal’, Zygon, 2 
(2013), 439 -453(442).
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beauty of divine Mind, reflected in creation’.5 For Maimonides, the intellect was that 
through which we have the capacity for unity with God (GP III.52). Both Augustine and 
Aquinas attested to our ultimate dependence on grace to ‘lift up’ or ‘illuminate’ the 
intellect, the need for the mind -  in Augustine’s words -  to be ‘enlightened by light from 
outside itself’.6 Though Aquinas emphasises rational capacity, he tempers this idea with 
his conviction that the ‘ultimate goal of the rational creature exceeds the capacity o f its
n
own nature’. Although the imago Dei is identified with the intellective soul in these 
interpretations, it is actually the case that thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas and 
Maimonides each interpret human nature in terms which include the person’s rational 
faculties but which also, as Reinhold Niebuhr puts it, ‘suggest something beyond them’.8 
We do not reflect the image of God through our own efforts, but through the grace o f God. 
This point is eloquently summarized in the writings o f John Chrysostom: ‘Humans 
possess dignity o f rational nature, but this comes to them as a gift, not as something they 
have earned. Hence there is no natural pre-eminence amongst us, for no good thing is 
naturally our own.’9
Contemporary theology, we have noted, generally resists the division of 
personhood into body and spirit and the identification o f the image with the ‘higher’ 
qualities o f the person. The Jewish theologian Michael Wyschogrod remarks that the 
restriction o f the person’s resemblance to God to rationality or some other non-corporeal 
aspect of the human person ‘would be neither biblical nor Rabbinic’.10 Wyschogrod 
writes that the person ‘is created by God as a physical being and if  there is a human 
resemblance to God then his body also resembles God’.11 These comments echo the idea 
o f the physical dimension of our likeness to God in early Rabbinic writings and also the
5 A. N. Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 4,
6 Aquinas, ST 1.12.4; Augustine, Confessions, trans. by H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991) IV. 15.25.
7 Aquinas. Compendium Theologiae, trans. by Cyril Vollert, (St. Louis & London: Herder, 1947), 144.
8 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny o f  Man: A Christian Interpretation, vol. 1, (New York: Cross 
Road, 1942)
pp. 161-162. Niebuhr’s work is illustrative of the fact that questions o f rationality were not entirely 
removed from the interpretation of imago Dei in the modem period. Niebuhr retains the centrality o f reason 
but he extends his interpretation of reason to include the idea of self-transcendence, a particularly human 
capacity brought about through the use of reason. Niebuhr holds that the person ‘is something which 
reaches beyond itself -  namely that he is more than a rational creature’. The Nature and Destiny o f  Man, 
vol. l ,p .  162.
9 John Chrysostom, Homilies on Philippians 7, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 1, vol. 13, trans. 
by John A. Broadus, ed. by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1889), p.213.
10 Michael Wyschogrod, Abraham’s Promise: Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations, ed. by R. Kendall 
Soulen (London: Eerdmans, 2004), p. 171.
11 Wyschogrod, Abraham s Promise, p.171.
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emphasis upon the sacrality of the female body in contemporary feminist theology. We 
can appreciate the theomorphic potential of the body without lapsing into an 
anthropomorphic idea of God, an idea abhorrent to Maimonides and highly problematic 
for feminist theologians such as Elizabeth Johnson, who critiqued the over-reliance upon 
male imagery in our God language. A disembodied account o f imago Dei, that associates 
the concept exclusively with particular human attributes such as rationality, is ethically 
problematic on account of the potential implication that some humans exemplify God’s 
image more than others, or even that some may be excluded entirely. Such exclusivity 
characterised previous interpretations: Augustine and Aquinas, in their association of 
women with the lower functions of the human mind, identified the capacity to reflect the 
image of God as characteristically male.12 However, although a contemporary theology of 
imago Dei should resist the definition of the concept exclusively in terms of the human 
intellect, we can still view our intellectual capacities as a part o f what it means to image 
God. There is enduring relevance to the emphasis that Augustine, Aquinas and 
Maimonides place upon our human efforts to perfect our intellects. Such insights carry 
implications for our capacity to encounter God through our contemplative efforts, which -  
in conjunction with imitatio Dei -  bring us closer to God. Though ultimately dependent 
upon God, our struggle to experience the presence o f the divine also requires effort and -  
as envisaged by Maimonides’ account o f intellectual perfection -  a certain degree of 
mental training.
Thus, our intellectual capacity, the beauty o f the divine mind reflected in our 
human mind, is rightly understood as one important facet o f our status as imago Dei, 
rather than as the single defining feature. Our human identity is complex and cannot be 
solely defined according to a single facet o f our existence. As David Fergusson argues, 
‘the concept o f the imago Dei is best interpreted as a signifier not o f some ontological 
property or moral attribute that sets human animals apart from others, but as designating a 
complex identity that is established by a providential ordering o f human life’.13 We must 
narrate our theological account of human existence rather than defining it according to a 
single property. Therefore, Fergusson argues, ‘the imago Dei might be better understood 
as a marker or signifier o f a history that will unfold than a substantive notion that is 
central to Hebrew anthropology’.14 The concept signifies that humans have a distinctive
12 Aquinas, ST 1.93.4; Augustine, The Literal Meaning o f  Genesis, XI.
13 David Fergusson, ‘Humans Created According to the Imago D ei\ p. 440.
14 Fergusson, ‘Humans Created According to the Imago Dei\ p. 446.
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place in the story of divine encounter that follows. It signifies, as identified in the 
relational interpretations of Karl Barth and David Novak, our identity as the covenant- 
partners of God, an identity fully explored in subsequent narrative and in relation to God 
and one another. As Barth writes: ‘God lives in togetherness with Himself, then God lives 
in togetherness with man, then men live in togetherness with one another’.15 Relational 
accounts o f imago Dei, in Christian theology, often appeal to the doctrine of the Trinity, 
envisaging the Triune God as reflected in human relation and interaction. Triune 
interpretations are viewed as dynamic, remedying the static substantive interpretations. 
This point is illustrated by Richard Middleton as follows: Tf, however, the God whom 
human being images is not a simple, single individual with certain internal attributes, but 
is more like a community of Persons, then it would seem more adequate to conceive o f the 
image in relational terms’.16 Jewish relational interpretations emphasise the covenantal 
dimension of the human-divine encounter, envisioned in Novak’s theology as a 
relationship of active mutuality.
The primacy accorded to rationality for almost all thinkers until the time of 
Aquinas and Maimonides was motivated by the desire to establish both some similarity or 
connection between God and the human soul and some distinction between the human 
person and the rest of creation. Though the appeal to rationality as the defining element 
of human nature is uncharacteristic in contemporary theology because o f the emphasis 
placed upon the whole person as imago Dei, the question o f human distinctiveness 
remains a most pertinent question in establishing the meaning o f the concept.
6.3 Articulating a Theocentric Distinctiveness
Today, the idea of human distinctiveness -  and certainly the idea of human dominion over 
the created world -  has unmistakably negative connotations. History attests to the fact 
that humankind is perhaps best distinguished by the unique capacity for destruction o f the
15 Karl Barth, Table Talk, ed. by John D. Godsey (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1962), p. 57.
16 J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image, p. 31. David Fergusson suggests that the Trinitarian reading, 
while advantageous in its avoidance of the potentially hierarchical reason-centred definition of the imago 
Dei, is problematic: ‘The function o f Trinitarian categories in the early church was to maintain the unity and 
revelation o f God in such a way that terms had to be reworked and pressed into service in hitherto 
unfamiliar ways. This was true a fortiori o f the Greek word “hypostasis” that was used originally for the 
divine being but later became the preferred term for the triune persons. The triunity o f God therefore had to 
be carefully distinguished from creaturely notions o f both unity and plurality. The doctrine of the trinity was 
never intended to be an anthropological construction.’ ‘Humans Created According to the Imago D e i\  p. 
444.
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created world and by the propensity to inflict harm upon fellow humans.17 Michael 
Welker articulates this issue as follows: ‘Is the connection between the imago Dei and 
dominium terrae in Genesis 1 about nothing other than the sad and brutal truth o f the 
human species, which asserts its strength to prevail biologically and culturally?’18 The 
denigration o f the created world is identified, in some feminist scholarship, as 
symptomatic o f patriarchy. Welker writes that the ‘long-standing anthropocentrism o f our 
cultures has become manifest as scarcely veiled androcentrism. Ecological concerns and 
feminist consciousness have brought to an end the naive or self-satisfied assumption of 
the preeminent position of “man” 5.19 Although the ecological crisis is a problem to which 
both sexes contribute, feminist thought has certainly heightened our perception of our 
connectedness to the created world. Sallie McFague, for example, proposes an 
‘ecological anthropology5 that embraces our interdependency and connection to all other 
living things.20 McFague argues that we should no longer see ourselves as the measure of 
all things but, rather, as the measurer. We are the ones that can admire and take care o f all 
the rest o f creation: ‘What our peculiar distinction has led us to see is that, given our 
present numbers and power, we have the ability to be either for or against the rest o f 
nature. We are not the only ones who matter, but we are the ones who are increasingly 
responsible for the others in creation.’21 McFague rejects the anthropocentrism that 
measures other creatures according to their similarity to human beings. All creatures are 
distinctive. We must therefore move beyond the individualistic anthropology that has 
characterised the last three centuries, in order to embrace our connectedness to the created 
world. The following passage from Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theological exposition of 
Genesis 1-3 supports McFague5s argument, though she would probably resist the use o f 
the term ‘rule5:
[T]his freedom to rule includes being bound to the creatures who are ruled. The
17 Douglas John Hall discusses the negative implications o f the interpretation o f  imago Dei in terms o f  
human distinctiveness and dominion in Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 
1986), pp. 21-26.
18 Michael Welker, Creation and Reality (Minneapolis: Augsberg Fortress, 1999), p. 69.
19 Welker, Creation and Reality, p. 60.
20 McFague, A New Climate for Theology, p. 48.
21 Sallie McFague, A New Climate for Theology: God, the World, and Global Warming (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2008), p. 47. Rosemary Radford Ruether, also a proponent o f ecofeminism, writes that it is 
only ‘by understanding how the web of life works can we also learn to sustain it rather than destroy it. This 
is not simply a task of intellectual understanding, but o f metanoia, in the fullest sense of the word: o f 
conversion of our spirit and culture, of our technology and social relations, so that the human species exists 
within nature in a life-sustaining way.’ Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology o f  Earth Healing (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 304.
175
ground and the animals over which I am lord constitute the world in which I live, 
without which I cease to be. It is my world, my earth over which I rule [. . .] in my 
whole being, in my creatureliness, I belong wholly to this world; it bears me, 
nurtures me, holds me.22
Should we now move away from a language of human distinctiveness towards that which 
emphasises our commonality with other creatures?23 Does this necessitate a weakening 
of the ontological status of the human person? At this point, we should refer back to the 
insights o f contemporary biblical scholarship as regards the meaning of the imago Dei. 
Such scholarship established that dominion is rightly understood as a theocentric 
construct, contextualised with reference to the care and stewardship that are inherent in 
the ideas of divine and royal dominion. Just as divine dominion is characterised by 
‘righteousness and justice’ (Ps 89:15) and just as the king should be like ‘rain that falls 
upon a mown field’ (Ps 72:6-7), the human person should exercise care for the created 
world on behalf of God, the true owner o f the land. Though contemporary theology 
distances itself from the language of dominion in favour o f the more palatable language o f 
‘stewardship’, the idea of dominion as depicted in Genesis does not imply the denigration 
of the rest of creation.24 Furthermore, while the Genesis creation account portrays human 
distinctiveness, it does not neglect our commonality with other creatures. While 
humankind alone is given dominion over the earth, non-human actors also take their 
appointed place in this story. Both humans and animals are, for example, formed from the 
earth and dependent upon it (Gen. 1:30). Similarly, both are commanded to reproduce
22 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition o f  Genesis 1-3 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1997), p. 66.
23 Alan M.W. Porter offers an interesting analysis o f human distinctiveness and non-human capacity to 
experience God in ‘Do Animals Have Souls? An Evolutionary Perspective', The Heythrop Journal, 4
(2013), 533-542. ‘The work of ethologists suggests that the origin o f human moral sense stretches far back 
in evolutionary history and that the distinction between humans and animals in this respect needs to be 
much more nuanced than it has been in traditional theological thinking.’ Porter writes that ‘octopuses have 
an intelligence comparable to chimpanzees, evidence o f consciousness, short-term memory, observational 
learning and abilities in tool-making and communication. Dolphins, crows and black bears also show 
ingenious behaviour patterns which have aroused the interest of ethologists. By a process of convergent 
evolution these cephalopods, cetaceans, corvids and ursus seem to possess brains and nervous systems o f 
comparable complexity, if different, to those of higher vertebrates. It is reasonable to ascribe consciousness, 
awareness and sensory pleasure to them and to other animals and thus the potentiality for ensoulment’. p. 
536. See also Celia Deane-Drummond, ‘God’s Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals: 
Performative Soul-Making and Graced Nature’, Zygon, 4 (2012), 934-948. George Kateb discusses the 
issue of ‘speciesism’ in Human Dignity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
Though he finds in the ‘speciesist’ argument an appropriate warning against excessive pride in our human 
identity, it is Kateb’s belief that ‘praiseworthy considerations outweigh those that deflate or shame the 
human race and that sometimes even make a few thinkers imagine that they wish for its extinction.’, p.viii.
24 R.J. Berry writes that the term ‘stewardship’ is often used as ‘little more than a formal response to 
environmental situations, without teeth or depth’. Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives -  Past 
and Present, ed. by R. J. Beriy, (London: T&T Clark, 2006), p. 10.
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(Gen. 1:22). As we attempt to balance ideas o f distinction and connectedness, we can 
refer back to the elaborate conceptions o f the soul that we discussed in Augustine and 
Aquinas. For Augustine, we recall, all creatures participate in the likeness o f God, though 
likeness increases according to status.25 Though the human person alone possesses a 
rational soul, the animal soul is ‘admirable and praiseworthy after its own fashion’.26 All 
creatures, Augustine writes, ‘attain a beauty appropriate to its own kind’. Aquinas’s 
hierarchical view of being also allowed for some form of continuity between human life 
and the highest form of animal life as well as a relatively high ontological status for 
animals:
Not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something 
which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something 
else according as it has some measure o f participation in reason, coming into contact 
at its highest level o f activity with reason at its lowest.28
Human faculties such as memory, Aquinas writes, ‘are not so very different from those in 
animals only they are heightened’ (ST 1.78.4). Though Aquinas views animals as inferior 
to human beings, and ultimately created for human benefit, they are nonetheless ‘capable 
of participating in divine goodness in a more eminent way than other inferior things’.29
If we maintain this theocentric idea o f distinctiveness, we can reconcile the 
biblically instituted task of dominion, understood as stewardship, with the urgency of the 
need to care for the created world without reducing our ontological status. There are good 
reasons to maintain our distinctiveness, as Robert Jenson writes:
As we destroy crippled horses, so we kill bom and unborn children whose mothers 
for whatever reason do not think they should raise them, or elders who have lost 
hope and burden the system or their families, or trauma victims in disheartening 
comas, or persons simply in pain they do not wish to endure or we do not wish to 
see them enduring. And there is no reason why we should not, if  there, is no 
ontological difference between humans and other animals.30
For Jenson, no idea o f human uniqueness apart from our uniqueness in relation to God is,
25 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, LI.2.
26 Augustine, On Free Will, XXItt.69.
27 Augustine, On Free Will, XXHL69.
28 Aquinas, On Tmth, trans, by R. Mulligan, B. McGlynn and R. Schmidt (Chicago: Regnery, 1952-54), 
25.2.
29 Aquinas, On Truth, 2.3. Aquinas’ attitude to animals is discussed by Celia E. Deane-Drummond in The 
Ethics o f  Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 65-77.
30 Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 58.
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in the long term, sustainable. This is an important point which unifies many o f the diverse 
interpretations considered in this thesis. The quest to articulate this idea of theocentric 
distinctiveness has manifested itself in different ways throughout our discussion. For 
covenantal interpretations, such as that of Novak, distinctiveness is identified with the fact 
that we are addressed by God’s moral word and enabled to respond. For Barth, the human 
.creature is distinct from animals only in the theological sense, in that it is the only creature 
that is for  God (CD III/2, pp. 70-71). Even where interpreters emphasised our superior 
human intellectual abilities, they did so in the conviction that such faculties, which exceed 
the needs o f human survival, are intended to lead us to our telos, which is apprehension of 
the divine. Interestingly, Jenson’s idea o f human uniqueness centres on prayer. The 
person can be classified as ‘the praying animal’.31 Further, the ‘word that created us 
human itself establishes our connectedness, and therefore we can respond only together; 
prayer is foundationally corporate’.32 The imago Dei is not an individual possession but, 
rather, a signifler of our connectedness.
The dual understanding of the person, distinct yet connected, characterises the 
functional approach to the imago Dei which, as noted earlier, is the interpretation 
favoured by most exegetes. This means that the imago Dei becomes manifest in our 
actions as God’s representatives on earth. This approach to the concept fosters a sense o f 
human vocation, emphasising, as we have drawn from Gerhard von Rad, the task rather 
than the gift itself.33 Theological interpretations, which can legitimately draw out 
meaning beyond what we learn from biblical scholarship regarding authorial intentions, 
are not limited to this interpretation.34 As with our appreciation o f the insights o f the 
intellectualist approach of the Patristic and medieval thinkers, we can regard our human 
vocation to care for the created world as another important dimension o f the multi-faceted 
concept o f imago Dei. Though the ethical dimension of the concept -  the task -  is 
important, theologians also need to elaborate the meaning of the gift itself, our innate 
ontological status. We have discussed in previous chapters the treatment o f these two 
dimensions o f the imago Dei, ethical and ontological, and the great complexity that the
31 Jenson, p. 59.
32 Jenson, p. 59.
33 Von Rad, Genesis, p. 58.
34 While it is importance to draw of the wisdom o f historical criticism, the site o f inspiration is not the 
original author but, rather, the text itself. As Joshua Moritz writes, ‘a theological understanding of Scripture 
as a continuous narrative of salvation history is not even possible if one is to cede hermeneutical primacy to 
a given text’s original intent and primary cultural and historical context’. ‘Why Theologians Should Take 
Biblical Studies Seriously, but not Too Seriously’, Dialog, 3 (2013), 170-174 (p. 171).
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interpretation o f the second creation account has brought to the reconciliation o f these two 
facets. The question of the loss of the image has arisen in each interpretation considered 
in this thesis and will now be discussed in relation to contemporary theology.
6.4 The Corruption of the Image
A central theme in our discussion of the imago Dei has been the extent to which our 
corruption and sin has distorted the image and likeness o f God within the person. Even in 
the earliest interpretations o f the concept, we see systematic attempts to come to terms 
with the paradox of the sinful person imaging God. The interpretation o f Genesis 1:26-27 
in conjunction with Genesis 2-3 motivated Irenaeus’ influential distinction between the 
terms ‘image’ and ‘likeness’. That which Irenaeus, in continuity with Paul, interpreted as 
the ‘fall5 resulted in the loss o f our likeness to God, while the image assumed ontological 
status and a permanency of sorts (AH III.22.4; III.23.5). This distinction was developed 
in Aquinas, who placed the two terms within the Aristotelian categories o f substance and 
accident. For Aquinas, ‘image’ referred to our essential rational nature and the ‘likeness’ 
to the supernatural gift o f righteousness. With similar emphasis upon intellectual 
attainment, Maimonides proposed that intellectual perfection had been lost through the 
fall, leaving humankind in need of greater moral instruction (GP 1.2). In each of these 
perspectives, we have observed a clear distinction between the original state of 
humankind and the fallen state. The negative anthropological implications o f the latter 
have been most definitively articulated by Calvin, who wrote that nothing remains of the 
imago Dei after the fall except what is ‘confused, mutilated, and disease-ridden’.35 Barth, 
in continuity with Calvin, and in the context o f his absolute prioritisation of faith, also 
emphasised the self-contradiction and depravity inherent in human identity, the tension 
between our reality as the covenant-partner o f God and our sinful tendency.36
Arguably, the question of the imago Dei has been greatly complicated by 
speculation as to the actual difference between humankind before the fall (homo creatus) 
and humankind after the fall (homo peccator), particularly given the questionable 
exegetical grounding for such in the Hebrew Scriptures. Chapter One established the fact
35 John Calvin, Institutes o f  the Christian Religion, 1.15.4, p. 190.
36 We concluded, as regards Barth, that his pessimism regarding human potential for access to God is best 
understood in the context o f his absolute prioritisation o f faith. He firmly believes that any contact between 
God and the person is impossible outside of the domain o f faith. Grace, for Barth, has complete priority 
over nature. Hence, for Barth, ‘one can only speak theologically and not both theologically and also 
philosophically o f this point o f contact, as o f all else that is real in faith, i.e., through the grace of 
reconciliation’. Church Dogmatics, V\, p. 239.
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that the ‘fall o f man’ interpretation o f Genesis 2-3 is contested in much contemporary 
biblical scholarship. As J. Wentzel van Huyssteen writes, the ‘exegesis o f these texts 
shows that the text does not even hint at the so-called loss of the image and likeness of 
God. Moreover, there is no hint even of any distortion o f that image5.37 We must ask 
whether the theological significance of the second creation account has been affected by 
what we now know about human origins. As David Fergusson argues:
[BJelief in a first couple created ab initio in a state o f moral, physical, and 
intellectual perfection is untenable in light o f the findings o f the natural sciences, at 
least since the time of Darwin. The conditions that govern suffering, disease, 
struggle, and death among species were prevalent long before the appearance of 
hominids. To attribute the causes o f such hardship to the first human lapse is no 
longer tenable, however attractive this may appear as a cornerstone o f Christian 
theodicy.38
This type o f concern is not unique to contemporary theology, nor even to post-Darwinian 
thought. We may take the following passage as Augustine's endorsement o f the 
continuing need for dialogue with the sciences:
It is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably 
giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics [pertaining 
to science]; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, 
in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn.39
How, Augustine asks, will Christians achieve credibility on matters concerning, for 
example, the resurrection of the dead if people believe that ‘their pages are full of 
falsehoods on facts which they themselves have learnt from experience and the light of 
reason?'40 We know that Augustine, working within the parameters o f the scientific 
knowledge o f his day, offered an interpretation of the book of Genesis that was open to 
symbolic or allegorical interpretation and we can only assume that, were he writing today, 
he would confront the full reality of scientific findings.41 We are reminded at this point of 
Novak's comments regarding Maimonides, that it is ‘a mistake o f many current followers 
of Maimonides to think they can conduct the search for truth using the same tools he
37 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 2006), p. 135.
38 David Fergusson, ‘Humans Created According to the Imago D ei\ p. 441.
39 Augustine, The Literal Meaning o f Genesis, 1:19.
40 Augustine, The Literal Meaning o f  Genesis, 1:19.
4'Augustine, The Literal Meaning o f Genesis, 1.19. Discussed by F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological 
Anthropology After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 206-8.
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used’.42 Augustine, and indeed many other thinkers that we have encountered in the 
preceding chapters, certainly had different tools at their disposal than those that we have 
today. So, rather than investing in the entirety o f what Augustine said, we must instead do 
as he did in the engagement of contemporary scientific knowledge.
It is interesting to refer to Augustine at this point, since it is his writings that are 
most renowned for the establishment o f a connection between the fall of Adam and the sin 
o f succeeding generations. We discussed, in Chapter One, the attention that modem 
scholarship has brought to Augustine’s reliance upon a mistranslation of the Paul’s Greek 
in the Latin vulgate which rendered ‘because all’ have sinned (NRSV) as ‘in whom 
[Adam]’ all have sinned (Rom 5:12). We have also observed Irenaeus’ alternative -  
though less well-known -  interpretation of Genesis 2-3 and his argument against the 
original perfection of Adam and Eve. For Irenaeus, Adam and Eve were infantile in 
relation to God. Their perfection, even if  it had been granted, would not have been 
sustainable (AH IV.38.2). It was, however, Augustine’s interpretation that enjoyed greater 
influence.
Original sin, with its connotations o f hereditary guilt, is a challenging concept. 
How did subsequent generations come to bear the sin o f Adam? The problematic nature 
of such ‘inheritance’, drawn from Augustine (influenced by Ambrose), has been 
recognised in other thinkers encountered in previous chapters. Both Aquinas and Barth 
distanced their theologies from the hereditary component o f the doctrine on the grounds 
that it minimises agency. Hereditary guilt, Aquinas wrote, is problematic since ‘the fact of 
having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is 
essentially something voluntary’ (ST I-II.81.1). For Barth it has a ‘hopelessly naturalistic, 
deterministic and even fatalistic ring’ (CD IV/1, p. 500). Original sin, for Barth, is ‘part 
of the voluntary and responsible life of man’ (CD IV/1, pp. 500f.). However, both 
Aquinas and Barth recognised the fact that the key insight o f the doctrine centres upon our 
need for grace. This led Aquinas to develop the idea that baptism effects the remission of 
original sin, influential for subsequent Catholic teaching.43
42 Novak, ‘The Mind o f Maimonides’, First Things: A Monthly Journal o f  Religion and Public Life, 90 
(1999),p. 27.
43 Aquinas writes that ‘by Baptism He takes away from man forthwith the guilt o f original sin and the 
punishment of being deprived of the heavenly vision. But the penalties o f  the present life, such as death, 
hunger, thirst, and the like, pertain to the nature, from the principles of which they arise, inasmuch as it is 
deprived of original justice. Therefore these defects will not be taken away until the ultimate restoration of 
nature through the glorious resurrection’ (ST III.69.3). This thinking manifests in Catholic teaching: 
‘Baptism, by imparting the life of Christ’s grace, erases original sin and turns a man back towards God, but 
the consequences for nature, weakened and inclined to evil, persist in man and summon him to spiritual
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Contemporary theology can develop its concept o f human sinfulness without 
recourse to a literal understanding of the fall that is reliant upon the righteousness of the 
original ‘prelapsarian’ state or upon our inheritance o f sin from the primordial 
disobedience of Adam and Eve. Although we may de-emphasise these aspects o f the 
traditional justification for the idea of original sin, the creation accounts still have 
something of value to teach us about our human existence. A. M. Allchin remarks that 
although the Fathers would not have the same awareness of the distinction between 
historical truth and saga that we have today, they would have advised that the significance 
o f biblical stories such as that of Adam and Eve ‘lay in what it told us about men, about 
mankind as a whole, rather than in what it told us o f an original pair, historically 
considered’.44 The comments of Richard Swinburne are useful in helping the 
contemporary reader to take the same approach:
At some stage in the history of the world, there appeared the first creature with 
hominoid body who had some understanding of the difference between the morally 
obligatory, the morally permissible (i.e. right), and the morally wrong; and an ability 
freely to choose the morally right. So much is obvious; since on modem 
evolutionary views, as well as on all views held in Christian tradition, once upon a 
time there were no such creatures and now there are some, there must have been a 
first one. It seems reasonable to consider such a creature the first man; and we may 
follow biblical tradition and call him “Adam”.45
What we can take from the second creation account is the same as what we see and know 
through our own experience, that sin is a reality o f human life. As Benedict XVI writes, 
‘it is enough to think of the daily news of injustice, violence, falsehood and lust. We see it 
every day. It is a fact’.46 This reality of sin is indeed an undeniable fact o f human life and 
a constant biblical theme. Abraham Heschel remarks that ‘sentimentality and unreality
battle". Catechism, 405. Barth, in keeping with Calvin, did not envision the remission of original sin 
through Baptism. He also questioned the practice of infant baptism since baptism, as biblically portrayed, 
has ‘the character o f an action in which there is a common affirmation by the candidates o f the Gospel 
preached and received, which involves their conscious and voluntary participation [...] (CD IV.4, pp. 179- 
80).
44 A. M. Allchin, ‘The Doctrine of Man -  An Eastern Perspective", in Man: Fallen and Free, pp. 142-158 
(p. 146).
45 Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 141.
46 The concrete, visible dimension of original sin is well explained by Benedict XVI: ‘The empirical fact is 
that a contradiction exists in our being. On the one hand every person knows that he must do good and 
intimately wants to do i t  Yet at the same time he also feels the other impulse to do the contrary, to follow 
the path o f selfishness and violence, to do only what pleases him, while also knowing that in this way he is 
acting against the good, against God and against his neighbour". General Audience, 3 December 2008, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2008/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20081203_en. 
html [accessed 10 July 2014].
182
have often been considered a distinctly Biblical attitude, while in truth the Bible 
constantly reminds us of man’s frailty and unreliability’.47 Heschel cites, for example, 
Isaiah’s ‘distress and darkness, the gloom o f  anguish’ (8:22) and Rabbi Hanina’s prayer 
for the welfare of the government as ‘were it not for fear thereof, men would swallow 
each other alive’.48 As Paul timelessly describes the self-contradiction at the heart o f our 
nature, ‘I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but I 
do the evil I do not want’ (Rom 7:18-39). It is still possible, and arguably very important, 
for contemporary theology to remain able to speak of a universal disposition towards 
sinfulness. Further, following the interdisciplinary leanings o f contemporary theology, we 
can begin to draw upon the findings o f other disciplines, such as psychology and 
anthropology, in doing so.49 These can be taken into account without sacrificing or 
minimizing the transcendent intention of theological anthropology. In this, caution is 
required, as well as clarity as to what ‘sin’ actually means.
Distinct from a general understanding of wrongdoing, sin is constituted by a 
violation o f the command of God. Sin is a religious category which, when removed from 
the context o f the human-divine relationship, loses its meaning. In comments reminiscent 
of David Novak’s view of religious inclusion in public discourse, Alasdair McFadyen 
writes that ‘if God-talk merely appends itself to an analysis already in place, then 
renaming as sin that which secular thought identifies as pathological is no more than a 
rhetorical flourish’.50 Certainly, our understanding of sin must be specifically theological 
if it is to have anything to offer secular discourse: ‘It adds precisely nothing at the level of 
explanation and understanding to baptise and bless conclusions arrived at by secular 
means for secular reasons’.51
The theocentric nature of the concept may account for the fact that the language of 
sin is experiencing something of a decline in some Jewish and Christian contexts. Today, 
ideas of sin, atonement and sacrifice can be viewed as ‘remote, metaphysical abstractions,
47 Heschel, The Insecurity o f  Freedom: Essays on Human Existence (New York: Schocken, 1972), p. 146.
48 Abodah Zarah, 3b-4a, discussed by Heschel, The Insecurity o f  Human Existence, p. 147.
49 Jerry D. Korsmeyer explores the interaction between original sin and evolutionary science in Evolution 
and Eden: Balancing Original Sin and Contemporaiy Science (Mawah: Paulist Press, 1998). See also 
Kenneth Miller, Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search fo r  Common Ground Between God and 
Evolution (New York: HarperCollins, 1999) and Nicolas Olkovich, ‘Reinterpreting Original Sin: Integrating 
Insights From Sociology and the Evolutionary Sciences’, The Heythrop Journal, 5 (2013), 715-731 (p. 715). 
Olkovich recommends an interpretation of original sin and grace that draws upon a synthesis o f theological, 
sociological and sociobiological insights.
50 Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine o f  Sin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 11.
51 McFadyen, Bound to Sin, p .l l .
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and for contemporary interdisciplinary theology are often like pieces in a museum for the 
history o f theological ideas’.52 Michael Wyschogrod regrets the disappearance o f the 
category of sin from the context of liberal Judaism:
The reality o f sin is therefore a function o f the sense of dependence on God. Where 
this dependence is weakened either because o f a loss o f belief in the reality o f God 
or because of the growth of the conviction that moral values can be autonomously 
justified without reference to God, the very concept of sin tends to disappear from 
discourse.53
These comments are equally applicable to the Christian context. It is interesting to 
observe the emphasis on sin in Wyschogrod’s work, given the fact that Jewish theology is 
often regarded as less concerned than Christian theology with such questions. This, as Jon 
Levenson argues, is a misperception:
If the point is that Judaism is optimistic about human nature, regarding the impulse 
to sin as unrooted in our innate constitution, then the observation is altogether in 
error and fails to reckon not only with the theological anthropology of the Hebrew 
Bible but also with the pervasive Rabbinic idea of the yetzer ha-ra, or “evil 
inclination”. 54
Though perhaps clothed in a different culture and language, ideas o f human sinfulness are 
present in Judaism as they are in Christianity. Certainly, given the long history of 
persecution to which it has been subjected, the Jewish community has particular reason to 
be mindful o f human capacity for evil. While the Augustinian ‘original sin’ would not be 
fitting in the Jewish context, Steven Kepnes suggests the word ‘galuf to denote the 
conditions into which life falls after the sin o f Adam. Meaning ‘exile’, galut suggests the 
limit placed upon our ability to be in free contact with God.55 Kepnes argues for the 
affinity between the Jewish and Christian concepts: ‘Like original sin, galut cannot be 
overcome by human will alone; exile will end only when God intervenes to make it
52 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, p. 117.
53 Michael Wyschogrod, Abraham’s Promise Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations, ed. by R. Kendall 
Soulen (London: Eerdmans, 2004), p. 60.
54 Jon Levenson, ‘Did God Forgive Adam? An Exercise in Comparative M idrash’, in Jews and Christians: 
People o f  God, ed. by Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 148-171 (p. 
164).
55 Steven Kepnes, ‘Original Sin, Atonement and Redemption in Jewish Terms’ in Christianity in Jewish 
Terms, ed. by Tikva Frymer-Kensky, David Novak, Peter Ochs, D. Fox Sandmel, and M.A. Signer 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), p. 295.
184
end.’56
The Rabbinic exegesis of the expulsion from Eden describes the exile of the divine 
presence (.Shekhinah) because of Adam’s sin, resulting in an upheaval o f the divine and 
cosmic reality.57 While the traditional understanding of exile relates to the separation of 
the Jewish people from the Land of Israel, the Jewish sources also reveal a different 
meaning of exile, applicable to every human person. In this sense, exile does not 
necessarily refer to separation from a geographical place but as Yehoyada Amir writes, ‘a 
sense of helplessness in the face of external forces over which one has no control and one 
is powerless to direct.’58 Amir sees in the Holocaust the ‘the cruelest and most definitive 
sense of exile in the widest sense’.59 The language of human sinfulness in Judaism offers 
some interesting resources for Christian theology in its efforts to address the difficult 
question of original sin.
To conclude this point regarding the loss o f the image, we maintain that, as an 
ethical concept, both the fulfilment and the distortion o f the image remain, to some extent, 
within our reach. The imago Dei is both an ontological and an ethical structure which 
points both to what we are and what we have been commissioned to do. It has a present 
reality within the human person but also a future potentiality. This dual understanding of 
the imago Dei justifies the retention of the traditional distinction between ‘image’ and 
‘likeness’. In contemporary discourse, we might regard ‘image’ as an absolute term and 
‘likeness’ as qualitative.60 While every human person has been bom in the image of God, 
each one had the potential to grow into the ‘likeness’ o f God and, conversely, to diminish 
this likeness through sin. It stands to reason that the evil we choose distorts God’s image 
within us. However distorted, though, the image cannot be lost. In Augustine’s words: 
‘Whether this image be so worn out as to be almost none at all, or whether it be obscure
56 Kepnes, ‘Original Sin, Atonement and Redemption in Jewish Terms’, p. 296. Exile is a central concept in 
Judaism, both in the Torah and in the rabbinic period in the attempt to reconstruct Judaism after the 
destruction o f the Temple. Exile and the desire for redemption pervade the entirety o f the Jewish liturgy. 
See also Richard L. Rubenstein, ‘The Human Condition in Jewish Thought and Experience’ in The Human 
Condition in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. by Frederick E. Greenspahn, (Hobokon: KTAV 
Publishing House, 1986), p. 5.
57 Midrask Rabbah, Genesis, 19.8.
58 Yehoyada Amir, ‘The Concept o f Exile as a Model for Dealing with the Holocaust’, in Wrestling with 
God: Jewish Responses During and After the Holocaust, ed. by Steven T. Katz, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp. 305-318 (p. 310).
59 ‘It places humanity in an impotent position within a horror deriving from the fact that that which is good 
and represents the beautiful has been completely nullified, that fundamental values are shattered, and that 
within the world o f the Holy One blessed be He, God is not even left with the four cubits o f the Halakhah 
intact’. ‘The Concept of Exile as a Model for Dealing with the Holocaust’, p. 316.
60 Fraser Watts, ‘Human Dignity: Concepts and Experiences’, in God and Human Dignity, ed. by R. Kendall 
Soulen and Linda Woodhead (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), pp. 247-263 (p. 253).
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and defaced, or bright and beautiful, certainly it always is’ (Trin. XIV.4).
A contemporary account of original sin in Christian theology can abandon the idea 
of hereditary guilt while retaining its component elements which are, firstly, the universal 
nature o f concupiscence and, secondly, the need for sanctifying grace. Interestingly, both 
o f these find strong parallels in Jewish theology. To draw again from Novak, ‘it can be 
asserted that both Judaism and Christianity are convinced that humans are doomed if 
basically left to their own devices; that grace is a necessity for the human condition. The 
difference between them, one that is even more crucial than the imaginary one just 
mentioned, is whether one is connected to the grace o f God by the Torah or by Chrisf .61 
Thus the question o f Christ’s restoration o f the image is an obvious distinguishing factor 
between Jewish and Christian theological engagement with the concept o f imago Dei. 
The discussion will now proceed to the function of the imago Dei as a Jewish and 
Christian concept and the effect that the Christological appropriation of the image may 
have upon the sense of commonality inherent in the concept.
6.5 Christological Appropriation: Jewish Reflections
Christian theology, we have discussed, associates the fullness o f the image of God with 
the person of Christ. In Chapter One, we noted the New Testament passages that identify 
Christ as the true image (eikon) of God, Colossians 1:15; 1 Corinthians 15:49; 2 
Corinthians 4:4 and Hebrews 1:3. These passages infer that we receive the fullness o f the 
image as we are raised to new life in Christ. The concept o f imago Dei works as a 
systematic principle, as a unifying force in some Christian theology, expressed 
particularly neatly in Jürgen Moltmann’s concepts o f the created image, the messianic 
image and the eschatological image.62
Though important for Christian theology, the Christological appropriation o f the 
image does not need to obscure the commonality o f the concept o f imago Dei as found in 
the Hebrew Scriptures. It is possible to understand Paul’s identification o f the image with
61 Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, p. 31.
62 See Jurgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology o f Creation and the Spirit o f  God (San 
Francisco; Harper & Row, 1985), pp. 215-243. Moltmann, an exponent of the eschatological approach to 
imago Dei, writes that ‘the image of God is the whole person, the embodied person, the person in his 
community with other people, because in the messianic fellowship o f Jesus, people become whole, 
embodied and social human beings, whom death no longer divides into soul and body, and whom death no 
longer divides from God and from one another’.62 Being human, for Moltmann, means becoming human. 
Though this process o f becoming will only be completed after death, we already live, here and now, in the 
process of resurrection. For Moltmann, the likeness to God is revealed not at the beginning o f God’s history 
with humankind, but at the end. God in Creation, pp. 225-27.
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Christ as a distinct use of image language in order to commute an eschatological idea, 
quite distinct from the original use of the concept in Genesis. Paul’s use o f image 
language intends to portray the idea that we are transformed in Christ and elevated to the 
state that God intends. It is possible to understand the two uses -  Hebrew Bible and New 
Testament -  quite distinctly.63 This helps us to avoid an overemphasis on the fact that 
Jesus restored what was lost in the Garden of Eden and the need for parallelism between 
the historical Jesus and the unhistorical Adam.64 Christian theology should also be 
sensitive to the salvific claims of Judaism. Jon Levenson’s comments regarding the 
Pauline view that sin reigned unchallenged from Adam to Jesus -  ‘Abraham’s faith and 
Moses’ Torah notwithstanding’ -  are instructive:
The good news, to put it directly, is that Jesus saves. The bad news is that 
everything else damns, since there was no forgiveness before his great reversal of 
universal sin. To any reader of the Scriptures (as Paul would call the book that 
Christians would later term the “Old Testament”), this is, to be sure, a puzzling 
claim. For Paul’s Scriptures offer abundant evidence that their God is, in the words 
o f Exodus 34:6-7, “a merciful and gracious God, slow to anger and rich in kindness 
and fidelity, continuing his kindness for a thousand generations, and forgiving 
wickedness and crime and sin”.65
For Jews, the Torah, the commanded word of God, and for Christians, Christ the Word 
made flesh, are both answers to the same question, articulated by Meir Soloveichik as 
follows: ‘How does finite, physical, fallible man relate to an infinite, immaterial and 
infallible God?’66
Though the Incarnation is the defining doctrine o f the Christian faith, it should not
be isolated from its Jewish context, specifically, God’s indwelling in Israel. Joel
Kaminsky argues for this contextual dependence, also alluding to the contentious issue of
the claim to the land of Israel:
The promise o f the land receives tremendous emphasis within the biblical text and 
rightly remains a central theme in postbiblical Jewish theological reception. While 
some contemporary Christians remain uncomfortable with this emphasis, one needs 
to recognize that incamational ideas so prevalent in Christianity grew out o f and 
only make sense in relation to the theology of the land and other location oriented
63 Regarding the New Testament use of image language, James Barr writes that it is ‘difficult or impossible, 
however, to say that these terms, though verbally almost identical, refer directly to the same image of God 
in which humanity was, according to Genesis, created’. Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 164.
64 David Fergusson,‘Humans Created According to the Imago Dei, p. 447.
65 Jon D. Levenson, ‘Did God Forgive Adam?’, p. 160.
66 Meir Soloveichik, ‘Torah and Incarnation’, First Things, 206 (2010), 44-48 (p. 45).
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While Christians need to recognise this contextual dependence, the connection between 
the Incarnation and God’s indwelling in Israel can also encourage Jewish reflection on 
possible areas o f commonality as regards such distinctively Christian or Jewish concepts. 
Michael Wyschogrod’s work is exemplary in this regard: T h e  doctrine o f the incarnation 
thus separates Jews and Christians but, properly understood, also sheds light on 
incamational elements in Judaism which are more diffuse than the Christian version but 
nevertheless very real’.68 Wyschogrod argues that the ‘Christian teaching o f the 
incarnation of God in Jesus is the intensification of the teaching o f the indwelling o f God 
in Israel by concentrating that indwelling in one Jew rather than leaving it diffused in the 
people o f Jesus as a whole’.69 Ultimately, however, for Wyschogrod, ‘such a severing of 
any Jew from his people is a mistake because, biblically, God’s covenant partner is always 
the people o f Israel and not an individual Jew’.70 Wyschogrod’s willingness to uncover 
some hospitality for incamational ideas in Judaism is a positive example o f the progress 
being made in Jewish-Christian theological dialogue, as is his recognition of the vast 
differences between the faiths on this matter. Wyschogrod emphasises the commonality 
inherent in the imago Dei. He writes that the ‘image of God that is impressed on all 
human beings, Jew and gentile, is the first and possibly most fundamental sign o f God’s 
love of man’.71 David Novak’s comments regarding Jewish-Christian dialogue accord 
well with Wyschogrod’s approach:
Some Jews and Christians are now able to recognize the otherness o f the other 
community as something to be respected rather than feared. And they are now able 
to recognize enough commonality in terms of common past origins, common 
present concerns, and common hopes for the future to enable a genuinely mutual 
relationship to take root and grow.7
A further example o f the shift from the context of polemic to one of dialogue in Jewish-
theological streams like those that surround the temple.67
67 Kaminsky, ‘The Theology o f Genesis’, p. 348.
68 Michael Wyschogrod, Abraham ’s Promise, p. 178.
69 Wyschogrod, Abraham ’s Promise, p. 178. James Barr also suggests that the Incarnation could only have 
emerged from its Jewish context, where God and the human counterpart were held apart from one another 
by a long tradition of divine transcendence. Old and New in Interpretation: A Study o f  Two Testaments 
(London: SCM, 1982), pp. 34-64.
70 Wyschogrod, Abraham’s Promise, p. 178.
71 Wyschogrod, Abraham’s Promise, p. 171.
72 David Novak, ‘When Jews are Christians’, in Talking With Christians: Musings o f  a Jewish Theologian 
(London: Eerdmas, 2006), pp. 218-229 (p. 218).
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Christian theological relations is exemplified in the work of Alon Goshen-Gottstein, who 
attempts to extract the Incarnation from its doctrinal content in order to uncover the wider 
religious sense inherent in the belief. He argues that the Incarnation is dependent upon 
the shared Jewish and Christian belief in the goodness of human life, the humility of God, 
the presence o f God and most importantly, the love of God:
The incarnation expresses a relation that, by the Christian’s account, is grounded in 
love. I would therefore postulate that until I, as a Jew, am able to hear in the talk of 
the incarnation the ground of love from which it springs, I have not yet heard what 
the Christian is attempting to say.73
Like Wyschogrod, Goshen-Gottstein also regards the Torah and Israel as signifying an 
incarnating presence for Judaism.
The suggestion of some degree o f openness to incamational ideas in Judaism is not 
intended to minimise the serious objections many Jewish theologians hold to the idea of 
the Incarnation. As Goshen-Gottstein argues, for many Jewish thinkers, the Incarnation 
represents an obstacle ‘to Jews’ re-owning Jesus as a teacher o f their own tradition, for it 
casts Jesus in a light that is not only foreign but also discontinuous and removed from his 
own Jewish roots’.74 Meir Soloveichik argues that even though Christianity has been 
traditionally regarded as the ‘spiritual’ religion in contrast to the perceived carnality of 
Judaism, the practice of Eucharist suggests otherwise: Those who partake of the 
Eucharist enter into communion with what they believe to be God’s physical body. Jews 
reject the notion that God might take bodily form and instead seek to commune with they 
believe to be his infinite mind’.75 There is a radical difference and, for Soloveichik, a 
great incompatibility between Jewish theology and the Christian understanding of 
Eucharist:
For Christians [through the Eucharist] the gap between finite man and infinite God 
is thereby bridged; for Jews, Christians are succumbing to the temptation that 
Deuteronomy warns against: seeking to bridge to gap between man and God 
through finite means.76
Such differences are significant and, for the present, irreconcilable. This should not,
73 Alon Goshen-Gottstein, ‘Judaisms and Incamational Theologies: Mapping out the Parameters of 
Dialogue’, Journal o f  Ecumenical Studies, 3 (2002), 219-240 (p. 224).
74 Goshen-Gottstein, ‘Judaisms and Incamational Thinking’, p.240.
75 Meir Soloveichik, ‘Torah and Incarnation’, p. 48.
76 Meir Soloveichik, ‘Torah and Incarnation’, p. 48.
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however, reduce the significance of the commonality in Jewish and Christian views of 
personhood. Both share the common belief in the irreducible sanctity o f human life by 
virtue o f our creation in God’s image. This belief tempers any particularistic tendencies 
of both faiths, reminding us that for Jews and for Christians, the imago Dei is a universal 
concept that relates to every human person. We recall the original context o f the biblical 
concept o f imago Dei, in particular the countercultural universalism, the democratization 
of status and dignity. Therefore the imago Dei, properly understood, institutes a strong 
sense of unity, unity as a prelude to the multiplicity and as the context for the diverse 
cultures that would subsequently emerge. Thus we address our final point: Can Jews and 
Christians relate the imago Dei to the multiplicity? Does the concept have any relevance 
in a non-religious context?
6.6 Imago D ei and Human Dignity: Seeking a Broader Application
With the insights o f Novak’s theology particularly in mind, this chapter will conclude with 
a brief discussion of the universal relevance o f the concept o f imago Dei. What 
contribution can the concept of imago Dei and the biblical view of the person make 
towards a multi-disciplinary appraisal of human nature? As Joel B. Green asks, when 
‘neurobiology speaks not only to the issues of memory and circadian rhythms, but also to 
topics formerly reserved for theology, like free will and responsibility, personal identity 
and religious experience, or empathy and altruism, what space is left for the biblical 
theologian?’77
Green’s question aptly articulates our concern, though its phrasing is somewhat 
unfortunate. Theology should not be restricted to the ‘space that is left’, those areas that 
are not yet occupied by the natural sciences. As discussed in the context o f human 
disposition to sinfulness, theology and the sciences may investigate some of the same 
questions, though they may do so in different and, one would hope, equally valid ways. 
Each perspective is of potential value. This only becomes problematic when, as Green 
argues, ‘theological studies masquerade as empirical science, or when empirical science 
confuses its physical findings with metaphysical accounts’.78 Theological reflection has 
the potential to be enriched through engagement with the sciences as regards, for example, 
the point o f human distinctiveness from other creatures. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen writes
77 Joel B. Green, ‘Humanity — Created, Restored, Transformed, Embodied’ in Rethinking Human Nature, A 
Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. by Malcolm Jeeves (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 271-294 (p. 272).
78 Green, ‘Humanity — Created, Restored, Transformed, Embodied’, p. 272.
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that 4 it is precisely in contemporary palaeoanthropological notions o f human uniqueness 
that theology may find a transversal link to a revisioned notion o f an embodied imago 
D ei\19 Interestingly, Van Huyssteen argues that the quest for meaning and even the quest 
‘for “religious fulfilment” certainly plays a crucial role in the way paleoanthropologists
today are arguing for human uniqueness as revealed in the complex history o f Homo
9 80 sapiens .
Our view of human distinctiveness has been, and continues to be, affected by the 
findings of science. However, the general acceptance of Darwinism, which presupposes 
that the human being, as descended from other primates, exists in continuity with other 
species and is likely to illustrate this continuity through certain dispositions or behaviours, 
does not need to threaten the importance that we attach to the idea o f human dignity.81 
Fraser Watts argues that such a sense of threat arises from a confusion between absolute 
and qualitative forms of dignity. Darwinism is seen as an absolute statement about 
dignity: because we are descended from animals, we are animals. For Watts, this is 
mistaken:
The conclusions that can properly be drawn about human beings from such 
premises are qualitative ones, not absolute ones. Our genes, our neurons, our basic 
instincts, and so on affect how we function qualitatively as human beings, but they 
do not yield absolute, ontological conclusions about what we are}2
In this citation, Watts is getting to the heart o f what a theological account o f human nature 
has to contribute. We recall, at this point, Barth’s firm resistance of any form of reductive 
anthropology and suggest that this is perhaps the particular contribution that a theology of 
personhood can make in an inter-disciplinary account o f human nature. This contribution 
is, however, necessarily limited since the imago Dei loses its meaning when removed 
from its theological context. It is interesting to note Alistair McFadyen’s observation, as 
regards the imago Dei, that it is ‘surprising how speedily functioning and active reference
79 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, p. 149. Van Huyssteen also writes that ‘scientific notions 
of human distinctiveness may help us ground theological notions of human uniqueness in the reality of 
flesh-and-blood, real-life experiences, and in this way help protect theological reflection from esoteric and 
exotically baroque abstractions when trying to revision the notion of imago Dei. p. 113.
80 Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, p. 141.
81 Charles Darwin, The Origin o f  Species (London: Harper Press, 2011). See also Jon H. Roberts, 
‘Religious Reactions to Darwinism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, ed. by Peter 
Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 80-103. For a discussion of the Jewish 
context, see Jewish Tradition and the Challenge o f Darwinism , ed. by Geoffrey Cantor and Marc Swetlitz 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
82 Fraser Watts, ‘Human Dignity: Concepts and Experiences’ p. 253.
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to God can effectively be evacuated even from a term that includes explicit verbal 
inflexion referring to God’.83 There are, however, contexts where the concept o f human 
dignity provides us with a more useful point o f reference. Though the imago Dei does not 
directly translate or correspond to the idea of human dignity, it does provide its 
philosophical grounding for Jewish and Christian theology. Theologically speaking, 
human dignity is derivative, not foundational and its invocation is not an attempt to 
secularise the imago Dei.84
Although a theological account of human nature should certainly contribute to the 
protection o f life, it is not alone in doing so. Not all non-theological anthropologies lead 
to what Robert Jenson tenns ‘anthropological nihilism’.85 Nor does the imago Dei, as 
Novak has argued, directly contradict all secularist notions o f personhood. While a 
theological anthropology offers distinct ideas as regards our origins and our ultimate 
destination, religious and secular anthropologies are not necessarily contradictory as 
regards esteem for life or ethical obligation. George Kateb’s philosophy, for example, 
consciously abstracted from any theological underpinning, emphasises the value of human 
life:
[H]uman beings have an incomparably higher dignity. They matter more because of 
what they are: members of the human species, with the unique and incomparable 
traits and attributes of the species. In being partly and commendably nonnatural, a 
human being has an incomparably higher status than any animal. If human beings 
matter more, their suffering matters more.86
There are, o f course, countless examples o f secular initiatives that fulfil the practical 
implications of this statement and we also note that human dignity is the foundational 
principle o f the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.87 Certainly, human dignity,
83 Alistair McFadyen, ‘Imaging God: A Theological Answer to an Anthropological Question’, Zygon, 4 
(2012), 918-933 (p. 919).
84 Maureen Junker-Kenny, ‘Does Dignity Need a Theological Foundation?, in The Discourse o f  Human 
Dignity, ed. by Regina Ammicht-Quinn, Maureen Junker-Kenny, Elsa Tamez, (London: SCM Press, 2003).
85 Jenson describes in the dangers of ‘anthropological nihilism’ in the context of the Holocaust: ‘The Nazis’ 
genetic estimates were bizarrely mistaken. But suppose they had not been, suppose they were established 
with the sort of certainty appropriate to relevant science that Jews -  or Norwegians or Bantus -  or the 
inhabitants of some island -  are on average inferior in intellectual and cultural capability, as any relatively 
self-contained strain of homo sapiens of course might very well be, would the Nazi program then be 
justified? Perhaps if it were less cruelly managed than by the Nazis? Perhaps if the undesirable strain were 
simply prevented from reproducing?’ Systematic Theology, p.57.
86 Kateb, Human Dignity, p. 23.
87 This is established in the preamble to the Declaration where it is written that ‘recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world’. The ‘disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
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where invoked in relation to the vindication of human rights, must have the capacity to 
transcend religious difference. Therefore, the absence o f an explicit dependence upon any 
particular revelation in a secular account of dignity maximises the potential for the 
universal acceptance of the concept. Given the urgent nature o f the universal acceptance 
of this common bond, it is important for Jews and for Christians to work in partnership 
with those for whom the worth of human life is a priority. Jews and Christians undertake 
this work in the knowledge that every person is worthwhile on account o f being, as 
Heschel phrases it, a 'disclosure of the divine’.88 Or, as Barth writes, we need to think of 
‘'every human being, even the oddest, most villainous or miserable, as one to whom Jesus 
Christ is Brother and God is Father; and we have to deal with him on this assumption’.89 
This is an appropriate point of conclusion since it brings to focus the core meaning of the 
concept of imago Dei which transcends the diversity o f interpretations considered in this 
thesis. The concept of imago Dei points us to God since it implies a reflection of the 
mystery o f God in humankind. The concept thus implies human worth, human 
relatedness and human vocation.
6.7 Final Reflection
In this concluding chapter, we have surveyed the insights o f the previous chapters and 
also reflected on the central themes o f the thesis in the context o f  contemporary theology. 
As stated in the Introduction, there are many significant voices whose inclusion would 
have extended and enriched the narrative presented in this thesis. Theological concepts 
have also emerged that merit further reflection beyond this study. We have, for example, 
touched upon interesting themes that could enrich Jewish-Christian theological dialogue: 
original sin and its parallels in Jewish theology; interaction between incamational 
theology and Jewish ideas of Divine Indwelling; the compatibility o f philosophy and 
revealed wisdom; and commonalities and divergences regarding the concept o f grace. 
Further, while our conclusions regarding the theological meaning of sexual difference 
were tentative and intentionally uncertain, there is much that is yet to be explored as
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people’, http://www.un.org/en /documents/udhr/ [accessed 11 July 2014].
88 ‘Aperson is not just a specimen of the species called Homo sapiens [...] The humanis a disclosure o f the 
divine, and all men are in one God’s care for man. Many things on earth are precious, some are holy, 
humanity is the holy of holies. To meet a human being is an opportunity to sense the image of God, the 
presence of God. ’ No Religion is an Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. by H. 
Kasimow and B. Sherwin (New York: Orbis, 1991), p. 7f.
89 Barth, ‘The Humanity of God’, p . 53.
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regards the meaning of our gendered creation in the image of God. There is a need to 
further elaborate the truth that the fullness o f divine life and creativity is reflected in our 
gendered human life, that which Janet Soskice refers to as the 'as yet unsung glory of 
Genesis 1:26-7’.90 The question of the ontological status o f the person within, yet apart 
from, the created world is also a potentially fruitful area o f further inquiry. So too is the 
quest to further articulate the meaning of theocentric distinctiveness in a manner that is 
grounded in revealed wisdom, but whose language also has the capacity to function in an 
interreligious and non-religious context. It would also be worthwhile to consider, in 
greater depth, the challenge that radical disruptions pose to ontological and ethical 
approaches to imago Dei, a question that emerged in our discussion of Raphael’s 
engagement with the Shoah.
This thesis has taken a narrative approach, proceeding from the assumption that 
the wisdom and value that is inherent in the biblical concept of imago Dei has been drawn 
out, shaped and re-shaped, through centuries o f intellectual engagement in the Jewish and 
Christian religious traditions. While each of the perspectives considered in this thesis 
have been shaped by their particular historical and religious contexts, we have engaged 
with them as living voices that still have the potential to enrich contemporary theology. 
The diversity o f perspective that we have encountered has illustrated that there are many 
ways to articulate the mystery of our creation in the image of God: our stewardship and 
creativity; our intellectual capacities; our sexuality and our bond with our fellow humans; 
our capacity for union with God. Like the many names and images for God, the varying 
interpretation o f imago Dei in the Jewish and Christian traditions can be positively 
regarded as a range of resources from which to draw in our articulation of a contemporary 
theological anthropology. We must narrate our theological account of human existence 
rather than defining it according to a single property, thus remaining open to the 
dimension of mystery inherent in human personhood. A contemporary account o f the 
imago Dei should thus include its relational, functional and practical elements, while 
avoiding the over-determination of meaning that has characterised some previous 
interpretations. It should also attest to the dual intention of the concept, ontological and 
ethical, thus reflecting our status, our vocation and our ultimate destination.
90 Soskice, ‘Imago Dei and Sexual Difference’, p. 304.
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